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Taking inspiration from Foucauldian work on governmentality and historical materialist 
approaches, this thesis examines the political ecology of compulsory water metering in the 
South East of England. Here, three main contributions are offered. First, a genealogy of water 
metering (1840 to 2009) is developed in order to demonstrate the multiple ways that the 
meter has been used to help negotiate different understandings of the waterscape. Secondly, 
contemporary compulsory metering programmes are positioned as a socio-technical fix where 
water companies have attempted to, at least partially, resolve a tension between water stress 
and household water demand and, at the same time, secure the continuation of the broadly 
neoliberal waterscape. Finally, the thesis examines the unanticipated outcomes of compulsory 
metering; it focuses on how affordability has been reframed as an important and immediate 
governance problem that requires private water companies to take on new roles, sometimes 
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1 An introduction to governing water in South East England 
 
1.1 Introduction 
In 2010, two water companies in South East England, Southern Water (SRN) and South East 
Water (SEW), embarked on the first companywide domestic compulsory water metering 
programmes undertaken in England and Wales. Although, as this thesis demonstrates, the 
desirability and feasibility of metering has been debated vociferously since the introduction 
of constant supply in the Victorian era, compulsory metering on such a grand scale was 
unprecedented. Indeed the prevalence of water metering in England and Wales is much lower 
than levels in other European countries. Prior to the advent of these programmes, the rate of 
meter penetration for SRN and SEW was close to 40 per cent and, overall, just 30 per cent of 
households were charged for water services by means of a meter across the entirety of 
England and Wales. Such a radical reconfiguration of the waterscape, a transition to charging 
for water by volume, signifies a fundamental challenge to how water and water users have 
been governed.  
 
Water metering in England and Wales has rarely been analysed in depth with processes of 
privatisation (Bakker, 2004), economic regulation (Helm, 1995; Littlechild, 1986; Saal and 
Parker, 2001; Shaoul, 1997), flood and drought (Taylor et al, 2009), water practices 
(Pullinger et al, 2013) and broader modes of governance tacking precedence (Haughton, 
2002; Chappells and Medd, 2008, for notable exceptions see Drakeford, 1998 and Knamiller 
and Sharp, 2009). Although the introduction of compulsory metering could be construed as a 
relatively mundane, everyday event, these programmes represent much more than an 
alteration in the charging arrangements for water services. Rather, companywide compulsory 
metering is of considerable interest because it provokes important and pressing conceptual 
questions regarding how households in relatively wealthy nations should access water in the 
twenty first century.  
 
Domestic water use has recently come under considerable scrutiny. This is in part because 
household water use now accounts for more than half (52% or 7, 756 megalitres per day) of 
all public water supply in England and Wales (Defra, 2008: 19). The proportion of water used 
for domestic purposes has increased since 1950 as a result of population growth and changes 
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in household water use practices. Customer leakage and company leakage accounts for a 
further six and 17 per cent of the public water supply respectively. By comparison, usage by 
commercial and industrial sectors (including agriculture) has declined and now, combined, 
these sectors use 23% (or 3, 500 megalitres per day) of the public water supply. This, in part, 
reflects the changing shape of UK industrial trends and outputs (ibid). Domestic water 
metering programmes have been offered as an important way of better managing the supply 
and demand balance in water stressed areas and producing a fairer water charging system. 
The hope is that water loss will be minimised through enhanced leakage detection and that 
volumetric pricing and economic incentives will inspire households to curb profligate usage. 
In this context, water metering technologies in the South East of England play a vital role in 
remodelling the relationships between the environment, water users and society.  
 
In turn, this raises a number of interrelated issues that demand further attention. For instance, 
does metering alter the way that people relate to and understand water? How might the 
introduction of compulsory metering influence the process by which water is ‘valued’? What 
counts as profligate use? How should the costs of water services be allocated and what does 
charging by volume mean for understandings of fairness in relation to water provision? These 
questions are all vitally important when considering how water should be accessed in the 
contemporary moment. It is clear that the study of water metering matters because the 
introduction of this technology has the potential to profoundly influence the shape and form 
of the waterscape.  
 
Taking inspiration from Foucauldian work on governmentality and historical materialist 
approaches this thesis examines the political ecology of compulsory water metering in South 
East England. More specifically, it analyses how compulsory metering emerged as a desirable 
and legitimate strategy as well as how the introduction of such programmes has influenced 
the ways that water and water users are governed. Although there are tensions between these 
bodies of literature, when brought together they have much to offer in terms of better 
understanding the relationships between technology, society and nature. Foucault’s work on 
genealogy and governmentality provide fantastic tools for tracing how particular regimes of 
governance materialise and, in particular, his insights into the processes of governing others 
and self-government are vital for unpicking how water and water users are governed. Indeed, 
Foucault’s work on governmentality has inspired a wealth of literature on ‘green 
governmentality’ despite discussion of environmental issues falling outside of his own 
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oeuvre. Meanwhile historical materialist work on the production of nature has expertly 
exposed the dynamic ways that the waterscape, as a messy combination of society, 
technology and nature, evolve in capitalist societies. Chapter two explains that although there 
are important tensions between these bodies of literature that should not be elided, insights 
from Foucault’s work and historical materialist work, particularly that of Harvey and his 
framework of ‘moments’ provide  powerful theoretical framework for better understanding 
the political ecology of compulsory water metering in the South East of England.  
 
Overall, this thesis offers three main contributions. First, a genealogy of water metering 
(1840 to present) is developed to demonstrate the multiple ways the meter has been used to 
help negotiate different understandings of the waterscape. This historicises contemporary 
compulsory programmes and highlights how early experiments with metering have, to an 
extent, set in motion a recurring conflict between biopolitics and economics. Secondly, 
contemporary compulsory metering programmes are positioned as a socio-technical fix where 
water companies have attempted to, at least partially, resolve a tension between water stress 
and household water demand and, at the same time, secure the continuation of the broadly 
neoliberal waterscape. Finally, the thesis examines the unanticipated effects of compulsory 
metering in reframing affordability as an important and immediate governance problem that 
requires private water companies to take on new roles, albeit reluctantly, as water welfare 
providers. These unintended outcomes of compulsory metering illustrate Foucauldian insights 
regarding the non-linear contingencies of government and highlight significant shifting 
boundaries between state and private companies with respect to water affordability.  
 
The remainder of this introductory chapter provides a brief background to the water sector in 
England and Wales and puts the new compulsory metering programmes into the context of 
broader reforms occurring in the sector in the contemporary moment. This chapter then 
outlines the research questions that have been pursued and concludes by sketching out the 
structure of the thesis.  
 
1.2 A brief introduction to the water sector in England and Wales 
The model of privatisation of water services in England and Wales, full divesture, is almost 
unique, no country, other than Chile, has matched England and Wales in extent (World Bank, 
2011). In 1989, the ten Regional Water Authorities (RWAs) that were created following the 
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1973 Water Act, and had operated along hydrologically drawn water basin boundaries, were 
floated on the London Stock Exchange having had all long term debt cancelled (Maloney and 
Richardson, 1994: 114; Ofwat, 2010a: 38). Importantly, water services in Scotland and 
Northern Ireland were not privatised and remained in public ownership. As a result, different 
legislative frameworks and systems of regulation are in operation across the UK.  
 
Water companies in England and Wales are regulated by a combination of an economic 
regulator, Ofwat, the Environment Agency (EA), the Drinking Water Inspectorate and the 
Consumer Council for Water (CCW) (although the Welsh government has the opportunity to 
follow divergent policies under the devolution settlement).As demonstrated throughout the 
thesis, the economic regulator, the EA and the CCW, to differing degrees, have played an 
important part in contributing to compulsory metering being adopted and implemented in the 
South East of England. Comparatively, domestic water provision in Scotland is administered 
by publically owned water company that is accountable to the Scottish Parliament. 
Meanwhile, the water supply network in Northern Ireland is government owned and is 
accountable to the Northern Ireland Utility Regulator; however it operates largely as a private 
company (Tinson and Kenway, 2013).  
 
In England and Wales, privatisation ushered in a different way of governing water, described 
by Bakker as a shift from ‘state hydraulic’ approaches to water governance to ‘market 
environmentalism’. Here a system that loosely privileged social equity through water pricing 
was superseded by a way of thinking that sought to achieve the twin goals of economic 
efficiency, expressed through pursuing as close to full cost recovery as possible, and 
environmental sustainability through market based mechanisms. Here Bakker’s (2004) much 
cited work on the re-regulation of the water sector has convincingly argued that water 
privatisation in England and Wales is best described in terms of complementary and co-
existing processes of corporatisation, commercialisation and financialisation. In this context, 
water metering looked as if it would become a key tool in reordering the water charging 
system with the government initially seeking to ensure that a volumetric charging system 
would be put in place by the 1990s.  
 
When the sector was privatised in 1989, the then government had announced that water 
companies would no longer be able to use rateable values to structure charges after the year 
2000. Water companies would have to accelerate metering installation or design a new 
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unmeasured tariff. The water industry favoured water metering as a long term solution but 
argued that implementing metering before this date would be extremely costly (Bakker, 
2004). Because the water industry deemed metering as a desirable yet, in the short term, 
unfeasible solution, an alternative unmeasured charging method was not developed. Instead, 
water meter installation rates limped slowly forward, rising by about two percent per annum 
as some households, often those who would gain financially from doing so, opted to take a 
meter. By 2009, around one third of households in England and Wales were metered and 
received a water bill based on the volume of water used.
1
 The remaining two thirds of 
domestic water users were charged according to the rateable value of their home; rateable 
values were last updated in 1973 (see chapter five for greater detail).  
 
1.3 25 years since privatisation: the shape of the waterscape 
In 2014, almost twenty five years since the industry was privatised, the water sector now, in 
some ways, looks very different to the sector Bakker would have encountered. It is important 
to sketch out the shape of the sector in order to contextualise and situate the emergence of 
compulsory metering programmes within broader political and economic circumstances. At 
present the water industry is characterised by processes of deepening finanicialization as well 
as reforms designed to usher in greater marketization and a more customer focused service. 
 
There are currently ten water and sewerage companies and a number of water only
2
 providers 
(Figure 1). Through mergers and acquisitions, some water companies have changed hands 
multiple times since privatisation and patterns of ownership have shifted towards private 
equity firms. As Tinson and Kenway (2013) has observed, three ownership models have 
dominated the sector since privatisation in 1989. The majority, 68 per cent, of water 
companies were listed on the stock exchange until the mid-1990s; the remainder of water 
providers were private water companies or non-UK listed/based multinationals. Multinational 
ownership of water providers grew throughout the 1990s, peaking in 2000. Whereas over the 
                                                 
1
 Water bills comprise charges for water as well as for wastewater removal; wastewater services relate to water 
returned to public sewers. For metered households the wastewater element is calculated on the basis of the 
volume of water used by the household and an allowance is made for water used for drinking and in the garden. 
Southern Water, for instance, wastewater is charged for 92.5% of water used. For unmeasured households these 
costs are determined relation to the rateable value of the property. Not all companies provide sewerage services, 
these companies often bill for such services on behalf of other water providers.  
2
 As the title suggests, water only companies do not supply sewerage services. Households supplied by a water 
only company receive their sewerage services from another company. Typically, household water users are 
issued with just bill for both services as the water only company tend to collect charges on behalf of the water 
and sewerage company.  
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last 13 years the situation has evolved so that now private equity consortia have acquired over 
half of water providers. The changes in ownership in England are important because these 
consortia are less transparent for they are not subject to the same disclosure rules as 
companies listed on the stock exchange. 
 
Ownership patterns in England and Wales differ from the direction of trends elsewhere. For 
instance, Pigeon et al (2012) reason that there is an emerging trend towards 
‘remunicipalisation’ in water governance, a transition between private to public provision of 
water services, where cites like Paris have declined to renew contracts with private 
companies for managing water services (see Lobina 2012 for an assessment of the factors that 
enable or prevent paradigm shifts in water governance). Some commentators have begun to 
question the extent to which trends in England are sustainable. For instance, Thames Water, a 
highly geared water company, has, according to Sir Ian Byatt, former Chief Executive of 
Ofwat, ‘damaged its credit rating’ and found itself in a position where it was unable to fund 
investment in its Thames Tideway sewerage project without government guarantees secured 
under the 2012 Industry (Financial Assistance) Bill (Byatt in Turner, 2013: 4). Key in this 
context is that the ratio of the industry’s net debt relative to its assets (measures as Regulatory 
Capital) has increased from 30 per cent in 1996-97 of RCV to 70 per cent by 2009-10 
(Tinson and Kenyway, 2013: 9, see Tables 1 and 2 for more detail). Debt in the sector has 
increased from zero to £8.2bn between 1989 and 1996-7 and from £8.2bn to £34.6bn between 
1996-97 and 2009-10 which is a four-fold in real terms (ibid). 
 
The water industry in England and Wales is currently undergoing another round of what 
Bakker might call re-regulation. Following a series of reviews on competition (Cave, 2009), 
regulation and consumer representation (Gray, 2011) and household charging (Walker, 
2009), a number of reforms have either been introduced or planned that are intended to 
reorganise the regulatory practices at work in the sector in order to provide scope for ‘market 
based approaches and voluntary approaches’ (Defra, 2011a). Here two processes dominate, a 
struggle for deeper marketization, particularly through competition in the non-domestic 
market, and an aspiration to create a sector that is more consumer centric; debates 
surrounding metering must be considered in this context. 
 
The 2014 Water Act will provide the legislative footing for the creation of a competitive non-
domestic water sector for the first time in England and indicates an intention to implement 
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abstraction reform from the early 2020s and upstream market reforms which would, in 
theory, make it easier for new entrants to provide water in competition with incumbent water 
suppliers after the next price review period. More broadly, the regulatory framework has also 
been altered in preparation for the forthcoming price review process to facilitate these 
aspirations. Importantly, water companies are required to establish and consult a Customer 
Challenge Group throughout the development of their business plans for the forthcoming 
price review. These groups are independently chaired (often a CCW representative has acted 
as chair) and are comprised of customer representatives (for example CCW, Age UK, 
Citizens’ Advice Bureau (CAB), Environmental bodies and local authorities). The hope is 
that if customers are involved in scrutinising the water company plans, companies are more 
likely to take steps to reflect customer views and priorities in their planning. If the regulator 
is satisfied that water companies have robustly engaged with water users, then the water 
companies’ plan will receive less rigorous, lighter touch scrutiny from the regulator itself. In 
this sense the water sector is undergoing a new process of re - regulation that is characterised 








































Key: AFW – Affinity Water; BRL – Bristol Water; CAM – Cambridge Water; CHL – 
Cholderton & District Water; DVW – Dee Value Water; ESK – Essex and Suffolk Water 
(part of Northumbrian Water); HPL – Hartlepool (part of Anglian Water); PRT – Portsmouth 
Water; SBW – Sembcorp Bournemouth Water; SES – Sutton & East Surrey Water; SEW – 
South East Water; SST – South Staffs Water (Ofwat, 2012).
Figure 1 Water Companies in England and Wales 
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Table 1 Water and Sewerage company ownership structure and gearing levels 
                                                 
3
 Rejected a takeover bid from a overseas consortium, LongRiver, in June 2013 
4
 Around 5 per cent of the holding is expected to change hands in the near future.  
5
 There has been speculation that United Utilities would be targeted for a takeover bid in 2013. 
Water Company Gearing ratio 







79.5 Anglian Water Services Limited. Osprey Acquisitions 
Limited. Consortium of pension funds, infrastructure 
funds and private equity fund managers.  
Dwr Cymru 
(Welsh Water) 
65 Glas Cymru. Company by limited guarantee (no 





63 Northumbrian Water Limited. Cheung Kong 
Infrastructure Holdings Plc (largest publicly listed 
infrastructure company in Hong Kong).  





55 South West Water Services Limited. Pennon Group Plc.  
Southern Water 79 Southern Water Services Limited. Consortium of 
infrastructure and private equity. Leading shareholders 
include JP Asset Management and UBS’s International 




Thames Water 77.4 Thames Water Plc. Parent Company, Kemble Water. 
Majority owner, Macquarie an infrastructure investment 
fund. Other investors include pension funds, private 
equity and sovereign investment funds including the Abu 
Dhabi Investment Authority and the China Investment 
Corporation.  
United Utilities  60 United Utilities Group Plc (FTSE 100 Company, largest 
remaining publicly quoted water companies in the UK).
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Wessex Water 63.6 YTL Utilities Limited. YTL Power International of 
Kuala Lumpur: Private limited company.  
Yorkshire 60.8 Yorkshire Water Services Limited. Kelda Group which 
was acquired by Solitaire Water in 2007: consortium of 
HSBC, Citigroup Prudential and GIC Special 





Table 2 Water only company ownership structure and gearing levels 
 
 
Although around one third of households were metered by 2009, the rate of water meter 
penetration differed substantially across England and Wales (see Figure 2). Some companies 
had high meter rates, for instance 64 per cent of South West Water’s customers were metered 
as households have attempted to stave off high unmeasured charges levied by SWW; this 
company’s bills were 43 per cent higher than the average due to the unanticipated extensive 
investment the company made in order to meet European Directives regarding the quality of 
the beaches in South West England (Walker, 2009). Anglian Water also had a high meter rate 
due to its proactive stance in encouraging households to opt for metering. Meanwhile other 
companies had much lower meter rates; for example just 12 per cent of Portsmouth Water’s 
Water Company Gearing ratio 





77 Limited company owned by Morgan Stanley and M&G 
Investments. 
Bristol Water 62 Bristol Water plc. Owned by Capstone Infrastructure 
Corporation (50 per cent), Sociedad General de Aguas 
de Barcelona (Agar) and Itochu Corporation of Japan 
(20 per cent). 
Dee Valley 66 Dee Valley Water Group plc. 









62.8 South East Water Plc. Utilities Trust of Australia 
investment fund Caisse de depot et placement du Quebec 





73.2 South Staffordshire Plc, Alinda Infrastructure Fund – 
made up of largely pension funds. 
Sutton and East 
Surrey Water 
76 Sutton &East Surrey Water Plc’s holding company was 
acquired by the Japanese company Sumitomo 




constituency were metered, while 26 per cent and 21 per cent of Thames Water and 
Northumbrian Water’s customers were metered respectively.  
 
In this context, 2009 marked an important moment for the water industry. While some 
companies had previously embarked on small, targeted compulsory metering programmes 
(see Knamiller and Sharp, 2009), 2009 was the first time that plans for compulsory, 
companywide metering were given regulatory approval. Here metering was considered to be 
a vital tool necessary to achieve two main goals. First, the meter was positioned as important 
in helping to address the supply and demand balance in water stressed areas and, secondly, in 
creating a fairer water charging system.  
 
 
Water availability is a particularly acute in the South East of England. According to the EA 
there is ‘less water per person in South East England than in many hotter, drier countries such 
as Morocco and Egypt’ (EA, 2008a: 10).  The water meter was perceived to be important in 
helping to realise the government’s aspiration of reducing per capita consumption (PCC) to 
Figure 2 Water meter penetration 2008 - 2009 (Walker, 2009: 31) 
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130 litres per day by introducing financial incentives to reduce water use (Defra, 2008).
6
 
According to the Climate Change Adaptation Sub-Committee, the (2012) average PCC in 
England is 145 litres a day; this has fallen from 150 litres per day in 2000 (Climate Change 
Committee Adaptation Sub-Committee, 2012: 66). This average figure masks considerable 
regional differences in PCC figures, regional averages ‘vary significantly from around 110 to 
185 litres per day’ (ibid). The highest rates of consumption, according to the EA, are found 
‘in several water supply area in the South East of England where household water use for 
unmetered properties is more than 170 litres per day’ (EA, 2008a: 11). The EA also reported 
that on average, people in metered households used 13 per cent less water than those in 
unmetered homes although it is unclear as to whether this difference should be attributed to a 
change in how water is used at home, changes in building codes or white goods making them 
more efficient or better detection of leaks (ibid). In addition to addressing water stress, the 
companies undertaking water metering emphasised that meters could be used in order to 
establish a fairer water charging system.  
 
Debates about fairness in the water sector are timely and particularly important due to rising 
water bills and broader concerns about the rising cost of living (Hirsch, 2013). Water bills 
have trebled between 1989-90 and 2013-14 whereas, over the same period, inflation has 
doubled meaning that water bills, on average, have increased by 50 per cent in real terms 
since privatisation (Tinson and Kenway, 2013: 7). Despite the potential for metering to 
negatively influence the cost of living for some households, the relationship between 
metering and affordability was not interrogated when the compulsory metering plans in South 
East England were approved (Boyland, 2010). 
 
The experience of metering in South East England could influence the way that metering, in 
the future, is implemented in other parts of the country. The 2009 Walker Independent 
Review of Charging for Household Water and Sewerage Services endorsed moving to a 
metered charging basis in the long term, although it did not advocate universal compulsory 
metering on a national scale, it did recommend metering 80 per cent of domestic properties in 
England and Wales by 2030. Therefore, the experience in the South East of England could 
help shape future approaches to metering elsewhere in England and Wales. Consequently, the 
                                                 
6
 This policy aspiration was set by the previous Labour government, however the present Conservative led 
Coalition government has not altered course.  
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ways that metering might contribute to negotiating different waterscapes and influence how 
water and water users are governed demands close attention. 
 
1.4 Research Questions 
This thesis explores the political ecology of compulsory water metering in South East 
England. As indicated at the beginning of this chapter, water metering has the potential to 
radically transform how domestic water users access water in South East England. This thesis 
explores the ways that water and water user are governed through compulsory water 
metering. In this context, the thesis examines the extent to which the introduction of 
compulsory metering in South East England undermines, challenges or reproduces the 
broadly neoliberal waterscape in England and Wales. Subsequently, the thesis asks three 
main questions:  
 
1. How and why have compulsory water metering programmes emerged, from the 
perspective of some water companies and stakeholders in the sector, as desirable 
interventions in South East England? 
 
2. How has the introduction of compulsory metering influenced the ways in which water 
and water users are governed in the South East of England?   
 
3. What, if any, unintended outcomes have resulted from the introduction of compulsory 
metering in South East England? 
 
1.5 Structure of thesis 
In responding to these objectives, the thesis is structured as follows. The next chapter reviews 
literature on governmentality and historical materialism to explore gaps in existing literature 
and consider ways that these bodies of literature might assist in developing a framework for 
better understand socio-technical change brought about in and through compulsory metering 
in South East England. The chapter argues that together these bodies of literature can provide 
a framework that is capable of capturing the messy, dynamic processes whereby compulsory 
metering emerges as a desirable policy intervention and influences the governance of water 
and water users. 
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The third chapter then provides detail on the methodological approach and tools used to 
collect, analyse and communicate findings from the empirical resources utilised in the thesis. 
It establishes links between the qualitative methods used and the literature review provided in 
the previous chapter. Finally, it highlights some of the challenges encountered throughout the 
research process.  
 
Subsequently, chapters four to seven take up objectives one to three in turn. Chapters four 
and five contribute to building a genealogy of metering in England and Wales from 1840 to 
2009. These chapters demonstrate the multiple ways that the meter, as a technology, has been 
used to help negotiate different understandings of the waterscape over this time period; 
through this genealogical approach the chapter also examines how and why compulsory 
metering became a desirable policy approach in the contemporary moment.  
 
Chapter six then focuses on how compulsory water metering programmes influence how 
water and water users are governed in South East England. This chapter draws specifically on 
governmentality approaches and Harvey’s work on ‘moments’ (see chapter two) to examine 
the ways that metering contributes to renegotiating the waterscape. Overall, this chapter 
argues that compulsory metering has deployed as a socio-technical fix that seeks to, at least 
partially, address tensions regarding water stress and perceived profligate water use in a way 
that secures the broadly neoliberal shape and form of the sector.  
 
Subsequently chapter seven, focuses on an unanticipated outcome of compulsory metering; 
the repositioning of water companies as, at times reluctant, water welfare providers. Here the 
chapter focuses on the relationship between water metering and affordability; an issue that 
was initially overlooked in the design of the compulsory metering programmes. It argues that 
companies have introduced important new schemes to mitigate against affordability problems 
caused by water metering yet the solutions proffered are not designed to fundamentally tackle 
broader affordability problems in the water sector. Significantly, these new measures have the 
effect of stretching the role of water companies and reshaping the corresponding 
responsibilities of the state and private water provider in delivering forms of water welfare. In 
turn, this has profound implications for understandings the respective role of the state and 




Finally, chapter eight summarises the main findings of the thesis, highlights the key 
contributions that the thesis offers and offers some avenues for future work which would 
build on the work contained in this thesis.  
24 
 
2 Literature Review: Society, Technology & Nature 
 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter develops a theoretical framework for better understanding how compulsory 
metering has emerged, from the perspective of some companies, as a desirable policy and for 
examining how the meter has contributed to negotiating and renegotiating the waterscape. It 
builds on Drakeford’s (1998) excellent work on prepayment metering, Trentmann and 
Taylor’s (2005) research on the relationship between metering and consumer culture and 
Knamiller and Sharp’s (2009) work on metering and trust in Kent. This chapter draws on 
Foucault’s work on governmentality and historical materialist insights on the production of 
nature, particularly Harvey’s work on moments, to develop a theoretical framework 
appropriate for theorising the messy, dynamic processes whereby water and water users are 
governed through water metering.  This framework is vital for examining how and why 
contemporary compulsory schemes have emerged and exploring the extent to which these 
schemes have sparked a substantial shift in how water and water users are governed in South 
East England.    
 
The chapter begins by examining Foucauldian understandings of biopolitics and 
governmentality in relation to environmental governance. It then moves to evaluate historical 
materialist work on the production of nature and Harvey’s work on moments. Subsequently, 
the chapter explicitly discusses water metering in relation to notions of fairness. The chapter 
concludes that although Foucault’s work on governmentality and Harvey’s framework of 
moments, do not fit together neatly, these two approaches are crucial for better understanding 
how the waterscape is reproduced in the South East of England. 
2.2 Foucault and the art of government 
In 2003 Castree reported that very few Geographers employed governmentality approaches. 
However, over the last decade, following the recent translation and publication of Foucault’s 
lectures at the Collège de France into English,  engagement with Foucault's work has become 
prevalent in wide range of studies including water governance (Bakker, 2010; Ekers and 
Loftus, 2008; Smith and Ruiters, 2006). Foucault himself did not express a strong interest in 
how nature, or the environment, becomes governed, or how populations are implicated in that 
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process. In fact, Rutherford reports that Foucault ‘indicated a definite distaste for it’ 
(Rutherford, 2007). Nevertheless, Scholars have drawn on Foucault’s ideas surrounding 
biopolitics (Joyce, 2003; Osborne, 1996, Bakker, 2012), governmentality (Agrawal, 2005; 
Elden, 2007; Legg, 2005) and genealogy (Gandy, 2003) to explain how environments and 
populations are governed. Gordon's representation of biopower as 'the conduct of living and 
the living' also suggests that there is scope within Foucault's position to examine the 
processes of governing both human and non-human natures (1991: 8). In the context of rapid 
growth of studies inspired by Foucault's work, Philo (2012) has noted that Geography is now 
far from ‘Foucault-lite’ (p.496).  
 
2.3 Foucault and Biopolitical7 problems 
Foucault’s work on the art of governing was initially framed through the concept of 
biopolitics; a notion engaged with throughout his Society Must Be Defended lecture series in 
1976 (Foucault, 2003) and in The History of Sexuality (Foucault, 1980).
8
 Biopolitics provided 
the theoretical foundations for Foucault’s work on governmentality and, broadly, can be 
defined as referring to the ‘art and the styles of governing' (Rutherford and Rutherford, 
2013a: 413). Nevertheless, there is more than one way to understand biopower (Rutherford 
and Rutherford, 2013a). Indeed, Foucault uses the term biopolitics in three ways: to describe 
a historical rupture in political thinking and practice that is characterised by a rearticulation of 
sovereign power’, to understand the ‘rise of state racism’ and as a ‘distinctive art of 
government that historically emerges with liberal forms of social regulation and individual 
self-governance’ (Lemke, 2011a: 34). What unites the three variants is Foucault’s enduring 
‘investigation of the practices of governance in modern times’ (Rutherford and Rutherford, 
2013a: 412). While Foucault was imprecise in his use of the terms biopower/biopolitics, 
Rabinow and Rose have suggested that biopolitics is best as expressed as 'the specific 
strategies and contestations over problematizations of collective human vitality, morbidity 
and mortality; over the forms of knowledge, regimes of authority, and practices of 
intervention that are desirable, legitimate and efficacious' (2006: 197). Accordingly, 
biopolitics is, as Rose and Miller outline, a 'problematizing activity' where particular 
problems are made visible and intervention in governing these problems becomes legitimised 
                                                 
7
 Foucault used the terms biopolitics and biopower interchangeably. 
8
 Strangely the series The Birth of Biopolitics gave scant attention to the notion of biopolitics despite the term 
featuring prominently in the title of the collection of lectures.   
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and intelligible (2008: 61). In this context, one of the main things that distinguished 
Foucault's concept of biopower from other ways of governing is the perceived locus of the 
object of government.  
 
Key to Foucault’s notion of biopolitics was his focus on population as the primary object of 
governance as opposed to territory. Through the lens of social medicine, he described the 
process whereby ‘old fashioned’ ways of governing through discipline and sovereignty were 
being increasingly complemented by governmental efforts to optimise the health and 
wellbeing of the population (Rutherford and Rutherford, 2013a). This did not mean, as 
Agamben (1998) has claimed, that sovereign power completely disappeared in Foucault’s 
analysis. Foucault's notion of biopolitics 'focused on the management of each and all, of 
things as well as people, by the state and by private agents’ (Rutherford and Rutherford, 
2013a: 413). In this context, Foucault was interested in charting: 
 
The attempt, starting from the eighteenth century, to rationalise the problems posed to 
governmental practice by phenomena characteristic of a set of living beings forming a 
population: health, hygiene, birth rate, life expectancy, race (Foucault, 2008: 317). 
 
Geographers, especially those working on water, now engage with Foucauldian notions of 
biopolitics in a more direct fashion (Bakker, 2010; Gandy, 2004b; Scholesse, 2008; Smith 
and Ruiters, 2006). For example, Bakker has recently stated that ‘the way we use and relate 
to water is quintessentially biopolitical’ (2012: 619). She argues that there is a link ‘between 
the constitution and consolidation of political and economic power, on the one hand, and the 
control of socio-natures, on the other’ (Bakker, 2012: 620). Here, Foucault’s concept of 
biopower provides the beginnings of a useful framework for analysing environmental and 
public health services such as water because it encourages exploration of how ‘modern 
governments seek to optimise both water resources and individual water-use practices in 
order to secure the health and productivity of the population’ (Bakker, 2012: 619). The thesis 
builds on work on biopolitics by identifying how, over time, different governmental problems 
relating to water are made intelligible and by examining how the meter has been deployed to 
intervene in and address these biopolitical problems. Chapters four and five trace how the 
meter has been used in an attempt to manage a wide variety of biopolitical problems, for 
example ensuring universal supply, managing perceived profligate use and the water stress. 
These two chapters explore how the meter has been used to help express what is understood 
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as a “fair” waterscape (see below for a discussion of fairness in relation to water metering). 
Meanwhile, chapter seven explores how metering interventions can also result in the 
emergence of unanticipated biopolitical problems, in this case affordability, which can, in 
turn, lead to important transforms in the configuration of the waterscape.  
 
Work on biopower/biopolitics throws up a wide array of questions surrounding what kind of 
governmental problems are identified and what type of strategies and techniques are 
employed by modern states to tackle them and secure the vitality of its population. While 
important, Foucault did not entertain a sustained engagement with biopolitics as a concept. 
Instead he moved swiftly to develop some of these ideas through the notion of 
governmentality. 
  
2.4 Governmentality: The Conduct of Conduct 
Foucault described governmentality as an ‘ugly word’ and described his work on this concept 
as an ‘extremely vague sketch’ that was ‘not finished work’ but a series of ‘possible tracks’ 
that could be taken up in later research projects (Foucault, 2008: 115). The term 
governmentality is derived from the French adjective gouvernemental and, according 
Brockling et al, ‘already had some currency before Foucault made it into a central concept in 
his work’ (2011:1). Although there are differences of interpretation, the definition of 
government within Foucault’s governmentality thesis is generally understood as ‘the conduct 
of conduct’ which refers to governing the self and to governing others (Huxley 2007: 186; 
Lemke 2001; 2002). Despite the absence of a complete theory and a published monologue on 
the topic, the two volumes of lectures in 1978-9, where Foucault explores the notion of 
governmentality, have proved hugely popular since the mid-1990s (Huxley, 2007: 192). It is 
important to note that although governmentality is often interpreted as a ‘major intellectual 
change in direction’ in Foucault’s work, focus on governmentality should be read as a 
development rather than a break in his oeuvre. Foucault’s account of governmentality 
complemented, yet did not supplant, his previous analyses of disciplinary power by 
considering seemingly less abrasive techniques and instruments for governing populations 
(Jessop, 2007: 37; also see Crampton and Elden, 2007). 
 
Over the last two decades, Foucault's 1978 lecture 'on governmentality' at the Collège de 
France, the fourth lecture in his Sécurité, Territoire, Population series, has influenced a vast 
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array of geographers engaged in policy critiques and studies concerning the re-articulation of 
governance over the self and over others (Burchill, 1996; Dean, 2004; Crampton and Elden, 
2007; Huxley, 2007). In this context, Jessop claims that there are a number of academics, 
loosely grouped under the umbrella of ‘governmentality studies’, who ‘do not aim to be 
Foucault scholars but selectively apply his initial insight on governmentality to new areas’ 
(Jessop, 2011: 58). Such an approach, Jessop argues, rests on a ‘narrow understanding of 
governmentality and resulting neglect of its place in Foucault’s intellectual and political 
reflections’ (ibid). Here Jessop is referring to the emphasis governmentality studies have 
placed on micro techniques of governance without locating these insights among broader 
changes in patterns of governance on a macro scale. Foucault’s own reflections on 
governmentality, which focus on the ‘analytics of government’, require consideration of ways 
of governing across multiple scales as he defines government as being ‘the conduct of 
conduct’ and thus encompasses both the way of ‘governing the self’ as well as broader 
processes of ‘governing others’ (Lemke, 2011a). This dual emphasis is useful for thinking 
about water metering as a strategy of governance. It gives scope for analysing how water and 
water users are, collectively and individually, governed in and through metering as well as 
how water users take up or resist calls to alter the way they use water. Chapter six explores 
these issues in greater detail. 
 
2.5 The art of governing: statecraft and state effects 
Foucault is quite clear that he initially conceived the concept of governmentality as a lens for 
analysing how different forms of governing, particularly representations of the state, emerge 
and are sustained. During the fifth lecture of the Security, Territory, Population series, after 
apologising for being ill, he posed a hypothetical question; ‘why should one want to study 
this insubstantial and vague domain covered by a notion as problematic and artificial as that 
of “governmentality”?’ (Foucault, 2009: 116). To which he re-joined: ‘my immediate answer 
will be, of course, in order to tackle the problem of the state and population’ (Foucault, 2008: 
116). Here Foucault, took a position that is congruent with many Marxist thinkers, he refused 
to take ‘the state’ for granted and does not offer an all-encompassing theory of the state that 
is ahistorical, essential, universal and stable. Instead he explored how particular 
understandings and expressions of the state become crystallised in certain conditions and at 
particular times. As Jessop notes, Foucault argues that the state is constituted ‘in and through 
interrelated changes in technologies of power, objects of governance, governmental projects, 
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and modes of political calculation’ (2007: 36). In this sense, the concept of governmentality 
is a way of reflecting on the historical constitution of forms of governing and how these 
forms of governing stabilise or change (Lemke, 2001: 6). Accordingly, as Rose and Miller 
indicate, the governmentalized state ‘can be seen as a specific way in which the problem of 
government is discursively codified’ and as a ‘way in which certain technologies of 
government are given a temporary institutional durability and brought into particular kinds of 
relations with one another’ (2008: 177). Or, as Jessop offers, governmentality relates to the 
study of ‘the historical constitution of different state forms in and through changing practices 
of government’ (2007:37). In this sense, in Foucault’s words, the governmentalized state 
should be understood as an: 
 
[E]nsemble formed by institutions, procedures, analyses and reflections, calculations and 
tactics that allow the exercise of this very specific, albeit very complex, power that population 
as its target, political economy as its major form of knowledge and apparatuses of security as 
its essential technical instrument (Foucault, 2009: 108). 
 
Governmentality is, therefore, the relational study of particular regimes of truth and modes of 
governance that ‘influence the assemblage of particular devices for exercising power and 
intervening upon certain problems’ (Huxley, 2007: 187). Accordingly, for Foucault, the state 
is understood as a ‘relational ensemble’ (Jessop, 2007:36) where ‘multifarious’ practices of 
government operate (Foucault, 1979: 93). In these lectures Foucault explored the emergence 
of different forms of governing from the 15
th
 century including the emergence of German 
liberalism following World War II and Chicago School neoliberalism. Throughout this work 
Foucault was concerned with the emergence and consolidation of specific ways of governing 
populations or, in other words, ‘the history of the present’ (Dreyfus and Rabinow, 1982: 119; 
O’Farrell, 2005; Roth, 1981). He considered questions, or problems, of public health and 
policy to be ‘inseparable from the framework of political rationality within which they 
appeared’ (Foucault, 2008: 317). In this context he was interested in questions surrounding 
how populations could be ‘taken into account’, what implications this would have for 
understandings of freedom and ‘in the name of what and according to what can it [the 
population] be managed’ (ibid). Here Foucault’s approach emphasises that ways of 
governing, including compulsory water metering, are not ahistorical. His work provides 
useful tools for analysing the emergence of different ways of governing over time and for 
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exploring how compulsory water metering, as a technique of governance has materialised, 
from the perspective of some water companies, as a desirable and legitimate policy. 
 
2.6 Government of the Self 
There is, as referred to above, a second way in which governmentality can be applied. In 
addition to being concerned with overarching governing rationales, Foucault was also 
interested in processes of self-government. It is this element of Foucault’s analysis that has 
been taken up most popularly amongst those operating within the loose field of 
governmentality studies. Foucault’s interest in self-government represents a significant, yet 
not absolute, shift in Foucault’s oeuvre. As Lemke (2002) reveals, Foucault seeks to ‘corrects 
the findings of his earlier studies in which he had investigated subjectivity primarily with a 
view to “docile bodies” and had too strongly stressed the processes of discipline’ (Lemke, 
2002:4). Through his work on governmentality, he examines processes of self-government or, 
as Foucault describes it, ‘technologies of the self’ (Foucault, 1988). In this sense, as Lemke 
(2001) describes, governmentality ‘refers to a continuum, which extends from political 
government right through to forms of self-regulation’ (Lemke, 2001: 201).  
 
Scholars have found Foucault's concept of governmentality, with its dual focus on tracing the 
emergence of forms of rule and the diverse processes of subjectification, useful for 
investigating how populations are “managed” within a 'new discourse of ecological scarcities, 
active citizenship and the commodification of nature' (Ruiters and Smith, 2006: 192). 
Academics from a range of disciplines have applied Foucauldian approaches to agency, 
power and responsibility to environmental issues in neoliberal societies (Agrawal, 2005; 
Hobson, 2013). Studies have shown how technologies of government, such as surveys, have 
been used to create particular discursive understandings of the environment, make 
environments intelligible and shape the roles and responsibilities of individuals. For example, 
Patterson and Stripple (2010) and Rutland and Aylett (2008) have analysed the ways that 
different technologies of carbon accounting are used to produce ‘responsible carbon 
calculating’ citizens. In these studies Foucauldian analytical tools have been fundamentally 
important in revealing how particular environmental truths have emerged in neoliberal 
regimes and how forms of subjectivity have been transformed in order to ‘make governance 
work’ (Raco and Imrie, 2000: 2195). In the context of water governance, this involves 
exploration of how the conduct of water users is “managed” as well as the water users’ 
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‘relations with the material world, customs, beliefs and ways of acting and thinking’ (Ekers 
and Loftus, 2008: 702). These studies have often concluded that, in different systems of 
neoliberal governance, responsibility for environmental problems tends to be ‘laid firmly at 
the door of individuals’ who ‘must make different purchasing decisions if environmental 
problems are to be solved’ (Hargreaves, 2011a: 319).  
 
With water metering specifically, most academic studies have explored programmes that 
target low income communities (Drakeford, 1998; Loftus, 2006; Ruiters, and Smith, 2006 
and Von Schnitzler, 2008). Here Foucault’s ideas surrounding regulation, surveillance and 
internalised forms of self-policing have proved useful for investigating some of the nuances 
of water metering policies. Studies using governmentality approaches have analysed how 
metering has contributed to producing particular, largely neoliberal, understandings of the 
waterscape and shaping the conduct of water users in ways that are complementary to 
neoliberal ideas. Foucauldian insights have proved especially relevant where metering 
programmes are designed to, and in some circumstances have led to, greater self-regulation 
of water use and deepening understandings of water as a commodity (Ruiters and Smith, 
2006). For example, Deedat and Cottle (2002), as well as Ruiters and Smith (2006), have 
used Foucauldian approaches to expose how controversial pre-paid meters have been 
deployed in South Africa to bring into being ‘calculative citizens’, who are expected to 
carefully calculate and economise their water use. Here water users are encouraged to 
become more “responsible” consumers. Similarly, Von Schnitzler (2008) has shown that pre-
paid meters can place additional disciplinary burden on low income households, normalise 
explanations for non-bill payment as a ‘culture of non-payment’ rather than an inability to 
pay and produce a culture of mistrust (2008: 912-13, also see Harvey, 2005). Similarly, 
Loftus (2006) has shown, though he does not directly engage with governmentality, that the 
introduction of metering, as well as trickle flow meters, imbues a calculative ethos that places 
additional burden on low income households and regulates the patterns of their everyday 
interactions with water. The compulsory company-wide metering programmes underway in 
South East England are very different to the programmes that specifically target low income 
households. Nonetheless, similar questions remain significant regarding how the conduct of 




2.7 The space of government 
Foucault’s conceptualisation of the state as a relational ensemble, and governmentality as the 
art of governing, calls for close attention to be paid to the multiple actors that exercise a 
governing role. Here Foucault’s work provides inspiration for the study of what Andrew 
Barry (2001) calls ‘the space of government’. Debates about water governance, particularly 
in relation to the commercialisation and privatisation of water delivery supply systems, are 
often framed in terms of the retreat of the state (Bayliss & Fine, 2008; Bakker, 2004). Painter 
notes that ‘despite long-standing calls to rethink the state “as a social relation”, reified 
understandings that view the state as a differentiated institutional realm separate from civil 
society are notably persistent in academic and political debate’ (2006: 752, also see Bulkeley 
and Schroader, 2012). Similarly, Barry suggests that, ‘traditionally, the space of government 
has been conceived in terms of a relation between a national population and a national 
territory’ (2001:3). However, using a Foucauldian approach, Barry argues that government 
operates in spaces beyond those commonly associated with traditional understandings of the 
state. He asserts that ‘government operates not just in relation to spaces defined and 
demarcated by geographical or territorial boundaries but in relation to zones formed through 
the circulation of technical practices and devices’ (ibid). Government is, then, understood as 
being ‘accomplished through multiple actors and agencies rather than a centralised set of 
state apparatuses’ (Dean, 2004:26). As Ruiters and Smith (2006) suggest, this understanding 
of government is useful for analysing the space of water governance, especially in respect to 
‘analysing the relational dynamics within a decentralised context for [water] service delivery’ 
(p. 192). This is because it facilitates analysis of governance beyond the “traditional” space of 
government to consideration of utility companies, meters, ideas, regulators, consumer 
advocacy organisations and other actors active in the water industry. As Rutherford claims, 
governmentality helps to ‘de-center the state as a seat of power: power bleeds across the 
social body in such a way that governing occurs in multiple sites and through a myriad of 
techniques’ (Rutherford, 2007: 294). Chapter seven builds on these ideas by exploring how 
the roles of different actors have changed as the sector seeks to tackle affordability problems 
caused by the introduction of compulsory metering. Extending the role of the private water 
company to encompass responsibilities for aspects of social welfare raises important 




2.8 Multiple contemporary governmentalities in England and Wales 
If the state is not a coherent, static entity but is, as Foucault describes, in effect 'nothing more 
than the mobile effect of a regime of governmentalities' (Foucault, 2007: 36), the question 
then becomes what governmentalities are at work and, in turn, how do they shape the practice 
of governing? Building on Foucault’s work, geographers have considered the extent to which 
neoliberalism can be understood as a form of governmentality (Larner, 2000 & 2007). This 
section focuses on three 'governmentalities' that have framed the art of government in 
England and Wales: 'market environmentalism', 'liberal paternalism' and 'the Big Society'. 
Together these multiple governmentalities have been hugely influential in shaping debates 
surrounding compulsory water metering programmes in South East England.  
 
In relation to water governance in England and Wales, Bakker (2004) has convincingly 
characterised shifts in governance approaches as a process of re-regulation. Most 
significantly, she has argued that the techniques for governing and managing the waterscape 
have shifted from a 'state hydraulic' paradigm, prevalent up until the 1970s, to one of 'market 
environmentalism'. Although neither approach is monolithic and, as such, materialise in 
different forms in particular places, there are common themes that distinguish the state 
hydraulic and market environmentalist approaches. Importantly, the two approaches are 
marked by different patterns of reasoning and are constituted of contrasting regimes of truth 
as well as differing governing techniques and technologies. Regarding the state hydraulic 
approach, Bakker explains that it was: 
 
Predicated on an assumption of abundant water supplies, this paradigm emphasised the 
deployment of hydraulic technologies to meet the inevitable growth in water demands 
engendered by modernisation. A commitment to social equity and universal provision 
necessitated significant government regulation, government ownership, and/or strict 
regulation of water resources development and water supply provision. This was in line with 
prevailing arguments in favour of recognised advantages of government provision, both 
political (such as democratic accountability and a commitment to public well-being) and 
technical (the relative availability of fiscal resources and the ability to collect and synthesize 




In England and Wales a state hydraulic approach, or what the former head of Ofwat Ian Byatt 
(2004) has described as 'water socialism', constituted of policy decisions that privileged 
engineering new sources of supply over demand management approaches. Reservoir 
development was preferred over technologies such as metering. The ultimate policy aim was 
to ensure universal access to affordable supplies of water. Here Herrington (1974, 1982) has 
noted that engineers, rather than economists, were prominent in influencing the direction of 
policy. In contrast, market environmentalism is characterised by three processes: 
 
The privatisation of resources, the commercialisation of environmental management, and the 
liberalisation of governance (Bakker, 2010: 38).  
 
Through the process of market environmentalism, according to Bakker, concern with social 
equality through redistribution was superseded by achieving positive environmental 
outcomes alongside economic efficiency (Bakker, 2004). Fundamental to ‘market 
environmentalism’ is the understanding that water, is best conserved, managed and regulated 
according to market driven governance methods (Bakker, 2010; Roberts, 2008). In this 
context, demand management strategies such as metering and cost recovery pricing structures 
took precedence over supply side measures such as reservoir construction. Shifts to market 
environmentalism can, therefore, be interpreted as a mode of re-regulation that views 
‘markets as the solution rather than the cause of environmental problems’ (Bakker, 2005, also 
see Smith, 2008). The difficulty, however, is that while claiming to provide a solution to 
environmental problems, deregulation and commercialisation has, in some situations, 
contributed to further problems, for instance the production of greater environmental risk 
(Prudham 2004). This thesis builds on Bakker’s work, and takes it in new directions by 
analysing the struggles that have been had, and remain, over metering, and by exploring the 
experiences of water users who are exposed to water metering technologies. 
 
In doing so this thesis constructs a genealogy of metering (in chapters four and five) that 
examines the way that the meter has been utilised in England and Wales to negotiate different 
understandings of the waterscape from the Victorian period to the present. Moreover, the 
thesis identifies and explores the multiple governmentalities, namely liberal paternalism 
(chapter six) and the Big Society (chapter seven) that, in addition to market 
environmentalism, have frame how the waterscape has been reproduced in the context of 
contemporary compulsory metering programmes. The former provides insight into how the 
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meter has been deployed as a means to influence the way water users engage with water 
while the latter helps explain how the 'state' has been reconfigured through the metering 
programmes underway in South East England.  
 
As discussed above, existing scholarship has revealed how water meters have been used to 
discipline water user behaviours and, in particular, to work up a type of environmental 
citizen-consumer that fits neatly with the neoliberal principles that shape the waterscape. 
Contemporary compulsory metering programmes use less draconian means and instead seek 
to engage in domestic users' everyday interactions with water through techniques such as 
behavioural economics. 
 
2.9 Governmentality and liberal paternalism: structuring ‘choice’, 
nudging behaviour 
Recently a collection of geographers have identified a new, or at least altered, 
governmentality at work in the UK (as well as the US); behavioural economics has become 
an influential discipline in the water sector and in UK policy circles more broadly (Hausman 
and Welch, 2010: 123; Huxley, 2011; John et al, 2011; Jones et al 2011a; 2011b). Although 
the meanings and expressions of behavioural economics are plural and hybrid, these scholars 
argue that the influence of Thaler and Sunstein’s (2009) international bestseller Nudge: 
improving decisions about health, wealth and happiness in policy circles represents a 
particularly important shift in ways of governing. Thaler and Sunstein have exerted 
considerable influence over governments in both the US and UK. Indeed, the relationship 
between the Conservative Party and Thaler was so intimate that Wilby, writing in the New 
Statesman, ‘went as far as to say that Cameron had found his philosophical guru in a similar 
way to how Blair had found Giddens and Thatcher had found Von Hayek’ (in Jones et al, 
2013:2).
9
 A number of different government departments have used behaviour change 
interventions in sustainability programmes, active travel projects and youth reoffending 
schemes (Cabinet Office et al, 2011: 6; also see Defra 2007). Moreover, on coming into 
power in 2010 Cameron established the Behavioural Insights Team, colloquially referred to 
as the ‘Nudge Unit’, at a reported cost of £520 000 per annum (Malik, 2013). The Nudge 
Unit has been deemed such a success that the government opted to mutualise it, turning it into 
                                                 
9
 For an excellent review of the emergence of liberal paternalism in UK policy making, see Jones et al, 2013. 
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a ‘profit making joint venture with private companies being invited to bid to make up 50 per 
cent of the new business’ (Mayo, 2013).  
 
In their 2009 volume, Thaler and Sunstein identify a series of problems with classical 
economics and introduce what they refer to as their ‘new movement’, ‘libertarian 
paternalism’ (2009: 5). Most importantly, Thaler and Sunstein argue that the concept of the 
rational economic man does not hold up to scrutiny. In this sense nudge appears to be in 
tension with some aspects of the neoclassical and neoliberal tradition. Thaler and Sunstein 
reject the notion that ‘almost all people, almost all of the time, make choices that are in their 
best interest or at the very least are better than the choices that would be made by someone 
else’ (2009: 10, also see Jones et al, 2013:18). As Jones et al note, ‘Thaler and Sunstein argue 
that many of our choices require some form of rationalised re-design’ (Jones et al, 2013: 28). 
In this context libertarian paternalism is presented as ‘a real Third Way – one that can break 
through some of the least tractable debates in contemporary democracies’ (2009: 253). 
Accordingly, Thaler and Sunstein describe liberal paternalism as a compromise that seeks to 
maximise individual freedom yet also acts in a paternalistic fashion by actively shaping 
environments so individuals are more likely to make choices that benefit them and society as 
a whole. Here policy makers are referred to as choice architects. Overall, Thaler and Sunstein 
offer libertarian paternalism (which from now will be referred to as nudge) as: 
 
A relatively weak, soft, and nonintrusive type of paternalism because choices are not blocked, 
fenced off or significantly burdened. If people want to smoke cigarettes, to eat a lot of candy, 
to choose an unsuitable health care plan, or to fail to save for retirement, libertarian 
paternalists will not force them to do otherwise – or even make things hard for them. Still, the 
approach we recommend does count as paternalistic, because private and public choice 
architects are not merely trying to track or implement people’s anticipated choices. Rather, 
they are self-consciously attempting to move people in directions that will make their lives 
better. They nudge (2009:6).  
 
Following this line of thought Thaler and Sunstein define a nudge as: 
 
Any aspect of the choice architecture that alters people’s behaviour in a predictable way 
without forbidding any options or significantly changing their economic incentives. To count 
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as a mere nudge, the intervention must be easy and cheap to avoid. Nudges are not mandates. 
Putting the fruit at eye level counts as a nudge. Banning junk food does not (2009: 6).  
 
In this sense, nudge has, to an extent ‘altered the logic of policy’ and, as Bradbury et al neatly 
put it, has led to ‘a new balance between two opposing logics of freedom and control... this 
new logic seeks to combine freedom of choice with the control of that choice, a paternalist 
obligation to help individuals make better decisions’ (2013: 263). Liberal paternalism with its 
focus on non-rational decision making and focus on freedom,  ‘can be seen as a contemporary 
twist on the long-standing general dilemma for liberal government of how to induce 
appropriate conduct among free subjects’ (Pykett et al, 2011: 304, also see Bell, 1996; 
Huxley, 2011). In this context, Wikins (2013) argues that choice architects tend to make a 
distinction between the ‘rational’ and ‘emotional’ decision making and target the latter as the 
‘particular sites, relations and practices… of government intervention’ (Wilkins, 2013: 5). 
Similarly, Bradbury et al (2013) describe nudge as a ‘revised rationality’, claiming that ‘it is a 
subtle adjustment, a revision of the conception of the subject’ that ‘envisages a different 
subject of policy and a different policy-making subject than neoclassical economics' (p. 252-
253).  
 
Importantly, this does not mean that Thaler and Sunstein's work on nudge, and behavioural 
politics more generally, should be read as a complete departure from neoliberalism. As Jones 
et al (2013) emphasise, ‘despite finding its origins in opposition to classical economic 
thought and the emerging neoliberal tradition, care must be taken not to draw too strong a 
line of distinction between behavioural economics and neoliberalism’ (ibid, p. 10). This is 
because what counts as ‘rational’ conduct, and its links to freedom, has been long contested. 
For instance Becker’s (1962) work on extending rationality and economic analysis to ‘non-
economic’ fields was challenged by Foucault, in the Birth of Biopolitics, who argued that 
Chicago School neoliberalism had incorporated both rational and non-rational elements of 
human behaviour (Foucault, 2008: 267-271; Huxley, 2011; Jones et al, 2013). Foucault also 
emphasised how notions of freedom are ‘constantly produced’, he argued that ‘liberalism is 
not an acceptance of freedom; it proposes to manufacture it constantly, to arouse and produce 
it, with of course [the] constraints and the problems of cost raised by this production’ 




It is important to note that we are by no means claiming that there is taking place some kind 
of epochal shift away from the rational subject within policy, and thus away from liberalism. 
‘Liberal paternalism’ has not supplanted or replaced neoliberal policy-making. In fact, it is a 
key to understanding the nature and operation of ‘nudge’ that it does not do so. This is not a 
radical discontinuity in the goals and modalities of neoliberal policy-making (Bradbury et al, 
2013: 253).   
 
Rather than perceiving the advancement of nudge as a complete and absolute shift, Bradbury 
et al interpret the revisions embodied by nudge ‘as part of a survival strategy for 
neoliberalism in policy, a jettisoning of a vital principle in order to allow the entire project to 
continue’ (2013: 264). Here they do not suggest ‘that neoliberalism as a concept has been 
abandoned, nor is it even in crisis’ but, rather, nudge should be understood as ‘a revision, a 
smoothing over of one of the flaws of neoliberalism with a supposed new discipline of 
behavioural economics’ (Bradbury et al, 2013: 264). Here, as Wilkins (2013) concludes, the 
‘relationship between libertarian paternalism and neoliberalism is… a complimentary and 
mutually transformative one’ (Wilkins, 2013: 4).  
 
The rising prominence of nudge raises questions regarding what types of behaviour are 
deemed desirable and legitimate to intervene in and influence. In light of the growing 
standing  of nudge interventions, Bradbury et al (2013) have called into question the ethics of 
nudge and have demanded close attention to questions such as who is influenced and targeted 
by ‘choice architecture? (p. 262). As Bradbury et al (2013) make clear, this line of 
questioning is vital because nudges have ‘real-life effects on people and their everyday lives’ 
(p. 262 -263).  
 
Although academic literature on the role of nudge in public policy is now being published 
(Goodwin, 2013; Mills, 2013; Pykett et al 2011; Jones et al 2013) and some scholars have 
even attempted to develop best practice guidelines for using nudges (Gill and Gill, 2012: 
925), sustained critique of how nudges, as new forms of governmentality, are deployed in the 
water industry has not yet emerged. This is despite considerable interest in the ideas from the 
sector. For example, John Bourne, Defra's Deputy Director for Water Supply and 
Infrastructure, challenged the industry to consider how nudge inspired interventions could be 
used in order to influence water users’ behaviours at the 2011 EA Tariff Trials Workshop. 
Moreover, a 2011 Ofwat report explicitly explored how nudge inspired policies could be 
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adopted in relation to metered households. The role of behavioural economics, particularly 
nudge, demands further investigation. Chapter six of the thesis examines how nudge tactics, 
as one of the multiple governmentalities at work in the South East of England, have been 
deployed through compulsory water metering in order to shape the way that the waterscape is 
governed.  
 
2.10 Governmentality and The Big Society: Decentralisation, localism, 
economic liberalism and Victorian volunteerism 
At the time of conducting research for this thesis, the Conservative government's vague, 
ideologically inflated – or as Kisby (2010) put it ‘deeply flawed’ - 'Big Society' political 
project had gained considerable currency in the popular press. The Conservative Party 
offered the Big Society as a way to rebrand itself prior to the 2010 general election, a way of 
governing through a smaller state and as a justification for deep public sector cuts following 
the 2008 financial crisis. In an attempt to differentiate the current party’s values from those 
held in the 1980s, where Thatcher had infamously declared that 'there is no society', David 
Cameron argued that society is broken. He argued that greater individual responsibility, 
enterprise and entrepreneurship would be necessary to achieve a 'social recovery [and] to 
mend a broken society' (Cameron, 2011). In this context, the party claimed that the Big 
Society was its ‘positive alternative to Labour’s failed big government approach’ 
(Conservative Party, 2010:1). According to Cameron, the Big Society would involve a 
combination of: 
 
1. Public service reform. Facilitating an enhanced role for the private sector and social 
enterprises in delivering public services. 
 
2. Localism. Encouraging ‘community groups’ to deliver local services. For example, 
the government’s Free School movement invites groups of individuals, companies 
and social enterprises to bid for state funding and open new schools outside of local 
democratic control.  
 
3. Enacting ‘a lasting culture change’. For the Conservative Party, the Big Society 
would usher in a new brand of politics, with a different way of governing that favours 
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a mix of deepening economic liberalism through privatisation, Victorian 
philanthropism and support for charities. 
 
Recent academic literature has highlighted the deeply ideological and politically expedient 
nature of the Conservative Party’s Big Society idea. North suggests that, in the context of 
economic crisis and persistent popular protests, the Big Society fulfils two functions. First, it 
affords ‘cover’ for government cuts to public expenditure and, in the longer term, it provides 
the ideological footing for deepening privatisation (North, 2011: 825). Similarly, 
Featherstone et al (2012) argue that the Big Society, as a way of governing, is ‘not politically 
innocent’ but ‘part of a broader repertoire of practices through which the government has 
constructed the local as antagonistic to the state and invoked it to restructure the public 
sector’ (p.177). Here the Big Society idea, according to Featherstone et al, is ‘being employed 
to instigate a new round of “roll-back” neoliberalism’ (2012: 177-178). Subsequently, the 
processes that make up the Big Society, namely greater economic liberalism, individual 
responsibility and a preference for private rather than public provision of public services, 
could have important implications for how the art of governing is reworked in the 
contemporary moment through compulsory metering.   
 
Interest in the Big Society as force driving policy has now waned to the extent that the Prime 
Minister now rarely references the once flagship idea. Despite the relegation of the Big 
Society term from public consciousness, the key neoliberal ideological principles that 
underpinned its conception remain. Moreover, the Conservative party’s promotion of the Big 
Society idea following its 2010 general election victory influenced the art of governing in the 
water sector. It is for this reason that the Big Society idea is taken up in this thesis and is 
considered as one of the multiple governmentalities that shape the art of governing the 
waterscape in South East England. More specifically, chapter seven examines how, at times 
invoking the language of the Big Society, private water companies have been encouraged to 
take on additional responsibilities for water welfare following the introduction of compulsory 
water metering. 
  
2.11 Critiques of governmentality 
Foucault's work on governmentality provides a fantastic range of tools for examining the 
emergence of multiple governmentalities and for analysing how water and water users are 
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governed through programmes like compulsory metering. However, the way governmentality 
approaches have been utilised exposes a number of limitations that should urge a sense of 
caution regarding the approach. The main criticisms governmentality studies have drawn 
refer to (1) an overemphasis of individual experience through focus on ways of self-
governing; (2) a tendency to treat the art of governing as a straightforward process devoid of 
slippages and instability; and (3) an apolitical stance that lacks critical spirit. All three 
criticisms are serious and the accusations warrant close inspection. This section outlines the 
limitations of governmentality approaches and makes suggestions as to how these gaps might 
be addressed by bringing governmentality into conversation with other approaches.  
 
2.12 The subject of governmentality: too individualistic? 
Jessop accuses governmentality scholars of placing too much emphasis on the micro-physics 
of power at the expense of macro-analyses. This is not a fault Jessop finds with Foucault's 
work, for the latter's 'investigation of liberalism [in his 1977-78 lecture course] required 
movement beyond the microphysics of power to more-macro analyses' (Jessop, 2007: 63). In 
this sense, Foucault's work on governmentality should, at least in theory, be 'scalable' and 
could be applied 'just as fruitfully as to the conduct of conduct at the level of interpersonal 
interactions, organisations or individual institutions' (ibid). In cases where governmentality 
approaches focus almost exclusively on government of the self, the literature is open to 
accusations that it places a disproportionate focus on just one aspect of the art of government. 
Social practice theory provides an interesting contrast to governmentality in this respect as it 
raises questions regarding the utility of focusing on the individual. Proponents of social 
practice theory have tended to concentrate on climate change policy as well as energy and 
water demand management programmes such as metering.  
 
Taking inspiration from social theories of practice that originate in Sociology (Giddens, 
1984), proponents of social practice theory have highlighted that focusing on individuals’ 
behaviours and experiences can obscure some of the principle reasons why resource intensive 
ways of using water emerge and become normalised. Consequently, rather than attempting to 
persuade individuals to use less water (or energy for that matter), social practice theory 
advocates urge researchers and policy makers to evaluate how resource intensive practices 
emerge and become stabilised (Hobson, 2006; Hargreaves, 2011b; Reckwitz, 2002; Shove, 




A “practice” in this context is understood as constituting three elements (1) images and 
meaning; (2) skills and practical know how; (3) objects, materials and tools (Shove, 2004). 
Examples include driving, cycling, showering, gardening and cooking. Here, Hand et al 
(2005) place considerable importance on thinking about practices as an assemblage of 
elements, they argue that:  
 
The existence of a practice depends upon the specific inter-connectedness of many elements – 
forms of bodily activities, mental activities, things and their use of background knowledge in 
the form of understanding, know-how and notions of competence, states of emotion and 
motivational knowledge (Hand et al, 2005: para 5.6). 
 
By exploring ‘the relations between the various elements involved’ rather than just the 
individual’s behaviour, Hand et al (2005) argue that social practice theory possesses a unique 
set of tools for analysing how and why particular practices have arisen and, in some cases, 
locating how they may be interrupted in order to facilitate the emergence of more sustainable 
practices. For instance, Strengers (2012) explains that a social practice theory analysis of 
changing patterns of residential air conditioning use would differ substantially from 
conventional explanations that focus on almost exclusively on market economics, cultural 
symbolism (as high status) and changing individual lifestyles or choices. She notes that: 
 
A practice theory perspective might view the increase in residential air-conditioning as the 
changing practice of household cooling, involving the complex co-evolution of material 
infrastructures (changing housing formats, central heating and cooling, the affordability and 
availability of the air-conditioner); common understandings of air-conditioning as a normal 
and necessary service, and changing notions of ‘air’, ‘health’ and ‘wellbeing’ associated 
with indoor climate and temperature; practical knowledge about how to cool the body and 
home; and rules about how to use and install the air conditioner (Strengers, 2012: 228-9).  
 
In this example, social practice theory advocates are less interested in individual behaviours, 
and focus instead on the broader assemblage of images, symbols, objects, habits, knowledge 




It is important to note that social practice theory perspectives are not homogenous, Shove et 
al (2012) for instance refer to ‘weaker’ and ‘stronger’ versions of the field. Here Shove 
suggests that Spaargaren et al’s (2006) work, which ‘treats domains of practice as sites in and 
around which consumers and systems of provision interact’, is a weak form of social practice 
theory for it ‘does not treat social practices as dynamic entities in their own right’ (Shove et 
al, 2012: 1279). Whereas, according to Shove, Reckwitz (2002) represents a stronger form of 
social practice theory for, in this work, ‘social practices take centre stage to the extent that 
people, and sometimes things, occupy secondary roles as the carriers of practice’ (2012: 
1279). This stronger brand of social practice theory, then, argues that ‘social change is in 
essence a matter of understanding how practices evolve, how they capture and lose us, their 
carriers, and how systems and complexes of practice form and fragment’ (ibid). 
 
The most important insight that social practice theory offers is that it shifts the object of 
analysis from the individual to practices. In this context individuals are often portrayed as 
‘carriers’ of practices. As Strengers (2012) suggests, ‘this does not mean that individuals 
become redundant or unnecessary’, individuals are understood as actively negotiating and 
performing a wide range of practices (p.228; also see Hitchings and Day, 2011). 
Consequently, advocates of social practice theory argue that in order to realise more 
sustainable outcomes focus should fall on how broader social practices emerge and how these 
can be transformed rather than necessarily considering encouraging individuals, through 
appeals to greater responsibility, to make more pro-environmental decisions. In this sense, 
social practice theory could potentially serve as a useful tool to complement governmentality 
approaches.  
 
There are, however, problems with the social practice theory approach. Despite being a keen 
advocate of this approach, Hargreaves (2011a) has argued that social practice theory contains 
its own shortcomings in that it tends to focus on single practices and neglects the alliances 
and conflicts between them (for an exception see Pullinger et al, 2013). Moreover, he has 
argued that there is a need within social practice theory to better address the social and power 
relations involved in practices and how these practices are sustained, in part, by these 
relations (Hargreaves, 2011b: 96). Social practice theory can be normative, politically flat 




Is there then, a different way to study practices that overcomes these short falls? Robbins’ 
(2007) work on lawn care practices is illustrative in this respect. In essence, Robbins’ goal is 
similar to that of social practice theory; he is interested in understanding how and why lawn 
care in suburban America came to be a prolific practice that, for some, causes ecological 
anxiety. Moreover, Robbins’ work is congruent with social practice theory in that he argues 
that it is not enough to simply encourage people to alter their behaviour through behavioural 
change campaigns. Instead, taking a strong political ecology approach, he examines the 
complex ecological, economic, political and cultural dimensions to how people become 
enrolled and implicated in the practice of lawn management. Here he traces the assemblage 
further than social practice theories to include home owners and their neighbours, particular 
species of turf grasses, the lawn care industry as well as pesticides and fertiliser 
manufacturers. By taking account of the political, ecological and economic relations that 
contribute to constructing and enrolling individuals within the practice. Robbins’ approach is 
able to offer critical insight into power structures where social practice approaches might 
struggle due to its normative character. So while taking inspiration from social practice 
theory might strengthen governmentality approaches by looking beyond the individual and 
their behaviour, it is also important to ensure that the analysis does not become detached from 
broader political and economic processes. In the context of this thesis, as chapter six shows, it 
is important to look beyond individual behaviours when examining the relationship between 
compulsory water metering and socio-technical change. However, it is important to ensure 
that the approach does not become normative but critically engages with the broader political 
and economic context in which compulsory metering occurs.  
 
2.13 Governmentality: a ‘too complete’ process of government? 
Despite some scholars, for example Miller and Rose (2008), stressing that governing is not a 
straightforward, complete process, a common criticism of governmentality literature is that 
programmes, policies and techniques of rule 'often appear as completed projects’ (Rutherford, 
2007; Hargreaves, 2012; Mackinnon, 2002). In contrast to Miller and Rose (2008), who 
emphasise that ‘the programmer’s world is one of constant experiment, invention, failure, 
critique and adjustment’ (p.14), much other work on governmentality tends to present 
governing efforts as fully-realised projects that are without unanticipated outcomes or 




It is important to note that this accusation of homogeneity and failure to account for the 
messy and unpredictable aspects of governing should not necessarily be lodged at Foucault 
himself but the 'governmentality studies' literature that has since emerged. Throughout 
Foucault's work he called for a close and historically sensitive analysis of 'material 
operations', 'forms of subjugation' and 'apparatuses of knowledge' (2004: 35). In order to 
overcome the all too neat processes of government that tend to be reported through 
governmentality studies, Rutherford (2007) has called for an appreciation of the messiness of 
governing both in design and in implementation. Arguing that failing to grasp the messiness 
of governing hollows out the concept of governmentality and relegates it to an abstraction set 
apart from reality. In turn, she convincingly argues that: 
 
This abstraction glosses over the ways in which strategies can, and often do, go astray when 
they meet their target of application. It ignores the interstitial slippages that can occur in the 
application of power and the moments of instability that emerge as a result... Governing does 
not arise a fully realised project, but is debated, revised, fine-tuned and continuously in need 
of re-articulation (Rutherford, 2007: 300).  
 
Huxley has made similar observations, she notes that focus on governance rationalities ‘can, 
at times, obscure struggles over discourses of truths and the messy, contingent and haphazard 
fashion in which localised practices of regulation get hooked up with, modified by, and in 
turn modify, rationalities for projects of government’ (2008: 168). In this sense, the body of 
literature surrounding governmentality has tended to pay insufficient attention to politics of 
difference and exclusion, how particular subjects become authorised to speak on behalf of the 
environment and the possibilities of constructing alternative narratives.  
 
In this context, some scholars, for example O'Malley et al (1997), have called for the 'messy 
actualities' of governing to be teased out. Similarly, Hobson (2013) has called for closer 
attention to be paid to the specific processes of how modes of government work rather than 
assuming that governmental interventions achieve 'hegemonic and totalising impacts' (p.180). 
Hobson calls for a 'realist governmentality' approach that is empirically driven and reflects 
the instability, failures, moments of resistance and slippages in governing (ibid). In a similar 
vein, Peck has also stressed that ‘the practice of neoliberal statecraft is inescapably, and 
profoundly, marked by compromise, calculation and contradiction’ (Peck, 2010: 106). In this 
context, Painter has argued for closer study of the ‘mundane practices that give rise to “state 
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effects”’ (or “stateness”) (2006). Here he focuses on the ‘more prosaic manifestations of state 
processes and how everyday life is permeated by “stateness” in various ways’ and through 
various actors (2006: 753). While Painter highlights congruencies between prosaics and 
governmentality in that both ‘focus on mundane practices and the productive nature of 
discourse’, he also differentiates the two by arguing that ‘governmentality draws attention to 
the construction of the objects of government, and to the logistics, rationalities and 
technologies of rule, whereas prosaics highlights the unsystematic, the indeterminate and the 
unintended’ (2006: 763).  
 
2.14 Governmentality:  a loss of ‘critical spirit’? 
The second, related, criticism that has been lodged at governmentality studies is that, with 
some notable exceptions (see Watts, 2003 for example), it has 'lost the “critical spirit” present 
in Foucault's own work' (Rutherford, 2007: 302). For instance, O'Malley et al (1997), argues 
that much of the governmentality studies literature, has been complicit in 'evacuating the 
social relations' from the approach (p. 513). This is problematic, especially since Foucault 
himself emphasised that his project was not an apolitical one:  
 
The real political task in a society such as ours is to criticise the working institutions which 
appear to be both neutral and independent; to criticise them in such a manner that the 
political violence that has always exercised itself obscurely through them will be unmasked 
so that one can fight them (Foucault in Rabinow, 1984: 5).  
 
In this context, Rutherford (2007) has called for critical perspectives to be ‘revalorized in 
governmentality literature’ and for governmentality studies to take the processes of 
inclusion/exclusion seriously (p. 303). She has further asserted that contemporary uses of 
governmentality approaches ‘need to be questioned, made messier, and informed by a critical 
perspective’ (2007: 300). Hargreaves adds that these studies could be improved if they were 
to engage ‘seriously with context, power and the full range of values that underpin everyday 
life’ (2011a: 320). As lack of a critical perspective does not necessarily apply across all 
applications of governmentality (for example see Von Schnitzler, 2008). Nonetheless, these 
criticisms raise questions as to how governmentality approaches can be applied in a 




Although governmentality approaches provide useful tools for unpicking how compulsory 
metering programmes influence the ways that water and water users are governed, as this 
section has highlighted, this approach is not perfect. The key question then becomes, how to 
respond to these limitations? The remainder of this chapter argues that critical geography, 
particularly Harvey’s framework of moments. The fit between these two approaches is not 
entirely neat, and the differences should not be elided, nonetheless the remainder of this 
chapter shows that, together, these two bodies of literature are useful for analysing the art of 
governing while retaining a critical spirit and accounting for the messiness of policy making.  
 
2.15 The production of neoliberal natures 
Although Gordon’s (1991) reading of Foucault’s position as the 'the conduct of living and the 
living' suggests that governmentality possesses scope to consider the relationship between 
society and nature, as highlighted further above, Foucault himself did not pursue these 
questions in any great detail. As Rutherford has astutely put it:  
 
Foucault did not adequately deal with the way in which the political and ecological 
problematisation of populations also gave rise, in more recent times, to a similar 
problematisation of nature and environment (Rutherford in Lemke, 2011b: 170). 
 
Other literature, particularly work in urban policy ecology, has investigated the production of 
waterscapes and nature much more directly and thoroughly. Here historical materialist 
approaches to the production of nature have been hugely influential in critiquing how and 
why particular ways of understanding and governing nature become dominant. One of the 
main strengths of recent work on socio-natures is that it excels in tracing the flows and 
relations of power within neoliberal governance systems, emphasising how society, nature 
and technology are internally related (Bakker, 2004, 2010; Gandy, 2003; 2004a; Harvey, 
1996; Heynen et al, 2006; Kaika, 2005; Linton, 2010; Swynegdouw, 2004; 2007; Young and 
Keil, 2007). These approaches, to varying degrees, all utilise Marx’s dialectical approach to 
understanding and questioning the world.  
 
Smith’s (1990) ground-breaking rebuttal of binary articulations of nature and society has 
inspired a wealth of work in geography; claims that society and nature are intrinsically 
interconnected and interrelated are no longer considered to be radical (Braun and Castree, 
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1998). Nevertheless, instrumental interpretations of nature and society often continue to 





 century liberal enlightenment principles, including, but not limited to, property rights, 
human emancipation and self-realisation, dominant approaches to water governance often 
present water as a resource, distinct from and externally related to society (Bellamy Foster, 
2000; Harvey, 1996). A resource that can be dominated and exploited by humankind (Bakker 
and Bridge, 2006; Bellamy Foster, 2000). In this context, work on ‘neoliberal natures’ (see 
Himley, 2008 for an overview) has proved pivotal in studies analysing global water 
commercialisation and privatisation strategies (Bakker, 2004; Haughton, 2002). Here, as 
Harvey convincingly asserts, prevailing practices dictate a profit-driven transformation of 
environmental conditions and an approach to nature that treats it as a ‘passive set of assets to 
be scientifically assessed, used and valued in commercial (money) terms’ (1996:131, also see 
Robertson, 2010 & 2012). In this context, Heidegger’s polemical proclamation that nature 
has become “one vast gasoline station” for human exploitation has some resonance (in 
Harvey, 1996: 131). 
 
In contrast to liberal assertions that nature and society are discrete entities, scholars from both 
historical materialist and STS, particularly Actor Network Theory (ANT), backgrounds have 
challenged the ‘false ideological dualism of society and nature’ (Smith, 1990:32). Instead, 
those working underneath the banner of these bodies of literature stress the co-constitutive 
relationship between society and nature (Swyngedouw, 2004; Linton 2010). Proponents of 
STS, most prominently ANT, argue that greater attention should be paid to the agency of 
non-human actors (Barry 2006; Bijker 2007; Hinchliffe and Whatmore 1998; Latour, 1993; 
2005; Whatmore 2002). For Latour, among others, this culminates in a call for the re-joining 
of nature and society, which he argues, have been separated under modernity (1993). 
Meanwhile, those operating from a radical geography perspective, many of whom take 
inspiration from Smith’s pivotal work surrounding the production of nature, tend to share 
ANT’s concern with obfuscating the perceived nature/society dualism. Most argue that socio-
natures are coproduced and maintain that the objective is to ‘renovate our conception of 
nature in a way that the dualistic world of bourgeois ideology can be reconstituted into an 
integrated whole’ (Smith, 1990: 32). For example, Budds and Hinojosa (2012) explain that in 
their research on the relationship between mining and water they ‘start from the idea that 
water is not merely a material substance that is subject to human manipulation, but a “hybrid 
nature” in which water’s materiality and its social relations constitute and express each other’ 
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(p. 119). They argue that this premise is productive because ‘redefining water as co-produced 
enables us to think about not only the social processes that shape water, but also the ways in 
which water also shapes social relations’ (ibid). Similarly, Linton employs the term 
‘hydrosocial cycle’ to emphasise that ‘instead of striving to master a presumed nature’, this 
approach strives to ‘challenge water’s social nature’ (Linton, 2010: 235). Such works do not 
treat water as an inert object but engage with its multifaceted materiality (Bakker, 2012).  
 
Although rejecting binary categorisations of nature and society partially unites historical 
materialist and STS approaches, there continue to be considerable differences in the questions 
these bodies of work ask about the production of socio-natures. Historical materialist 
analyses differ fundamentally from that of ANT in that they focus explicitly on the questions 
that ANT deliberately elides: ‘how we produce nature and who controls this production of 
nature’ (Smith, 1990:63). In this sense ANT and historical materialist approaches take 
different ontological starting points; the latter tends to be concerned with not only how things 
are produced by why things are produced in certain ways and for whose benefit (Kirsch and 
Mitchell, 2004: 702). 
 
Smith’s work highlights this disjuncture particularly well. He positions Marx’s analysis of 
labour as the focal point in the relationship between nature and humans, arguing that the 
‘contemporary relation with nature derives its specific character from the social relation of 
capitalism’ (Smith, 1990: 47). Thus, it becomes clear that ‘nature and humans are 
simultaneously social, material and cultural’ (Heynen et al, 2006:7) and that commodities (in 
terms of labour and “resources”) are ‘not things but, in fact, socio-natural relations’ (Castree, 
2003: 28, emphasis in the original). Through his analysis of the labour process and the 
production of socionatures, Smith is able to offer a radical critique of the epistemological 
separation of nature and society as well as illuminate the production and effects of uneven 
development. In this context, Kirsch and Mitchell (2004) convincingly argue that ANT 
possesses two main analytical weaknesses. The first weakness is that ANT provides no means 
for ‘distinguishing among “things” – things of different powers, and things of different 
properties – save only as effect (p. 689). The second analytical weakness is one that Latour 
heralds as one of ANT’s greatest strengths; the tendency within ANT to perceive power as a 
purely relational effect (ibid). However, positioning power as a relational effect precludes 
investigation into the causes of particular uneven power relations. Watts notes this criticism 
in his study of oil in Nigeria where he finds it more compelling to ‘emphasise the ways in 
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which objects, networks and identities are built and how such construction matters’ rather 
than to stop at mapping relationships (Watts, 1998: 245-246). Thus, while Castree’s (2002) 
attempt to seek a rapprochement between ANT and historical materialism by incorporating 
‘weaker’ forms of ANT within Marxist approaches to stress the agency of non-humans is 
useful (also see Rudy and Gareau, 2005), it does not appear to completely bridge the 
divergent interpretations of power.   
 
Recent contributions from scholars adopting an urban political ecology (UPE) perspective 
have brought these tensions between ANT and historical materialist approaches under the 
analytical spotlight. For example, see Heynen (2013) for an excellent review of existing work 
on UPE and ways that the field has evolved, taking into account research in STS and feminist 
geographies. In general, it appears as though many UPE theorists have adopted the language 
of ANT but have retained an explicitly historical materialist ontology (e.g. see Swyngedouw, 
2009). Therefore it can be concluded that while the terminology associated with ANT, of 
networks, nonhuman agency and hybridity, has to an extent proved useful in revitalising 
empirical studies of agency and human-nature-technology relations (Kirsch and Mitchell, 
2004: 702), it is a truism that we cannot engage with the agency of human or non-human 
actors in a productive manner without also examining the nexus of power in which they are 
situated (Bakker and Bridge, 2006: 17).  
 
In this context, Swyngedouw’s (2004) work is particularly important. He combines some 
ANT linguistic tools with Marxian concepts of metabolism and circulation to provide a 
guiding framework that illuminates the production of socionatures. This approach has 
provided fecund ground for analysis of water governance as well as studying the production 
of commodities more broadly under neoliberal governance systems (Kaika 2006; Loftus 
2006). ‘Metabolic circulation’, in this instance, can be understood ‘as the socially mediated 
process of environmental, including technological and transfiguration, through which all 
manner of “agents” [human and non-human alike] are mobilised, attached, collectivised and 
networked’ (Swyngedouw, 2006:32). Suggesting that socionatural environments cannot be 
understood as value neutral as ‘these metabolisms produce socio-environmental conditions 
that are both enabling for powerful individuals, and disabling for marginalised groups 
(Heynen et al, 2006: 10). Linton describes this process of producing socionatural waterscapes 
as ‘the business of fixing water’, arguing that it ‘is hardly just an intellectual performance; in 
each instance, it allows for certain hydrosocial realities while making it difficult or 
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impossible for others to spring to life’ (2010:3). Consequently, ‘the meanings of water that 
get fixed in any particular time and place can therefore be seen as a function of the relative 
power of different social actors’ (Linton, 2010: 13). Of course, the way in which nature 
becomes ‘fixed’, expressed or understood does not occur in the same way across different 
spaces and places (Castree, 2008a). 
 
In addition to market environmentalism (see above), Castree (2008a) identifies three other 
types of fixes that contribute to the neoliberalisation of environments. The first of these fixes 
has synergies with Harvey’s concept of ‘accumulation by dispossession’ and involves 
‘extending capital’s formal and/or real subsumption of nature without any overtly 
‘ecofriendly’ motivations so that ‘the nonhuman world simply becomes a means to the end of 
capital accumulation (p. 147, also see Roberts, 2008). Meanwhile the second relates to the 
active degradation of the environment in the pursuit of profit (Castree, 2008a: 148). Whereas 
the final fix Castree describes refers to way the state seeks to manage nature. He suggests that 
‘the state might make formal efforts to encourage citizens to take personal or communal 
responsibility for the ‘goods’ and ‘bads’ that arise from nature’s neoliberalisation’ (ibid). 
According to Castree, ‘such efforts can help ensure that the state avoids or minimises future 
legitimation crises in the environmental arena’ (2008a:149). This last fix is similar to 
Foucault's work on governmentality in that it examines how both forms of knowledge and 
ways of governing the individual contribute to reproducing the waterscape 
 
While there are some consistent factors involved in the process of neoliberalisation - in the 
context of water governance, it tends to involve the conceptualisation of water as a 
commodity, commercialisation, financialisation, the re-articulation of citizens as consumers 
and the introduction of market principles into water delivery systems (McDonald and Ruiters, 
2005) - it is also important to note that neoliberalisation is a ‘spatiotemporally variable 
process (‘neoliberalisation’) rather than a fixed and homogenous thing (‘neoliberalism’) 
(Castree, 2008). In the context of water, this echoes Haughton’s assertion that while ‘the 
production of water as a commodity is largely a transnational process’ it is equally important 
to acknowledge that ‘the actual manifestations of this are certainly nationally and locally 
contingent’ (Haughton, 2002). 
 
In some senses, Foucault’s concept of governmentality appears to strike a chord with studies 
which examine the production, and more specifically, the neoliberalisation, of socionatures. 
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Here, the neoliberalisation of nature can be understood as a specific ‘regime of truth’ (Rose, 
1991) that has subsequently shaped modes of environmental governance (Roberts, 2008). As 
Raco highlights, ‘a Foucauldian approach draws attention to how subjects are created in 
different places and at different times and therefore provides an insight into the ways in 
which (neo)liberal states use space and place to pursue their strategies of action’ (2003:78). 
UPE’s close attention to the processes whereby socio-natures and waterscapes are produced 
and sustained complements concerns articulated by governmentality approaches regarding 
the art of governing yet strengthens its insights by offering a more explicit critical analysis. 
Together these approaches, as this thesis shows, provide an excellent framework to analyse 
compulsory water metering programmes. In particular, chapters six and seven demonstrate 
that Foucauldian and historical materialist approaches can be usefully combined to evaluate 
compulsory metering programmes in South East England. Chapter six draws on Foucauldian 
and historical materialist tools to demonstrate that metering is best understood as a socio-
technical fix that has the effect of partially solving some of the tensions in the water industry 
while strengthening the neoliberal character of the sector. Meanwhile, chapter seven, which 
focuses on the relationship between metering and affordability, examines how, as a 
biopolitical problem, affordability is managed through compulsory metering. These chapters 
contribute to developing a theoretical framework that retains a critical approach and takes 
account of the messiness of sociotechnical change in the waterscape.  
2.16 The production of technonatures 
White and Wilbert use the term ‘technonature’ to describe a world that is ‘ever more 
technologically mediated, produced, enacted and contested’ where and, ‘diverse peoples find 
themselves, or perceive themselves, as ever more entangled with things – that is, with 
technological, cultural, urban, and ecological networks and diverse hybrid materialities and 
non-human agencies’ (2009: 6). The role of technologies in reproducing waterscapes has 
recently received considerable attention in geography and related fields. For example Bakker 
(2012) has argued that socio-technical objects mediate the dialectical relationship between 
society and nature and that, accordingly, water should be understood as ‘simultaneously 
socio-technical and socionatural’ (2010: 616-8). Recent work has explored the role of canals 
(Carse, 2012), dams (Coutard and Guy, 1999), water pumps (de Laet and Mol, 2000; Barnes, 
2012), water meters (Jaglin, 2008; Loftus, 2006; Marvin et al, 2011; Trentmann and Taylor, 
2005; Von Schnitzel, 2008) and household water infrastructure such as showers, taps and 
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toilets (Hobson, 2006; Kaika, 2004; Soufoulis, 2005; Shove, 2004; Strengers, 2009) in 
negotiating the socionatural make up of different places.  
 
Some geographers, for example Furlong (2010), have argued that combining insights from 
STS and geography might lead to more nuanced conceptualisations of the role of water 
technologies in socio-technical change. Furlong (2010) states that studies of technology in 
geography tend to treat the ‘impact, function and use of technologies as given’ (p.2), 
Whereas, Coutard and Guy have alleged that geographical studies of pre-paid metering have 
been overly pessimistic and generated a sense of unjustified ‘alarmism’ with respect to 
infrastructural change. While these insights are important, this thesis does not provide a full 
STS analysis of water meters. Rather than exploring the complex materialities of the water 
meter and its configuration, for which an STS approach would be instrumental, this thesis 
uses metering programmes as a lens through which to explore and better understand how 
water and water users are governed. This does not mean that metering technologies are 
understood in this thesis as stable, black-boxed entities, nor does this thesis adopt a 
pessimistic approach to technology or adapt a sense of ‘alarmism’ about technological 
change; rather water meters are positioned, following Feenberg (1997), as contingent 
technologies that have the potential to influence the waterscape in multiple ways. 
 
Technologies, such as water meters, do not necessary produce predicable changes to the 
socio-natural landscape. Here, as Marvin et al (2011) argue, water meters can act as 
‘mediating technologies’ whose effects may be uncertain or unintended (also see Furlong, 
2010). Similarly, Coutard and Guy stress the ‘deeply contingent nature of the appropriation 
of new technologies, and as a consequence, [the equally contingent nature] of the social 
“effects” of technologies’ (2007: 713). Importantly, technologies, according to Feenberg, 
have ‘no singular essence’ but are socially contingent and could therefore be reconstructed to 
play different roles in different social systems’ (1999:7). For instance, Marvin et al (2011) 
trace the different ways that smart meters can be used to structure relationships between 
utilities, users and the technology depending on the configuration of the technology and the 
socio-economic conditions within which decisions are made. Whereas Pritchard (2011, 2012) 
and Von Schnitzler have explored how water technologies often reflect the contemporary 
political and social processes in which they are introduced; the way that technologies are 
applied is not politically neutral. In this context, Barry (2001) argues that a ‘distinction can be 
made between a technical device conceived of as a material or immaterial artefact, and a 
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technology, a concept which refers not just to a device in isolation but also to the forms of 
knowledge, skill, diagrams, charts, calculations and energy which make its use possible’ 
(2001: 9, also see Whatmore, 2009 on knowledge and the distribution of expertise). For 
Feenberg, the ambivalence of technology is important because it translates to the ‘availability 
of technology for alternative developments with different social consequences’ (ibid). The 
'effects' of technologies in this instance may be unanticipated. Feenberg’s reflections raise 
important questions regarding whether compulsory water metering might contribute to 
producing a potentially more progressive waterscape, or replicate inequalities that already 
exist within the socionatural waterscape. This question is central to the thesis and each of the 
four analysis chapters in examining the role the water meter plays in helping to renegotiate 
the way water and water users are governed in South East England.  
 
As is explored throughout this thesis, water metering has been, and continues to be, an 
important conduit through which questions of governance evolve. Key to this are debates 
centred on what is considered ‘fair’ in relation to how water and water users are governed. 
What counts as fair, and how this is measured, has been fiercely debated, not just in relation 
to water but geography and related disciplines more generally. Rawl’s (1971) work on justice 
and social contract theory, Sen (1999) and Nussbaum’s (2003) work on capabilities and 
social justice and Harvey’s work on transformative notions of social and environmental 
justice have been particularly important in prompting questions regarding ‘fairness’. For 
example, who is it that decides what is ‘fair’; whether there are certain characteristics that are 
fundamental to ‘fairness’; how the needs of the individual can or should be squared with the 
needs of the collective and under what conditions ‘fairness’ can be achieved’. 
 
Although what is understood as a fair situation changes according to the context, discussions 
regarding fairness are often grounded in questions of how and to whom resources are 
allocated; this involves procedural issues as well as questions of production and power. As 
such, debates surrounding ‘fairness’ are often intertwined with notions of justice (for 
example, see Walker and Burningkam 2011). In the context of water metering and water 
governance, geographers have also emphasised that notions of fairness should reflect the 





Recent work on fuel poverty and exposure to flood risk has highlighted some of the key 
issues surrounding fairness in the UK context. Walker and Day (2012) describe fuel poverty 
as ‘fundamentally a complex problem of distributive justice’, where resources are allocated in 
a way that results in gross inequality, but also emphasise that addressing fuel poverty must 
involve ‘recognition of vulnerable and marginalised social groups’ and the pursuit of 
‘procedural justice through opening up involvement and influence in decision making 
processes’ (p. 275). Similarly Walker and Burningkam (2011) have stressed the importance 
of analysing what is expected to be a just and fair situation and exploring how institutions 
manage perceived injustices. Common across these studies is a concern with (1) the notion of 
‘fair distribution’; the definition of which is deeply contested depending on whether the 
issues is approached from a utilitarian, libertarian or egalitarian position; (2) procedural 
justice where the application of rules is considered fair and (3) the ability of people to decide 
for themselves what conditions constitute fairness, influence decision making processes and 
make meaningful decisions over their everyday lives. These articulations of fairness are 
important for theorising and better understanding the dynamics of fairness and justice.  
 
Nevertheless, this thesis does not seek to impose a definition of fairness, instead it examines 
the important role water metering programmes have played in negotiating and framing the 
emergence of different understandings of fairness in relation to water and water users in the 
South East of England. As chapters four, five and seven show, the understandings of fairness 
that emerge in relation to different metering interventions offer conflicting perspectives with 
respect to what constitutes fair water use as well as fair ways of governing water and water 
users. 
 
2.17 'Moments' of socio-technical change 
This thesis utilises Foucauldian tools of genealogy and governmentality to examine how and 
why compulsory metering became, from the perspective of some water companies and policy 
makers, a legitimate way of governing water and water users. Foucauldian tools are also 
employed to explore how the introduction of water metering, in its various guises, has 
influenced, and continues to influence, the way that water users engage with water through 
processes of self-governing and the way that the state, loosely defined, practices processes of 
government. As highlighted earlier in this chapter, while important, governmentality is an 
imperfect framework through which to analyse and interpret these questions. This thesis 
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brings work on the production of nature, specifically Harvey’s framework of ‘moments’, into 
conversation with governmentality approaches. In doing so, it recognises that while there are 
productive tensions between these positions there are also limits to any attempt at 
rapprochement (see below). This thesis is not suggesting that the two approaches can be 
utilised together in a seamless fashion rather, recognising that they can be employed to 
different ends. Foucauldian tools offer the method of analysis, while Harvey offers the thesis 
an interpretative framework. 
 
Harvey’s work on ‘moments’, initially set out in his 1982 volume Limits to Capital, builds on 
Marx’s dialectical method. Here he carefully considers the evolution of capitalism as well as 
the consistent failure of alternatives to mount a successful challenge to dominant ways of 
social organisation. In Limits to Capital Harvey explores and evaluates Marx’s approach. He 
argues that: 
 
Marx sees each relation as a separate ‘window’ from which we can look upon the inner 
structure of capitalism. The view from any one window is flat and lacks perspective. When we 
move to another window we can see things that were formerly hidden from view. Armed with 
that knowledge, we can reinterpret and reconstitute our understanding of what we saw 
through the first window, giving it greater depth and perspective. By moving from window to 
window and carefully recording what we can see, we come closer and closer to 
understanding capitalist society and all of its inherent contradictions (Harvey, 1982: 2).   
 
Harvey explores his work on moments in greater depth in his 1996 volume, Justice, Nature 
and the Geography of Difference. Here he identifies ‘six distinctive “moments” to the social 
process’ which, he argues, ‘are basic markers to chart much of what goes on in social and 
literary theory’ (1996: 78). The six moments include discourses/language; 
beliefs/values/desires; institutions/rituals; material practices; social relations and power. 
Harvey presents the moments in ‘no particular order of significance’ and uses the ‘term 
“moment” in order to avoid, as far as possible, any sense of prior crystallisation of processual 
activities into “permanences” – things, entities clearly bounded domains, or systems’ (1996: 





In later works, Harvey has developed this approach further and, in doing so, draws on a 
fascinating footnote in Chapter 15, vol. 1 of Capital On Machinery and Large Scale Industry 
that sets out how six different moments - technology, nature, relations of production, 
everyday life, technology, social relations and ideas – ‘co-evolve in ways that accommodate 
and consolidate the permanently revolutionary character of capital’ (Harvey, 2010: 127). To 
these six moments, Harvey adds a seventh, institutional arrangements, and argues that capital 
‘cannot circulate or accumulate without touching upon each and all of these activity spheres 
in some way’, noting that where barriers are encountered either within or between these 
moments, then ‘ways have to be found to circumvent or transcend that difficulty (2010: 124). 
He argues that social change occurs through the uneven co-evolution of these internally 
related moments and calls for a non-determinist framework for conceptualising social change. 
As Hartstock noted, ‘Harvey suggests that moments are linked to but not bounded by time or 
space in any simple way; they are instead conceptual tools that can help to address complex 
and over determined social relations’ (Hartstock, 1998: 708). Each moment is dialectically 
related, internally dynamic and, importantly, no moment is assumed to be determinate 
(Harvey, 2010: 128). This does not mean that the seven spheres should always be given equal 
weight but rather ‘that the dialectical tension within their uneven development should always 
be borne in mind’ (Harvey, 2009: 134). Methodologically, this framework is useful because, 
as Harstock highlighted: 
 
The concept of “moment” can then be analytically useful in both separating out the social 
relations the theorist wants to concentrate on while reminding us that these social relations 
are in fact connected with and defined by other social relations and with their own pasts and 
future possibilities (Hartstock, 1998: 709). 
 
Harvey makes clear that slippages or possibilities can emerge in any of the connected 
moments but demands that those striving to better understand the dynamics of capital, or 
foster the emergence of alternative futures, should consider how these seven moments co-
evolve, unevenly, to create a totality rather than focusing on one element in isolation. He 
argues that ‘perhaps one of the biggest failures of past attempts to build socialism has been 
the reluctance to engage politically across all of these spheres and to let the dialectic between 
them open up possibilities, rather than close them down’ (2009: 134). There are no steadfast 
rules regarding which moment one should initially engage with. Here Hartstock helpfully 
describes the moments as ‘filters’ that can be ‘changed as one moves analytically among 
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different moments, and then different aspects of the social relations will be revealed’. Loftus 
also engages with Harvey’s work on moments in his 2012 volume Everyday 
Environmentalism, here he takes nature and everyday life as his moments of departure noting 
that these moments are unrepresented in existing studies, this does not mean that he obscures 
the other moments identified by Harvey or considers nature and everyday life as determinant 
(p. xix). Similarly, using Harvey’s framework, there is nothing to prevent scholars taking 
other moments which they feel have been neglected as a starting point. 
 
A number of critics have expressed concerns with Harvey’s method of moments. For 
instance, Hartstock has called on Harvey to be much more precise in his views on marginality 
and where he locates historical agency (1998). Similarly, Iris Marion Young has argued that 
Harvey’s understanding of social difference equates to a politically disabling and fragmented 
political approach which is ‘both theoretically and politically counterproductive’ (1998: 37). 
She concludes that although ‘Harvey usefully reminds us that the situated differences of 
gender, race, ethnicity and sexuality ought not to be frozen into essential identities’ and 
‘recognises the complexities of cross-cutting structured and shifting relationships in some 
places in his text, he nevertheless returns to an oversimplified account of class politics when 
he discusses appeals to justice and norms of solidarity’ (1998: 39). Furthermore, Braun has 
underlined how Harvey’s model has the potential to collapse difference, so that certain 
relations, especially those of race and gender, are overshadowed by class analysis. Here 
Braun argues that greater attention ought to be paid to the scale at which analysis occurs 
(Braun, 1998: 714).  
 
More recently, Thompson (2010) has argued that some moments should not be treated in the 
same way as others. He argues that ‘daily life’ ‘should, in fact, be granted analytic and 
strategic primacy’ for, according to Thompson, ‘”daily life” both predates and permeates all 
the other moments’ (2010: 273-274). Here, Thompson implies that Harvey is guilty of 
pandering to ‘abstract empiricism of bourgeois economics’ and ‘abstract idealism of 
professed revolutionary norms’ (2010: 283). It is true that Harvey’s framework is not perfect. 
More could be done, perhaps following Foucauldian governmentality, to tease out the 
dynamics and differences in peoples’ situated experiences and agency. However, this is not 
cause for abandoning the framework of moments nor does it justify accusations of economic 
determinism. Harvey explicitly rejects this type of reductionist tactic, he states that ‘problems 
arise when one or the other of these perspectives is exclusively and dogmatically viewed as 
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the only source and hence the primary political pressure point of change’ (2009: 13). He 
argues that many approaches unwittingly espouse ‘dangerously oversimplisitic monocausal 
explanations’ (2009: 134). He explicitly cites technological determinism, environmental 
determinism and class determinism as examples of movements which have failed because 
they do not hold these distinct, yet internally related, moments together. This clear dismissal 
of determinism, and emphasis on movement across moments, should unsettle any lingering 
suspicions, or accusations, that Harvey’s work harbours economic determinist leanings. For 
Harvey, it is important to focus, first, on whichever moment is most immediate or offers up 
potential political leverage or exposes ruptures and possibilities (2010: 34). 
 
This thesis draws Harvey’s work on moments, particularly in Chapter six, to examine and 
interpret the messy dynamics of the socionatural and sociotechnical changes that have taken 
place through compulsory water metering programmes in the South East of England. Chapter 
six identifies a series of moments, which are loosely based on Harvey’s, to analyse how 
socio-technical change occurs across multiple, interrelated moments. It explores how the 
introduction of the compulsory water meter, has, together with new ideas surrounding 
behaviour economics; social relations; the way that the water company is understood; how 
relations to water is understood and water users’ everyday interactions with water, combine 
to transform the waterscape and, ultimately, how water and water users are governed. Moving 
between these moments enables close attention to the messy nature of sociotechnical change 
and an appreciation of how changes in one moment can inspire changes in other moments, 
sometimes in unanticipated ways. Chapter six demonstrates that water companies in the 
South East have been able to use compulsory metering to (partially) resolve a perceived 
tension between water use and water stress by making changes across these dynamic 
moments.  In this sense, Harvey’s framework of moment provides vital inspiration for 
explaining and analysing the ways that water and water users are governed through water 
metering. 
 
2.18 Governmentality and the production of nature: productive tensions 
and their limits 
Invoking Foucauldian approaches alongside historical materialist ideas is not without 
difficulties, particularly considering the different conceptions of power that they offer. This 
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short section demonstrates that tensions between the two approaches are significant and 
warrant attention. Yet the same tensions are productive for exploring how water metering has 
emerged as a desirable policy option for some water companies as well as how water and 
water users are governed in and through compulsory water metering. The two approaches can 
be used to tackle different questions and, in this thesis, are utilised for particular analytical 
effects. 
 
Barnett (2005) argues that it is undesirable to seek a rapprochement between marxist and 
Foucauldian approaches, arguing that 
 
… Marxist and Foucauldian approaches are not necessarily as easily reconciled as it might 
seem. They imply different models of the nature of explanatory concepts; different models of 
causality and determination; different models of social relations and agency; and different 
normative understandings of political power (p.7).  
  
Harvey’s own interpretations of Foucault’s work also reveals significant tensions. Harvey has 
criticised Foucault’s work as being insufficiently dialectical (2007: 46), suggesting that while 
governmentality ‘has something important’ to say for it ‘interestingly analyses the 
intersections between two spheres – institutional and administrative systems and daily life 
(construed as body politics)’, its analysis is ‘unidimensional’ because it does not address how 
these two moments co-evolve with aspects of social change (Harvey, 2010: 134). Moreover, 
Ekers and Loftus (2008), for instance have highlighted that Foucault was suspicious of some 
variants of Marxism and its interpretation of ideology. For Foucault, some Marxist 
approaches that linked ideology to some sort of deeper, hidden truth risked missing ‘how 
truth always operated with discourses and practices, generating specific effects’ (Ekers and 
Loftus, 2008: 705). For Foucault there is no determining form of power, rather it is ‘situated 
and exercised at the level of [everyday] life’ where there are continual struggles over the 
understandings of what the “truth” may be and in what form certain governance practices 
emanate (Rabinow and Rose, 2006:296). Within this process, particular assemblages of 
certain power relations come to dominate others at certain times.  
 
Barnett’s insights, as well as Harvey’s own criticism of Foucault and Foucault’s suspicion of 
Marxist approaches, expose some fundamental differences between the two approaches with 
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respect their ontological and analytical starting points. Nevertheless some of the tensions are 
productive for better understanding processes of sociotechnical change in the water sector.   
 
Foucault and Marxist approaches are not, however, completely incompatible. For instance, as 
Ekers and Loftus (2008) highlight, there is potential for a rapprochement between the way 
Gramsci conceptualises power and Foucault's focus on practices of power (see Foucault, 
2008: 321). Similarly, Hunt (2004) argues that it would be a gross error to exaggerate the 
differences between historical materialist and Foucault’s own understandings of power. He 
argues that, even if Foucault did not directly quote Marx, ‘much of Foucault’s intellectual 
formation was decisively influenced by the looming presence of Marxism in the post-war 
France in which he lived’ (2004: 604). Hunt reasons that ‘although Foucault’s views were 
often articulated in terms different from Marx, they are by no means incompatible’ (2004: 
604). He concludes that ‘Foucault’s views are much closer to Marx than he was even 
prepared to concede’ (ibid). Specifically, Hunt has stated that 
 
The distance between Foucault and Marx might not be so great as Foucault suggests, 
[because] both are concerned to account for change and to promote it. Foucault attends to 
how to ‘think differently’ and to ‘conditions of change’ but, similarly, Marx focused on the 
‘conditions of existence’ that identify the necessary and sufficient conditions for the 
emergence of some social form (2004: 604). 
 
Here Hunt suggests that Foucault takes issue with ‘Marxism-Leninism’ rather than Marx’s 
own work. Similarly, Jessop has highlighted that Foucault’s work includes ‘an implicit 
appropriation and development of insights from Marx himself’ and makes the case that 
Foucault was not rejecting Marxisms in their entirety but was in ‘opposition to official and 
vulgar Marxist positions’ that were prevalent at that time (Jessop, 2007: 34). Likewise, Hunt 
argues it is likely that Foucault’s ‘estrangement was not so much with Marx, but with the 
French Communist Party' (PCF) (2004: 604). This positions is supported by Jessop’s (2011) 
work which highlights that Foucault’s research on governmentality explored similar 
questions to those posed by Marxist scholars. In this sense, Foucault's work on 
governmentality has clear synergies with historical materialist approaches. To illustrate this, 




Foucault himself explored not only the generalisation of the conduct of conduct across 
diverse spheres of society but also studied how specific governmental practices and regimes 
were articulated into broader economic and political projects. Thus he continued to argue 
into the late 1970s that capitalism had penetrated deeply into our existence, especially as it 
required diverse technologies of power to enable capital to exploit people’s bodies and their 
time, transforming them into labour power and labour time respectively to create surplus 
profit (Jessop, 2011: 60). 
 
With this in mind, in certain situation, the gulf between Foucauldian and historical materialist 
approaches might not be as great as some commentators have argued.  Nonetheless, the fact 
remains that there are limits to any attempted rapprochement between the two positions. With 
this in mind, this thesis uses Foucauldian methods to examine the emergence of compulsory 
water metering through historical experiments with metering, changes in the modern state – 
specifically how the state has responded to particular biopolitical problems associated with 
water metering - and the processes of governing that are expressed through metering. 
Meanwhile, Harvey’s work on moments is employed as an interpretative framework to 
explore the dynamic processes of sociotechnical change that have taken place in the 
neoliberal water sector through contemporary compulsory water metering programmes in 
South East England. Here these two approaches are deployed to tackle different elements of 
the debates surrounding water metering. 
 
2.19  Conclusion 
This chapter has shown that, although not entirely compatible, Foucauldian and historical 
materialist approaches are fundamental to developing a framework for better understanding 
how compulsory water metering programmes have emerged in the South East of England and 
how water and water users are governed through metering. The concluding section of this 
chapter outlines how the literature reviewed is engaged with throughout the thesis.   
 
In chapters four and five, the thesis draws on Foucauldian methods of analysis to develop a 
genealogy of metering in England and Wales which examines how water and water users 
have been governed in different ways through metering interventions. In doing so, these 
chapters make two main contributions. First they build on and take forward existing literature 
in geography on biopolitics by identifying the myriad of biopolitical problems that metering 
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has been invoked to address. Secondly, these chapters examine how these technologies, in 
their various guises, have been used to negotiate different understandings of the waterscape, 
particularly in respect to notions of fairness. These chapters stress that the process of 
negotiation is not a neutral process yet and the meter, as a contingent technology, has the 
potential to help produce waterscapes that can be perceived to be negative as well as positive. 
This corresponds with research objective one and explains how and why compulsory 
companywide metering, from the perspective of some within the sector, has emerged as a 
legitimate and desirable policy in the contemporary moment. This history of the present, 
helps tell the story of water companywide compulsory metering in South East England.  
 
Chapter six then examines how water and water users are governed through compulsory 
companywide metering programmes in the contemporary moment. The chapter identifies 
moments (which are loosely structured around Harvey’s moments) and moves between them, 
one by one, to explore the messy processes whereby different moments together, in tension, 
co-evolve to produce and reproduce the socionatural waterscape. This is important for 
understanding the metering programmes in South East England as socio-technical fixes 
where the water companies have sought to address some tensions in the waterscape yet have 
ensured that its neoliberal character is retained. This sociotechnical fix takes place across 
each or the interlinking and interrelated moments.. Importantly,  the chapter also takes 
forward existing literature on governmentality by exploring how behavioural economics, in 
particular work on nudge, has been deployed through metering programmes in an attempt to 
influence the way that water and water users are governed. The chapter explores how 
metering interventions are taken up and resisted by water users.  
 
The final analysis chapter addresses a gap in the existing literature; it examines the 
relationship between compulsory metering and affordability. The chapter explores how the 
introduction of compulsory water metering influences water affordability patterns. 
Affordability in relation to compulsory metering is portrayed as a biopolitical problem which 
water companies are seeking to manage through new schemes. The chapter, in response to 
research objective three, reveals that the introduction of compulsory water metering has led to 
the stretching of water company roles as they develop and implement programmes to tackle 
affordability problems caused by metering. The chapter argues that this change to the 
waterscape, negotiated through compulsory metering, has important implications for thinking 
about the character of the waterscape, especially in terms of the govermentalisation of the 
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state, non-linear contingencies of the state and understandings of democracy. The following 







At its simplest, methodology is the way in which information is collected. It concerns 
both the ways in which data are gathered and the techniques used to analyse or 
interpret them (Ruming, 2009:451). 
 
3.1 Introduction  
Water companies tend to commission research projects hoping to prove that water metering 
does or does not work or that a particular communications strategy works best in order to 
justify investment decisions. Here the research process is often treated as an objective, 
scientific collection of ‘facts’, a process that can seem rather remote from the messy, fleshy 
world that we inhabit. Of course it is important to understand whether metering works or, at 
least, whether it delivers the anticipated effects (see Parker and Wilby, 2013 for a discussion 
of how qualitative and quantitative methods can be used in combination to better understand 
household water demand). However, at the time of writing, sufficient quantitative data is not 
yet available to analyse the relationship between metering and household demand in a 
meaningful fashion. Rather than asking whether metering “works” (e.g. delivers a c.10 per 
cent demand reduction) my research, overall, is concerned with better understanding the 
genealogy of water metering, exploring how water metering might influence the ways people 
relate to water and how the waterscape is reproduced as a result of compulsory companywide 
metering programmes. Accordingly, I am primarily interested in (i) how and under what 
conditions, at least from the perspective of water companies in the South East of England, the 
regulator and the government, these programmes have become legitimate and desirable 
policy interventions and (ii) how the introduction of a might influence peoples’ practices in 
relation to water and contribute to the reproduction of the socionatural waterscape. This line 
of inquiry requires a methodological approach that equips the researcher with means to 
elucidate the complexities of ‘environment, individual experiences and social processes’, for 




Recently, academic researchers have used qualitative methods to tackle some of the questions 
that positivist approaches have obscured. For example see Medd and Chappells’ (2007) work 
on flooding, Shove’s (2004) work on comfort and cleanliness, Strang’s (2004) research on 
how the meaning of water, Knamiller and Sharp (2009) on trust and fairness in the context of 
Folkestone and Dover’s compulsory water metering programme in Kent and Pulligner et al 
(2013) on water use practices. Unfortunately, qualitative methods are commonly referred to 
as fluff or, more sympathetically, as colourful in the water sector; qualitative methods 
continue to be interpreted as subordinate to quantitative techniques. 
 
Nevertheless, qualitative approaches have become increasingly mainstreamed in the water 
sector as companies seek to fulfil the regulator’s requirement that companies should 
demonstrate the extent which their plans are supported by their customers. Much of the 
qualitative research undertaken in the UK water industry has taken shape through large scale 
surveys. While these approaches are vital, large scale surveys typically aim for ‘breadth and 
coverage’ rather than ‘depth and detailed understanding’ (McDowell, 2010: 158). Most water 
companies undertake little research explicitly from domestic water users’ perspectives; often 
customer research is tagged onto the back of an existing project or narrowly framed for a 
particular end (although there are notable exceptions, see CCW 2007 and Doron 2011’s 
deliberative research with household water users).  
 
This chapter outlines the methodological approach and tools utilised throughout the thesis. It 
begins by providing the rationale for the case studies chosen for this research. It then outlines 
the research methods used and makes links between those methods and the literatures 
reviewed in the previous chapter. Subsequently, the limitations of the research are reflected 
upon and, finally, the chapter outlines how the data has been analysed and translated into a 
thesis.  
 
3.2 Choosing “Case Studies” 
There are 21 private water utilities in England which operate as regional monopolies. Ten of 
these companies are water and sewerage providers and the remainder are water only 
companies. Each of these companies has its own specific history and contextual 
circumstances that make it an interesting potential focus of inquiry. For example, the 
percentage of households that are metered varies considerably across England (see Figure 3). 
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Some companies in water stressed areas have commenced large scale compulsory metering 
programmes others, for example Northumbrian Water, United Utilities and Yorkshire Water, 
have stated that such programmes will not feature in their water resource management plans 
in the immediate future. These companies argue that due to more abundant water supplies 
that are available in the north of England, it is not necessary to effect demand reductions 
through household water metering. Northumbrian Water have stated that if they were to 
pursue a metering programme, it would have to justified in terms of establishing a fairer 
charging system, fair in this context meaning that customers would only pay for what they 
use
10
, rather than on the basis of demand reduction (Northumbrian Water, 2009). Although it 
would be extremely valuable to explore attitudes and responses to water and water metering 
in areas of England outside the water stressed South East, this is outside the scope of this 
doctoral research.  
                                                 
10












This thesis focuses on Southern Water (SRN), South East Water (SEW) and Thames Water 
(TW) because these companies committed to undertaking a companywide compulsory 
metering programme in their respective 2009 Water Resource Management Plans (WRMP). 
Although the scale and pace of implementation vary, these three companies have committed 
to (near) universal compulsory metering (see Table 3). Companywide compulsory metering 
programmes are unprecedented in the English waterscape, therefore it is important to trace 
how and why these programmes came to the fore and better understand how water meters 
might influence the way people relate to water.  
 
Table 3 Outline of selected water companies in South East England 
 
 
Before detailing the research methods that have been used, it is important to make it 
absolutely clear that this is not comparative research in the traditional sense and nor am I 
seeking to generalise from a particular case (Baxter and Eyles, 1997). Following Ward, I am 
keen to avoid the ‘rather fixed and static theorisations of place, space and scale that tend to 











Supplies water to one million 
customers and wastewater to 
two million customers across 
Sussex, Kent, Hampshire and 
the Isle of Wight.  
c. 40% Universal Metering 
Programme: 92% 
households to be 
metered on a  








Supplies water to 2.1 million 
customers across Kent, Sussex, 
Hampshire and Berkshire.  
c. 40% Customer Metering 
Programme: 70% 
households to be 
metered on a 
compulsory basis by 
2015; 90% of customer 







UK’s largest water and 
sewerage company, serves 14 
million customers across 
London and the Thames 
Valley. 
c. 30% Initial 10 year strategy 
of compulsory metering 
from 2010. 50% 
penetration by 2015; 
80% by 2020. 
Delayed.  Progressive 
Metering programme 
due to start in 2015. 
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continue to characterise much of the comparative urban studies literature’ (2010: 473). In 
seeking to circumvent these issues, I have adopted the relational comparison approach 
advocated by Hart (2002) and Ward (2010). Relational comparison approaches differ from 
traditional comparative approaches that tend to focus on how and why discrete sites might be 
similar or different and what this means for the establishing or destabilising universal rules 
(Ward, 2010: 475). Instead, a relational comparison approach considers how places are 
historically formed and produced in relation to other spaces. This means stressing 
interconnectivity and considering what careful examination of a particular place can reveal 
about broader processes. Hart’s own explanation of her innovative approach is worth quoting 
at length: 
 
I am using what I call a relational concept of comparison that refuses to measure ‘cases’ 
against a universal yardstick. Instead of taking as pre-given objects, events, places and 
identities, I start with the question of how they are formed in relation one another. In this 
conception, particularities or specificities arise through interrelations between objects, 
events, places and identities; and it is through clarifying how these relations are produced 
and changed in practice that a close study of a particular part can illuminate the whole 
(Hart, 2002:15). 
 
Accordingly, adopting a relational comparison approach entails moving away from 
‘searching for similarities and differences between two mutually exclusive contexts and 
instead towards relational comparison that uses different cities [or in this case water company 
areas] to pose questions of one another’ (Ward, 2010: 480). With regard to the English water 
sector, this approach allows for greater consideration of how the trajectories of different 
regional monopolies are interconnected beyond their arbitrarily drawn boundaries and how 
approaches to metering are formed in relation to the emergence of other metering 
programmes. I have approached the case studies from the perspective that each company’s 
metering approach has been, at least in part, informed and influenced by the experiences of 
other water companies; the boundaries between water company areas are then, to an extent, 
permeable. In this context, embracing the concept of relational comparison facilitates 
investigation of how metering policies in particular areas emerge in relation to other 
programmes and what these specific manifestations can reveal about broader processes 




3.3 Research methods 
Decisions regarding the selection of methods used have been influenced by the two schools 
of thought identified in chapter two, namely historical materialism and Foucauldian notions 
of governmentality. A combination of the following methods have been used: document 
analysis, semi structured interviews with policy makers and water industry representatives, 
participant observation, and semi structured interviews with households receiving water 
meters. Table 4 establishes how the chosen methods correspond with the research objectives 
outlined in the introductory chapter. Subsequently, an explanation of each method is offered. 
 
 Table 4 Relationships between empirical research objectives and methods 
 
3.4 Discourse analysis 
Discourse analysis is portrayed as a powerful methodological tool in geography (Dittmer 
2009; Fairclough, 2003; Massey; Rydin 2005), albeit the exact role and transformative 
potential of the method is fiercely debated (see Lees, 2004). Discourse analysis speaks to 
both of the theoretical perspectives outlined in the previous chapter. This method can help 
describe how a set of rationales become dominant and how these versions of the “truth” are 
Research Objective Method(s) Corresponding 
Chapter(s) 
How and why have 
compulsory water metering 
programmes emerged, from 
the perspective of some water 
companies and stakeholders 
in the sector, as desirable 
intervention sin South East 
England? 
Discourse analysis, archival work, 
interviews with policy makers and 
industry representatives. 
Chapter four and 
five. 
How has the introduction of 
compulsory water metering  
influenced the ways in which 
water and water users are 
governed in the South East of 
England? 
Document analysis, 
Semi structured interviews with 




Chapter six and 
seven. 
What, if any, unintended 
outcomes have resulted from 
the introduction of 
compulsory water metering 
South East England? 
Document analysis, 
Semi structured interviews with 








produced, perpetuated and performed. Lees identifies two histories of discourse analysis, the 
first originates from the Marxist tradition and describes discourse analysis as ‘a tool for 
uncovering certain… ways of thinking and talking about how things should be done that 
serve vested interests’ (2004: 102). The second approach derives from Foucault’s work on 
genealogy and uses discourse analysis to better understand ‘how things and identities get 
constructed’ (Lees, 2004: 103, also see Anais, 2012). Of course, these two trajectories are far 
from mutually exclusive, for instance Said’s (2003 [1978]) Orientalism shows how these 
approaches are often mixed in practice through his application of Gramscian ideology 
critique and a post-structural exploration of discourse (Lees, 2004: 103).  
 
This thesis takes inspiration from Foucault’s work on genealogy to explore how compulsory 
companywide water metering programmes emerged, from the perspective of some water 
companies and policymakers, as a legitimate and desirable way of governing the waterscape. 
For Foucault, ‘genealogy is a methodological process concerned with telling the story of how 
a set of discursive and non-discursive practices come into being and interact to form a set of 
political, economic, moral, cultural, and social institutions which define the limits of 
acceptable speaking, knowing, and acting’ (Anais, 2012: 125). Indeed, Foucault (1997) noted 
that genealogy provokes questions regarding how certain ways of governing come to be. Here 
the focus of genealogical approaches differs from a historical one in that its task is not to 
trace events or practices from beginning, middle to end (Anais, 2012: 127).  Rather, 
according to Foucault, genealogy ‘disturbs what was previously considered immobile; it 
fragments what was thought unified; it shows the heterogeneity of what was imagined 
consistent with itself’ (1977: 147). Within the context of this thesis, discourse analysis, 
primarily in the form of document analysis, is useful because it can help explain how specific 
rationales come to the fore, how they are retained and reinforced. Moreover, discourse 
analysis can be used ‘to show how alternative geographies are foreclosed while the status quo 
is perpetuated’ (Dittmer, 2009: 285).  
 
In this context, document analysis is one of the key methods utilised throughout the research 
process. Following Silverman in his definition of “text”, I use “document” to describe ‘a 
heuristic device to identify data consisting of words and images which have become recorded 
without the intervention of a researcher (e.g. through an interview)’ (2009:52). As Dittmer 
notes, ‘if a researcher is interested in the ways in which knowledge is formulated and 
validated by society as truth, then discourse analysis is likely to be an excellent methodology 
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to use’ (2009: 275). In part, this is because discourse analysis can highlight the ‘non-obvious 
ways in which language is used in social relations of power and domination, and in ideology’ 
(Fairclough, 2003: 229). Document analysis is, therefore, an appropriate method for 
developing a genealogy of metering and analysing the ways in which compulsory water 
metering has become a legitimate policy intervention.  
 
There is an enormous amount of published textual data on water governance in England, as a 
result I had to be selective in the documents I chose to work with. This has, of course, has 
shaped the narrative of the thesis. I focused primarily on documents relating directly to 
metering that had been produced by government, actors within the water industry, CCW, the 
regulators and the popular press. The origins of the key documents that I have engaged with, 
in addition to those that are publically available from the water industry and donated or 
loaned by interviewees, are outlined in Table 5. Communicating how texts are selected is, as 
Dittmer suggests, ‘important for demonstrating the rigor of the analysis’ (2009: 28; also see 
Baxter and Eyles 1997). 
 
Table 5 Document libraries and sources 
Document source Content 
Public Utilities Access Forum 
Water Archives, Bishopsgate 
Institute: London. 
I was informed by a former Secretary of the Public Utilies 
Access Forum (PUAF), Sean Creighton, that boxes of 
PUAF publications, meeting minutes and correspondence 
had been donated to the Bishopsgate Institute’s Library in 
London.  
The National Archives, Kew: 
London. 
Water policy and planning documents, correspondence 
and minutes pertaining to water in the 1950s to 1960s. 
The British Library: London. Water policy and engineering documents 1840-1990. 
The Water Demand Library, 
The Radcliff Library, Oxford 
University: Oxford. 
This collection is constituted of approximately 1000 
documents dating from privatisation until 2008; 
documents were originally kept by the UK National 
Demand Centre and constituted its Water Demand 
Library.   
 
Document analysis in this project is not used as an end in itself. While useful to explore how 
certain ways of governing come to be dominant, document analysis alone, as Bakker notes, is 
insufficient to understand some the nuances of knowledge production in UK waterscape 
(1998). Therefore, it is vital that this method is combined with others in order to better 
understand how knowledge is produced and performed in practice. For instance, McDowell 
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has highlighted how interviews can be used, in combination with other methods, to ‘probe an 
issue in depth’ (2010: 157).  
 
3.5 Water industry interviews 
Interviewing “key informants” is a well-established tradition within human geography and 
across the social sciences more broadly (McDowell, 1998). Initially, I arranged a series of 
preliminary meetings with representatives from organisations that appeared prominent in 
existing literature; individuals who have been active in water debates in the UK and 
academics who are currently working on water governance in the UK. Ruming draws on 
ANT methods (though I would argue that this approach is far from exclusive to ANT as 
indicated by reference to snowballing in a large range of research methods text books), to 
argue that beginning a research project with a series of interviews sampled through a 
“snowball” technique can be beneficial. Firstly, it allows the researcher to begin to 
understand how different actors are connected in the sector and, secondly, this kind of 
interview process can be ‘mobilised in an effort to validate... agency as a researcher and gain 
access to informants’ through gaining credibility as an “informed” researcher (Ruming, 2009: 
459). I found snowballing a useful way to meet individuals within the water sector that I 
otherwise would not have done. Especially since during the initial stages of the research, it 
became apparent that knowledge about water governance in England is focused in the hands 
of a relatively small number of individuals in the water sector.  
 
Throughout the course of my research I interviewed 32 water industry officials, for a full list 
of interviewees see Table 6. Interviews were semi-structured, varied considerably in length 
and some interviewees were spoken with on multiple occasions. As McDowell (2010) 
suggests, in-depth semi structured interviews are useful because they can provide a more 
detailed and multi-layered picture of how and why environments are produced in particular 
ways. However, this kind of interview is not unproblematic for, as Rice points out, 
‘interviewing elites presents researchers with a number of practical challenges associated 
with the question of power’ (2010: 70). Power, in this instance, should be understood as 
relational and it is this relational effect which can cause elites to ‘restrict access and truncate 
critical social research’, particularly in instances where the research material is commercially 
sensitive (ibid). In this context, Rice observes that the researcher is unlikely to retain 
complete control of the scenario and is often reliant on industrial or corporate elites who may 
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be sceptical regarding the commercial implications of the research. Here it is worth reflecting 
on Ruming’s (2009) writings on the partiality of research and acknowledge that it is not 
always possible to access all the information the researcher would like to. McDowell explores 
these challenges in her work with merchant bankers in regard to the conflict between honesty, 
openness and gaining access to potential interviewees (2010: 164). She suggests that ‘people 
are now more cautious and more savvy about being interviewed’ (ibid). For this doctoral 
research, on the whole, interviewees tended to be extremely open and helpful. However, at 
times, concerns about commercial sensitivity or company image came to the fore and 
interviewees made clear that they did not feel able to openly discuss some issues.  
 
In this context, the positionality of the researcher requires careful thought. In order to reduce 
the amount of possible obstacles faced, I thought carefully about how I would position 
myself, how I would explain my research objectives and how I would offer to share data 
(Rice 2010, McDowell 1998, Routledge 2008, England 1994). Indeed, it is now, rightfully, 
commonplace for researchers to recognise that ‘they are not invisible, neutral entities; rather, 
they are part of the interaction they seek to study, and they influence the interaction’ (Fontana 
& Prokos, 2007: 83, also see Rose, 1997).  
 
The format of these interviews was largely dependent on the participants’ schedule and 
commitments, some interviews took place in person, others over the telephone and I met with 
some interviewees multiple times. The majority were recorded and transcribed. Where 
possible I provided interviewees with a transcript of the interview for comment, this was 
extremely helpful because it allowed participants to clarify their viewpoints and highlights 
areas that they thought were unclear in the original interview transcript and, to an extent, 
relieved tensions surrounding commercial sensitivities. References to interview material have 
been anonymised due to the highly sensitive politics of water metering. Where interviews are 
cited directly, they are referenced in bold according to the date of the interview and the type 







Table 6 List of interviewees 
Organisation Role of interviewee 
Age UK Policy Adviser, Consumer Markers (Utilities). 
Citizens’ Advice Bureau 
(CAB) Social Policy Officer, Essential Services. 
Chartered Institute of 
Environmental Health Principal Policy Officer. 
Consumer Council for Water 
(CCW) 
Research Project Manager. 
Research Manager. 
Policy Manager - London and South East. 
Assistant Policy Manager South West England. 
Senior Policy Manager Affordability. 
Energy Savings Trust Water Strategy Manager 
Frank Dobson MP Former Shadow Secretary of State for the Environment. 
Lord Deben (John Gummer) Former Secretary of State for the Environment. 
Fabian Society Senior Researcher. 
Greater London Assembly 
Senior Strategy Manager and Assistant responsible for 
water policy. 
Independent Researchers 
Senior Researchers who work with water companies when 
delivering projects related to metering. 
Ofwat 
Metering Policy Officer. 
Smart Metering Lead. 
Water Resources Manager. 
Senior Manager responsible for affordability policy. 
South East Water 
Metering Manager. 
Communications Manager responsible for managing the 
metering programme. 
South West Water 
Service and Delivery Manger. 
Customer Research. 
Research and Policy Manager. 
Southern Water 




Policy and Standards. 
Communications. 
Operations (metering). 
Metering and Leakage. 
Water efficiency. 
Waterwise Policy Officer/Researcher Water. 
3.6 Household interviews 
In addition to interviews with interested parties, I also interviewed 45 domestic water users in 
Basingstoke, which is in SEW’s constituency and 15 households in London, TW’s catchment 
area. Water users in Basingstoke, one of the first areas to obtain meters as part of its customer 
metering programme, had received meters shortly before the interview whereas many of 
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those interviewed in London did not possess a meter. Interviews were semi-structured and, 
although a number of key topics were covered each time, the structure of the interview 
enabled interviewees to pursue issues that were of greater interest or relevance to their 
situation. This allowed participants to shape the research process, the main implication being 
that more interview time was dedicated to discussing the relationship between metering and 
the cost of the water bill than I had initially anticipated. This in turn shaped of course shaped 
the analysis and the final form of the thesis. 
 
For the most part, interviews were undertaken on a one to one basis. However, at times, 
interviews were conducted with multiple members of the same family or in small groups. 
Water use within the home can be deeply personal and in some cases the small focus groups 
allowed participants to ‘discover shared experiences’, or different experiences, in a safe 
environment (see Pratt, 2002: 221). Some of the more interesting discussions were borne out 
these interactions. Similarly, household interviews tended to be more vibrant when more than 
one member of the family was present; it tended to be the case that interviewees were more 
comfortable speaking about water use at home when in small groups. These interviews and 
focus groups explored residents’ views on (compulsory) water metering, how they relate to 
water and how that might change given the installation of a meter. 
 
Household interviews are a useful method because they can provide insight into ‘how 
individual people experience and make sense of their own lives’ as well as ‘the meanings 
people attribute to their lives and the processes which operate in particular social contexts’ 
(Valentine, 1997: 110). Considering that my research is in many ways concerned with the 
potential performative effects of increased metering, focusing on meaning, experiences and 
situated knowledge of water users is vital. This involves acknowledging that ‘all knowledge 
is produced in specific circumstances and that those circumstances shape it in some way’ 
(Rose, 1997: 305). As Haraway (1998) states, ‘knowledges are limited, specific and partial’ 
and it is important to consider how these particular knowledges are negotiated and 
articulated. The importance of exploring situated knowledges is emphasised by McDowell 
who explains the importance of adopting a method that allows people to ‘construct their own 
accounts of their experiences by describing and explaining their lives in their own words’ 
(McDowell. 2010: 162). I endeavoured to ensure that interviews were ‘a dialogue rather than 





Recently, the extent to which interviews are an appropriate method to research everyday 
practices has been called into question. Some scholars, drawing on stronger forms of social 
practice theory, have argued that people are carriers of habitual practices, thus suggesting that 
people are incapable of critically reflecting on why or why not they adopt a particular 
practice (Reckwitz, 2002 – see chapter two for more on social practice theory). Hitchings 
(2012), challenges this statement. Instead, he argues that while it is sometimes difficult for 
people to talk about their practices in an interview situation, this does not mean that this 
approach is impossible or without merit. For example, in Hitching and Day’s research with 
older people and comfort practices surrounding achieving domestic warmth in the winter, 
they argue that ‘probing about why they might or might not, adopt alternative approaches, did 
help us work through their mundane actions together’ (ibid). Hitchings concluded that: 
 
Respondents could, and did, talk about their practices in various thoughtful ways and, whilst 
they could be reticent about discussing them with their peers, they would often quite like to. 
In any case, this group certainly did not feel themselves to be impotent ‘carriers’ of practices 
that forced them to reproduce unexciting suites of mundane actions with little personal 
reflection. Rather they were often alive to the potential for doing differently, and relatively 
keen to discuss this’ (Hitchings, 2012: 65).   
 
During the research process I found, for the most part, people were happy and fairly 
enthusiastic about discussing their practices and were generally interested in what other 
people do and think regarding water and water metering. 
 
When interviewing households about their water practices, it is important to consider the 
positionality of the researcher. The researcher, as suggested above, is not neutral but 
influences the type of data that is produced. My role as researcher was tested at times. Some 
interviewees confused me for a water company employee, despite reassurance to the contrary 
and having presented university identification at the first meeting and at the beginning of the 
interview. These interviewees were hoping that I would be able to answer questions on behalf 
of the water company. When these situations arose, I made clear that I am an independent 
researcher and, as I am not affiliated to any of the water companies, I could not speak on their 
behalf. Where appropriate, I encouraged interviewees to consult the water company or CCW 




3.7 Interview sampling strategy 
Sampling is important because it in designing the sampling strategy, the researcher is 
presented with a number of decisions that will determine ‘whose voices will be heard’ 
(McDowell, 2010). For this reason ‘sampling should be theoretically grounded’ (Silverman, 
2009: 143). This does not mean that sampling has to be fixed; the sample can evolve as the 
study progresses. As Baxter and Eyles highlight, ‘who and what comes next depends on who 
and what came before’ (1997: 515). For this research, it was most appropriate to target 
households in areas where meters were being installed at an early stage of SEW’s ten year 
project because I was keen to hear about peoples’ experiences of the company’s customer 
engagement strategy as well as their attitudes to water use pre and post metering. SEW kindly 
provided a list of installation dates by postcode, this helped me to structure the sample more 
carefully. 
 
I mapped Indices of Multiple Deprivation (IMD) data across Basingstoke and compared this 
to the meter installation timetable. IMD data was used because it gives a more nuanced 
representation of relative degrees of poverty as it considers variables, including income data, 
which are not accounted for in other surveys such as the census. The IMD data analysis 
output is also at neighbourhood level, thus providing a more accurate indication of relative 
poverty. However, this is only indicative as neighbourhoods often contain households in 
radically different circumstances. In terms of sampling I endeavoured to include: households 
situated across the IMD spectrum; a range of household types; a range of ages; a balance of 
male/female participants; people who would receive a meter under the compulsory scheme as 
well as a smaller number of people who had opted for a meter. 
 
In order to recruit participants I tried a range of strategies with relative degrees of success. 
Initially I carried out a letter drop using a flyer that outlined my research and invited 
households to participate. I followed this up by door knocking and I also received emails 
offering participation from people offering their time for an interview. Take up using this 
method was relatively low. Attitudes to researchers approaching domestic spaces seem 
radically different in England compared to my previous experience in South Africa where, 
with a community leader making an initial introduction, residents on the whole tended to be 
much more open. In comparison English homes appeared closed off. For instance, an 
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interviewee I met at a water company event said after his interview that ‘to be perfectly 
honest you’re lucky that you spoke to us when you did, we don’t tend to open the door unless 
we’re expecting someone, you get so much rubbish through the post these days and people 
coming round trying to sell you anything and nothing’.  
 
Seeking a greater number of participants I contacted managers of community centres in both 
Basingstoke and London, after I had explained my research, most allowed me to address 
group members before a session or club commenced. I also attended several metering drop-in 
centres organised by SEW and asked attendees to consider participating in the research. 
Recruiting in this way required a high degree of sensitivity; I had to ensure that I 
differentiated myself from the water company employees and exercised discretion when 
approaching attendees. The first drop in centre was attended by residents who were fairly 
sympathetic with the metering programme and were seeking further information, here 
participants were happy to arrange interviews. However, in the following session some 
attendees were visibly distraught, clearly it is important as a researcher not to cause or 
exacerbate distress so I decided that it would not be appropriate to approach these residents.  
 
It was made clear that participants were welcome to withdraw from the research at any point 
and all material would be anonymised. Most interviews were recorded; however some 
interviewees indicated that they were uncomfortable with this, so in these cases hand written 
notes were taken. Interviewees were offered an opportunity to amend a transcript of the 
interview, very few respondents thought this necessary. However, it was important to offer, 
especially since the same opportunity was presented to policy groups. 
 
3.8 Observation 
In addition to document analysis and interviews, I accompanied SRN’s Green Doctors on 
three visits and recorded observations. Additionally, I attended several All Party 
Parliamentary Water Group meetings which are held in the House of Commons and chaired 
by the Conservative MP Anne McIntosh. These meetings usually consist of panel discussions 
followed by a question and answer sessions and are attended by a range of stakeholders 
including MPs, water companies, regulators, suppliers, advocacy organisations, unions, 
academics, business representatives and consultancy organisations. Moreover, observations 
were made at conferences, meetings at Defra about the future of SRN’s metering programme, 
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CCW’s quarterly public meetings and SEW’s drop in centres for its metering programme. 
Observation became a key means of better understanding how policy is negotiated and 
relationships between organisations are performed as well as how some elements of policy 
are implemented in practice (Flick, 2009). Observations were recorded in a research diary.  
 
3.9 Limitations 
The main limitations of this thesis relate to questions of access. The popular press tends to 
react negatively to news that companies are considering metering programmes; metering 
tends to be presented as a punitive tax on the poor. Considering the unprecedented scale of 
the metering programmes, and the corresponding change to the way water charges are 
structured, policy makers were cautious about how these programmes would be presented by 
researchers and journalists. Negative press coverage could have serious implications for the 
acceptability of future metering programmes. The sensitivity of water metering meant that it 
was sometimes difficult for interviewees to speak frankly and, at times, arranging interviews 
with senior policy makers proved difficult. This was especially true of government figures. 
Of course, these access issues shaped the narrative of the thesis.  
 
There were also challenges in recruiting participants for household interviews. When 
conducting qualitative research it is common for water companies and other organisations to 
pay participants around £100 for their time. Clearly it is not possible to provide this sort of 
incentive within parameters of a doctoral project. Moreover, ethically, it is not desirable. As a 
result of difficulties in recruiting participants, the sample is skewed in favour of those who 
tended to be at home during the day and used community services. Consequently, those who 
have retired and women with young children were overrepresented in the sample. As a result, 
data from these interviews should be treated with caution and definitive statements about 
broader trends should not be extrapolated. Nonetheless, the content of these interviews 
provided interesting insights into how these households engaged with water and compulsory 
metering.  
 
The politicised and high profile character of compulsory metering also influenced content of 
household interviews. Although the interviews were semi structured, and therefore were 
organised to be responsive to the interviewees’ interests and experiences, key topics were 
included in the interview script. These included questions about how participants used water 
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at home; their water practices; how they perceived the local environment; impressions of 
compulsory metering; and what, if anything, they might change following the introduction of 
the meter. However, these topics were covered unevenly on occasion because some 
interviewees were anxious about the impact that a metered charge might have on their water 
bill. As a result these interviewees were more interested in talking, and asking questions, 
about the introduction of metering and the potential bill impact rather than the other topics. 
This could be partially addressed in the future by changing the way the research is 
communicated to participants and placing greater emphasis on water practices rather than 
metering specifically. However, it was important to be honest about the aims of the research. 
While, ideally, it would have been preferential to cover the topics more evenly, the 
interviewees’ focus on the financial aspects of metering provided insight into some of their 
key concerns and consequently shaped the contours of thesis. 
 
The final difficulty also makes this doctoral research interesting; compulsory metering is 
happening in the contemporary moment. This means that information about aspects of the 
programmes, particularly with information pertaining to affordability mechanisms, has 
changed rapidly throughout the course of the research. Debates around water affordability 
have also been undertaken in the context of high profile parliamentary and public discussions 
about the affordability of energy. Recently, government has made multiple announcements 
about energy affordability and there have also been calls for the government to take further 
action regarding water affordability. These debates are ongoing yet the thesis draws a line at 
October 2013. All material is up to date and accurate at the time of writing.  
 
3.10 Analysis – translating research into a thesis 
 
Most interviews [are] pure twaddle and valueless… Now, in your interview, you have 
certainly been most accurate; you have set down the sentences I uttered as I said them. But 
you have not a word of explanation; what my manner was at several points is not indicated. 
Therefore, no reader can possibly know where I was in earnest and where I was joking; or 
whether I was joking altogether or in earnest altogether. Such a report of a conversation has 
no value. It can convey many meanings to the reader, but never the right one’ (Mark Twain 




The final research output reflects the network of actors the researcher has been able to access. 
It expresses how research participants and documents have been engaged and, importantly, it 
reflects how the researcher decides to interpret, present or suppress their findings (McDowell, 
1998). The network we translate is, therefore, different from that which we enter in the first 
place and in some senses, the researcher is in a powerful position in translating research. All 
research is, therefore, a process of translation told by a particular person, at a particular time 
and to a particular audience (McDowell 1998; Ruming, 2009: 451; Cowan et al. 2009). I tried 
to ensure that the final thesis reflected not only the content of interactions accurately but also 
the spirit.  
 
This was partly achieved by sharing transcripts with interviewees as discussed above. Sharing 
these transcripts provoked a conversation with participants about the interview material and 
provided a clearer indication of how the data should be represented. This helped to ensure 
that the final thesis reflected the spirit of interactions with participants. The thesis also uses 
direct quotes as frequently as possible to help ensure that data is presented clearly.  
 
The data collected through interviews, observations (which were recorded in a research diary) 
and document analysis were manually coded. The coding method is important because it, in 
part, determines what themes the researcher focuses on and, accordingly, the eventual shape 
of the analysis. I began by identifying a series of broad themes across the data, deliberately 
keeping an open mind so my approach was flexible enough to allow particular themes and 
sub-themes to emerge in the participants’ words. Cope argues that this flexible approach 
‘allow[s] the data to “speak”’ (2010:444). Here, as researcher, it is important to reflect on 
codes as they emerge and consider how these codes relate to existing literature. I coded 
interview data by hand, creating a database of key themes. This enabled me to situate 
quotations and ensure that the final quotations used in the thesis were representative of the 
broader data. The process of coding then becomes an instrumental way of analysing data and 
is vital in ensuring that the evidence used in the final thesis is representative of the data 
collected. Information from transcripts, field notes from interviews have been triangulated 








Water metering is often treated as an adjunct to debates about institutional change (Hassan 
1998), regulation (Bakker 2004) and shifts in supply/demand management strategies (Walker 
2013) in the water sector. This and the subsequent chapter provide a genealogy of water 
metering in England in order to better understand how companywide compulsory water 
metering has emerged as a desirable technique to govern the waterscape in South East 
England. The two chapters draw on Foucault’s genealogical approach to trace how water 
metering programmes, in its various guises, have been used to negotiate different ways of 
understanding the waterscape with respect to governing the conduct of individuals and 
regulation of the population more broadly.  
 
This chapter teases out how the meter has been used to help express and negotiate different 
understandings of fairness and waste between 1840 until 1960. In doing so, this chapter 
builds on Drakeford’s (1998) work on the more draconian aspects of prepayment meters and 
disconnection in the 1990s, Knamiller and Sharp’s (2009) work on the relationship between 
compulsory metering and trust and Trentmann and Taylor’s (2011) work the relationship 
between debates over household metering and the onset of consumer politics in the early 
twentieth century. Importantly, meanings and measurements of fairness and waste have been 
constantly renegotiated through water metering since 1840. Chapter five then examines how 
the meter has been used to renegotiate the waterscape from 1960 until 2009. Here it is 
important to reiterate that this chapter is not a history of metering; it does not trace the story 
of metering absolutely from beginning to middle to end. As discussed in chapter three, 
genealogy, closely linked to Foucault’s work on governmentality, is a:   
 
Methodological process concerned with telling the story of how a set of discursive and non-
discursive practices come into being and interact to form a set of political, economic, moral, 
cultural, and social institutions which define the limits of acceptable speaking, knowing and 




In constructing a genealogy of water metering, this chapter seeks to provide the means to 
launch an investigation of what Foucault referred to as 'the “history of the present” by 
‘mounting an organised assault on the intellectual object that we take history to be and by 
unsettling and disrupting the political and intellectual grounds upon which we rest our 
inquiries' (Anais, 2012:126). It considers what the story of water metering in England can tell 
us about the emergence of contemporary companywide compulsory metering programmes. In 
doing so, reflecting on theories of governmentality, the chapter reveals a recurring conflict 
between economics and biopolitics where the biopolitical political need to secure life through 
a constant supply of affordable water is often presented as being, to an extent, antithetical to 
paying for water by volume. In this context, the meter is taken as an important artefact 
through which understandings of fairness in the waterscape are negotiated and renegotiated.  
 
This chapter begins by exploring the emergence of the waste water meter as a means of 
securing and managing the biopolitcal problem of constant supply in the late 19
th
 Century. It 
argues that the meter played an important role in securing and regulating the water network. 
Subsequently, building on Trentmann and Taylor (2005), calls for a ‘right’ to household 
metering are considered alongside debates surrounding the (in)justices of metering in the 
context of rising unmeasured water prices. This section explores how the object of the meter 
shifted from the physical network to household consumption, focusing on debates over the 
competing notions of fairness present in metering debates. The chapter then moves to 
position the meter as a means of defining and delineating what is understood by ‘normal’ and 
‘domestic’ supply at the turn of the 20th century; here water metering became, for a relatively 
short period of time, a politically salient issue. Overall this chapter teases out how the water 
meter has been utilised to help frame and, in part, constantly renegotiate different 
understandings of fairness and waste in relation to water from the late Victorian period to 
1960. In this context, the water meter has played an important role in producing the 
socionatural waterscape and setting in motion a debate that placed securing public health 
through an affordable supply of water at odds with forms of economics which privileged 




4.2 Vital biopolitics and the problem of constant supply 
Although sanitation had been a matter of concern for government since medieval times, the 
‘heroic’ exploits of Victorian water engineers in realising constant supply during 1870-90 
represented a pivotal moment in the history of water supply in Great Britain (Marvin and Guy 
1997). Some have described this moment as an ‘urban revolution’ (Wohl 1983). In particular 
Edwin Chadwick’s Report on the Sanitary Condition of the Labouring Population of Great 
Britain (1842) and Sir Joseph Bazalgette’s system of ‘intercepting sewers’ (Halliday, 2001:4) 
were vital in ‘cleansing, clearing, paving, draining and ventilating’ the city (Joyce 2003: 63). 
Victorian water engineers were successful in convincing politicians of the importance of 
technological solutions. Individual bodies became increasingly connected to the city through 
the water network, for instance through the introduction of new technologies such as water 
closets.  In doing Victorian water engineers forged a ‘hydraulic society… which conceived… 
the city as a place of flows and, movement and circulation’ where ‘vital processes’ had to be 
secured and disease tackled (ibid). This should not be read purely as philanthropic exercise 
but a securitisation strategy or, in other words, ‘a means of preventing disease in order to save 
on outlay on the Poor Law’ (Osborne, 1996: 104). Disease in this context was considered to 
be ‘wastage’ (ibid). Here, Joyce insists that the ‘care of the city and health of the body were 
one’ (2003: 65).  
 
This reworking of the water supply system is best understood as a biopolitical process, a 
system of ‘vital regulation’, where government intervenes, in this case through the 
engineering of sanitation solutions and the introduction of constant supply, to secure life 
(Osborne 1996: 100; Bakker 2012). It is important, however, not to overstate the networked 
nature of the water system. Although legislation in 1847/52 ‘compelled water companies to 
provide water for domestic supply’, constant supply of water emerged ‘slowly and unevenly’ 
after 1860. As a result, ‘people in neighbouring streets and districts had radically different 
experiences as users, subject to different hours, quantities, standards of supply and prices’ 
(Trentmann and Taylor, 2005). This level of fragmentation indicates that water supply in 
England and Wales had not achieved the ‘modern infrastructural ideal’ described by Graham 
and Marvin in their Splintering Urbanism thesis (2001). At this point a plethora of water 
providers, public and private, were operating in England. Although the number is greatly 
reduced compared to the Victorian era, there were still over 1000 water undertakings 
registered in 1950. The story of the radically reconstituted networked water system in Britain 
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is well documented (Hassan 1998), less well told is the relationship between metering and the 
emergence of constant supply.  This relationship is imperative because it helps establish a 
series of principles that, as this chapter demonstrates, will continue to be struggled over one 
hundred years later.  
 
4.3 Securing and Re-ordering the Network: the waste water meter 
The invention of the Deacon Waste Water Meter in Liverpool (1870, see Figure 4) highlights 
an important juncture in the history of water supply governance in the England and Wales; it 
represents a key moment when water waste became a matter of concern for government. In 
addition to achieving constant supplies of water, engineers, water companies and politicians 
began to become concerned with notions of water ‘waste’ and measures to reduce it which, in 
turn, would secure the water network. There is, of course, no objective definition of water 
‘waste’. Particular understandings are socially and historically determined. In this context 
water ‘waste’, typically, referred to water lost through leakage rather than perceived wasteful 
or high volume water practices. Engineers and politicians were united in a common goal to 
defend England's recently acquired title of 'the home of hygiene' (Joyce, 2003: 69). As Taylor 
and Trentmann (2011) have emphasised, the introduction of constant supply is directly linked 
to the emergence of metering.  
 
Although the quest for constant supply elevated water to a matter of concern for government, 
the goal of achieving constant supply should not be confused with support for free-flowing, 
unregulated water supplies. When giving oral evidence to the 1886 Royal Commission on 
Water Supply, an engineer from the Kent Waterworks Company was asked whether, in his 
opinion, ‘constant supply would be a very good thing?’ To which he responded: ‘I do, if we 
could at once prevent waste, or if we had power given to us to prevent it, or any system were 
devised by which we could rid of the enormous waste which is attendant upon a constant 
supply as carried out under the present system’ (HC 1886, col. 497). In this instance it is clear 
that water had not ‘always behave[d] the way humans had hoped’ (Joyce, 2003: 15; Bakker 
2004 later coined the phrase ‘uncooperative commodity’ to describe this phenomenon). 
Support for constant supply was conditional upon waste reduction strategies. The waste water 
meter became a means of subverting the controversy introduced by constant supply by 
making waste more visible and then, along with new pipes, fixtures and sewers, making it 
less unruly in an ‘attempt by humans to make matter perform’ by ordering and securing the 
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water network (Joyce 2003: 15). Reflecting back on Foucault’s concept of governmentality, 
the Deacon Waste Water meter was not employed to influence the self-conduct of water  
 
users, instead metering operated at the district rather than household level. Here the Deacon 
Waste Water Meter became an important biopolitical tool and was implemented to secure life 
by disciplining the physical water network rather than the population per se.  
 
 Figure 4 The Deacon Waste Water Meter 
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While contemporary companywide compulsory water metering programmes are located in 
South East England, the Waste Water Meter was invented in North West England by Mr G F 
Deacon, an engineer to the Liverpool Corporation.
11
 According to Watherston (1876), the 
waste water meter was ‘devised and adopted for the discovery, suppression and prevention of 
waste’ (p. 3). This meter differed from more blunt instruments ‘which merely count[ed] the 
number of gallons passed between any two observations’ because it also recorded ‘on a 
diagram, the rate of flow at each and every instant’ (ibid). Its inventors claimed that meter 
readings could be used to differentiate between the water wasted and the water used (see 
Figure 5 for an example). Interestingly, waste was identified as water lost in the network, for 
instance through ‘improper fittings’ and leakage, rather than the result of the actions of 
individual households. Watherston argued that  
It is obvious that when water being drawn off for use in such a district, the rate of flow from 
minute to minute must be variable, and this is accordingly shown by the irregular vertical 
lines from noon to 11pm. And from 5 am to noon. When waste alone is taking place, the flow 
must evidently be uniform, and the condition is indicated by the comparatively uniform and 
horizontal line from 2 to 5am. Only occasionally is water drawn during the night (1876: 4).  
 
Following the installation of a waste water meter system, water waste could be monitored 
carefully. The water network was divided into a number of districts and the net population of 
the district was ascertained. From this information an estimate of the average waste per head 
per could be obtained by a simple calculation. Readings were taken for the meters every three 
to four days and the information from the meter could be used to identify the ‘most wasteful’ 
districts which would then, in turn, inform the activities of the Night Inspector. After 11pm a 
Night Inspector would visit the ‘most wasteful’ districts and inspect the stop cock using a 
wooden rope and stethoscope, leaving open those where he heard running water and 
recording the waste in his report book. The following morning a Day Inspector, accompanied 
by a labourer, would visit the marked properties to examine the fittings and pipes in order to 
determine the source of waste. According to Walker 
 
Any minor causes of leakage, such as worn leather, or other defect which can be repaired in 
a few minutes at the time, without interfering with regular plumbers work, is set to rights 
                                                 
11
 Perhaps it should be no surprise that the waste water meter was developed in Liverpool for, according to 
Hassan, ‘water was so scarce in Liverpool that begging for it was common’ (1998). 
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gratuitously by the Day Inspector, whilst notices to repair or renew are only issued to the 
owner or occupier in graver cases (Walker, 1883:4-5).  
 
During the same day, the diagram produced by the water meter was consulted to measure the 
flow of water, the accuracy of the Inspectors’ report was checked and the ‘proportion of the 
whole waste of the district’ that he had detected would be calculated (ibid). Here the meter 
became a key way of managing the security of the water supply network. In tackling waste, 
emphasis was placed on the workings of fixtures and fittings, the quality of which was 
bemoaned by engineers, rather than the water use practices of individual households. In this 
context, one Member of Parliament concluded that ‘the success or failure of constant supply 
depended entirely upon the state of the fittings in a house. Unless they were in good order a 
frightful waste occurred’ (Mr Coope, HC 1875, col 874-94). Interestingly, while some 
engineers were sceptical that the habits of household water users could be altered, others 
argued that it would be necessary to establish a ‘water police’. The ‘water police’ would 
regulate household water use but a Royal Commission report concluded that ‘the public 
would not bear’ it and so the introduction of a water police was considered to be ‘perfectly 
out of the question’ (Royal Commission 1885).12 Addressing inefficient fixtures and fittings 
was perceived as a more realistic and politically palatable solution.  
 
The architects of the waste water system made fantastic claims regarding the advantages 
posed by the waste water meter system. First and foremost the meter could help reduce waste 
(see Figure 6 which shows the record of water flow before and after an inspection). It was 
claimed that the waste water meter system would bring water savings of between 25 and 100 
per cent compared to ordinary inspection. Moreover, the meter was described as a ‘labour 
saving technology’ for it economised inspector’s time and would require fewer staff to 
operate than the inspector system. Nevertheless, it is clear that the waste water meter system 
was not universally welcomed across the myriad of water companies, both public and private, 
that were in operation during the late 19
th
 century. For example, the engineer for Croydon 
Water Works Report advised against the adoption of the waste water meter system due to the 
expense of meter installation; a reason that would be frequently cited over the course of the 
next century (Walker 1883). Instead he advised the company to continue to employ 
                                                 
12
 The notion of a water police has some resonance with the Green Doctor service provided by SRN in the 
contemporary moment and is explored in chapter seven. 
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inspectors in order to carry out waste detection without the technical support offered by the 
meter.  
 
Despite concerns expressed by some water providers, notions of waste reduction and labour 
saving were sustained in the dominant discourse surrounding metering. For example the 
adverts below (Figure 7) from the Water Engineer’s Handbook clearly show that these ideas 
and concerns about network security had become prominent. What is clear is that the advent 
of constant supply made water (and water waste) a matter of concern for government. In this 
context, water providers sought ways to better control the flow of water and the Deacon 
Waste Water System was introduced in an effort to reduce water waste. This technology was 
designed to support and secure new constant supplies of water by monitoring the network 
rather than individual water use practices. Importantly this was done with the conscious 
intention of protecting England’s newly acquired reputation as the ‘home of hygiene’ thus 
emphasising the importance of water and water metering as biopolitical problems. This way a 
key moment in the process of the governmentalisation of the state; securing life by ensuring a 

















Figure 5 Measurements from the Deacon Waste Water Meter 


































Figure 7 Adverts for meters (Source: Water Engineers’ Handbook, 1930 & 1931)  
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4.4 From pipes to people: The ‘right’ to a meter and the (in)justice of 
water metering  
Although households were not initially metered in the 19
th
 century, businesses were. There 
are two main reasons for this. Firstly, the cost of supplying meters to industrial bodies was far 
less than to households. Secondly, industrialisation had triggered rapidly rising water 
consumption in Victorian cities and, as a result, water providers were keen to ensure that the 
cost of supplying water to commercial organisations was recouped (Royal Commission, 
1885). In contrast, households, or at least those who had access to constant supply, paid water 
rates. These were configured on the basis of estimated consumption which, in turn, was 
calculated according to property size. Water rates differed radically from one water provider 
to another. From the 1850s the way that water charges were constructed altered. Instead of 
property size, annual property values became the basis of the charge, thus bringing water in 
line with other local taxes (Trentmann and Taylor, 2005).  
 
The change in the way water rates were articulated was met with scorn from some Ratepayer 
Associations. This, in turn, stimulated a broader debate over household metering. In 
particular, the actions of Archibald Dobbs, a prominent Barrister and a member of the 
Islington Rate Payers Association, helped to shift the object of metering from pipes to people. 
His activities are important in the context of this genealogy of water metering for three main 
reasons. Firstly, his legislative battle and claim to the right to a metered supply elevated the 
political interest in metering and helped instigate the emergence of a new consumer culture 
(Trentmann and Taylor, 2005). Secondly, Dobbs was directly involved in Luton based 
George Kent Ltd’s decision to adopt water metering into its business. Finally, and most 
importantly, Dobbs’ activities brought to the fore a debate about equality and water metering 
that would continue to rage on for over one hundred years.  
 
In 1882, Archibald Dobbs brought a test case against the New River Company which 
operated in North London. Dobbs objected to the introduction of property valuation to 
determine water charges, arguing that the re-articulation of the system, and the resulting rise 
in the water rate, resulted in companies overcharging customers and thus violating the 
customers’ private property rights (Trentmann and Taylor 2005: 64). Dobbs took his case to 
the House of Lords and won. This was perceived to be a disaster for the water company, not 
least because of the fiscal implications but because the decision involved a ‘great question of 
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principle’ (ibid). Here ‘the House of Lords had decided that the Water Companies had been 
charging far too much’ and water customers needed to be protected from the vampire-like 
behaviour of the private water companies (Trentmann and Taylor, 2005: 64). Dobb’s case 
formed the foundations for a series of active (if relatively short lived) Consumer Defence 
Leagues established to protect consumer interests (ibid). In this context, Kent argued that 
domestic water users were ‘agitating’ for metering; meters were perceived as a key means of 
preventing further price rises (1982: 94, chapter six explores the relationship between 
metering and control over the bill in the contemporary moment).  
 
Dobb’s court case was also important because it contributed towards George Kent’s decision 
to include the manufacture of water meters as a core part of his business. George Kent Ltd 
would later become Elsevier Metering, one of the largest water meter companies with 
considerable global reach. Kent had first entered the business world as a blindmaker and, 
prior to adopting the meter, his firm was considered to be a pioneer of domestic ‘labour 
savings technologies’. The business was most renowned for the rotary cleaning knife and the 
domestic refrigerator or ‘ice safe’. It was somewhat fortuitous for George Kent that the water 
meter arose as a viable business venture considering that the ice box and the cleaning knife 
had been ‘more or less relegated to the limbo of the past’ (George Kent Ltd, 1938).  
 
Water meters were first included in the business in 1883. An employee of George Kent Ltd, 
Mr J.W. Sutton, had followed the Dobbs’ case with considerable interest. Sutton approached 
Dobbs and the two men met frequently to discuss ‘the question of the want of equity, so far 
as the customer was concerned, in charging by the rate instead of by quantity… and the idea 
of substituting the water rate eventually directed Mr Sutton’s thoughts towards water meters 
as a possible branch of the firm’s business’ (George Kent Ltd 1938). Subsequently, the firm 
bought the rights for the Meinecke Inferential Meter, which had won a silver medal at the 
Interventions Exhibition in 1885, and the world patents for a semi rotary meter (ibid). After 
steady growth, business began to boom and by 1938, in the relative absence of a large 
domestic market, George Kent Ltd developed its business overseas and won a Queen’s 
Award for ‘export achievement in the Mechanical Meters Division’.13 While household 
                                                 
13
 As will be explored in greater detail below, the operations of George Kent Ltd would become important in 




metering represented a considerable expense for water companies, for George Kent Ltd and 
other manufacturers water metering represented a lucrative business opportunity.  
 
Significantly, the discussions between Dobbs and Sullivan represent a diversification of the 
meanings of equity beyond the tax and property based models in use at the time. The 
meaning of equity in relation to water was hotly contested in Parliament with the exchange 
reaching its apogee in 1884 with the Metropolitan Board of Works (Further Powers) Bill.
14
 
This bill would have provided the legal means for customers to demand a metered charge 
and, effectively, the right to a meter (if the customer was willing to pay for its installation). 
The provisions in the bill were not reciprocal, meaning that water companies would not be 
able to force households to take up meters. This is important; protagonists of the new clause 
were not forwarding an agenda for compulsory metering but optant metering where 
households could request a metered supply. Calls for optant metering were very much tied up 
with a specific understanding of equity or fairness that privileged private property rights. As 
Trentmann and Taylor (2011) convincingly explain, calls for a right to a meter spurred the 
development of consumer politics and a shift in the relationship between water user and 
provider. The clauses under consideration prompted substantial debate regarding meanings of 
fairness in the context of water supply. In this sense debates over metering revealed 
conflicting understandings of fairness that juxtaposed biopolitical concerns over constant, 
affordable supplies of water in opposition to economic arguments for metering where 
households would be able to pay for water by volume.  
 
Sir Thomas Chambers, Member for Marylebone, who introduced the second reading
15
 of the 
1884 Bill, told the House of Commons that the existing system based on rateable values was 
unfair because prices, which rose according to property values, bore no relation to the 
quantity (or quality) of water received. Chambers noted that he ‘could not remember another 
instance of an article bought and sold, where the price charged had no relation whatever to 
                                                 
14
 The Municipal Board of Works had also taken up the case for metering in 1875 (Trentmann and Taylor, 2005: 
70). 
15
 Second reading is an early stage for a Bill to be defeated in the UK parliamentary process. Normally a Bill is 
not debated at its first reading; this is just a formal introduction. At the second reading Members of Parliament 
are able to debate the main principles of the Bill, at the end of the debate a vote takes place to determine whether 
the Bill should proceed to the next stage. If the Bill does proceed, a Committee normally analyses each clause 
line by line and any amendments to the Bill are debated. The Bill is then returned to the floor of the House 
(report stage) so that any amendments made in Committee can be considered. The Bill is then read for a third 
time and debated. The same process then takes place in the House of Lords and, finally, both Houses are invited 
to consider any amendments that have been subsequently made. 
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the quality of the thing sold’. He told the Commons that ‘the Bill proposed to give the 
customer power to say to the Water Companies – “I will take my water by measure, and I 
will pay for it according to the quantity I consume”’. He argued that ‘surely nothing could be 
fairer than that’ and suggested that in ‘certain cases in which it would not be fair – as, for 
instance, where the quantity taken was very small, and the cost of supplying it larger than the 
average’, a Select Committee would ‘inquire into and settle’ the matter (HC 1884, vol 285 
col 1200).  
 
These particular understandings of fairness were far from universally accepted. For example, 
Sir Henry Holland, Member for Hampstead, argued that ‘in the first place, it was by no 
means clear that the meter system for all purposes (trade and domestic) would work well 
from either a sanitary or economical point of view’ (1884, vol 285 col 1212). Again 
emphasising the perceived potential threat of the economics of metering to the biopolitical 
health of the population. Drawing on evidence from the cities of Liverpool and Manchester, 
Sir Henry Holland argued that 
The poor would lose, while the rich would gain… where a poor man was now charged from 
6s. to 8s. per annum, he would have to pay, under this Bill, a minimum charge of 12s. per 
annum, to which must be added the charge for the meter (HC 1884, vol 285 col 1197 - 1243). 
 
Sir Henry Holland concluded that he was ‘justified in saying that this was a Bill to relieve the 
rich at the expense of the poorer classes’ (HC 1884, vol 285 col 1197 - 1243). 
 
Debate over the proposed Bill is illuminating as the question of fairness and the anticipated 
costs faced by the water providers proved to be considerable sticking points to introduction of 
optional metered charging (contemporary water companies in South East England faced 
similar conundrums regarding the relationship between compulsory companywide metering 
and equity, see chapter six). The Bill was originally promoted by the Corporation of London 
who proposed that the ‘whole water supply of the Metropolis should be by meter, at the 
option of the tenant, at a charge 6d. per 1000 gallons’. Members on both sides of the house 
showed concern that water metering would be ‘highly unjust and unfair to the water 
companies, and it would be oppressive to the ratepayers’ (Mr Coope16, Member for 




Middlesex, HC 1884 vol 285 col 33-51). This was because the cost of meter installation 
would be met by the customer and thus would present a prohibitive price increase for some 
households. The House drew upon evidence from Berlin’s experience of domestic water 
metering.
17
  Coope claimed that ‘the only town of any size supplied by this principle [by 
meter] was Berlin and there the charge of water was about three times as much as that 
proposed by the Corporation’ (HC 1884, vol 285 col 33-51). Members argued that the poor 
would face a disproportionate price burden and would be forced to reduce their water 
consumption. As a result, Members expressed concern that the poor would pose a public 
health threat. Coope’s statement is indicative of the tone of the debate and is worth quoting at 
length: 
 
The water rate was obviously a tax upon property, and it was so arranged that the poor 
should receive full benefit at the expense of the rich. The water companies had felt that it was 
their duty to meet the wants of the poor in that respect. If they attempted to supply water by 
meter, they would at once considerably curtail the quantity of water the poor would get. At 
present, every small house received a supply from the water companies of 66,000 gallons per 
annum. According to the Corporation Bill, they would receive only 24,000 gallons per 
annum, or a little more than one-third; but the charge to the poor would be 3s. per quarter, 
and 3s. was the lowest charge for the use of the meter. Therefore, the total charge would be 
15s. a year; whereas many houses now supplied by the water companies did not pay more 
than from 8s. to 10s. a-year; so that it was evident that, while the poor would be robbed of a 
considerable part of their water supply, they would have to pay a great deal more for it. 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
16
 Interestingly Mr Coope, a Teller for the Noes – meaning that he was one of four people responsible for 
counting the votes and announcing the results to the House – was also the Director of a Metropolitan Water 
Company. One Member, Mr Firth, raised a Point of Order, highlighting that Coope had ‘a direct pecuniary 
interest in the Question before the House’ and thus called into question whether it was appropriate for someone 
in that position to hold conflicts of interests on that scale. Given that water companies were thought to be 
making considerable profits as a result of annual increases in rateable valuations, concerns about Coope’s 
impartiality were warranted. Initially Mr Firth called for Mr Coope’s vote to be discounted, however after 
debate and guidance from the Speaker as to the public importance of the legislation being debated, the request 
was withdrawn. 
17
 Berlin did in fact meter households. A footnote in Walter Kent’s (1892) The Water Meter, It’s difficulties, 
types and application: a manual of reference and fact in connection with the supply of water by meter, states 
that: ‘Berlin is supplies with water entirely on the meter system, the supply having been found inadequate under 
the rating method; the meters are all inferential; the supply is constant without cisterns. Owing to the fact that 
each house contains a number of families living in flats, each meter supplies water for an average of sixty-seven 




While Archibald Dobbs had argued that the introduction of metering would enable customers 
to avoid what he perceived to be unjust taxes like water rates, at this time the dominant 
position among Members of Parliament was one of resistance to domestic metering. 
Parliamentarians feared that the introduction of a metered system would result in a larger 
financial burden being placed on the poor. Overall the House concluded that ‘the 
establishment of a general meter system would be an unfortunate thing for London’ (Mr 
Firth, Member for Chelsea HC 1884 vol 285 col 1197 - 1243). This was because, according 
to Mr Henry Wiggin, Member for Handsworth, ‘the adoption of a system of supplying water 
by meter would compel the people very materially to reduce the consumption of water’ (HC 
1884, vol 285 col 1197 - 1243). In turn, this would pose a threat to the relatively high health 
and hygiene standards achieved through a combination of interconnected sewerage networks 
and the circulation of water. Indeed, Mr Wiggins begged the House ‘to recollect what had 
made London one of the healthiest cities in the world’ (HC 1884, vol 285 col 1250). Rather 
than placing pressure on households to reduce their water consumption, Firth suggested that 
‘the more water is consumed in the cleansing of houses and in bath-rooms, gardens, and so 
forth, the better it is for the public health and sanitary condition’ (ibid). Here any potential 
restricted water flow was associated with the increased prevalence of dirt and disease, 
metering therefore posed a threat to the health of individuals as well as the population at 
large. Sir William Makins, Member for South Essex, argued that  
 
In a crowded City like London they had more to fear from dirt than dynamite, because dirt 
meant disease, immorality, and drunkenness. There was no surer way of producing disease 
than by the generation of sewer gas, and the only way of preventing the generation of sewer 
gas was to provide a copious and plentiful supply of water, such as that which was supplied 
at present (Makins, HC 1884 vol 285 col 1450-69). 
 
Overall, there was little appetite within parliament to sanction any movement towards the 
establishment of a metered water charging system; the Bill was defeated at its second 
reading. The Noes took a 199 Majority with 235 to 36 votes. However, despite this 
significant loss, debates over metering did not disappear. For example, in 1885, the House of 
Commons considered amending the 1847 Waterworks Clauses Act to include a new clause 
that would permit the Supply of Water by Meter. The new clause, “Supply of Water by 
Meter”, was raised by Daniel Grant, Member for Marylebone, at the Committee stage yet the 
proposed clause was considered outside the scope of the main Bill and was not debated. 
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While there was no consensus regarding the merits of metering, clearly interest in metering 
had not waned, as did the antagonism between economics and biopolitics in the context of 
metering. 
 
The issue of metering continued to occupy legislative time in Parliament. In 1890 the London 
Water (Meter) Bill, proposed by Mr Gainsford Bruce, Member for Finsbury Holborn, would 
have provided for the ‘supply by meter of Water for domestic purposes within the limits of 
supply of the London water companies’ (HC 1890, col 104). This proposed measure was 
introduced alongside two other Bills; the Metropolitan Companies Charges Bill and the 
Metropolis Water Supply Bill with the intention that all three, and thus the broader question 
of the metropolis’ water supply, would be considered together in Committee. The London 
Water (Meter) Bill was designed to prevent ‘an increase of the water rates of the Metropolis 
by reason merely of the increase of the annual or rateable value that may be unconnected with 
water supply and which may involve no commensurate increase in the consumption of water’ 
(Mr Causton, Member for Southwark West, HC 1891, vol 351 col 191). The proposals 
contained within the London Water (Meter) Bill once again resulted in the relationship 
between metering and fairness, as well as biopolitics and economics, being fiercely debated. 
 
For instance, Mr Webster, Member for St Pancras East, told the House that he was concerned 
about the high cost of metering systems, in terms of equipment cost and labour time, as well 
as the impact higher prices for water would have on low income households should these 
costs be passed on through bills. He stated: 
 
It seems to me that the measure [of metering] is one entirely in favour of the rich and of the 
wealthy tradesmen of London, and very detrimental to the interests of the working classes. In 
Berlin the system of measuring and charging for water by meter has been adopted, and it has 
been found necessary to employ an Inspector for every 400 meters. Therefore, if the system is 
adopted in London it will be necessary to appoint no fewer than 1,600 Inspectors. The Bill, 
moreover, while it compels the companies to go to the expense of £3,000,000 sterling in 
securing meters, provides no means by which to raise the money... Further, the Bill may 
necessitate landlords in London putting in their leases the amount of water to be used by 
their tenants. In short, it is of such a complicated and confiscating character that I am 
surprised to find any of my friends on this side of the House supporting the Bill. I protest 




Mr Theodore Fry, Member for Darlington, spoke most emphatically about the issue, is worth 
quoting at length because his statement captures concerns about the cost, disproportionate 
financial impact on the poor and health implications associated with metering: 
 
The Bill is eminently one in favour of the rich as against the poor. What will be really the 
effect of a measure of this kind? Many of the wealthy houses in London are shut up for 
several months in the year, during which time little or no water is used in them; and if a 
system of payment by meter is adopted, the charge upon the owners of such houses as these 
will be comparatively small. A rich man, who is an hon. Member of this House, today told me 
that he had refused to be put on the Committee to consider this question [of metering], 
because the result of such a Bill as this would be to put so much money in his pocket, that he 
felt that he could not fairly support it. This fact alone shows how much the Bill is in the 
interest of the rich. If the Water Companies lose money by the meter system in consequence 
of the closing of the houses of the wealthy during a certain season of the year, they will be 
obliged, in order to secure their income and pay their dividend, to make a heavier charge on 
the masses of the community and the poor. There can be no doubt that if water is charged by 
meter the price will have to be very much larger than is paid at the present time, and there 
will be a constant endeavour to limit its use in order to escape charge. For instance, in No. 
44 meter district, Cornwall Road, Brixton Hill, the water rate is now on the average £1 3s. 
9d. per house per annum, but if the charge is by meter system at the rate of 1s. per 1,000 
gallons, the rate will be increased to about £2 16s. 2d. per annum. In these circumstances, 
the water rate will be enormously increased on the poor if the companies are allowed to 
charge by meter. Further than that, the Bill would tend to limit the use of water for sanitary 
purposes, and thus endanger the public health. The Bill, therefore, is a very mischievous one. 
The cost of the meters, again, will have to be borne by the consumers, and this is not an 
unimportant consideration. The principle also of the supply of water by meter is an entirely 
new one. Before I conclude, I will remind the House that an important official connected with 
the Local Government Board—Mr. Stoneham—gave evidence before a Select Committee on 
this point, and in answer to a question said that if water was supplied to London by meter it 
would certainly lead to a curtailment of the power of cleansing the houses of the poor, which 
is not very efficiently exercised under present circumstances; that under a meter system 
insufficient water would be used for sanitary purposes, which would lead to an increase of 
disease; and that the sewers would become stagnant, resulting probably in an outbreak of 
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cholera. Under these circumstances, I hope the House will not hesitate to reject the measure 
(HC 1891, vol 351 col 198). 
 
The Bill did continue to Committee stage, but it did not make the statute books. Here it is 
important to note the strength of conviction that some Members expressed concerned 
regarding the perceived incompatibility of metering and a fair water charging system. 
Understandings of fairness, and the relationship between equity and the water meter, were 
contested and juxtaposed in a binary fashion. Some closely aligned ‘fairness’ with property 
rights, and, consequently, paying for water by volume. Whereas others considered equity, 
defined very broadly in biopolitical terms as access to sufficient volume of water for 
domestic purposes to tackle dirt at a price that all within society could afford, to be virtually 
incompatible with household metering. At this point metering set into motion a conflict 
between biopolitics and economics, in terms of paying for water by volume, which would 
reoccur over the next 120 years. 
 
 During the latter stages of the 19
th
 century there were also more nuanced arguments being 
articulated about metering fairness. Biopolitics and economics were not presented as being 
diametrically opposed. For instance Siemens (1856) and Kent (1892) argued in favour of 
metering but proposed that any metering system should be structured so that low income 
households would receive enough water to service ‘minimum’ sanitary needs. Siemens 
emphasised that the ‘principal value of meters to water companies consists in the prevention 
of waste’ (1856: 117). He argued that metering presented three advantages: 
 
1. Each customer only pays for the water actually used by him, whereas at 
present has to pay a share of all the waste that is going on. 
 
2. Regulating the distribution of water on his own premises and for preventing 
waste by servants. This would obviate the inconvenience of water inspector 
visits. 
 





However, he also noted that objections had been raised against metering ‘on the grounds that 
the poorer housekeepers would economise water with detriment to their own sanitary 
condition and also that the cost of the meter is too high in proportion to the amount of rent 
they pay’ (1856: 117). Here, Siemens suggested that ‘those objections are applicable however 
only to the case of labourers’ cottages’, who, he argued could be ‘supplied without 
restriction, or might be charged a fixed rate till their consumption exceeds a certain 
maximum' (ibid). Similarly, almost fifty years later, Walter Kent proposed that metering 
systems should include a ‘low minimum’ of water, as it ‘tends to assist sanitation and secure 
the remuneration of the supplier without causing any loss or hardship to the consumer’. Kent 
also proposed a ‘sliding scale’ of charges where households would pay the same amount per 
unit of water used in excess of the 'sanitary minimum’ but would pay different amounts per 
unit water used within the ‘sanitary minimum’ (1892: 101). In this context, Kent considered 
the ‘sanitary minimum’ to be 10 gallons per head; he argued that this would cover the cost of 
the mandatory flushing systems which were necessary to cleanse the sewers.  
 
Kent argued that this type of metered water supply system would incentivise water economy 
yet retain ‘the sort of “legalised state socialism” involved in the rating system which 
‘cheapens water to the poorer classes at the expense of the well to do, and which its advocates 
aver is its merit' (Kent, 1892: 122). This would address biopolitical concerns of securing the 
water supply and health of the population whilst incorporating a different type of economics 
than was practiced at the time. Here economics and biopolitics were not conflictual 
complementary; under this scenario, economics would become a key way of addressing 
biopolitical concerns.  These proposals for differential metering tariffs resemble later block or 
step tariff designs and the Free Basic Water Policy in South Africa. Here, households are 
provided with a small amount of water for free , or at a reduced rate, and then are charged, 
through a block tariff, for the volume of water used in addition to the basic rate (Loftus, 
2006; Muller, 2008). This is interesting because it shows an understanding of fairness and 
equity, negotiated and facilitated through metering, beyond the binary pronunciations popular 
at the time.  
 
Despite the existence of such proposals, overall, parliamentarians appeared to be convinced 
that a constant, uninterrupted supply, devoid of any potential barriers to access created 
through price, was necessary to ensure the health of the city. The deliberate decision was 
taken to continue with water charging on the basis of a property based tax along with its 
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associated cross-subsidies. Importantly, decisions made in parliament indicate that the 
relative absence of household metering in England at this time, and in the contemporary 
moment compared to other European states, was not historical accident but a conscious 
decision made in defence of the nation’s reputation as the ‘home of hygiene’, concerns 
regarding fairness and the protection of water providers’ coffers. The decision not to advance 
metering solutions was in fact of core part of the state strategy for governing water and water 
users. What was less clear was what ‘domestic’ household water use actually referred to. It is 
to this issue the chapter now turns. 
 
4.5 Delineating materialities of home through water metering  
Objections to a metered supply for domestic use were founded on the notion that a sufficient 
supply of water should be available for all at an affordable price for public health reasons. It 
is important to note that this was not the same as advocating unchecked and unrestricted 
supplies of water. Instead household meters were adopted, in part, to demarcate the contested 
boundaries of domestic and non-domestic supply. Here meters played a positively political 
role in helping to shape understandings of basic water need as opposed to luxury, and 
profligate as opposed to necessary use. Water suppliers were statutorily obliged to provide 
water for ‘domestic’ use on an unmeasured basis yet were able to charge by meter for any 
services considered to be an ‘extra’. Water meters were used to effectively compartmentalise 
consumption into separate water use categories and to help determine the perceived 
legitimacy of different consumption practices. Moreover, the meter contributed to 
consolidating contemporary understandings of normal and abnormal water use.
18
 From this 
perspective it is clear, contrary to Joyce’s assertion that technical solutions are depoliticising, 
‘that sanitation had become a matter of science and technology, separate from the political’, 
meters were a cause of controversy and an important tool for mediating new understandings 
of fair, legitimate water use in and around the home (2003: 69). 
 
‘Extras’ not considered as constituting ‘domestic supply’ included water closets, bathtubs, 
refrigerators, hosepipes and sprinklers. 'Domestic supply' therefore was largely limited to 
cooking and drinking water. Here the meter effectively drew a line between internal and 
                                                 
18
 The very same techniques continue to be used to today. Meters have been used to differentiate between water 
use inside and outside the home and to distinguish between ‘necessary’ and ‘discretionary water use’. For 
instance since 1990 water companies have been able to meter homes that have a swimming pool, a sprinkler 
system or other water intensive devices such as power showers. Clearly, these divisions are socially produced, 
yet the meter has been repeatedly used to express those socially determined delineations.  
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external water use, hardened the division been ‘essential’ and ‘discretionary’ water use and 
between socialised ideas of ‘needs’ and ‘wants’. Water supplied for extra purposes was 
charged for by meter. In instances where a property could not be metered, a blanket fee was 
imposed in addition to the regular tariff. So although ideas surrounding the need for constant 
supply were prevalent at this time, these needs were not considered to be unconditional. The 
notion of discretionary water use suggests luxury, which in turn implies ‘waste’, or at least 
non-essential water use. Authorities were committed to ensuring that the cost of ‘waste’ of 
this kind was recouped. For instance the engineer for Kent Waterworks stated that 
 
In the case of meters, we supply the meters because then we do not care how much they 
waste, as they have to pay for it (Morris, 1868: 497).  
 
Metering represented an accumulation strategy for ‘non-essential’ extras, whereas charges for 
‘essential’ water use continued to be levied on the basis of property value. The boundaries 
between essential and non-essential use were contested. For instance Taylor and Trentmann 
cite Mayor of Sheffield, Edward Tozer, who had stated in relation to baths that ‘if it was not a 
domestic use for a man to wash his skin and keep himself clean, he did not know what was’ 
(2011:21). Moreover, legal challenges were issued in response to the decision to legislate 
bathing as a non-domestic water practice some. For example Charles Bingham, who took his 
case to the High Court, believed that he should not have to pay additional charges for bathing 
and, wishing to avoid a meter, he had 
 
Painted a waterline to mark the point where the bath held exactly thirty-two gallons. Opposite the tub 
hung above the line, and to mark each use on the calendar. Added up, the numbers would show how 
much water had “actually been used” over the year. Bath water was charged at 1s ½ d per thousand 
gallons…. Without his personal measurement Bingham believed he had been over-charged 
(Trentmann and Taylor 2011:21). 
 
Bingham lost his case and was instructed to have a meter installed (ibid). While Bingham’s 
circumstances were privileged, access to indoor bathrooms and showers or even household 
piped supply was by no means universal and class politics certainly shaped the contours of 
access, his case shows how the everyday activities and understandings of domestic use 
became politicised throughout the period. Understandings of domestic water use were 
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contested, renegotiated and often expressed through metering (chapter six revisits this process 
in relation to compulsory metering). 
 
What counted as domestic water use varied across the country and changed over time. For 
example, baths were considered to be ‘domestic’ by the 1930s and, as a result, associated 
charges were included in the water rate rather than as an extra. Engineers remained convinced 
that it was ‘of the greatest importance that water supplied by local authorities shall not be 
wasted and that no apparatus fitted up will cause either waste or undue consumption of water’ 
(Water Engineer’s Handbook, 1929). However understandings of what constituted water 
needs had shifted and baths had come to represent one of the material emblems of citizenship. 
Reflecting on the parameters of domestic water use, an entry made in the Water Engineer's 
Handbook (1930) stated that 
 
An effort has been made to define domestic supply, and it is stated to be a sufficient supply to 
any dwelling house for ordinary use, including baths of a capacity not exceeding the 
prescribed number of gallons, and water closets, but shall not include a supply of water for 
any other purposes (Water Engineer’s Handbook 1930: 210).  
 
Similarly, a year later, the Water Engineer’s Handbook reported the findings of a House of 
Commons Select Committee on Unopposed Bills which had: 
 
Enunciated a principle with regard to the charges of water for baths. The committee has for 
some taken the view that there should be no handicap on the installation of baths. The 
committee will not accept any proposal again that is going to make a charge for the first 
bath. No obstacle of any kind should be placed in way of having a bath placed in every house 
in the country. The very fact that there was a separate charge for a bath was going to act 
detrimentally (Water Engineer’s Handbook, 1931). 
 
Even though baths were included in the domestic rate, there were other uses that remained outside this 
spectrum and, in cases where a meter could not be installed, a fee described in the Water Engineer's 
Handbook as an 'arbitrary “all in” charge’ was made (see Table 7).  
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Table 7 Special purpose charges for water (Source: Water Engineers' Handbook, 1930: 210-
211) 






£4 10s Herb beer 
manufacturers 
plus 50 per cent 
of domestic 
charge 
Agricultural shows £1 Horses 5s each 
Allotments up to 
400sq.  
6d.  Horse trough or 
standpipe 
£1 10s 
Auction Marts for fat 
stock  
£4 10s Hose pipes 15s  
Bacon washing £2 2s Hydrants £1 10s 
Bakehouses 7s 6d Ice cream vendors plus 50 per cent 
of domestic 
charge 
Basket makers  from 20s Laundries £1 
Beerhouses per quarter of domestic 
rate 
Lodging houses 10s in addition to 
domestic rate 
Beer-raising machines 20s Milk coolers £1 10s 
Billiard rooms 6d per £ valuation of 
rooms 
Milk sellers, for 
washing utensils 
18s 
Bowling Green by meter Motor cars 7s 6d 
Burial grounds 5s per tap Offices half domestic 
rate 




circus, shows etc 
1d per person or house 
& Steam engines and 
lorries 6d per day. 
Oyster and shell 
fish shops 
from 10s 
Caravans 2s, 3d per quarter Petrol Wagons £1 10s 
Caretakers 12d, 9d per quarter Photographers 15s 
Carpenters, joiners 
and cabinet makers' 
shops 
per bench 4s Pigs 5s 
Cattle troughs in fields 10s each Plasterers yards from 5s 6d per 
half year 
Chapels and churches 5s  Printing offices 1s 8d per half 
year 
Chemists 7s 6d Public houses 15s 
Clubs, pubs quarter domestic rate Refrigerators  £1 4s (private 
dwelling) 
Coachbuilders 15s Sausage Makers plus 50 per cent 
of domestic 
charge 
Coffee carts £4 Sheep dipping £2 




Conservatories 1d per sq.yard of site 
per half year 
Slaughterhouses £1 10s 
Cows 6s each Smiths  7s 6d 
Cricket pitch £2 10s Soda Fountains plus 50 per cent 
of domestic 
charge 
Dairies 15s Sprinkler Lawn  £2 2s 
Dentists 7s 6d Steam Cranes 15s 
Donkeys 12s Stonemasons 7s 6d 
Eating houses plus half of domestic 
rate 
Sugar Boilers from 20s 
Fire Sprinklers £1 per hundred heads Surgeries £1 
Fishmongers 15s Temperance hotels plus hald the 
domestic rate 
Fish washing from 10s Tennis court £2 10s 
Fountains, drinking 10s each Tripe Sellers plus 50 per cent 
of domestic 
charge 
Fried Fish shops 15s Vans, living £2 8s 
Greengrocers plus half of domestic 
plus 10 per cent of 
domestic rate 
Washerwomen from 2s 3d per 
half year 
Greenhouses 1d per sq. yard of site 
per half year 
Wheelwrights per 
man employed 
11s per half year 
Hairdressers 7s 6d Wine and spirit 
shops 
from 5s 6d per 
half year 
Hearses £1 each Workpeople in 
mils, factories etc 
for washing and 
drinking only 
1 1/2 per head 
per quarter 
 
The shifting understandings of essential and non-essential use reflect evolving ideas 
surrounding cleanliness and what Trentmann and Taylor refer to as ‘perceptions of 
entitlement’, water ‘requirements’ or needs (2011: 213). It is, however, important to note that 
although baths were increasingly considered to be legitimate domestic assets, this did not 
mean that access was universal; distribution was unsurprisingly determined in large by 
income. In this context, Orwell’s comments on unequal access to water and changing 
perceptions of cleanliness in his pamphlet The Road to Wigan Pier are indicative: 
 
Do the ‘lower classes’ smell? Of course, as a whole, they are dirtier than the upper classes. 
They are bound to be, considering the circumstances in which they live, for even at this late 
date less than half the houses in England have bathrooms. Besides, the habit of washing 
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yourself all over every day is a very recent one in Europe, and the working classes are 
generally more conservative than the Bourgeoisie. But the English are growing visibly 
cleaner, and we may hope that in a hundred years they will be almost as clean as the 
Japanese (1937: 121).  
 
In this context it is clear that notions of essential and discretionary use are socially 
constituted; there is no objective, accepted measure of basic consumption or needs. Indeed, 
what constitutes essential use continued to be debated in relation to metering. For instance, in 
the 1980s Herrington argued that ‘the emotional idea that virtually all domestic water use is 
essential to private and public health cannot be sustained in serious argument' and 
understandings of ‘essential’ domestic water use prevented any serious consideration of 
metering. More recently, Gleick recommended that ‘international organisations, national and 
local governments and water providers adopt a basic water requirement standard for human 
needs of 50 litres per person per day (l/p/d) and guarantee access to it independently of an 
individual’s economic, social or political status’ (1998: 83). However, even then, Gleick 
recognised that water needs, according to climate and culture would differ. Elsewhere, South 
Africa, through its Free Basic Water (FBW) policy, concluded that, as a minimum, 
households should be able to access at least 6 kilolitres of water per day.
19
 In England and 
Wales interviews with policy makers undertaken as part of this thesis confirmed that there is 
no accepted standard of consumption to benchmark against. Interviewees also noted that any 
attempt to develop a basic standard of consumption would be politically charged and shaped 
by dominant power relations. One consumer group interviewee argued that it would not be in 
the public interest for there to be a basic level of consumption because privatised water 
companies would, cynically, seek to produce a narrow measure for basic consumption. This 
section has shown how the meter has been important in helping to delineate and negotiate 
boundaries between domestic, essential and discretionary use. In turn, the meter helped 
determine what counted as legitimate water use or profligate uses of water.  
 
4.6 Conclusion 
This chapter provides the first part of a genealogy of water metering that is vital for 
contextualising and better understanding the emergence of compulsory water metering in 
                                                 
19
 The FBW policy differs across municipalities, for instance eThekwini has increased the volume of FBW each 
household is provided with from 6 to 9 kl/h/d (Nash 2012). For more detail about the emergence and politics of 
FBW see Loftus (2006) and Muller (2008). 
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South East England. This chapter demonstrates that the water meter has been a key fulcrum 
around which the waterscape has been renegotiated. In this context, uses of the meter have 
not been static; the water meter, as a contingent technology, has been used in different ways 
to express competing understandings of fairness and domestic water use. This chapter 
explored how the meter was used in three particular ways: as a way of regulating and 
securing constant supply, as a way of limiting price increases and as a way of delineating the 
boundaries between profligate and essential use.  
 
Importantly, the meter was used to target different objects of government and, in turn, to 
reflect different and changing understandings of fairness. Meters were used to monitor the 
water network in an effort to secure constant supply and, in turn, maintain high standards of 
public health. Meters were in operation on a district level rather than a household level and 
monitored the network rather than household water practices. Water charges were based on 
property value and so contained an element of cross-subsidisation. For some, this system was 
perceived to be unfair and measured bills were called for; volumetric bills were positioned as 
a way to avoid annual price increases imposed by the water companies. The object of the 
meter changed, meters were deployed to measure household water use rather than water lost 
through the network. This debate highlighted contested understandings of fairness and, to an 
extent, a conflict between liberal economics and the biopolitical needs surrounding access to 
water Fairness was constructed as either ensuring that the needs of the poor were met through 
an unmeasured charge to prevent a potential public health threat, or charging by volume so 
that household water charges more closely reflected water usage despite the poor potentially 
paying considerably more than under the unmeasured system. The chapter also demonstrated 
that what was understood as domestic water use changed over time; the meter was used to 
demarcate this divide. In this context, the meter played a vital, politically charged role in 
negotiating the waterscape. These debates are important because they give context to similar 
discussions concerning the fairness of contemporary compulsory metering programmes; 
chapter six explores the contemporary relationship between metering and fairness. In this 
sense, metering effectively set into motion a conflict between economics and biopolitics that 
would be regularly revisited for over a century. The following chapter builds on this 
genealogy of water metering and contributes to better understanding how and why 
contemporary compulsory water metering programmes emerged in 2010.  
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5 Negotiating the waterscape, from a supply fix to securing life: A 
genealogy of water metering (1960 – 2009) 
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter forms the second part of the genealogy of water metering and covers the period 
between 1960 and 2009; it provides context to the emergence of contemporary compulsory 
companywide metering programmes in the South East of England. Overall, the chapter 
argues that the meter has been used to tackle a variety of biopolitical governance problems 
and has targeted different objects of government. By examining the different roles that the 
meter has been deployed to perform, this chapter shows that the meter is a contingent 
technology which cannot be divorced from the political and economic circumstances that 
surround it. This chapter, read in conjunction with chapter four, constructs a genealogy of 
water metering that is vital for understanding how contemporary water metering programmes 
emerged, from the perspective of some water companies and policy makers, as a desirable 
way of governing water and water users.   
 
The chapter begins by examining the pivotal role that engineers played in water planning and 
the relative reluctance to pursue metering in the 1950s and 1960s. The first section builds on 
Herrington’s notion of the ‘supply fix’ and examines the preference for supply side solutions 
over demand side options. The following section explores the growing influence of 
economists, at the expense of engineers, between the mid-1960s to mid-1970s. The chapter 
then considers the consequences of the growing influence of economics and the water 
metering experiments undertaken throughout the late 1980s and early 1990s. Subsequently, 
the chapter examines how, following privatisation, the meter was used to discipline water 
use. This section takes the example of the Lower Grange Campaign for Water Justice to 
demonstrate how meters, and the type of waterscape that they represented, were resisted. The 
chapter then turns to more draconian expressions of water metering during the 1990s where 
prepayment meters with a disconnection function were used primarily as a means to 
discipline payment rather than water use. Subsequently, the chapter explores how, following 
the defeat of prepayment meters in the courts, metering on a compulsory basis emerged as an 
option to secure water supplies in water stressed areas.  The meter evolved from a way of 
disciplining water use or price to a means of securing life in the water stressed South East of 
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England. Importantly, movement between different uses of the meter was not smooth or 
linear; this chapter draws out how struggles over different expressions of metering helped 
negotiate how water and water users were governed. In this context, Foucault’s 
governmentality framework helps to demonstrate how debates over metering have, to an 
extent, set in motion a conflict between particular understandings of economics and 
biopolitics. The privileging of market principles through metering has often been interpreted 
as antithetical to the biopolitical security of the population. Nonetheless, from the 1980s, the 
meter was increasingly positioned by some water companies and stakeholders in the sector as 
a vital instrument for securing the waterscape.  
 
5.2 Meeting demand without measuring consumption: the ‘supply fix’ 
This section examines the pivotal role engineers played in water planning and the absence of 
a sustained commitment to household metering until the 1960s (Herrington, 2007). The 1950s 
and 1960s were best described, according to Twort, as ‘an era of giganticism’ (1963: 9 in 
Hassan, 1998). Policy makers were concerned with safeguarding a sufficient quantity of 
water for industrial supply rather than monitoring domestic water use. In this context, Hassan 
claims that the 1950s and 1960s witnessed ‘unprecedented growth in the demand for water 
and, therefore, accelerated development of the nation’s water resources’ (Hassan, 1998:61). 
Notably the construction of reservoirs grew ‘exponentially during post war recovery’ 
(McCulloch, 2009: 463). Herrington described the main techniques for managing water as a 
‘supply fix’, due to the focus on constructing new sources of supply, and argued that this 
period was characterised by a dereliction of economics in favour of engineering expertise 
(1974; 1982; 1993). Although significant water supply shortfalls were experienced, 
authorities did not perceive them to be an important problem. For example a Joint Committee 
on Water Resources considered the significance of the 1933-34 drought to be ‘somewhat 
exaggerated in the minds of the public’ (Hassan, 1998:34). It was not until the establishment 
of the 1955 Central Advisory Water Committee (CAWC) that serious thought was given to 
future growth in demand for water (Jordan et al, 1997). The CAWC was tasked with 
‘preparing a balance sheet of supply and demand for water’ (CAWC, 1959). Although supply 
options continued to be favoured, the CAWC 1962 Report of the Sub Committee on The 
Growing Demand of Water briefly considered metering. It argued that metering was ‘the 
ideal solution’, yet concluded that metering was not practical because the cost of metering 
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outweighed the cost of water supply (CAWC, 1962). During this period metering was not 
investigated in great detail.  
 
Towards the end of the 1950s, following drought in 1959, and amid growing fears regarding 
the loss of farmland to reservoir construction, policy makers increasingly looked to engineers 
to inform decisions about the planning of controversial reservoirs. The assumed neutrality of 
engineers enabled this group of key experts to exert influence in policy making spheres 
(Maloney and Richardson, 1994). In this sense the formation of the Water Resources Board 
(WRB) in the mid-1960s, the self-proclaimed ‘master planner of the water resources of 
England’, was fundamentally important (WRB, 1965). The core functions of the WRB were 
to collect data on national water demand and to advise ministers ‘on the development and use 
of water resources throughout England and Wales’ (McCulloch, 2009: 461). The WRB also 
undertook its own research and provided technical expertise to the water authorities. Here the 
WRB was primarily concerned with ‘the issue of water quantity’ (Jordan et al, 1977: 320). 
Shortly after its inception, the WRB commenced a number of studies on ‘the future demand 
for water in different regions’, it concluded that ‘demand for water would double by the end 
of the century’ (Jordan et al, 1977: 320). These engineers, according to Herrington, relied on 
‘unsophisticated extrapolation’ methods up until the 1990s. This involved ‘placing a ruler 
through a time-series with roughly the right slope and then drawing forward’ into the future, 
for Herrington the WRB’s forecasting methods relied ‘on large doses of intuition and 
foresight’ rather than evidence based planning (1979: 7).  
 
The access the WRB had to central government made it an extremely important body despite 
its lack of formal decision making powers (McCulloch, 2009). Although its role was 
advisory, the WRB had significant influence on the way that water problems were framed. 
The WRB favoured large scale engineering projects over demand side options like metering. 
Kinnersley went as far to say that ‘what the Water Resources Board really offered [was] not a 
future strategy but an engineering spree – just like the old days, but even bigger’ (1988: 90). 
Here the WRB’s approach shaped dominant approaches to managing water. According to 
Ward, the WRB’s priorities reflected 
 
Not the financial priority of reducing costs, nor the ecological priority of conserving the 
more vulnerable sources, but the engineering priority of, as a matter of pride, meeting 




Kinnersley, came to a similar conclusion arguing that  
 
Clearly this contributed nothing to helping a modern prosperous community learn to share 
water better or act with more respect for its water environment. The crude aim was to make 
the natural regimes of small river basins adapt more to human purposes however self-
indulgent they might be (1988: 90). 
 
In this context, Herrington described the dominance of ‘well-tried engineering principles’ as 
‘an intellectual straitjacket, inhibiting the industry from responding sensibly to changing 
economic, financial and environmental circumstances’ (1982: 28). 
 
Much of the criticism levelled at the WRB emanated from a group of relatively high profile 
economists, including Herrington, who were seeking to encourage the water sector to take 
economics more seriously. Such was Herrington’s prominence, the Chairman of Seven Trent 
Water Authority described him as ‘the high priest of the water demand school of thought’ 
when introducing him to the Royal Society of Arts (Herrington, 1982). These economists, 
who were concerned with the ‘sane’ allocation of water, were highly critical of organisations 
like the WRB and argued forcefully for greater emphasis to be placed on the economics of 
water supply (ibid). Referring to the WRB’s reluctance to turn to demand management 
strategies such as household metering, Herrington argued that the WRB’s claim that they had 
carried out ‘considerable research’ on metering was a ‘complete fabrication’ (1982:30). 
Instead he argued that a ‘dogmatic’, ‘anti-metering’ attitude haunted the organisation which, 
he contended, was inappropriate for the modern water supply network (Herrington, 1974). 
 
Amidst pressure from academics and economists to pursue metering, members of the WRB 
argued that metering had come to represent a ‘King Charles’ Head issue for many people in 
the water supply industry’. Meaning, from the perspective of the WRB members, that 
metering had become an irrelevant obsession that intermittently resurfaced in relation to 
debates about water supply management (Calvert, WRB 1967). Policy makers’ decisions 
were informed by the perceived need to increase supply to meet what were (erroneously) 
assumed to be ever increasing industrial demands. The water supply system reflected ideas of 
fairness where water was perceived as a social service that should be paid for through forms 
of taxation. Between the 1960s and 1990s the supply fix approach was dislodged as a result 
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of the rising standing of demand side economics.
20
 Consequently, the relative benefits of 
metering became an important political issue for policy makers. This in turn prompted 
reflection on how fairness was understood in the sector. Again, as in the previous chapter, 
debates over metering provoked conflicts between particular understandings of economics 
and biopolitics. Support for metering, and for the market economics associated with 
metering, was often predicated on ‘whether you saw water as a social service or a 
commodity’ (Memorandum MHLG, 1967).  
 
5.3 Water meters: why not? The decline of the ‘supply fix’  
From the mid-1960s a discernible shift within the sector was set into motion. Economists 
began to take an increasingly important role in influencing policy, which marked the decline 
of what Herrington had coined the ‘supply fix’. This was not a clean, linear transition but one 
that was hotly contested behind the scenes. This section examines the struggles over metering 
and explores how the meter was used to express different understandings of water and 
fairness. The chapter focuses on intra and inter-ministerial discussions, the personal 
campaigns of a small number of civil servants, the role of academics specialising in 
economics and an attempt by George Kent Meters to establish a domestic market for 
metering. The decline of the supply fix is an important moment in the genealogy of water 
metering because this contributes to the emergence of contemporary compulsory water 
metering programmes. At this point, liberal forms of economics were increasingly understood 
as being complementary to efforts to secure the waterscape. Indeed developing an approach 
to governing water and water users that was informed by economics was deemed to be 
necessary in some circles (see chapter two on market environmentalism). While the 
relationship between metering, economics and biopolitics had been consistently struggled 
over since the introduction of the Deacon Waste Water meter (see chapter four), at this time a 
new governmentality was emerging that favoured ways to govern water that were inspired by 
demand side economics. This particular form of economic thinking was increasingly 
positioned as the major form of knowledge and apparatus of security that would secure the 
                                                 
20
 While demand side options became more prominent, preference for supply driven solutions did not 
completely disappear from the political lexicon. John Redwood MP, among other posts former Minister for 
Local Government and Inner Cities (1992), Secretary of State for Wales (1993-1995), Shadow Secretary of 
State for the Environment, Transport and the Regions (1999-2000), made an argument at an All Party 
Parliamentary Water Group meeting in 2012 which elevated supply solutions above demand side options. When 
discussing drought resilience measures, Redwood made an analogy between Bakeries and Water Companies. He 
argued that just as Bakers avoid disappointing customers by producing additional bread rolls to match supply, 
water companies ought to deliver sufficient water to match customer demand rather than focus on reducing 
household demand for water.  
116 
 
waterscape in terms of environmental and financial sustainability. Here the metering, in its 
various forms, became a key focal point in the waterscape for thinking through how water 
and fairness were understood.  
  
In 1966 Kent Meters (see chapter four for more on this company) wrote to William Howie, 
the Member of Parliament for Luton, where the company was based, to compel Howie to 
lobby government to ‘see whether or not the metering of domestic [water] supplies could be 
encouraged in this country’ (Howie, 1966). Howie obliged, bringing the issue to Jim 
McColl’s attention, who was the Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister of Housing and 
Local Government (MHLG) at that time. Howie noted that 
 
Needless to say, Kent make water meters and do very well in the exports with them…. they 
argue of course that a stronger home market for their meters would greatly help their 
prospects. 
 
When writing to Howie, Kent Meters had enclosed a persuasively written pamphlet based on 
Bird and Jackson’s 1965 paper Water meters: why not? The pamphlet set out the economic 
case for metering and argued that: 
 
Metering can help reduce this wastage without any reduction in domestic use. The greater 
part of the waste usually occurs on the customer’s side of the meter. The customer is charged 
for this and is thus given an incentive to avoid leaving taps running or overflows operating 
unnecessarily, and to report any leakage he notices on his premises. Meter readings help to 
detect leaks not noticed by the customer. They also remind us that water has a cost.  
 
Kent informed Howie that ‘our next step should be to promote interest amongst water 
suppliers’. Kent Meters circulated the pamphlet and claimed that at least 24 water providers 
had registered an interest in exploring metering in further detail.  
 
Although politicians were not convinced by the economic argument for metering, Rayner, 
from the MLHG, was taken by the idea of water metering and in June 1967 wrote to the 
WRB, in confidence, to seek advice about the feasibility of metering.  Not even the water 
authorities were to be consulted, the Ministry evidently did not want to draw any publicity to 
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the matter. Metering was considered a hazardous political issue; Ministers on both sides of 
the house have often been reluctant to pen their names to a commitment on water metering.  
 
After corresponding with the WRB, civil servants within the department produced a 
relatively detailed briefing note called ‘Water Charges – supplies for domestic purposes: 
Note on metering vs water rates’. The authors of the briefing note, Cliver and Street, tried to 
weigh up the different arguments for and against metering in terms of preventing waste, 
inducing the customer to use less water and the problem of punitive charges which might 
disproportionately impact poorer households, particular those with ‘dirty jobs’21 (1967: 10). 
The briefing note questioned whether it might be more fruitful to devote attention towards 
waste detection rather than broach the subject of waste indirectly through universal metering. 
Of ‘fairness’ in relation to metering, the authors noted that the concept was problematic and 
unconvincing. They stated that if metering were to be considered as a viable policy option, 
ideas surrounding fairness could be utilised as ‘a useful make-weight argument, [however], 
the main justification would… probably have to be the saving of water’ (1967: 10). The 
treatment of the issue of fairness as a make-weight argument is particularly interesting 
considering that 'fairness' would, in 2010, be cited by some companies as one of the primary 
motives for introducing compulsory metering (see chapter five).  
 
With this in mind, civil servants sought ministerial approval in October 1967 to undertake 
‘experiments in the metering of water supplies to domestic consumers, in consultation with 
the water industry and with academics in the appropriate disciplines (economics!), with a 
view to change legislation to enable the experiments to be made’.22 They also requested 
permission to approach the Treasury for funds to support the proposed metering experiments. 
Civil servants were convinced that the cost of supplying water on an unmeasured basis was 
increasing ‘so fast that the Department [would be] duty bound to explore the subject’. Despite 
expectations that metering would be ‘ill-received by the public’, it was thought that ‘it may 
be necessary’ to further explore metering (Girling, 9th October 1967). Subsequently, Lord 
Kennet, Parliamentary Secretary of the MHLG, suggested three courses of action 
 
                                                 
21
 Such jobs included but were not limited to mining, heaving industry, agricultural work. 
22
 The 1945 Water Act had only permitted metering for non-domestic purposes, therefore a change in the law 
would be needed to allow for metering trials for domestic purposes.  
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(1) To have a committee to advise us on (2) how to set up an experiment which could (3) tell 
us whether general domestic metering was a practical possibility (16th October 1967). 
 
Kennet suggested that ‘we could expect much unpopularity at (3): a little at (2): but hardly 
any at (1) (Kennet, 16th October 1967). Subsequently, the minister responded to Cliver and 
Street, asking if setting up such a committee was urgent and enquiring as to whether their 
claim that metering could result in demand savings the region of 10 per cent in the South East 
by 2001 was accurate. The minister also sought confirmation as to whether the ‘idea of 
“saving water”’ was the main consideration behind the proposal. The minister was anxious 
about negative publicity and argued that any ‘announcement – or the leaking out from the 
British Waterworks Association of news of the committee – could give rise to stories that the 
government were looking into “rationing” water, and rationing it by price’. He noted that 
while Lord Kennet agreeing to a subcommittee did not commit the government to metering, 
he also stated that the establishment of a committee is ‘hardly likely to be regarded as purely 
academic’. Concerned that the minister’s ambivalent response would result in the metering 
experiments stalling, the aforementioned civil servants went to great lengths to strengthen 
their proposal. For instance, the MHLG wrote to its German counterpart to find out more 
about how metering worked in Germany.
23
 Hoping to persuade the Labour minister that 
metering did not necessarily have to pose a threat to the poorest in society. They even 
fleetingly researched which ‘Communist’ countries had metering programmes, reporting that 
 
I have heard that water is metered in Poland, but not on reliable authority. It might help in 
convincing the Minister if we could say that even in a Communist country metering has not 
been thoroughly anti-social. It is not worth making special enquires, but if you or Mr Rayner 
happen to know whether any of the countries that meter are Communist ones, it would be 
worth mentioning the point (7th Nov 1967). 
 
Street replied noting that parts of Russia are metered, as was much of Poland and 
Czechoslovakia. Moreover Chilvers suggested that Yugoslavia pursued a domestic water 
metering policy. Unsurprisingly the minister was utterly unconvinced. Stating that ‘I am still 
un-persuaded by this persuasive minute. I think NOT’ (17th November 1967: emphasis in the 
original). In particular the minister was concerned because water suppliers were sceptical 
                                                 
23
 Metering is widespread in Germany. It is commonplace for households are to be metered, although not all 
apartments are metered.  
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about metering and he expected that the measure would be deeply unpopular with the public. 
After hearing news of the minister’s decision, Calvert of the WRB informed Rayner that he 
was ‘disappointed’. He asked whether there was any chance the issue would be reopened, 
suggesting that Herrington’s charge that the WRB showed ‘unreasonable hostility to 
domestic metering’ is somewhat severe. Rayner considered that it would be ‘highly 
improbable’ that the minister would reconsider metering. However, still keen to pursue the 
issue, he discovered an opportunity to undertake a metering ‘experiment’ without the 
publicity risk but on a much smaller scale than originally anticipated. The opportunity arose 
when Malvern water authority was to become amalgamated into South Worcestershire (both 
Malvern and South Worcestershire were supplied by Seven Trent Water).  
 
Malvern was granted special dispensation for metering in 1891 (although the reason for this 
was unclear), this made Malvern an anomaly within the water charging system. It was the 
only area in the country to have been metered on an almost universal basis for a considerable 
period of time. The level of metering in Malvern enabled research into how households use 
water. This is why Herrington has described Malvern as the 'Mecca for Economists’. 
According to Herrington, ‘it is likely that more intimate detail is now known about the 
personal sanitary habits of the long suffering and water economising citizens of Malvern than 
of any other group in the English-speaking world’ (1979:4). The amalgamation of Malvern 
and South Worcester represented as interesting opportunity because it would allow the 
consumption patterns of households who had been metered for a long period of time to be 
compared to those that had not. Rayner hoped that the trial would finally end debate over the 
viability and desirability of water metering. According to Rayner, 'the benefits of [an 
experiment] would be confined to ending (one would hope) a long and inconclusive wrangle; 
if the results themselves were inconclusive, the expenditure would of course have been 
wasted; but if the results showed that metering produces economies, the experiment could 
result in very substantial savings’ (November 11th 1969). Rayner hoped to end the debate one 
way or another.  
 
Interpretation of results from the series of metering experiments undertaken in Malvern, as 
well as Flyde, in the 1970s, were not universally agreed upon. For instance Herrington noted 
that interpretation ‘remains difficult and controversial’. Nonetheless the dominant 
interpretation of the results suggested that PCC domestic consumption was approximately 10 
per cent less in metered than non-metered areas (Herrington, 1979). Results from initial 
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experiments were described as ‘both improbable and inconsistent’ but the ‘more careful 
work’ undertaken as part of the government-Severn Trent experiment was held in higher 
esteem (ibid). Slowly, the notion that metering could potentially help reduce water demand 
started to take hold in the sector. Economics was beginning to be taken more seriously in the 
sector and demand management was becoming a more prominent concern. 
 
The change in government in 1970, from Labour to Conservative, resulted in ministers that 
were more open to the possibility of metering taking office as well as some legislative 
changes which set the foundations for further meter experiments. This did not mean that 
metering was a fait accompli for the Conservative Party. The issue remained controversial 
and was intermittently debated within the House of Commons. The primary concern was the 
extent to which a metered system represented the introduction of commercial charging for an 
essential need and the health and social implications might result from this metering . The 
opposition accused the government of seeking to introduce metering on a near universal 
basis; a claim that the Undersecretary for the Environment, Mr Eldon Griffiths, dismissed as 
‘moonshine’ in 1972. Nonetheless, the 1973 Water Resources Act Granted Regional Water 
Authorities powers to install meters and to use them for charging purposes.  
 
In this instance the customer was expected to cover the costs of metering installation and, as a 
result, meter penetration remained very low. The reorganisation of the water sector in 1974, 
where the multiple water suppliers were consolidated into 10 Regional Water Authorities and 
the WRB was disbanded, were also important changes. Any notion of central planning was 
lost and the decisions over metering trials and experiments were delegated to the respective 
companies. Although for a short time after the WRB was disbanded there had been some 
consensus regarding the relative benefits of metering, the Conservative government 
demonstrated greater appetite to explore water metering. For example the ‘Water Use Studies 
Group’, an ‘informal meeting of like minds from the water authorities, driven by Vic Cocker 
and the Severn Trent Water Authority’, initiated further metering trials at Malvern and 
Mansfield between 1974-79 (WDM: 2). The Water Use Studies Group met under the 
auspices of the newly created National Water Council
24
 and published Paying for Water 
which raised the issue of selective metering in 1976. Within this context, the Council for the 
                                                 
24
  National Water Council was the successor to the WRB, it consisted of a chairman nominated by the minister 
as well as the chairman of each regional water authority and no more than 10 additional members nominated by 
government; the organisation has been described as ‘weak and ineffective’ by McCulloch (2009:471). 
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Protection of Rural England reasoned that a ‘quiet revolution’ was occurring within this 
sector (1977). This was perhaps confirmed in 1977 when the Secretary of State refused 
Southern Water’s application for a reservoir at Broad Oak, suggesting that the company 
should consider demand strategies more seriously (Herrington, 1979).  
 
This section has shown how the influence of engineers was slowly supplanted by that of 
economists.  In turn, meanings of fairness became increasingly contested. The economists in 
question viewed resistance to metering as ‘dogmatic’ and ‘emotional’ and argued forcefully, 
unsurprisingly, for economic thinking to take precedence. In part this meant advocating for, 
and experimenting with, metering (Herrington, 1979). However, it is notable that this 
movement from engineering to economics was far from smooth; the resulting debate over 
metering in this period was reminiscent of previous debates regarding the fairness of 
metering. The type of market economics represented by the meter were presented as both in 
conflict with and complementary to the biopolitical security of the waterscape. Market 
economics were interpreted as both a potential threat to and guarantor of public health 
through regulating access to affordable supplies of water. 
 
5.4 Creeping compulsory metering? 
 
The Secretary of State for the Environment has intervened four times, and he has protested 
too much. We do not believe him when he says that he is not in favour of compulsory water 
metering. Why? Because, before the Tories were elected, they did not say that they would 
privatise rain, but when they got into power they did (Dennis Skinner, 1996 HC vol 281, col 
188). 
 
The 1990s, in the context of a newly privatised water sector, was a turbulent time for debates 
over metering in England and Wales. The Conservative party had issued legislation that 
prohibited the use of rateable charges beyond the year 2000 in an attempt to accelerate the 
emergence of a metered charging system.
25
 It was during this period when the regulator, for 
the first time, made absolutely clear its preference for metering in two papers: Paying for 
                                                 
25
 It quickly became clear that establishing a metered charging base would not be possible within the given time 
frame. The 1999 Water Industry Act reversed this decision, again allowing Rateable Values to be used as a 
means for structuring water charges.  
122 
 
Water (1991) and Paying for Growth (1993). Here the regulator played a key role in pushing 
companies towards metering solutions. Sandwiched between these two reports, the 
government also expressed preference for metering in Using Water Wisely (1992). In this 
context, some, rather polemically, claimed that water meters were ‘the government’s last 
great hope to create a market in water’ (Counterclaim, 1995) while others joked that the 
Paying for Water paper appeared to be a ‘manifesto for the Compulsory Metering Party’ 
(Labour Party Brighton Fringe Meeting, PUAF). Rather than being perceived to be a 
marginal issue, metering was presented as the optimum, most rational, way of ordering the 
water charging system. At this point metering, as a technology of government that promoted 
self-regulation and market inspired patterns of resource allocation, was increasingly 
positioned by government and the economic regulator as a vital way of securing the 
waterscape.  
 
The government instigated a series of metering trials to establish the feasibility of a metering 
system (WDM, 2010: 6). Interestingly, these were primarily designed to test the financial 
viability of metering, rather than the impact these types of schemes might have on PCC. The 
National Metering Trials took place over twelve areas of the UK (see Table 8) between April 
1989 and March 1993 and were led by David Gladbury of Southern Water. The final report 
claimed that the introduction of metering resulted in average household water use reductions 
of 21 per cent. Other analysts concluded that ‘the average reduction in domestic consumption 
associated with compulsory metering was found to be 11 per cent nationally’ and ‘suggested 
that compulsory metering had very marked effects on peak demand with a 30 per cent 
reduction being recorded in peak month, week, day and hour demand in years with hot, dry 
summers (Ofwat, 1992: 22; Goyal and Hall, 1992). In a sense, metering was beginning to be 
positioned as an engineering fix that would result in reductions in household water 
consumption.  
 
The much contested results from these trials have gained enormous traction within the water 
sector. In particular the claim that water metering can help reduce average PCC by c.10 per 
cent has been uncritically reiterated so frequently, although source of the 10 per cent figure is 
rarely referenced directly, that it has taken on an almost mythical quality. The continued use 
of the National Water Metering Trials results are problematic for two reasons. Firstly, 
consumer groups argued that the trial results should be treated with caution because the 
sample was not representative of population as a whole and the study did not take into 
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consideration the potential burden that the poorest might face. Secondly, the results have 
been presented in a crude fashion in that they failed to distinguish between demand reduction 
from heightened leakage detection and changes in customer water use.  
 
The composition of the National Water Meter Trials were heavily criticised by consumer 
organisations because the demographics of the trial area differed dramatically from the 
population at large. For example, a small percentage of those taking part in the trial received 
benefits or were on low incomes. Questions were raised about the potential hardship metering 
could cause to low income households who might try to cut their consumption significantly 
(Hugby, 1994). Interviews with the trial’s participants revealed that ‘the great majority stated 
that they did not regard it [reducing their water use] as necessary... [and] that they could 
afford to pay for the amount of water they were using at present’ (National Metering Trials 
Working Group, 1989). However, a small but significant number of households taking part in 
the trial suffered financial hardship and some cut back on what consumer organisations 
considered to be essential use. Here Hugby argued that ‘a distinction ought to be made 
between cutting back on essential use to avoid financial hardship and debt and extra use to 
minimise waste’ (Hugby, 1994). When discussing these issues at a Public Utilities Access 
Forum (Forum) sub group meeting on 21
st
 July 1997, PUAF concluded that ‘there is no real 
proof that metering affects consumption' and asserted that the National Water Metering Trials 
were defective and narrow’ (ibid). The PUAF noted: 
 
Data emerging from the national metering trials are not representative and the final report 
gives only rudimentary information about the effects on demand. Although metering overall 
appears to have resulted in reduced levels of consumption this is by no means the case in all 
households, or even in all sites (Sub Group Meeting, 21st July 1997).  
 
It is common for water companies to state that customers who have meters tend to use, on 
average, about 10 per cent less water than those who do not. Importantly reiterations of the 10 
per cent statistic do not make a distinction between water demand reductions and leakage 
control. Here the notion that households use 10 per cent less water seems somewhat 
undermined.  Furthermore, the notion of average water customer and average water use hides 
the diversity in water use practices and the varied impact metering could have on different 




Table 8 National Water Meter Trial Areas 
Trial Area Number of Properties Participating Company 
Isle of Wight 48 000 Southern Water 
Bromsgrove (Worcs) 1191 East Worcestershire 
Waterworks Company 
Camberley (Surrey) 1174 Mid Southern Water 
Brookman Park (Herts) 1145 Three Valley’s Water Service 
Hotwells (Bristol) 1007 Bristol Water 
South Nomanton (Wakfield) 815 Yorkshire Water 
Chorleywood (Herts) 813 Three Valley’s Water Service 
Hutton Rudby (Teeside) 997 Northumbrian Water 
Haling Park (Croydon) 756 Thames Water 
Chandlers Ford (Hants) 595 Southern Water 
Broadstone (Poole) 358 Wessex Water 
Turlin Moor (Poole 320 Wessex Water 
Total 53332  
 
With this in mind it is perhaps surprising that the 10 per cent figure continues to be used as 
part of the evidence base used to justify contemporary company-wide compulsory metering 
programmes. Interviewees maintained that there is an ‘overwhelming collective thinking’ 
within the water sector ‘that you get a 10 per cent reduction’ through metering yet 
interviewees also acknowledged the imprecise nature of the 10 per cent statistic:  
 
Recent evidence isn’t all that forthcoming. There is quite a bit of evidence comes from the 
Isle of Wight trials in the 1980s and there have been some UKWIR research more recently 
but none of them are completely conclusive on the demand effects of metering. But if you take 
the body of evidence on the whole, there’s a suggestion that there’s a 10% reduction.  It’s not 
by any stretch of the imagination science’ (water company interview conducted on 
15.09.2011). 
 
This data is often supplemented with data from households who have opted for a meter. This 
is problematic because households who opt for meters tend to benefit from being charged by 
volume (for example smaller households) and thus do not tend to give further insight into the 
impact metering might have on low income families who reside in low rateable value 




Although the foundations of the oft cited 10 per cent figure has its foundations in the trials 
undertaken during the early 1990s, it continues to influence the way metering is presented to 
households, even if the source of the 10 per cent finding is rarely cited.
26
 Instead it is 
attributed to ‘independent research’ or merely ‘research’ thus masking the age of the data 
source. Here the meter, in the 1990s, was beginning to be understood as an engineering fix 
that would lead to reductions in overall measures of household consumption.  
 
Following trials in the early 1990s, metering technologies were utilised in various forms 
throughout the 1990s: traditional ‘dumb’ volumetric meters were used in new builds whereas 
prepayment meters and flow restrictor valves tended to be targeted at households in debt to 
the water company. Importantly, meters were used for the first time as a means of directly 
disciplining payment and water consumption as a whole rather than just external use or ‘non- 
essential’ use. Prepayment meters and trickle flow valves played a particularly important, but 
highly controversial, role in facilitating different ideas about the waterscape. 
 
In this context, PUAF argued that the ‘government had decided that water was a product, not 
a service’ (21st Feb 1995). Increasingly water metering, as a technology of government, was 
perceived to be a fair, economically rational, conservation tool. Although policy makers and 
regulators appeared keen to establish a metered charging system, some water companies were 
rather less enthusiastic about the prospect of metering. For example while Anglian Water 
committed to a proactive metering campaign, in part because Anglian operate in a water 
stressed area and was under pressure from the National Rivers Authority to take measures to 
conserve water before it built more reservoirs, most other companies, including both Thames 







                                                 
26
 More recently research published by the Energy Savings Trust (EST), where participants were drawn from 
people who had used the EST online water calculator, suggested that the households with meters could use just 
3% less water than non-metered households (EST, 2013). 
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5.5 The government’s ‘Secret Agenda’?  
 
The government line is a paraphrase of Henry Ford: “You can have any system you like, so 
long as it's metering” (Dobson, 1996 HC vol 281, cc 184-237) 
 
Lord Deben (John Gummer), who held the position of Secretary of State for the Environment 
in the 1990s, suggested that ‘no one was particularly focused on metering’ (interview 
conducted on 03.06.2013). However, according to the opposition, as well as consumer 
organisations, the government was seeking to realise a compulsory metering system. National 
press led with articles claiming that the government had a ‘secret agenda’ for water metering 
(Guardian, 1995). Arguments surrounding metering intensified throughout the 1990s due, in 
part, to the radically rising cost of water bills and the high rate of disconnections for non-
payment (see Table 9). Metering was debated furiously within Parliament in 1995/6 which is 
perhaps unsurprising given that the 1997 election was fast approaching. Raising the profile of 
water, as an important and immediate issue, presented a political opportunity for the Labour 
Party.  
 
Table 9 Domestic disconnections for non-payment (1989-1998) (Source: Bakker, 2004: 132) 










2679 2456 8048 7495 5536 4932 2657 1315 702 
Total 8426 7873 21282 18636 12452 1047 5826 3148 1907 
 
*Household disconnection for non-payment prohibited from 1997. 
 
In this context, the Labour Party used its Opposition Day
27
 to launch a verbal assault on what 
they saw as a thinly veiled commitment to compulsory metering and a reluctance to consider 
alternative, non-metered, ways of ordering the water system. The then Shadow Environment 
                                                 
27
 Opposition Days are days that are allocated to the official Opposition in the House of Commons in each 




Secretary Frank Dobson led a vehement attack on the government’s water metering policy on 
the grounds of ‘social justice’. Lord Deben argued that Labour’s approach was organised 
around ‘old class war battles’ where Dobson focused on two arguments: that metering would 
be a tax on the poor and that water companies were not doing enough to deal with leakage 
(interview conducted on 03.06.2013). Dobson opened his speech by asking the house to call 
 
Upon her Majesty’s government to abandon its hidden agenda to force water metering on 
every household, which would prove expensive, unjust, dangerous to health and the least 
cost-effective way of protecting the environment (Dobson, 1996, HC vol 281, cc 184-237). 
 
Here Dobson described metering (and the forms of economics that underpinned metering) as 
a threat to public and environmental health. Again economics and biopolitics were placed in 
opposition. The Labour Party was convinced that the Conservative Party, particularly John 
Gummer, was concealing a ‘hidden agenda’ concerning metering, despite the government 
making no explicit statement to this effect. Dobson argued that the government’s approach, 
facilitated by the newly established independent regulator, amounted to ‘creeping compulsory 
metering’. He stated that 
 
The Tory government want to force every family in the land to install water meters. They will 
not put that proposal in their manifesto for the general election, but it is on their secret 
agenda. The water regulator the government appointed is even worse. He is obsessed with 
promoting water metering for domestic customers. He seldom misses an opportunity to push 
water metering (Dobson 1996 HC vol 281 cc 184-237).  
 
Lord Deben confirmed that the government saw water metering as being the most appropriate 
means of structuring the water charging system and stated that those who opposed metering 
were effectively climate change deniers. He has subsequently called into question Labour’s 
competency on environmental issues; Lord Deben recently alleged that Frank Dobson 
‘wouldn’t understand an environmental problem if you threw it at him’ and suggested that 
‘the Labour Party in those days had no environmental policy’ (interview conducted on 
03.06.2013). In contrast for Lord Deben water metering presented a means of better 
balancing environmental objectives by prompting people to reduce their water consumption 
through financial incentives. Market economics and metering were not in conflict with 
biopolitics, rather they were complementary. This, he claimed, was a ‘common sense’ 
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approach (HC 1996 vol 281 col 184). Lord Deben did, however, refute Dobson’s claim that 
the Conservative party favoured compulsory metering, he stated that: 
  
The hon. Gentleman has made an allegation which is entirely untrue. The government do not 
wish to force people to have water meters. We are opposed to compulsory water metering. 
The government have no intention of introducing it (Lord Deben, 1996 HC vol 281, cc 184-
237).  
 
Gummer preferred optant metering, where households could choose to receive a metered 
charge, citing Anglian Water’s approach as a model for others to emulate. Anglian had 
installed meters in homes within their constituency but did not initially use them to structure 
water bills. Instead, customers were provided with comparisons of their unmeasured and 
prospective measured charges and were then asked whether they would like to revert to a 
metered charge on a permanent basis.  
 
The main thrust of Dobson’s critique was levelled at the government’s failure to consider 
alternative ways of charging for water. He argued that the Conservative Party was thus 
placing a disproportionate responsibility on households to save water. He argued that  
 
Everyone accepts the need to save water, to restrain the growth in demand and to make sure 
that our use of water is environmentally sustainable, but that does not mean that everyone 
should be forced to have a water meter. There are other ways of saving water and reducing 
demand. We believe that the alternatives to water metering would give better value for 
money, would have a quicker impact, would be more equitable, and would be less of a threat 
to public health (Dobson, 1996 HC vol 281, col 237). 
 
Dobson was not alone in his interpretation of the situation, Save the Children (Herbert and 
Hempson 1995; Cunningham, et al 1996), the Consumers’ Association (1996), some of the 
regional Water Voice committees, PUAF and AgeUK were amongst the many consumer 
organisations who voiced concern about the government’s water policy at this time.  
 
Dobson’s shadow department produced a number of reports in 1995/6 including Licensed to 
Leak: How the Tories Let the Water Companies of the Hook (1995), More Money Down the 
Drain: Water Leakages and Water Profits (1996a), The Waterfacts of Privatisation: Failure, 
129 
 
Waste and Greed in the Privatised Water Industry 1990-5 (1996b), Ending the Waste: 
Labour’s Plans for a World Class, Water-efficient, Sustainable Water Industry (1996c) 
Floods of Cash, Floods of Excuses: Labour’s 1996 Annual Report on the Privatised Water 
industry (1996d). These papers exposed the scale of company leakage and highlighted the 
gross profits which the sector had accrued while customers struggled with escalating water 
prices. Here Dobson pledged to: establish and enforce tough mandatory leakage targets; 
require water companies to offer a free leakage repair programme for customers; require 
water companies to carry out free water efficiency audits of people’s homes; promote the 
development and use of water-efficient devices in the home; ensure new buildings are 
designed to promote efficient use of water; refuse licenses for increased abstraction; require 
companies to compensate customers for interruptions in normal supplies; instil tougher fines 
for pollution by water companies; publish a national audit and require water companies to 
publish their annual performance in local newspapers. Here Dobson advocated a different 
way of governing the waterscape and argued that rather than placing responsibility on 
customers through metering, and encouraging forms of self-government, companies should 
be compelled to tackle leakage. While important in illuminating the contested understandings 
of the role of the water meter and its relationship to fairness, the Labour Party’s analysis was 
rather blunt and established crass dichotomies between metering and better leakage control.  
 
Alongside these strong views for and against metering, a more nuanced debate was emerging 
within the water sector about the future of the water charging system at this time. The work 
of NPI/OXERA, which culminated in the 1999 report Water Charging and Social Justice: 
Why politicians must act, was of particular note (Palmer, 1999). Overall, this document 
argued that both the existing unmeasured tariff, based on rateable value, and blanket metered 
tariffs were socially and environmentally regressive. One of the reasons why this volume is 
so interesting is that it contains an article by Keith Harris, the then Director of Finance and 
Regulation at Wessex Water. He called for variable tariff structures in order to provide a 
service responsive to both social and environmental imperatives. With respect to metering, 
Harris was especially critical of blanket volumetric tariffs. He argued that 
 
Currently every customer, rich or poor, faces the same metered price. Not surprisingly 
therefore the cost of metered water is more regressive than in the unmeasured sector. 
Furthermore, it is low income households who have the greatest incentive to save, as their 
water bills are a greater share of their total household budget. This is exactly the wrong 
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message. There is little if any need or purpose in restricting the use of customers who, on the 
whole, do not impose peak demands. Indeed, given the limited amount of discretionary use in 
low income households, any reduction in demand is likely to come in the form of essential use 
and instances of what is fashionably known as social exclusion (Harris, 1999: 33). 
 
Similarly, Martin Fitch, of Sheffield City Council, argued that metered water bills will 
‘always result in disproportionate impacts on the poor’. Fitch favoured water charges based 
on Council Tax bills because, ‘like housing refuse collection and other council services, 
water and sewerage provision constitutes an essential service’ (Fitch and Price, 2002). As an 
alternative to a blanket metered tariff, Harris recommended using a combination of rising 
block tariffs (where the cost of water per unit rises in correlation with the volume of water 
used) and Council Tax bands to determine water charges. He hoped that this system would 
achieve two goals: (1) provide incentives for high volume water users to economise on their 
water use and (2) be more sensitive to household affordability. Here Harris exposed the 
multiple ways in which metering technologies (inclusive of the tariff) can renegotiate the 
water charging system; metering does not inherently produce regressive water charging 
systems.  
 
Harris’, as well as others’, work on the potential use of Council Tax bands within the water 
charging system received criticism. Firstly, it was highly questionable whether, in practical 
terms, it would be desirable to use Council Tax bands as a basis for water charging. Critics 
argued that Council Tax bands had become divorced from income. As an article in 
Counterpoint noted: 
 
The problem for those who want council tax bands to replace water rates is that council tax 
bands are not very closely aligned with ability to pay. Anyone who is going to introduce a 
fairer system will first have to look at reforming the council tax system itself (Counterpoint, 
1995).  
 
Counterpoint argued that it would be altogether more radical to ‘accept that the whole 
community has an interest in ensuring that everyone is connected to the water and sewerage 
system’ and, ‘on this basis, water should be treated as a “public good”, funded out of general 
taxation’ (Counterclaim, 1995). These approaches, which transcended the binary arguments 
for and against metering, barely made an impact on the broader water sector or on the 
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parliamentary based debates at the time. Instead, discussions about metering were 
increasingly juxtaposed with leakage rates, as a conflict between economics and biopolitics. 
 
Discussions about alternative tariffs demonstrate that the meter is a contingent technology 
and can result in multiple water charging systems. During the 1990s it became clear that 
metering was perceived as the ideal strategy. Although the Conservative Party was accused of 
having a secret agenda regarding metering, policy at this time was far removed from 
universal, compulsory metering. Rather than enacting a universal metering system, meters 
were instead employed as disciplinary tools targeted at those on low incomes. The following 
sections focuses on the experiences of residents of the Lower Grange Estate and the debates 
that materialized during a local government led legislative campaign against prepayment 
metering and trickle flow valves. It shows how the meter was used as a disciplinary tool to 
govern waters users’ interactions with water. Whereas in the previous chapter the meter was 
perceived to be a means to governing the network or a sense of justice for some households, 
the subsequent section examines some more negative instances of metering, where metering 
was deployed as a technology of the self, and explores how understandings of a fair 
waterscape were struggled over through metering in this period. In this context conflicts 
between market economics and biopolitics took precedence.  
 
5.6 Disciplining water use? The Lower Grange Campaign for Water 
Justice 
Water companies had been able to install meters in new homes since 1990. The move to 
install meters in every new home differed from previous expressions of metering: the water 
meter was no longer used to mediate or delineate between different types of water use in the 
home. Instead the meter was used to measure usage as a whole, and the distinction between 
essential and discretionary use dissolved somewhat over this period. The emergence of 
Lower Grange Campaign for Water Justice is illustrative of some of the struggles over water 
and water metering throughout this period; especially regarding the way water meters could 
be used to discipline water use and, in Foucauldian terms, as a technology of the self.  
 
The Lower Grange Campaign for Water Justice was comprised of residents from the Lower 
Grange Council Estate in Bradford, Yorkshire which included 850 semi-detached houses 
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built in the 1920s. In 1991, residents were moved into new properties following complaints 
that their existing homes had significant problems including rising damp and a lack of indoor 
toilets (Hyatt, 2004: 2). These new properties were fitted with water meters. In just a matter 
of months a group of tenants had formed the Campaign for Water Justice. For many within 
this group, the water meter was considered to be a potential threat to water for ‘basic’ needs.  
 
Importantly no one from the housing estate was disconnected for non-payment. However the 
organisation argued that households frequently rationed their water use below acceptable 
levels and personal debt had spiralled as a result of meter installation (Hyatt 2004: 5). 
Households were self-regulating their water use in ways which were considered a threat to 
the biopolitical health of the population. Residents made comparisons to their neighbours, 
who had not been metered, and found that their bills were larger. Leaders of the organisation 
argued that residents could not maintain ‘hygiene standards’ and newspapers reported an 
unconfirmed link between water metering and a surge of cases of dysentery in the area. In 
this sense, water meters, as a technology of the self, had been used to successfully, and 
arguably draconically, discipline water use. As a result the organisation called for the 
discontinuation of water metering. The standpoints (as well as the creativity) of the residents 
are in part captured in the poem below (Figure 8) written by a member of the organisation, 



































The Lower Grange Campaign for Water Justice also organised public protests: two particular 
forms of protest stand out and are worth briefly expanding upon. The first involved members 
of the organisation donning Victorian dress and washing clothes in the city centre public 
Dear Sir, some words to say I’orter,  
What’s this ‘ere about our water? 
I’m sick to death on feeling dowdy, 
Sometimes Dull and sometimes Cloudy. 
Now it’s time to go to town,  
Oh No! The water’s turning BROWN. 
 
There’s lots of people ‘goody-goody’, 
I wonder if their water’s muddy. 
Our homes would look so much neater 
When they’ve sorted out our Water Meter.  
We’re crying over milk that’s split,  
It’s too late now the homes are built. 
Every Rose, June or Kath,  
Would like their folks to have a bath. 
With a family’s imperfection,  
There’s a fear of mass infection. 
 
Friends and family we are greeting 
When we go to our public meeting. 
We all sit down and then discuss 
Sorting things out, what’s all the fuss? 
Then someone, who has got some power 
Says, “Why bother, why don’t you shower?” 
 
This is not a plot that’s sinister,  
This is a plea to our Prime Minister 
We’d like to know what is the fate 
Of folks who live on our Estate. 
 
This poem’s been written in a rush 
It costs too much to ‘toilet flush’! 
What happens when there’s a drought? 
They threaten to bring the standpipes out! 
And what about disabled folk? 
They can’t carry theirs, it’s no joke!! 
Figure 8 "The Water Meter" written by the Tortoise (member of the Lower Grange for 
Water Justice Campaign) (Source: PUAF, 1993) 
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fountain, making the fountain bubble using soap. Members of the organisation argued that the 
Victorian attire reflected Yorkshire Water’s approach to water supply. Their main aim was 
‘to demonstrate that the problems on Lower Grange were not matters confined to individual 
households but, rather, that they were emblematic of the way in which government had 
“washed its hands” … of the responsibility for acting to protect the public’s health and 
welfare’ (Hyatt, 2004: 2). The second involved members using a campaign fund to buy water 
company shares (which would have been approximately £8 at the time) so that they could 
attend meetings and air their grievances.  
 
The majority of the organisation’s efforts centred on the removal of water meters from the 
residents’ homes, arguing that they were unjust. The Lower Grange Campaign for Water 
Justice’s opposition to metering was not lost on Ofwat, in fact the regulator met with the 
organisation on 1993. At this meeting a spokesperson for the campaigners, Joe Flerin, 
presented their predicament to the General Director of Ofwat, Ian Byatt. The transcript is 
worth quoting at length because it reveals how ideas surrounding water need, equality and 
even democracy are presented differently in the exchange. Joe Flerin, of the more vocal 
members of the Lower Grange Campaign stated that 
 
Our main reason for coming to talk to you this morning is to voice our anger and outrage at 
Yorkshire Water’s treatment of Lower Grange residents with regards water meters… We 
believe that we have been denied our democratic rights to choose whether we have water 
meters installed. We live in a democratic society and we are angry that Yorkshire Water 
Authority has usurped that democratic right of ours. They have done so in installing water 
meters without prior consultation with the residents of the Lower Grange area. While the 
properties were being built, there should have been proper consultation with the 
representative of Lower Grange.  
 
We demand justice… We demand the removal of the water meters in the homes of the 
residents of Lower Grange. We also demand that every resident who has had a water meter 
installed without prior consultation be approached individually and asked, and let them have 
the choice whether they have a water meter installed or whether they want meter rates in the 
normal, conventional way. 
 




Let us just look at the situation between a mother and her son... A year, two years ago, the 
mother used to instil in that child, that boy, the importance of cleanliness, of hygiene, of 
tidiness. To have a bath every day, keeping clean, because cleanliness is next to godliness. 
Yet this same mother is having to turn round to that boy and say sorry, son, you can only 
have a bath once a week or once a fortnight. When you come in from playing outdoors, you 
have to be extremely careful how much water you use to wash your hands because we’ve got 
to save water. I can’t afford to pay the exorbitant cost for water usage. Can you imagine 
what that son is going to say to his mother? That “mother, you’ve been trying to impress 
upon me for so long the importance of cleanliness, now you’re turning round to me and 
saying I cannot use water” (PUAF, 1993). 
 
In response, Ian Byatt attributed rising water costs to EU water quality standards, drew 
attention to the decision making procedures in the water sector and was rather dismissive 
about the groups’ objections to metering. He stated the group had 
 
… made a number of points about democracy and human rights, and those are important 
matters, but I’ve got to remember that I’ve got to act within the law and the law in the 
country which we live in is made by Parliament, and is how our democracy works, and that 
Parliament has decided that the rateable value system of charging for water will not be 
available to any company after the year 2000, and, of course, there are no rateable values 
assessed for new properties, and Parliament has given companies the right to devise the 
charging method, and that went through parliament and was subject to debate. Now you may 
or may not feel that that was right or wrong but that is the situation that Parliament has 
decided and those are the arrangements under which I operate (PUAF, 1993). 
 
Byatt’s response was not well received by residents. Maggie Chapman, one of the leading 
members of the group, questioned the mismatch between the metering policy and the design 
of the new build houses as well as the lack of means residents had to adapt their homes in 
order to mitigate against bill potential increases caused by meter installation. She asked 
 
When our houses were built in 1991 why were they not fitted then with water saving fixtures 
and fittings? We have to throw gallons of water down the sink yearly as we wait for the hot 
water to begin to flow. We have gigantic sized baths and our toilets are completely 
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inadequate. Yet when we receive our bills, there is a pamphlet enclosed telling us how to use 
water wisely!! Put a brick in the toilet system! Get a shower installed! Buy an ecological 
washing machine!! WHERE ARE SUPPOSED TO GET THIS KIND OF MONEY FROM TO 
FOLLOW THIS ADVICE?? (PUAF, 1993 – emphasis in the original).  
 
The Lower Grange Campaign for Water Justice, along with a number of other groups, drew 
national recognition for their work. The campaign exposed the deeply political characteristics 
of water supply and contested understandings of what the waterscape should look like as well 
as the key role the water meter has in advancing particular ideas surrounding fairness, 
disciplining water use and negotiating understandings of the waterscape. The campaigners 
argued that water meters placed greater pressure on households to reduce their water use. In 
this sense meters could be described as a means of disciplining household water use. The 
problem from the groups’ perspective was that some of the households in question reduced 
their water consumption below socially acceptable levels and struggled to find ways of 
mitigating against bill increases. Metering in this context, as a technology of the self, 
represented a potential threat to public health. 
 
5.7 Disciplining payment: the budget payment unit and trickle flow valves  
Alongside legislating for the installation of water meters in new houses from 1990, this 
decade is also noteworthy for the introduction of prepayment water meters, sometimes 
referred to as ‘Budget Payment Units’, and flow restrictor valves. According to Drakeford, 
‘by June 1995, 11 companies were trialling or using units and a further 5 were planning 
trials’ (1998: 592). These devices represented the more draconian potential of water metering. 
Four elements of this particular metering technology differed fundamentally from other 
expressions of metering: water charges were made up front; the meter predominantly 
measured time rather than volume of water used; the meters served a (self-) disconnection 
function; and the flow restrictor valve could reduce water supply to a trickle. So different 
were the characteristics, that PUAF member Ian Ford, who worked for local government, 
questioned ‘when is a meter not a meter?’ It is these functions which prompted PUAF 
members to emphasise that it was 
 
Important to differentiate between volumetric meters which have concerned PUAF for a long 
time and pre-paid meters... Irritatingly, prepayment is as nicely contradictory a piece of 
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social welfare as might be imagined, a mixed blessing that sustains people at a minimal level 
by alternatively providing and denying supply (PUAF, 1993). 
 
This statement refers to the positioning of prepayment water meters as budget management 
tools and a means of disciplining payment rather than water use. Companies argued that 
prepayment meters were an important part of ensuring ‘disciplined payment behaviour and 
giving customer confidence that they can get on top of debt’ (PUAF, 1997). In this context, 
Lord Deben has suggested that prepayment meters represented a legitimate option for water 
companies seeking to collect payment from customers who, he argued, could afford to pay 
their bills yet refused to.
28
 Lord Deben argued that ‘you have the kind of person that does not 
pay any bills, quite seriously, so there you have a real problem’ (interview conducted on 
03.06.2013). Typically, prepayment meters were targeted at customers who had fallen into 
arrears and companies argued that these meters would help ensure that households did not 
miss water payments. Customers were expected to liaise with the water company to purchase 
water for an agreed amount of time, measured by the meter, after which they could use as 
much water as they desired for that allotted period. Once this time period expired, and if the 
customer had not agreed a subsequent payment or topped up the meter, the water supply 
would cease or in some cases would continue at a trickle. At times of restricted flow, water 
would be sufficient for drinking water and perhaps, over time, toilet flushing. Yet the supply 
would be inadequate to meet the socially ascribed needs of most households. In this sense, 
the prepayment meter could be best understood as a means of disciplining payment.  
 
The prepayment water meter’s capacity to prevent households from accessing the water 
supply, particularly through self-disconnection, made the use of this technology a contentious 
political issue. For instance, PUAF (1993) made clear that their non-regulator members were 
‘fundamentally against budget payment units because customers can self-disconnect’. 
Although the rate of households being disconnected for non-payment by water companies 
had decreased by 19 per cent between 1993/4 and 1994/5 in England and Wales, Drakeford 
has drawn attention to the ‘accelerating adoption of prepayment devices by companies in that 
same period’ (1998: 592, also see Bakker 2004). The disconnection function of prepayment 
meters meant that the decision to disrupt the water supply was transferred from the water 
company to the household. Consequently, due to meters being deployed as technologies of 
                                                 
28
 Although some, for example Water UK (2009), have tried, differentiating between those who are supposedly 
unwilling to pay and who are unable to pay is extremely controversial and difficult.  
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the self, it became more difficult to track the number of households without a constant water 
supply. As Drakeford convincingly argues 
 
The direct effect of prepayment meters has been to remove the public visibility and awareness 
of disconnection by companies themselves, and to ‘privatise’ that decision within the lives of 
the poorest houses (1998: 600). 
 
The acceptability and suitability of prepayment water meters became a hotly contested issue. 
Influenced, in part, by the Merseyside Campaign for Water Justice and the Lower Grange 
Campaign for Water Justice, a number of Local Authorities in the North West of England 
‘sought legal advice on the implication of prepayment meters for local authority powers’ in 
1994 (Drakeford, 1998: 596). Subsequently, Robert Carnwath QC concluded that prepayment 
meters contravened the water provider’s statutory domestic supply duty.  Following this 
advice, Liverpool City Council wrote to Ofwat to request that prepayment meters be declared 
illegal. 
 
Initially, Ofwat rejected the conclusions of the legal counsel and circulated a letter stating its 
support for prepayment meters. Ofwat stressed that the devices were adopted on a voluntary 
basis and argued that customers were ‘exercising choice to go without water’ (1998: 596). 
Similarly, North West Water argued that these devices effectively amounted to a ‘pay as you 
go system’ where the customers agree ‘an amount they think they can afford and then pay 
that on a weekly or even daily basis’ and, ‘as long as the person pays the agreed amount, he 
can use as much water as he needs’ (PUAF 1993). Consequently, in March 1996, six local 
authorities (Birmingham, Liverpool, Salford, Manchester, Oldham and Lancashire County 
Council) took joint legal action against the use of prepayment water meters with a 
disconnection function.  These local authorities were supported (financially) by over 20 
additional local authorities (Drakeford, 1998: 596).  
 
The councils were granted a full judicial review in the autumn of 1996. Mr Justice Harrison 
found in favour of the local authorities and declared prepayment meters unlawful on the 20 
February 1998 (ibid, 598). The government subsequently legislated to remove the power of 
water companies to disconnect customers for non-payment and prohibit prepayment water 
metering devices with a disconnection function and flow restrictor valves. This decision is 
important because it prioritised access to water over payment recovery in law. Here the 
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prepayment water meter was perceived to operate in a draconian fashion, posed a threat to the 
ability of domestic water users to access water. As Lord Deben noted, deploying prepayment 
water meters with a disconnection became ‘politically impossible… because people believed 
that water is essential, people don’t like the idea that people are being cut off, so it was felt to 
be contrary to human rights if it were to be cut off’ (interview conducted on 03.06.2013). 
 
Following the removal of powers to disconnect domestic household water customers, the 
desirability of prepayment meters and flow restrictor valves as tools to discipline payment 
continued to resurface periodically. Some actors questioned whether prepayment meters 
could be used to discipline payment in a less draconian manner. For example, the then 
consumer body, Water Voice, suggested that rather than disconnecting the water user, 
prepayment meters could ‘emit a noise when more money was required in the meter to make 
further payments towards the water bill’ to assist households in  budgeting (Water Voice and 
Ofwat, 2003: 43). However, Water Voice warned that this proposition would ‘not [be] well 
received by either customers or money advisers’ (ibid). More recently, the Walker Review 
(2009) and Water UK (2009) explored the potential for using prepayment meters and reduced 
flow valves. The Walker Review team did not recommend the introduction of prepayment 
meters or reduced flow valves and determined that ‘in today’s society, other less draconian 
debt recovery methods should be employed’ (Walker, 2009: 139). Nonetheless, some 
companies continue to express support for the use of these devices (ibid). In contrast, CCW, 
the CAB and UNISON oppose their introduction. UNISON went as far to warn that it would 
mount a legal challenge if these technologies were introduced. For the foreseeable future, 
prepayment meters of any type are unlikely to feature in England and Wales. 
 
Debates over prepayment meters were significant because they involved a shift from 
disciplining water use to disciplining payment, and from predominantly measuring water to 
measuring time. These particular technologies of the self had different objects as the target of 
governance. While Coutard and Guy correctly highlight that prepayment technologies can, 
potentially, offer positive features such as budget management, during the 1990s, prepayment 
meters were used as a blunt disciplinary tool. Prepayment water meters helped negotiate a 
waterscape where low income households faced a risk of being disconnected from the water 
supply. The struggle over the desirability of prepayment meters reflected a struggle over what 
the waterscape should look like; whether payment should be prioritised over access to water. 
Metering again placed economics in opposition to biopolitics.  
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5.8 Securing Life: making compulsory water metering possible 
After disastrous publicity over prepayment meters, other forms of metering were approached 
with caution in England and Wales. Metering was primarily advanced through the Free Meter 
Option scheme where households could request a meter at the expense of the water company. 
In addition to the Free Meter Option scheme, providers were also permitted to meter new 
homes and could exercise limited powers to compulsory meter households that were deemed 
to have high levels of discretional water use (e.g. possessing a swimming pool, sprinkler 
system or power shower). Typically, households who opted for meters tended to be those 
who would benefit financially from metering, e.g. small or single person households or 
households in parts of the country where unmeasured tariffs were especially high. As a result, 
metering has been carried out in a haphazard, unplanned fashion and the rate of metering 
penetration is highly uneven across the country. For instance, South West Water has a usually 
high rate of metering as a consequence of customers electing to take a meter in order to offset 
above average unmetered water charges caused by water quality investments that have been 
required by the EU.  
 
The Free Meter Option scheme, in addition to the water companies’ limited compulsory 
metering powers, resulted in metering rates rising steadily by around two per cent per annum 
from 2000 until the introduction of compulsory metering programmes in 2010 (EA, 2008, 
Figure 9). However, following a serious drought between 2004 and 2006, debates over the 
utility of water metering resurfaced and the meter was presented as a way of dealing with 
‘potential permanent “water scarcity”’ in the South East of England (Taylor et al, 2009: 591). 
This section argues that following the prohibition of prepayment meters, household water 
metering was increasingly framed in turns of securing life by helping to guarantee future 
water supplies in water stressed areas. This did not mean that the all of the disciplinary 
aspects of metering disappeared completely. Rather, these were complemented by a change in 
focus. Metering was increasingly framed as a way of managing water stress rather than just 
disciplining payment. In this sense, to an extent, changes in the emphasis of metering debates 
has mirrored shifts in Foucault’s analysis regarding his evolving his work on 








Concerns about levels of water stress are not new, however the experience of drought 
between 2004 and 2006 in South East England revealed ‘fundamental tensions’ about water 
consumption, especially regarding what is normal or legitimate consumption, whether 
consumption should depend on ability to pay and whether there are inherent problems with 
existing arrangements for supply and demand for water (Taylor, et al, 2009: 591). While 
previous metering strategies have focused on disciplining payment, targeting the use of a 
small set of households, negotiating understanding fairness in relation to distributing the costs 
of water supply and measuring waste on a district basis, debates about metering in the 
immediate run up to the introduction of compulsory metering centred on how the meter could 
be used to manage the relationship between household water use and high levels of water 
stress in the South East of England.  Importantly, water demand management had become a 
high profile issue and patterns of household water use have been increasingly scrutinised 
(Defra, 2012; ICE 2012:4; EST, 2013). 
 
In this sense metering was understood as a tool for helping to secure future water supplies. 
With an average daily water usage of 145 litres per person (CCC, 2012: 11), many within the 
water sector have argued that domestic water users in England are profligate and take water 
for granted (Defra, 2011: 4, Ofwat, 2012; Fairness on Tap, 2011). Although the accuracy of 
comparisons is questionable due to data being measured in different ways, according to the 
EA (2008a) levels of household water consumption in England compare unfavourably with 
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PCC rates in other European states. For instance Austria has a PCC rate of 125 litres, 
Belgium 107 litres, Denmark 131 litres, Germany 115 litres, and the Netherlands 127.5 litres. 
Most within the water sector are united in arguing that water is “undervalued” and that there 
is scope to reduce household water consumption. For example, in 2008 the government 
announced an aspirational target of reducing PCC from c.150 litres per day to c.130 litres 
(Defra, 2008a).  
 
In this context, a range of stakeholders have argued that increased levels of metering is the 
most effective way of tackling the risks posed by water stress. Metering is thought to enhance 
awareness about the value of water and instil a heightened sense of market discipline into 
pricing. In turn, water metering was presented as being a fairer way to structure the water 
charging system (Walker, 2009; Fairness on Tap, 2011; Doron, 2012; Ofwat 2011; EC 2012: 
11). Here water meters, this time through compulsory programmes on a companywide scale, 
played a pivotal part in attempts to renegotiate the waterscape.  
 
Following Defra’s (2007a) Consultation on Metering in Areas of Serious Water Stress, the 
concurrent EA’s (2007) publication Consultation on Identifying Areas of Water Stress, and a 
proposal from the Water Savings Group
29
 (2005-2008), companywide compulsory metering 
projects were regarded by government and some water companies as a legitimate policy 
option. This marked a decisive change in attitudes towards metering. Meters were positioned 
as vital tools or, as Tibbett (2007) described, major weapons for managing water stress in 
South East England. Water companies argued that the ‘low hanging fruit’, the so-called easy 
options, for managing the supply/ demand nexus had been exhausted and, therefore, metering 
represented the next logical step towards securing water supplies (water company interview 
conducted on 31.01.2011). More expansively, one water company manager responsible for 
metering operations argued that 
 
We have increasing demand in the South East because we have an increasing population and 
relatively high per capita consumption as well... So when you have a population that is 
growing and there is a gap that has been around for a while, you have to keep filling it. We 
have taken the low hanging fruit already, the cheap options have already gone in, so we are 
                                                 
29
 The Water Savings Group was established in 2005 and was tasked with developing ways to reduce water 
demand. The group met every six months and was comprised of Defra; Department for Business, Enterprise and 
Regulatory Reform, Ofwat, EA, Water Companies, CCW, Water UK and Waterwise (non-government 
organisation with a remit concerning water efficiency).   
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in a world where metering is the next option on the list (Water company interview conducted 
on 15.09.2011) 
 
The EA’s work on water stress was pivotal in legitimising and supporting compulsory water 
metering interventions. The EA, at Defra’s request, developed a classification system to 
describe the levels of relative water stress across England; it designated areas as being subject 
to ‘serious’, ‘moderate’ or ‘low’ levels of water stress (Environment Agency, 2007: 2). The 
EA found that the South East faced serious levels of water stress, the Midlands and South 
West recorded moderate levels of water stress whereas the North of the country faced low 
levels of water stress (see Figure 10). The classifications have been recently updated (July 
2013). Classifications are determined on a water company area level, however the new 
publications also include an assessment of water stress at a water body level, which was more 













































Figure 11 Water stress classifications at the water body scale (EA, 2013: 8) 
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These classifications were designed to support decisions about metering. The 1999 Water 
Industry (Prescribed Conditions) Regulations were amended so that water companies 
operating in areas of serious water stress were obliged to consider water metering alongside 
other options when compiling their WRMPs. Prior to these amendments, water companies 
that wished to pursue compulsory metering had to apply to the Secretary of State at DEFRA 
for ‘water scarcity status’. In determining whether it was appropriate to deem an area as water 
scarce, the Secretary of State was then obliged to consult the EA, Ofwat and customer 
representatives regarding the projected supply/demand relationship for the forthcoming 
decade. Granting the application disapplied the statutory right of established household 
customers in the designated area to remain on an existing unmeasured basis of charging. It 
was under this original protocol that the (former) Folkestone and Dover water company 
successfully applied to compulsory meter a portion of its supply area.  
 
The amended regulations, supported by the EA classifications, made undertaking compulsory 
metering more straightforward and served as an important precursor to companywide 
compulsory metering. Metering was positioned as an important way of securing future water 
supplies. For instance, the then Environment  Minister, Phil Woolas, argued that ‘as the 
impacts of climate change on our weather and rainfall patterns increase… it seems right 
that… the costs and benefits of compulsory water metering are given consideration’ (in 
Tibbetts, 2007). Nonetheless, it is important to note that the government did not set national 
targets for (compulsory) water metering; a decision that disappointed the House of Commons 
Environment and Rural Affairs Select Committee (EFRA, 2012). Moreover, the government 
was not introducing an unmitigated ‘green light for metering’. Rather water companies 
operating in areas of serious water stress were expected to consider introducing compulsory 
metering (Defra, 2007b). Companies would still have to provide a positive cost benefit 
analysis for their prospective metering programmes (Defra, 2007b; Ofwat, 2011e).  
 
Momentum towards universal, compulsory metering gathered pace with the publication of the 
2009 Walker Review, entitled the Independent Review of Charging and Metering for Water 
and Sewerage Services. The Walker Review team concluded that water metering was 
fundamentally important in addressing water stress in the South East of England. Walker 
recommended that, starting with areas of serious water stress, 80 per cent of households 
should be metered by 2030. Such a positive exposition of metering led to some stakeholders 
describing the 2009 Walker Review as a ‘watershed moment for metering’, giving a sense 
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that a future charging system founded on metering was inevitable (consumer group 
interview 07.03.2012; consumer group interview 27.03.2012). Even organisations that 
have historically rejected metering outright, for example AgeUK, now accepted that metering 
would be the future of the water charging system. With this positive endorsement in mind, 
some of the water companies in the South East of England included compulsory 
companywide metering schemes in their 2010-2015 business plans and 25 year WRMPs, two 
companies commenced programmes in 2011. 
 
The decision to pursue compulsory metering for water companies operating in the South East 
of England was taken primarily as a means to tackle water stress. Debates over fairness were 
secondary, at least to begin with, to attempts to measure and manage water stress. The meter 
had become a technical exercise that represented a means of cost effectively securing the 
network. While previous governments had considered metering to be desirable yet unfeasible, 
due to either political or financial cost, drought in 2006 and the subsequent Walker Review in 
2009 provided the political leverage to make metering possible on a scale that had been, until 
that time, considered impracticable. Dominant discussions about compulsory metering did 




This chapter developed a genealogy of water metering from 1960 up to 2009. In doing so it 
made two contributions. First, it demonstrated that the meter, as a contingent technology, has 
been instrumental in struggles to negotiate and renegotiate how water and water users are 
governed. Secondly, this chapter, read in conjunction with chapter four, provided context to 
the introduction of companywide compulsory metering in South East England. The chapter 
examined the different ways that the meter has been deployed to govern water and water 
users. It shows how different ways of understanding the waterscape have been expressed 
through metering programmes, or in the case of 1950s and 1960s, the absence of metering 
programmes.  
 
The chapter traced the decline of dominant supply side solutions and the rise of metering as a 
viable demand side solution. It explored how debates about metering evoked competing 
understandings of how water should be managed. The chapter also examined the different 
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ways meters can be used to influence the way water users are governed. In a similar vein to 
how the focus of Foucault’s work on governmentality changed from discipline to securing 
life, approaches to water metering have evolved from a means to discipline demand and 
payment to a way of securing life by addressing water stress. Here, as Furlong (2010) 
suggested, the meter can be an important way of mediating changes in the waterscape. Yet, it 
is important to recognise that these attempts to instigate change are not always successful and 
are often partial. Nor were the transitions between different uses of the meter linear, rather 
they were struggled over. These struggles represent broader debates about what the 
waterscape should look like. This chapter shows that the water meter cannot be detached 
from the social and economic processes that flow around and through the technology. This 
genealogy of metering is vital for better understanding how contemporary compulsory 
metering programmes in South East England contribute to reproducing the waterscape. By 
exploring the role metering has played in mediating specific understandings of the 
waterscape, this chapter has served to historicise debates about metering that are being had in 
the present day. 
 
What is most interesting here is the persistence of debates and tensions surrounding the 
perceived fairness of introducing water metering across the two chapters. In this sense the 
two chapters show how debates surrounding metering have, to differing degrees, placed 
biopolitics in conflict with economics. Consistently, metering has been depicted rather 
crassly as either an unjust, disproportionate tax on the poor and a public health threat or an 
‘instrument of fairness’ that enables water users to ‘pay for what you use’ and can help 
mitigate against water stress (Strang, 2004). The oscillating conflicting and complementary 
relationship between economics and biopolitics had been set in motion by the introduction of 
the Deacon Waste Water Meter (see previous chapter) and continued to be debated through 
different metering technologies. Here different targets formed the object of government and 
each metering intervention sought to influence the way that water and water users were 
governed in different ways. By the advent of contemporary compulsory metering 
programmes in the South East of England, dominant stakeholders perceived the type of 
market economics facilitated by metering to be vital for securing the waterscape. ‘Paying for 
what you use’ by metering was understood to be the optimum way of securing the socio-
natural waterscape by heightening water users’ understanding of the ‘value’ of water and 
encouraging water uses to reflect and economise on the ways that they engage with water. By 
this point, economics and biopolitics were understood to be mutually reinforcing. In 
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Foucauldian terms, expressed through metering, a governmentality had emerged where 
through processes of self-governing, the population was the target and the economy was the 
primary form of knowledge and apparatus for securing the waterscape. In this sense, water 
meters have proved to be an important fulcrum around which understandings of fairness in 
relation to water have been articulated, negotiated and renegotiated. The water meter, as 
Feenberg (1999) and Coutard and Guy (2007) suggest, is an ambivalent technology that has 
the potential to mediate a variety of waterscapes, none of which are inevitable.  
 
The following chapter explores the ambitious companywide compulsory water metering 
programmes being undertaken in South East England by SRN and SEW. Chapter six explores 
how contemporary companywide compulsory metering programmes have, informed by 
behavioural economics, been used to usher in alternative understandings of how water and 
water users should be governed. The chapter argues that while compulsory water metering 
was initially perceived as a technical exercise to settle a supply/demand imbalance, 
compulsory metering programmes developed into a much more expansive socio-technical fix 
that actively intervened in how people understand as well as relate to water and sought, at 
least partially, to tackle water stress while ensuring the continuation of a broadly neoliberal 
waterscape. In this sense, the transition to universal, compulsory metering in some water 
company areas in the South East of England has profoundly influenced attempts to govern 







6 Compulsory metering in South East England: Moments of 
sociotechnical change and the emergence of a sociotechnical fix 
6.1 Introduction 
This chapter probes the extent to which compulsory metering either reproduces the existing 
waterscape or opens up avenues for alternative productions of the socionatural waterscape. 
Compulsory metering in South East England has reframed the way that water and water users 
are governed. Overall, this chapter argues that contemporary compulsory metering 
programmes have been deployed as a sociotechnical fix where the water companies in 
question have attempted to, at least partially, resolve a tension between water stress and 
household water demand and, at the same time, secure the continuation of the broadly 
neoliberal shape of the water sector. In particular, a shift has occurred whereby metering 
installation is no longer perceived as an engineering solution, or a purely technical fix. 
Instead, the meter is considered to be one part a broader programme of change where new 
ideas such as behavioural economics have been adopted, different ways of understanding 
nature have been promoted, interventions in everyday life have been pursued and 
understandings of fairness have been renegotiated. This chapter argues that the best way to 
theorise this shift is through bringing together Harvey’s recent work on moments and 
Foucault’s work on governmentality because, notwithstanding perceived critical differences 
between these two positions (which are explored in chapter two), doing so enables close 
analysis of governing and self-governing processes. Foucauldian concepts are useful in 
analysing the processes of self-government associated with compulsory metering, 
Meanwhile, Harvey’s moments are used, loosely, to help explain how different moments of 
the sociotechnical fix co-evolve, dialectically and dynamically, to reproduce the neoliberal 
waterscape. 
 
The chapter focuses primarily on two compulsory companywide metering programmes in the 
South East of England: SRN’s Universal Metering Programme and SEW’s Customer 
Metering Programme. These two companies included compulsory metering schemes in their 
respective 2010-2015 business plans (SRN, 2010; SEW, 2010). SRN’s metering plans were 
the more ambitious of the two; SRN intended to meter 93 per cent of its customer base by 
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2015 whereas SEW expected to meter 92 per cent of its customers by 2020.
30
 SRN outlined a 
five year programme to install 500, 000 meters. Meanwhile, under its 10 year programme, 
SEW pledged to install 200, 000 meters by 2015; this represents around 70 per cent of SEW’s 
customer base. Prior to compulsory metering, 40 per cent of households in SRN and SEW’s 
constituencies were metered. Thames Water did not include a compulsory metering 
programme in its 2010-2015 plan. However, it has recently announced that it plans ‘to 
increase the proportion of homes with a meter from 30 per cent to 50 per cent’ (Thames 
Water, 2013b: 15). Thames Water has a high proportion of properties within its constituency 
that are difficult to meter due to shared piping, therefore it is unlikely that it will be able to 
achieve the same rate of meter penetration as SRN or SEW. Nonetheless, Thames Water ‘aim 
to meter 78 per cent of properties by 2040 and anticipate installing bulk meters in all 
buildings (ibid). Thames Water call this a ‘progressive metering programme’ and anticipates 
commencing metering in London from 2014 and meter installation in areas outside the capital 
from 2020 (Thames Water, 2013b: 26). As Thames Water’s metering programme has not 
been implemented, this chapter analyses SRN and SEW’s programmes in greater detail. 
However, where appropriate, Thames Water’s plans are referred to. 
 
In order to illustrate how these compulsory metering programmes have been deployed as a 
sociotechnical fix, and better understand the processes through which water and water users 
are governed, this chapter is loosely structured around Harvey’s work on moments 
(technology, ideas, institutional arrangements, relations to nature, social relations, everyday 
life and relations of production, see chapter two) and draws on Foucault’s notion of 
governmentality. The chapter is loosely based on Harvey’s moments in the sense that they are 
not treated as ahistorical categories and moments that are specific to the contemporary 
compulsory metering programmes are identified. This is most clear in relation to the moment 
Harvey describes as ‘institutional arrangements’ which is better understood as a changing 
role for the private water company (see further below).The chapter moves across the different 
moments that combine to create the sociotechnical fix that operates through compulsory 
water metering. Although the chapter takes inspiration from Harvey’s work, the moments in 
this chapter do match perfectly with Harvey’s; the moments of sociotechnical change are 
specific to compulsory water metering in the South East of England. The ‘moments’ in this 
                                                 
30
 Companywide compulsory metering programmes are unlikely to apply to the whole customer base. In cases 
where to install a meter is deemed too costly, for instance where there is shared plumbing, households would be 
placed on as assessed charge. These are based on the number of bedrooms in a home or whether the property is 
occupied by one person. The reasoning is that there remains a loose correlation with water use.   
152 
 
chapter are separated out for methodological purposes and should not be understood as easily 
demarcated, pre-given, stable and absolutely independent entities. In this sense, as Hartstock 
notes, ‘the concept of “moment” can... be analytically useful in both separating out the social 
relations the theorist wants to concentrate on while reminding us that these social relations 
are in fact connected with and defined by other social relations and with their own pasts and 
future possibilities’ (Hartstock, 1998: 709). This focus on moments, as Linton argues, 
‘provides a more subtle understanding of historical change than the standard dialectic 
(Hegelian or Marxian)… [and] a rather unconstrained historical process that emerges as an 
internally relational dynamic rather than a sequence determined by any particular force or 
logic’ (Linton, 2010: 32-33). Harvey’s approach emphasises the messy and dialectical 
character of sociotechnical change. Meanwhile governmentality approaches reinforce 
Harvey’s insights by providing tools for exploring the particular ways that water and water 
users are governed through sociotechnical change, particularly in relation to processes of self-
government. Overall, this chapter argues that the way these moments come together can be 
understood as a sociotechnical fix. In this context, the waterscape is reproduced in a way that 
seeks to address some of the tensions within the water sector (for instance tensions between 
water stress and domestic demand) while, at the same time, strengthen the neoliberal 
characteristics of the sector. 
 
The chapter begins by examining how the newly introduced Revenue Correction Mechanism 
(RCM) resolved a tension in the water industry between revenue volatility and metering. This 
section argues that by lowering the water companies’ exposure to risk, this mechanism had 
the effect of securing the continuation of the neoliberal relations of production that shape the 
water industry. Subsequently, the chapter demonstrates that the use of smarter metering 
technologies enabled water companies to be more ambitious in shaping how water and users 
are governed through the promotion of behavioural economics. The chapter then examines 
how the adoption of ideas from behavioural economics, particularly Thaler and Sunstein’s 
work on nudge (see chapter two), has, as a form of governmentality, contributed to reshaping 
the waterscape through water metering programmes. The next section of the chapter argues 
that compulsory companywide water metering represents a substantial change to the way that 
water companies have traditionally operated and sustained relationships with household water 
users; there is greater emphasis on the companies’ role as a customer service provider. The 
chapter then moves to explore how water metering programmes promoted a different way for 
water users to understand water, articulated around a notion of fairness that closely aligned to 
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neoliberal inspired cost recovery approaches, and enabled companies to intervene in water 
users’ everyday engagements with water, albeit on a partial basis. Here, this chapter moves 
across the different moments of the sociotechnical fix and exposes the productive tensions 
between Harvey’s work on moments and Foucault’s insights on governmentality that are 
mutually beneficial for analysing how the waterscape is negotiated and renegotiated through 
compulsory water metering.  
 
6.2 Reducing volatility: reproducing neoliberal relations of production  
Despite assumptions to the contrary, compulsory water metering is not a crude accumulation 
strategy. The RCM does, however, facilitate the continuation of existing relations of 
production in the water sector by resolving a tension between widespread metering and 
revenue volatility. Previously, as chapters four and five highlighted, water companies have 
been reticent to embark on extensive metering programmes due to the unpredictable impact 
on company revenue. Paying for water by volume, rather than a flat fee, has the potential to 
create uncertainty and makes it more difficult for companies to forecast their income. This 
section argues that the introduction of Ofwat’s RCM removes the risk of revenue instability 
previously associated with metering and, in turn, contributes to a sociotechnical fix where 
some of the tensions in the sector are resolved while, at the same time, the neoliberal 
characteristics of the industry are strengthened.  
 
In England and Wales water prices are set every five years and price limits are approved by 
Ofwat (see Table 10). When setting the price limit, Ofwat do not set a limit on company 
profits yet they do allow companies to make a ‘reasonable return’ so water companies are 
able to finance their functions. Prices set for metered customers cannot be considered outside 












England Prices set by Ofwat every five years. The formula for doing so is 
known as RPI+K where RPI is the Retail Price Index inflation 
measure and K is an additional measure for investment and profit.  
Wales Same process as England. 
Scotland Set by Water Industry Scotland Commission. Charges reflect values 
determined by Scottish Parliament and are based on council tax 
rates. 
Northern Ireland Households do not pay a specific water charge. The cost of water is 
included in regional taxation. The company is largely funded by 
government subsidy. Plans to introduce water charges have been 
delayed several times since the Northern Ireland Assembly 
reconvened in 2007.  
 
When asked why companies were pursuing compulsory metering, domestic water users often 
presumed that the water companies’ motive was the pursuit of profit. As the following two 
quotations show, even in cases where interviewees cited environmental reasons or network 
security as key factors, households also tended to offer profit making as a core motivator in 
the decision to introduce compulsory water metering: 
 
I don’t think that they are doing it entirely for environmental reasons… I’m sceptical because 
I think they might just increase the prices – they’ll have to, at least to pay for the meters. 
Water will become more expensive, you have no choice but to pay more. That is where they 
get you (Household interview: Rosemary, retired 1 person house: SEW).  
 
You would like to think that they’re trying to make people more efficient. It’s probably for 
two reasons. The first is money. Lots of people are using water that they’re not paying for, so 
they’ll make money from that... But they would also be regulating their use of water, so then 
they would know exactly where their water supply is going (Household interview: Dave, 
retired, 2 person household: SEW). 
 
Although domestic water users often assume that metering is a crude accumulation strategy, 
the RCM and the broader price setting process make the situation more complicated. Here, 
the RCM plays an important role by removing the ‘scope for a company either to over-or 
under-recover revenue’ relative to the assumptions Ofwat have made when determining price 
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limits (Ofwat, 2009). It allows Ofwat to adjust the price limit in response to under or over 
recovery. As a result, metering should not materially affect company revenue. Any profit 
accrued beyond the price limit as a result of metering should be returned to customers and, 
similarly, companies can claim for unanticipated losses in future price increases.  
 
The RCM performs a second important role, according to Ofwat the RCM ‘removes the 
disincentive for companies to promote water efficiency measures’ and ‘provides a financial 
incentive for the companies to use water wisely’ (Ofwat, 2011c). Before the RCM was 
introduced, metering represented a risk for companies due to potential revenue reductions 
should less water be consumed than initially anticipated in the assumptions informing the 
price review process. Therefore, there was a perverse incentive for companies to encourage 
high water use from metered customers.  
 
The introduction of the RCM is particularly important because, according to CCW, any 
increase in uncertainty about revenue streams could have an indirect impact on household 
water bills because it ‘will lead to higher borrowing costs and shareholders will want to be 
rewarded for greater risk’ (CCW, 2010a: 9). When the research for this thesis was conducted, 
there was no clear evidence regarding the influence widespread metering might have on 
company revenues. However, prior experience suggests a higher degree of uncertainty and 
potential volatility, commenting on Veolia South East’s (now Affinity Water) experiences, 
CCW water highlighted that 
 
In addition to year on year volatility, which depends on weather to a large extent, there will 
be the substantially uncertain effects of changes in household consumption following on from 
metering and the various other potential influences on household behaviour. Early 
experiences of Veolia South East indicates a greater reduction in revenue through volumetric 
bills than forecast. How far this is the result of being transferred to a meter or due to 
previous over estimations of PCC is uncertain. But water companies experiencing significant 
revenue shortfalls will seek to increase their charges through Ofwat’s revenue correction 
procedures and doing so will increase customers’ bills and potentially lead to a serious 
destabilisation of revenues… Even at low levels of meter penetration, several companies 
made part of their case in the recent price review that revenues had been depressed by and 
had not yet recovered from reduced levels of consumption associated with the drought of 




The RCM has been welcomed by companies, for example, Affinity Water stated in its 2011 
June return that: 
 
The high level of metering penetration and our success in promoting water efficiency has 
made us particularly vulnerable to the risk of under-recovering income. Consequently we are 
pleased that the Revenue Correction Mechanism is now in place. This regulatory 
improvement has removed the principal financial risk to which we were previously exposed 
(Affinity Water, 2011: 4). 
 
The importance of the RCM for stabilising existing relations of production was further 
underlined by pressure from ratings agencies following the introduction of compulsory 
metering. SRN, one of the most heavily geared water companies in the industry (see chapter 
one), has experienced pressure from ratings agencies following revenue uncertainty, in part, 
due to the implementation of its compulsory metering programme. In 2011 Moody’s rating 
agency downgraded SRN’s debt status to two notches above junk with a negative outlook. 
This, according to the Financial Times, was the lowest rating of any of England’s nine water 
companies since privatisation in 1989 (Gray, 2013). Moody’s decision to lower SRN’s rating 
followed a revenue shortfall resulting from lower than expected consumption levels. In the 
following year, Standard & Poor’s (S&P) rating agency threatened to downgrade SRN’s 
credit rating and issued a negative outlook for SRN’s debt status, again citing weak cash flow 
as the primary motivator for this warning. S&P concluded that SRN’s cash flow problems 
could be in part attributed to a ‘revenue shortfall resulting from its overestimate of the 
amount it would charge metered customers during the 2010-2015 regulatory period’, which 
of course is when the compulsory metering programme commenced (Water Briefing, 2012). 
S&P were also of the opinion that metered customers ‘might consumer less water due to 
restrictions imposed as a result of drought’ which would then lead to a further reduction in 
revenues (ibid). This shows how undertaking compulsory metering can lead to revenue 
uncertainty and, potentially, increases in the cost of raising capital and changes to a 
company’s debt rating.  More recently, in September 2013, Fitch Ratings announced a stable 
outlook for SRN’s debt rating, suggesting that SRN would not face negative rating pressure 
in the immediate future. This is in part due to under recoveries in the region of £150m being 
returned to the company under the RCM (Reuters, 2013). The RCM, then, played a strong 
role in stabilising what would otherwise be an important unintended consequence. Without 
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the RCM, metering, at least in the short term, posed a challenge to the relations of production 
that shape the water sector through revenue instability.   
 
Here, the RCM plays an important role in resolving a tension in the water industry between 
revenue volatility and metering. This has the effect of stabilising metering and the broader, 
largely neoliberal, relations of production that shape the sector by lowering the water 
company’s expose to risk. However, it does not, and is not designed to, issue a challenge to 
the existing ways of organising the waterscape. This reduction of risk allows companies to 
pursue metering and is part of a sociotechnical fix that seeks to solve tensions at work within 
the sector and strengthen the neoliberal characteristics of the waterscape.  
 
6.3 Technology, becoming smarter? 
This section focuses on the moment of technology. It examines some of the recent 
innovations in metering technologies that have co-evolved with other moments to reproduce 
the waterscape. Smarter meters, as a governmental technology, play an integral role in 
influencing how water and water users are governed. This section argues that the new 
technologies being circulated within the South East of England enabled water companies to 
proactively interact with, and intervene in, how water and users are governed through the 
promotion of behavioural economics and by reshaping how relations to nature are 
understood. In this sense, the introduction of different forms of smart metering technologies, 
has, to an extent, resulted in the breaking out of what Graham and Marvin (2001) have 
described as the ‘black box’ effect where the myriad socio-natural relations that surround and 
course through the meter are reduced, simplified and, at times, hidden from view.  
 
Most meters used in England and Wales are ‘dumb’ meters. These meters do not have the 
capacity to record readings at different times or support the use of associated technologies 
such in-house displays (IHD) which, in turn, can be used to communicate water use data with 
water users and ideas such as behavioural economics. Despite being hidden underground 
outside, and being relatively isolated from the water user, the dumb meter had been 
understood in the 1990s as possessing the necessary abstract qualities to exercise the type of 
causative power necessary to deliver substantial changes in the waterscape (see chapter five). 
It was assumed that the mere installation of a meter would alter the way water users engaged 




Interviewees argued that, commonly, metering had been understood by companies as an 
engineering problem. Here the question at the forefront of the utility was how to best run the 
operational side of metering installation; or ‘how to get meters in the ground’. However, 
water metering has never been, and can never be, a purely technical intervention as this 
implies that the technology can be materially separated from ideas that shape its construction, 
the water that flows through it as well as the user who interacts with it. Faith in the mediating 
role of metering technologies (see chapters four and five) has not disappeared yet water 
companies undertaking companywide compulsory metering have identified the limitations of 
dumb meters, and have opted for smarter versions which provide a platform for proactively 
engaging in water users’ everyday interactions with water. 
 
The available technological options for metering have expanded and companies are 
increasingly opting for smart(er) technologies. There is no agreed definition of smart 
metering but, often, it refers to a system rather than just a device. Smart metering systems are 
characterised by greater communication flows between water user and utility, greater 
capacity for data storage, remote data collection, and ‘intelligent’ use of that data to inform 
policy. Table 11 broadly outlines the different metering systems that are available. 
 
Table 11 Characteristics of different metering systems 
Type of system Typical characteristics 
Dumb Meters Meters are manually read twice a year and the information 
garnered is used primarily for billing purposes and to provide 
the user with limited information about water use. Leaks may 






Meters are fitted with a Radio Frequency transmitter to 
support walk by/drive by reading which allows the company 
to reduce its operations costs. Meters often continue to be 
read twice a year but the technology tends to capture monthly 
indexes which can be used to produce more information 
about water consumption. AMR meters usually have an alarm 
which detects leaks and alerts the company to tamper 
attempts, low battery and other mechanical problems.  
Intelligent 
Meters 
Fixed network with greater flows of information. Meters can 
be set to record information at range of intervals (i.e. 15 
minute/ 1 hour intervals), the information can then be used 
for billing, providing information about consumption and 
network management.   
Fully ‘Smart’  Meters/ 
Advanced AMR systems 
Fixed network with two way information flows which allow 
for active management services. Readings are transmitted 
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without the need for a human to take a physical reading at the 
site. IHDs, real-time water usage data tend to be available. 
Potential integration with smart energy meters and allows 
faster detection of leaks inside the home.  
 
Unlike the energy industry where the government has supported a universal, albeit delayed, 
compulsory nationwide smart metering programme complete with IHDs and a coordinated 
public information programme, each water company pursuing compulsory metering has held 
its own procurement process and taken different technological routes. Both Southern and 
SEW water have chosen varieties of ‘smarter’ technologies, although SRN’s system has 
additional ‘smart’ functions. Importantly, metering is not seen as an end in itself. Water 
companies see smart metering as ‘an essential prerequisite’ to ensure that water efficiency 
and leakage targets are met (SEW, 2010: 189). The approach to compulsory metering 
undertaken by each company is summarised in Table 12.  
 
Table 12 SRN and SEW's metering strategies 
Company Metering Strategy 
Southern Water SRN use AMR technology supplied by Arad. These meters 
facilitate drive by metering, are read on a six month cycle and 
return 12 month end readings. The meters have data loggers 
that can store 5.5 months of hourly readings. The meters are 
equipped with leakage alarms. Household water users are 
able to access a customer web portal which details the latest 
meter information. A key fob can also be used to access real 
time meter information, thus removing any need for the 
customer to manually read and inspect the meter.  
South East Water  SEW use AMR supplied by Elster. Meters can be read on a 
walk by basis and the system is upgradable to drive by. This 
system has been described as a ‘semi smart’ because ‘you do 
not have to put your head down a pit to read a number but 
you have to be quite close to it for the technology to work’ 
(interview conducted on 15.11.2011). The meter can store 
data and reports monthly and weekly readings. In the future 
SEW intend to move to a fixed network system.  
Thames Water  Undertaken fixed network district metered area (DMA) trials. 
Thames use a conventional AMR technology provided by 
Homerider Systems/Vensys and an advanced AMR 
programme that use LR radio to report readings rather than 
repeaters. Thames has been using these trials to inform its 
mains replacement programme. Thames water will undertake 




Although the metering programmes are compulsory, SRN has had to make concessions after 
some customers rejected the specific metering technologies supplied by the company. SRN 
use meters manufactured by Arad; an Israeli company which also develops water meters for 
the Israeli state owned company called Mekorot. Corporate Watch have criticised SRN’s 
decision to work with Arad due to its relationship with Mekorot which, it argues, supplies 
water in illegal settlements and denies water to Palestinian communities (Corporate Watch, 
2013). At least one household has refused an Arad meter. The Palestine Solidarity Campaign 
in Brighton & Hove has also launched a campaign to boycott meters supplied by Arad. Its 
campaign has been publicly supported by Keith Taylor MP and Norman Baker MP and, so 
far, a small number of water users have joined the campaign (Brighton Palestine Solidarity 
Campaign, 2013). Here is important to emphasise that these particular water users were not 
necessarily rejecting the principle of compulsory metering, only that the meters that had been 
manufactured by Arad. SRN initially responded to complaints by stating that metering was 
compulsory and non-negotiable yet, later, it compromised and installed a refurbished dumb 
meter that had been previously installed elsewhere on its network and developed by a 
different supplier (ibid). This serves as a reminder that the meter should not be divorced from 
the socio-economic circumstances in which it is situated and that, as Rutherford (2007) has 
emphasised, attempts to alter the processes of governing, in this case water and water users, 
are rarely smooth and are often met with contestation.   
 
Nonetheless, the introduction of smarter metering technologies provided a platform for water 
companies to develop a relationship with the water user and to better understand, as well as 
more proactively engage with, waters’ understandings of nature and water practices. While 
the meter is still a central consideration, metering is no longer understood, purely, as an 
engineering problem or solution. For instance, Dr Jack Carnell, National Chair of Energy and 
Utility Skills (and former Managing Director of South Staffordshire Water Plc), opened the 
Society of British Water and Wastewater Industries (SBWW) 2011 annual Metering and 
Leakage Seminar by stating that 
 
Arguably, I believe that metering is the most important issue in the sector… There’s a war 
going on out there called climate change. Just putting the meter in there won’t fix it. We need 
to get serious about the economics… we have to ensure that customers understand the cost of 




Here Carnell highlights the continued importance of the meter yet also emphasises that meter 
installation alone is insufficient to deliver demand reductions. He argues that more effort 
ought to be made to ensure that households better understand the costs of water and the 
economics of delivering it. This would involve mobilising particular understandings of nature 
as well as specific socially constructed notions of fairness which, in turn, would require 
interventions beyond the installation of a meter. Water company employee interviewees 
noted that this represented a shift in how companies approached metering, as Crooke notes, 
SRN in particular 
 
Are keen to stress that they are not implementing an installation programme; they are, in 
fact, overseeing ‘a customer journey’. Whilst getting the meters in the ground on schedule is 
obviously important, a key priority is to help customers understand why meters are being 
installed, offer advice and support to help them reduce their water use and make the most of 
the opportunity to reduce their water and energy bills (Crooke, 2011: 228).  
 
In perceiving metering programmes as more than metering installations, water companies 
have, to an extent, shed light on the complex and messy socionatural and sociotechnical 
relationships at work throughout the waterscape. Through its consideration of how water 
users engage with the metering technology and how households relate to water, compulsory 
metering programmes have been able to approach tensions within the industry with greater 
dynamism, cutting across a number of the moments described by Harvey. By engaging with 
multiple moments, the compulsory metering programmes have emerged as a sociotechnical 
fix where particular reproductions of the socionatural waterscape are projected. This involves 
invoking specific understandings and rationales of how water and water users should be 
governed. The next section, demonstrates how water companies have embraced and adopted 
ideas from the field of behavioural economics, as the latest form of governmentality, within 
their compulsory metering programmes. It argues that these ideas have been used to in an 
attempt to solve some of the tensions within the waterscape and reproduce the waterscape in 








6.4 Ideas: Nudging behavioural change  
‘We should be using metering more as a carrot than a stick’ 
Anne McIntosh, Conservative MP, Chair of the Environment, Food and Rural Affairs 
Committee, APPWG 21.02.2012. 
 
This section examines the way ideas from behavioural economics have been taken up through 
the compulsory metering programmes in the South East of England. Behavioural economics, 
specifically Thaler and Sunstein’s ideas surrounding nudge, have become influential in policy 
making spheres over the last ten years. So much so that Huxley (2011), Jones et al (2013) and 
Wilkins (2013) suggest that neoliberalism is currently going through a transition and the 
particular brand of behavioural economics made popular by Thaler and Sunstein is emerging 
as a new governmentality (see chapter two). This section argues that the adoption of these 
ideas represents a key moment in how the waterscape is governed. Water companies have 
used some of the technical advances associated with smarter meters to facilitate nudge-style 
approaches. Nudge inspired ideas have helped to partially transform, yet ultimately 
complement, existing neoliberal framings of the waterscape. This chapter examines how this 
new form of governmentality helps to renegotiate understandings of nature, fairness and the 
role of the water company. 
 
Behavioural economics, to varying degrees, has become influential in the water industry. For 
instance, at the 2011 EA Tariff Trials Workshop, John Borne, Defra’s Deputy Director for 
Water Supply and Infrastructure, Water Availability and Quality Programme, issued a 
challenge to those present to build on recent work in behavioural economics and consider 
how nudge could be best adopted in the water industry in order to encourage households to 
use water more efficiently. Moreover, Ofwat has administered a series of modest targets for 
companies to ‘help customers to save water’ (Ofwat, 2010c). These include an annual target 
for each company to save at least one litre of water per property a day, on average, by 
promoting water efficiency and a requirement to provide information to consumers on how to 
use water more wisely (Ofwat, 2010c: 18). In fulfilling these targets, it was envisaged that 
companies would include behavioural change programmes as a key part of its basket of 
policy options. The most explicit reference to nudge materialized in Ofwat’s 2011 paper 
Push, pull nudge: how can we help customers save water, energy and money. In keeping with 
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the language of nudge, Ofwat argued that ‘the way we use water is deeply ingrained’ and ‘we 
do not tend to make conscious decisions about how much we use and we are unlikely to 
change our habits without being prompted’ (Ofwat, 2011a: 5). The paper identifies three 
ways of ‘prompting change’: by pushing, pulling and nudging (ibid). Here push refers to 
‘setting standards for water saving devices’ and includes regulations for fittings and new 
homes. Pull refers to ‘rewarding customers for using water wisely’ by improving price 
signals and charging the ‘customer for what they use, so that they pay less if they use less’ 
(Ofwat, 2011a: 5-6). Meanwhile, nudge is described as being 
 
About understanding customer behaviour and using it to promote change. It draws on best 
practice in advertising and marketing to encourage consumers to change their water-using 
habits. It is something that government, the regulators and those providing services to 
consumers can all use (Ofwat, 2011a: 5). 
 
Throughout this document, Ofwat emphasised the importance of metering programmes as a 
conduit through which nudges are facilitated. Here Ofwat focused on the importance of 
restructuring the water charging system to provide households with financial incentives to 
save water and, in recognition that humans do not always act rationally, organising the 
charging structure so that the “decision” to use less water is made easier. Ofwat argued that 
metering, as part of a nudge strategy, is desirable because 
 
People waste water when the benefit they get from using it is less than the cost of supply, 
including wider social and environmental costs. Using this definition, we can start to see 
some of the reasons why we might waste water even though it is in all our interests to use it 
wisely. The most obvious is that the price we pay for water does not reflect the cost of supply. 
So we are unable to compare the costs and benefits when we decide how much water to use. 
Unmetered customers pay a fixed fee, but then pay nothing at all for each unit of water they 
use. Even metered customers pay less than the cost of supply. Metered charges reflect only 
water company costs which cover some but not all of the environmental costs of supplying 
water, and removing and treating wastewater (Ofwat, 2011a:5).  
 
The language in Ofwat’s report, in particular its focus on non-rational decision making, 
clearly speaks to Thaler and Sunstein’s ideas surrounding nudge. However, before 
continuing, it is important to highlight some of the potential problems of identifying 
164 
 
compulsory metering programmes as a form of nudging. Most of the points of potential 
conflict revolve around the relationship the relationship between nudge and freedom (see 
chapter two) in the context of compulsory metering.  
 
On first inspection the compulsory element of metering appears to be at odds with the nudge 
thesis due to its prescriptive nature. Thaler and Sunstein make very clear that ‘nudges are not 
mandates’ (2009: 8). Here, as Huxley (2011) highlights, both nudge and governmentality 
approaches involve, and place considerable emphasis on, the production of freedom. Despite 
their aversion to compulsion, it appears that Thaler and Sunstein make some exceptions, they 
argue that ‘when incentives are badly aligned it is appropriate for government to try and fix 
the problem by realigning them’ (2009: 196). Here they have in mind ‘taxes or penalties on 
those who pollute’ and ‘cap-and-trade systems’ (ibid). They argue that ‘despite its coercive 
features, this basic approach is, in a sense, a cousin of libertarian paternalism, because people 
can avoid paying the tax by not creating pollution’ (ibid). In this context, Thaler and Sunstein 
maintain that ‘liberty is much greater when people are told, “you can continue your 
behaviour, so long as you pay for the social harm that it does” than when they are told, “you 
must act exactly as the government says”’ (2009: 196). Then, using the language of nudge, 
compulsory metering can be understood as a ‘cousin’ of the idea because, despite being 
mandatory, the meter creates an incentive to save water/money but does not require the 
household to respond to that incentive; therefore an element of “choice” supposedly still 
remains. Nudge in this sense manufactures a particular understanding of freedom, a perceived 
freedom to choose how much water is used in the home. Companies undertaking compulsory 
metering have attempted to divert attention away from the compulsory element of the 
metering programmes. For instance none of the compulsory metering programmes refer 
explicitly to compulsion in their title. SRN has coined its programme the Universal Metering 
Programme, SEW has called its scheme the Customer Metering Programme, whereas Thames 
Water’s forthcoming metering programme is referred to as Progressive Metering. In this 
sense, metering helps to produce notions of freedom that centre on choosing how to use water 
and downplay the compulsory aspect of metering.  
 
In this context, companies administering compulsory metering programmes have emphasised 
that meters should not be understood as a means of limiting freedom to use water but a means 
to empower water users by giving ‘the customer advice about what they can do to reduce 
their consumption’ and urging ‘customers to be more conscious and aware of the 
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environmental costs of water consumption’ (water company interview, 12.12.2011). Here 
the meter is portrayed as a facilitating tool that enables nudging, rather than as an end in 
itself. Similarly, Ofwat suggest that, as a result of metering, households are presented with 
the option to use less water and therefore avoid a higher water bill. Importantly, for Ofwat, 
this is ‘not about restricting or interfering with customers’ freedom to choose … [as] [t]hey 
can always give choices the cold shoulder’ (Ofwat, 2011a: 18). Architects of compulsory 
water metering emphasised that ‘ownership and accountability [for water use] should be with 
the customer’ and that metering programmes are ‘about encouraging the customer to go out 
and find out more and providing enabling tips’ rather than the company ‘telling the customer 
what to do’ (water company interview, 12.12.2011). In this sense, compulsory water 
metering programmes are consistent with Thaler and Sunstein’s ideas surrounding nudge and 
represent the emergence of a new, or at least altered, governmentality that attempts to strike a 
balance between promoting freedom and structuring choices in a way that benefits both the 
individual and society more broadly. Metering programmes, despite being compulsory, do 
not exercise any explicit coercion. Other than higher water bills, there are no direct penalties 
for not ‘saving water’.  
 
The meter enables a different way of structuring choices, by introducing financial incentives 
and providing feedback on water usage patterns, yet it does not force households to use water 
in particular ways. Instead, metering programmes promote a particular way of understanding 
water and governing water users. The adoption of nudge style strategies, as a new form of 
governmentality, then has profound implications for how the waterscape is produced, 
particularly in relation to how water and water users are governed in and through compulsory 
metering. In turn, nudge inspired approaches associated with compulsory metering contribute 
to producing a sociotechnical fix by managing a tension between freedom and perceived 
profligate domestic water use practices while, at the same time, failing to fundamentally 
challenge the neoliberal notions of choice that shape the waterscape.   
 
The next section focuses on SRN’s Universal Metering Programme and SEW’s Customer 
Metering Programme to show how water companies’ use of smarter metering technologies 
and nudge style behavioural economics are dialectically related to changing role of the water 
company in the sector. Specifically, the chapter focuses on the enhanced role of customer 




6.5 Seismic change? Water companies as customer service providers 
Harvey identifies ‘institutional arrangements’ as a key moment. This section focuses on the 
changing role of the private water company as this a particularly important issue in relation to 
contemporary compulsory metering programmes. This is not to say that other dimensions of 
institutional arrangements in the water sector are not important. Chapter one outlined the key 
role that the Ofwat, and other regulators, typically play in influencing which policies are 
adopted and implemented in the water sector. Chapters four and five also highlighted the 
respective roles Ofwat and the EA have played in influencing metering policy. This section 
focuses on the changing role of the private water company because the role of the company 
has evolved directly in relation to the introduction of compulsory water metering. These 
changes have been key to advancing compulsory metering.  
 
The implementation of compulsory metering represented a challenge to the way that water 
companies have traditionally operated and sustained relations with its customers for it 
resulted in the companies communicating with its customers on an unprecedented scale. Both 
SRN and SEW sought to better understand its customer base in order to gauge how customers 
would respond to a compulsory metering programme, support customers in adapting to life 
with their meter and encourage households to use less water. In order to achieve this, both 
companies developed detailed customer engagement strategies. Typically water companies 
have had little direct contact with their customer base other than processing bill payment. 
Consequently, companies undertaking compulsory metering found that they needed to 
develop new skills and strategies for engaging with water users. 
 
According to a water company interviewee who worked closely on the communications 
strategy for a compulsory metering programme, the scale of change was of ‘seismic’ 
proportions (water company interview conducted on 15.01.2012). Historically, there has 
been a disconnect between the company and water user where companies have tended to do 
their best to stay invisible and as such, according to a consumer group interviewee, have 
resembled ‘ostriches with their heads in the sand’ (consumer group interview, 08.06.2011). 
Indeed, a 2011 ICS/You Gov survey found that ‘respondents were most likely to label water 
companies as “invisible”’ (Reid and Acutt, 2011). Water Companies undertaking compulsory 
metering have stressed the importance of developing a relationship with customers regarding 
metering. For instance SRN’s Jo Fielding Cooke told an All Parliamentary Water Group 
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meeting in October 2013 that its metering programme was designed ‘with our customers, for 
our customers’. The increased emphasis that has been placed on customer engagement in the 
water industry is further underlined by Ofwat’s June 2010 guidance which outlined minimum 
engagement expectations for large scale metering programmes. Without extensive experience 
of interacting with customers companies found that it was necessary to make significant 
changes in order to design and implement a customer engagement strategy to accompany the 
compulsory metering programme. 
 
There are important differences between the ways that the two companies approached 
customer engagement. SRN drew more heavily on external agencies, attempted to introduce a 
more intensive, face to face service and, at least initially, placed considerably more emphasis 
on continued forms of engagement following metering installation. Nonetheless the approach 
adopted by the two companies is similar in that both were committed to a more ‘customer 
focused’ metering programme and both developed a ‘Customer Journey’ engagement strategy 
(outlined in Table 13) which, in turn, facilitated nudge inspired strategies before, during and 
after meter installation. Both companies placed considerable importance on the customer 
journey as a positive and proactive way to enrol households in their metering plan. As one 
water company interviewee noted, the ‘main challenge is around taking your customers on 
the journey, it is around communication and taking the customers and stakeholders with you 
so they want to do it and they’ve bought into it’ (water company interview conducted on 
15.09.2011) 
 
Table 13 SRN and SEW's customer journey 




Three months prior to the meter 
installation date SRN placed 
adverts in the local press 
(including television) and placed 
leaflets in public spaces in order to 
raise awareness about the metering 
programme.  
 
Six weeks before the installation 
day, customers were issued with a 
welcome pack informing them 
when their meter would be 
installed and with links to further 
information – SRN had launched a 
Six months prior to installation SEW 
made contact with local media, held 
community drop in sessions and placed 




Three months before installation SEW 
made contact with the customer, providing 
a brochure which informs the customer 
that the way they pay for water is about to 
change and ‘explains why metering is 
important for the sustainability of water 
resources’. This brochure also provides a 
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purpose designed website and 
created a call centre with staff 




One week before installation, SRN 
put up street signs as a reminder of 
the impending meter installation.
31
 
link to the SEW metering website where 
customers can calculate an estimate of the 
bill change they are likely to experience.  
 
Two months prior to installation radio 
campaigns begin. 
 
One month before installation, customers 





Mobile information units were 
located in streets were installations 
were occurring.  Contractors 
knocked on the door of each 
household to notify customers that 
meters had been installed, check 
the technology was working and 
offer a water audit.  
 
Customers were offered water 
saving shower heads and vouchers 
for other water saving 
technologies. 
Customers issued with a welcome to your 
meter pack. It contained information about 
the tariffs, water efficiency, Direct Debits, 
a free Hippo Bag and a shower timer. 
SEW also offered a short water audit, this 
involved offering devices including a tap 
and shower aerator.  
Post meter 
installation 
Customers were not placed on a 
metered charge immediately after 
installation (households do not 
receive their first metered bill until 
nine months after installation).  
 
Three months after installation, 
customers were sent an indicative 
bill that showed household 
consumption and what their water 
bill would have been for that 
period under the new program.  
 
Customers who were likely to see 
large bill increases identified and 
offered a visit from the Green 
Doctors (offered a water and 
energy audit and an assessment to 
qualify for the social tariff, see 
Customers were not placed on a metered 
charge immediately after installation. 
 
Three months after installation, customers 
were sent an indicative bill that showed 
household consumption and what their 
water bill would have been for that period 
under the new program.  
 
                                                 
31
 In order to install meters, the company may need to access water users’ property and some companies have 
planned punitive measures to ensure cooperation. For instance, SRN invites households to agree to an 
appointment. If, after ‘extensive effort’ to make contact, the company are ‘unable to obtain... co-operation to 
progress the installation of a meter’ it switches customers to its No Access Charge. This is a fixed annual charge 
which prevents the household accessing single occupier discounts, financial assistance through targeted tariffs 
and means that households ‘ may well pay more’ than if they were charged on a metered basis. The No Access 






Notably, in preparing its respective metering programmes, both companies recognised that 
existing staff capacity would not stretch to producing a grand engagement strategy. The water 
companies responded by contracting services from external agencies and creating new 
communication specialist in house positions specifically for the metering programme. SRN 
approached the Design Council UK, a not-for-profit organisation that provides design advice 
to industry and government, to appoint agencies to help them better understand how and why 
their customers use water. Here IDEO, a design and consultancy firm, worked with SRN to 
research how different categories of water user might react to a metering programme and map 
the customer journey for its metering programme. SEW also worked closely with partners 
including the Energy Savings Trust to develop its communication strategy. SRN then 
consulted customers on its plans and held training sessions with contractors Balfour Beatty, 
the contractor responsible for meter installation, and Groundwork, a charity employed to 
deliver SRN’s Green Doctor service (see chapter seven for further details). Following 
regulatory approval for the metering programme, SRN spent 10 months meeting with local 
stakeholders including AgeUK, local politicians, Housing Associations and the CAB in order 
to explain the programme and provide an opportunity for any concerns to be voiced. Both 
companies hired additional employees with communications backgrounds and SRN went a 
step further by running its metering programme as completely separate operation which 
would be retrofitted back into the broader company structure at a later date.  
 
These customer engagement strategies are important because they exemplify how companies 
have responded to challenges within the sector by altering their company arrangements. In 
this context, shifts towards a more ‘customer focused’ service, where the company is visibly 
interacting with water users to implement nudge techniques, has broader implications for how 
the role of the water company is understood. This is an important change, over the last twenty 
five years, water companies have typically operated as self-contained companies focused 
almost explicitly on engineering focused goals to ensure the uninterrupted delivery of water. 
Now private water utilities, at least those undertaking compulsory water metering, are making 
greater efforts to deliver a customer service rather than merely delivering water. Here water 
companies have increasingly drawn on third party organisations and adopted more a customer 
focused communication strategy that challenges previous company priorities. Changes to the 
water companies’ practices represent just one moment in explaining sociotechnical change in 
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the waterscape. Changes to role of the water company have enabled companies to implement 
nudge style tactics which, as the following section shows, have helped stabilise particular 
understandings of water. It is through this coevolution of moments that a sociotechnical fix 
emerges where some of the tensions in the sector are addressed yet, simultaneously, the 
continuation of neoliberal characteristics in the waterscape is secured.  
 
6.6 Relations to Nature: Realising the “true” value of water 
One of the key messages emanating from the compulsory water metering programmes 
communications and engagement strategies is that water is not valued appropriately; it is 
undervalued. The failure to value water appropriately is perceived to be a core tension within 
the sector and is thought to lead to profligate domestic water use. In this context, there has 
been a resurgence of interest in pricing issues in the water sector (Defra, 2011), and more 
broadly in the pricing of ecosystem services (Yusoff, 2011). This has culminated most clearly 
in the publication of the Independent Review of Competition and Innovation in Water 
Markets (Cave, 2009) and The Independent Review of Charging for Household Water and 
Sewerage Services (Walker, 2009). Importantly, the Walker Review team concluded that the 
‘biggest issue [in the water sector] is the mismatch between how we value water now and 
how we need to do so in the future’ (2009: 1). In seeking to manage the tension between the 
value of water and profligate domestic water use, the compulsory metering programmes 
contribute to reshaping how relations to nature are understood. Here the value of water is 
conflated with the price of water and the meter is framed as offering new incentives to take 
‘control’ over water and the customers’ water bill. Presenting relations to, and the value of, 
water in simplified, often monetised terms, plays a key role, along with other moments, in 
reproducing the waterscape in broadly neoliberal ways. 
 
In the absence of metering, it is argued that households do not have a clear indication of the 
volume of water used or the related costs (whether environmental or financial) of that usage. 
In this context, Walker made a causal connection between the price of water and how it is 
valued, arguing that ‘we are used to it being cheap and plentiful and so we tend to treat it as 





There is a disconnect between the current valuation of water and its likely future value. 
Water today is cheap. When companies abstract water they pay very little for doing so. At the 
other end of the pipe, a litre of tap water costs less than 1p to supply and take away. At about 
£1 a day, water bills for most customers are significantly less than energy bills (Walker, 
2009: 47).  
 
In order to bridge this disconnect, Walker recommended that the ‘future charging system 
should be generally based on the volume of water used and therefore on a metered system’ 
(2009:12).
32
 According to Walker, metering would help make the ‘true value of water’ 
intelligible to households by offering more information about water use patterns as well as 
and financial incentives to use water more efficiently (2009: 74).  
 
Water companies undertaking compulsory water metering have played a vital role in framing 
the value of water in simple financial terms through their communication materials. For 
instance, SRN’s communication strategy, which ‘focused on strong branding’, bore the 
message ‘saving water saves you energy and saves you money’. Reference to money is 
emphasised because, according to the company, it is a core customer concern (water 
company interview conducted on 12.12.2011). On its dedicated metering website, SRN 
water explained that metering is desirable because ‘a meter puts you in control so you can 
save’. Moreover, SRN argued that: 
 
Having a meter will give you control over your household water bill and the opportunity to 
save money by reducing how much you use (SRN yourmeter.co.uk).  
 
SRN characterised the meter as an incentivising tool that enables the empowered individual 
able to take greater control over water bills. This focus on price produces narrow, monetised, 
understandings of water and squeezes out other, complementary or contrasting, 
understandings of value.  
 
                                                 
32
 At the other end of the pipe Cave 2009 recommended, and Walker 2009 supported, market based instruments, 
most notably scarcity charges, to introduce an element of cost reflective pricing and competition into the 
abstraction license regime. At present, water is nominally priced for free and the current abstraction regime, 
introduced in the 1960s, does not link directly to the cost of abstraction licenses and the relative scarcity of the 
water source.  
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SEW’s communications strategy differs from SRN’s in that it did not hone in so closely on 
the price of water. SEW had intended to lead with the money saving message, it was 
displayed on the front page and within draft copies of its metering leaflets, however SEW’s 
customer research revealed that the money saving message ‘was not well received’. 
Participants concluded that this message could be construed as ‘false advertising’ because not 
all would save money with a metered charge and some households would see their bills 
increase (water company interview conducted on 15.09.2011).  
 
Instead of focusing primarily on the cost of water, SEW focused on environmental 
justifications for metering. In doing so, it created the ‘making every drop campaign’ (see 
Figure 12). SEW deployed non-financial nudges, ‘emotional registers’, to encourage water 
users to be more receptive to metering and reflect on their water use (see Ereaut and Segnit, 
2006; Wilkins, 2013 for more on emotional registers and Ghertner 2010 for an excellent 
analysis of ways of governing without numbers). Emotional registers are utilised as part of a 
meaning-making and a rebranding of water that represents it as something that ought to be 
cared for. However, this does not mean that the calculative elements were completely absent 
from SEW’s approach, price signals remain important. Indeed, the slogan ‘making every drop 
count’ conjures financial and calculative imagery. Meanwhile interviewees revealed that 
SEW still expected customer to respond to financial incentives, SEW suggested that some 
customers might react by thinking “oh crikey this is a bit expensive; I’m going to use less 
water”’ (water company interview conducted on 15.09.2011). Therefore, although SEW 
emphasise the value of water as a scarce environmental good, there remains a strong 





In this context companies have placed considerable faith in households responding to the 
potential financial savings facilitated by metering. Through metering, companies envisaged 
that water would be increasingly experienced and understood as a commodity. This does not 
mean that the process of commodification is complete. As Bakker’s (2001) work shows, 
water is not a “perfect” commodity. Water does ‘not fit the neoclassical definition of a 
commodity that the proponents of market environmentalism envisioned: a standardised good 
or service, with interchangeable units, sold at a price determined through market exchange’ 
(Bakker, 2005: 552, also see Page, 2005). Nonetheless, the creation of a situation where 
water is increasingly financialised, and experienced in commodity form, has the potential to 
enact major changes in how people relate to water.  
 
Water users interviewed noted that the relationship between water and money was more 
explicit with metering than under previous charging methods: 
 
It’s very clear that water = money now. It’s like everything else. Before, when it was the 
water rates, and then a flat fee it was different, you still had to pay for it but the link wasn’t 
so obvious (Household interview: Nicole, SEW, 3 person household). 
 
Figure 12 Branding water metering programmes 
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Nonetheless, at this same time, the strong meaning making relationship between metering, 
water and money was challenged by other interviewees who focused on other ways of 
valuing water, for instance as a ‘precious’ environmental good. 
 
It [the meter] doesn’t force you to use less. Water doesn’t always matter in terms of money, if 
the environment is the end goal then that’s what matters. I don’t think you need to pay more 
to do that though (Household interview: Maxine, SEW, 2 person). 
 
Although understandings of the value of water are not homogenous, the compulsory meter 
 performs a specific role in stabilising understandings of water as a commodity and producing 
a waterscape that aligns more closely with neoliberal inspired pricing principles. The multiple 
values of water (see Strang 2004) become simplified and conflated with price. Water 
becomes, at least in theory, something that is always ‘already encountered in commodity 
form’ (Robertson, 2012: 386). As Robertson argues, this is important because  
 
Buying a carbon credit is one thing; the creation of a world in which our metabolism is 
already legible as commodity production is another. In Marxian language, it is the difference 
between the employment of a worker for wages, and the creation of a society in which the 
worker already understands his/her labour as a commodity (Robertson, 2012: 387). 
 
In thinking through how metering programmes have been used to produce altered 
understandings of relations to nature, and how this particular moment combines with others 
to reproduce the waterscape more broadly, Swyngedouw’s (2004) diagrammatic 
representation of the process of producing socionatures is helpful (see Figure 13). Building 
on Harvey’s work on moments, Swynegdouw considers the different parts that produce 
socionatures. In his whirling diagram he shows that ‘none of the component parts is reducible 
to the other, yet their constitution arises from the multiple dialectical relations that swirl out 
from the production process itself’ (2004: 20). Swyngedouw argues that, ‘consequently, the 
parts are always implicated in the constitution of the ‘thing’ and are never outside the process 





















Water is discursively constructed in a financialised form, as a commodity, with price being 
the primary value of nature.  In order to tackle a perceived tension between how water is 
valued and perceived profligate water use, companies have drawn on financial imagery, 
neoliberal inspired cost signals and emotive registers to reproduce understandings of the 
relations to nature. This understanding of the relation to nature dialectically interacts with 
other moments to the broader waterscape. Ideas, including nudge, are tied up in and struggled 
over throughout this process. For instance nudge techniques have been used to promote the 
‘true value’ of water. This, in run, has contributed to strengthening neoliberal understandings 
of the waterscape. 
 
6.7 Socialising water: Renegotiating fairness as ‘paying for what you use’ 
The processes through which charges are constructed determines how costs of the water 
system are distributed amongst and between different groups of water users. The introduction 
of metered charging fundamentally changes the shape and form of the water charging system. 
Figure 13 Dialectical interaction of different moments (Swynegdouw, 2004: 20) 
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This is a key moment in relation to compulsory metering. Water companies have put forward 
individualistic notions of responsibility and ‘fairness’ in attempt to tackle a tension between 
profligate household water use and water stress. In this context metering has been deployed, 
in Foucauldian terms, as a technology of the self. Here the socialisation of water charges, 
together with the other moments, contributes to forming a sociotechnical fix in the water 
sector that broadly secures neoliberal understandings of the waterscape. 
 
Using water meters to help negotiate different ideas of fairness is far from a new notion, as 
chapters four and five indicated, the use of the meter in this way can be traced throughout the 
last two hundred years. There is no denying that the existing method for constructing 
household water charges, based on rateable values, is no longer fit for purpose. The rateable 
value system, first introduced in 1847 to help fund sanitation improvements, was designed to 
be sensitive to variable abilities to pay. Historically, it had a loose correlation with income 
but the last domestic property rateable value assessment took place in 1973 and it is widely 
accepted that the rateable values used are no longer an accurate reflection of a property’s 
value (Walker, 2009). Following privatisation, the Conservative government had initially 
announced that companies would no longer be able to structure charges using rateable values 
after 1990; it had anticipated that an alternative method of charging would emerge in its place 
(see chapter four). This did not occur and amendments and additions were made to the 
rateable charging measure in 1990. The rateable value charging system is only used for water 
and was perceived as a short term solution while other charging methods were developed 
(Bennet, 2013). As rateable values are no longer updated, the distance between property 
value, rateable value, income and ability to pay has become greater. As one senior water 
company interviewee adeptly observed, to base water charges ‘on the value of your house 
twenty years ago is slightly crackers!’ (water company interview conducted on 
15.09.2011) 
 
The introduction of contemporary companywide compulsory metering programmes involves 
a shift from collective to individual responsibility for water management. This, in turn, 
signals the intensification of market environmentalist principles. In this context, emphasis on 
individual responsibility and framings of fairness as “paying for what you use” have become 
key elements of water companies’ nudge inspired compulsory water metering programmes. 
Articulating fairness in this way has the tendency to forward individualistic interpretations of 




Water companies undertaking compulsory water metering have successfully presented 
metering as an ‘instrument of fairness’ (Strang, 2004). Although there are some dissenting 
voices, overwhelmingly, actors within the water industry, consumer groups and water users 
appear to be united in arguing that metering is the fairest way to structure the water charging 
system. “Paying for what you use” has become the ultimate signifier of fairness. For instance 
the 2009 Walker Review Team testified that ‘the overwhelming view expressed in both in the 
original call for evidence and responses to the interim report was that charging by volume of 
water used is, overall, the fairest charging system’ (Walker, 2009: 68). More specifically, 
Walker identified eight principles of fairness. First, that charges should relate to the costs 
imposed on the system; charges should relate to the volume used; charges should be 
affordable to everyone; charges should be fair to future generations; charges should be fair to 
companies; charges should be simple and transparent; and the charging structure should be 
neither too expensive nor complex to administer (2009: 37). While these principles privilege 
cost recovery, neoliberal inspired approaches, the eight principles also touched on 
affordability and environmental objectives. At times these eight objectives look to be in 
competition and it is not clear how Walker anticipated that they should be reconciled. 
Nonetheless, cost recovery approaches and the notion of ‘paying for what you use’ has 
played a key role in rearticulating how water users are governed through compulsory water 
metering.  
 
In similar terms as Walker, the EA has argued that a ‘fair charging system is one based on the 
principle of cost reflective charges’ (EA, 2009). The Fairness on Tap Coalition33 has also 
argued that ‘the fairest way to pay for water is to each pay for what we actually use. Doing it 
in this way means we don’t have to pay for someone else wasting water and we are in control 
of our bill’ (2010: 6). Most water companies agree that, in principle at least, ‘ultimately 
metering is fairer’ (water company interview conducted on 15.09.2011). CCW also 
reported that 57 per cent of respondents to its annual attitude tracking survey agree that 
metering is the fairest way to structure charges. Likewise, SRN argued that 70 per cent of the 
respondents to its customer survey ‘were or would be happy to be charged for water as 
measured by a meter’ (Southern Water, 2010). Water company interviewees suggested that 
                                                 
33
 Angling Trust, Association of Rivers Trust, Buglife, Chartered Institute of Water and Environmental 
Management, Great British Refurb, the Green Alliance, National Trust RSPB, Salmon and Trout Association, 
Society of British Water and Wastewater Industries, Unison, Waterwise, Wildfowl and Wetlands Trust, Wildlife 
Trusts , WWF-UK 
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paying by volume is favoured by households because this is how many other items and 
services are paid for, including some other utilities such as electricity. Water charging was 
compared with paying for food at fast food restaurants, according to one water company 
interviewee, water users ‘always say it’s [metering] the fairest way possible’ because ‘paying 
for what you use goes for everything else you do. [For example] You pay for how many 
McDonalds you eat, you pay by volume, and you pay by how many you have’. Furthermore, 
consumer organisations such as the CAB have also stated that ‘paying for what you use is a 
reasonable starting point’. Even organisations such as AGE UK and Unison, which have been 
historically reticent about metering, have recently adopted metering as a preferred policy 
following Walker’s recommendations for water metering. For instance Unison, offering a 
stance that differs fundamentally from its position on other public services such as healthcare, 
noted that while 
 
Some of our people would be very supportive of saying that it [water services] should be paid 
for by local or national taxation, the trouble with that is there is no incentive to use less or at 
least be more aware. The more we look into it, the more we think that metering is probably 
the fairest way of providing water but with the strict conditions along the lines [of]… 
protecting the customer (interview conducted on 17.09.2011).  
 
The fairness principle that has gained most currency, and been promoted most prolifically in 
water company literature, is the notion of “paying for what you use”. The existing rateable 
charging system is depicted as encouraging ‘wasteful’ water use and being unfair on water 
conscious, or smaller, households (see Figure 14). In this context, the Fabian Society found 
that participants in its research ‘felt strongly that if someone is using a high amount of water, 
it is deeply unfair for the person to pay the same as someone trying to conserve water’ 
(Doron, 2011: 33). Here, the Fabian Society argued that ‘the language of responsibility was 
the most appropriate term to use in describing levels of water use’ (Doron, 2011:35). 
Furthermore, the Fabian Society concluded that ‘“responsibility” in the context of water use 
mean[t] the same thing as fairness’ (ibid). The way that fairness is rearticulated as taking 
individual responsibility is reminiscent of Patterson and Stripple’s (2010) work on 
governmentality and the production of responsible carbon calculating citizens as well as 
Maniates’ (2001) work on individualism and environmental politics. With water metering 
specifically, fairness is likened to individual responsibility for water use and paying bills. 
Previously, the water charging system was informed by a sense of sharing the costs of 
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providing water, albeit imperfectly, across the water company area according to a series of 
cross-subsidies loosely based on income (see chapter seven for how companies have 














There is valid concern that water charges based on rateable values can discriminate against 
single person households and the elderly who tend to use less water (although it should be 
noted that water companies tend to offer a single occupancy discount). However, the 
evidence used to substantiate the insinuation that without metering to keep the water user in 
check, some water users will behave selfishly by ‘wasting water’ is very shaky. The idea that 
‘paying for what you use is fair’ demands greater scrutiny; the following section unpicks 
misleading statements surrounding paying for what you use. Meanwhile the subsequent 
substantive section, under the banner ‘intervening in the everyday’, addresses the 
implications that this has for how notions of freedom and control are understood following 
this particular interpretation of fairness.  
 
The notion that households pay for what they use through metering is misleading. Even when 
metered, the bill does not reflect the ‘true cost’ of supply water to that household (Efra, 2012: 
15). In theory, according to cost recovery principles, a customer who lives in a  remote area, 
who is located further from the treatment works and requires the company to invest in 
additional infrastructure in order to supply the household, should face higher water bills to 
Figure 14 The existing water charging system? (Waterwise in Fairness on Tap, 2010: 7) 
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cover the additional cost. However, these issues are not usually taken into account when bills 
are calculated. This is due to the principle of “de-averaging” which means that water 
providers are unable to cherry pick those customers who cost less to supply and ensures that 
 
Water and sewerage customers usually pay the same prices within a given company area, 
even if the costs of serving those customers vary because the costs of building and 
maintaining the infrastructure are averaged out across the company’s customer base (Efra, 
2012:15). 
 
Furthermore, according to National Audit office analysis of unmeasured bills, typically, ‘only 
one third of the water bill pays for the operating costs of supplying drinking water and 
removing wastewater (Efra, 2009: 5). The remaining two thirds of the bill cover: return to 
debt and equity investors (30 per cent); capital charges for depreciation and infrastructure 
renewal (28 per cent); and business taxes (6 per cent) (ibid). With metering, water charges do 
not just cover what the volumetric charge, there is also a standing which normally includes at 
least three additional charges; a charge for removing foul water; a surface water drainage 
charge which covers the cost of removing and processing rain water that falls on properties 
and then seeps into the public drainage network; and a highway drainage charge for removing 
the water that falls on roads. These fixed charges are not levied equally by the different 
companies, the methodology for calculating these charges vary. As Walker noted 
 
At present, different water companies set a wide range of prices for the standing charge and 
for the variable element. At one extreme, the average metered bill would split around 30:70 
into standing charge and volumetric charges, while at the other extreme the split would be 
more like 10: 90… No explanation for this variation has been forthcoming from the industry 
or the regulator (Walker, 2009: 85). 
 
Tables 14 demonstrates the variation between water and sewerage companies while table 15 
gives a more detailed breakdown of SRN and SEW’s charge.
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Table 14 Percentage of average combined measured bill comprised of standard charge: 





Standing Charges for water 
and sewerage (inc Surface 
and highway drainage) 






Dŵr Cymru £321 £33.0035 10 
Northumbrian 
(excluding Essex & 
Suffolk)  
£295 £122.80 42 
Severn Trent £303 £102.7
36
 34 
South West  £411 £74.04
37
 18 
Southern £430 £81.14 19 
Thames £324 £84.00 26 
United Utilities £362 £128.00 35 
Wessex £410 £77.00 19 
Yorkshire £304 £80.07 26 
 
                                                 
34
 This is the amount for Anglian's standard measured charge. Its other tariffs have different rates of standing 
charge, its SoLow scheme for low users has no standing charge and a higher volumetric charge compared to the 
standard, the Watersure rate has a fixed charge of £344 but no volumetric charge and its Aquacare Plus scheme 
has a fixed charge of £284 but a lower volumetric rate than the standard. 
35
 Welsh Water do not have standing charge for sewerage. Costs for sewerage, surface water, highway drainage 
are calculated volumetrically. 
36
 This calculation includes the surface drainage charge for a semi-detached house. Severn Trent have different 
charges for different property types (detached houses £91.85; semi-detached £61.28 and other £30.58) 
37
 In addition to these charges, South West measured bills are comprised of a volumetric charge for surface 
water and highway drainage set at a rate of £3.4701 per cubic metre. 
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Table 15 Percentage of average metered water bill that is standard charge for SRN and SEW 
 
 
                                                 
38
 As SEW is a water only company, sewerage costs are billed by other companies including SRN and Thames 
Therefore charges vary.  
39
 This includes surface drainage and highway drainage charges.   
Company Service Metered Annual Standing 
Charge (£) 




Water supply 26.44 £1.169 
Wastewater 20.70 £2.198 
Surface water drainage 23.00  
Highway drainage 11.00 
Total standing charges 81.14 
Average Annual  Water Bill                                                                                               £155           
Average Annual Sewerage Bill                                                                                          £275          
Average Annual Combined Bill                                                                                          £430 
Percentage of Average Annual Combined Bill that is Standing Charge                           18.87 
South East 
Water 
Water supply 21.60 Ranges from 1.49 
to 1.58 depending 
on which company 
is responsible for 
network. 







Wastewater supplied by 
Thames Water 
56 70.41 pence 
Total standing charges 
SRN/Thames 
76.3 / 77.6  
Average Annual Water Bill                                                                                                 £169 
Average Annual Sewerage Bill (SRN/Thames)                                                         £275/£138 
Average Annual Combined Bill (SRN/Thames)                                                         £444/ 307 
Percentage of Average Annual Combined Bill that is standing charge (SRN/Thames)  
                                                                                                                               17.18/ 25.28 
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From these tables, it can be surmised that the standing charge constitutes just under a fifth of 
the average water bill for SRN and SEW. Of course, actual percentages will vary from 
household to household. Therefore, it is clear then that households do not entirely pay for 
what they use and statements to the contrary are somewhat misleading. There is a limit to the 
amount of the bill made up by the water you use, as AGE UK highlighted 
 
Metering on the face of it seems fair, we’re used to it with electricity and gas… [but] in some 
cases it [the volumetric element] has been less than, well less than 50%.... So we think it’s not 
very clever to go on about meters to try and reduce usage without relating to actually what 
the bill is made of. So that’s a hobby horse because we’re worried that older people will try 
and use as little as possible without realising that it’s not going to make too much difference 
(interview conducted on, 07.03.2012). 
 
Ofwat would prefer to see standing charges limited to reflecting the costs of providing 
customer related costs and therefore ensuring that the volumetric element is substantive and 
can then be used to incentivise water use reductions.  In its 2003-04 Tariff structure and 
charges report, Ofwat stated that 
 
To give customers sensible incentives to use water efficiently, companies should set the 
volumetric charge to recover the costs which they will incur over the longer term to meet 
demand. The standing charge, on the other hand, should recover no more than the customer-
related costs for the unmeasured service, plus the additional fixed costs associated with 
providing a measured service (for example, meter reading) (Ofwat, 2004). 
 
Here, Ofwat’s position does not reflect an economic necessity in that 
 
For most companies, the fixed costs in any given year incurred in running the system are 
about 90% of their total costs, with only around 10% of costs varying by the volume of water 
supplied... As a result, there are not very strong economic reasons for recovering the water 
industry’s fixed costs in any particular way. The issues surrounding tariff design are 
therefore more to do with fairness of the resulting distribution of costs between different 
customers with different usage, usage patterns and difference in other characteristics – which 





This section has shown that the notion that water users only pay for what they use is 
deceptive and companies have, through metering, rearticulated understandings of fairness to 
read individual responsibility. More broadly, this speaks to neoliberal trends of financialising 
water, individualisation and strengthening commodity relationships.  
 
The way that tariffs are structured also reflects how water charges are socialised. Metered 
charges do not have be structured through a simple standing charge and fixed volumetric rate, 
meters can also be used in the design of alternative tariffs (Walker, 2009: 83). At present, 
SRN and SEW are not planning to implement different types of tariffs alongside compulsory 
metering and have argued that introducing new tariffs at the same time as metering would be 
too complicated. In contrast, Thames Water plan to install meters, conduct trials and then 
introduce alternative tariffs where appropriate. Meanwhile, Unison has called for a variable 
step tariff that has similarities with the Free Basic Water (FBW) charge in place in South 
Africa (Loftus, 2006; Muller, 2008; Nash, 2013 for details about the FBW). Some companies, 
for example Wessex Water (2012), have conducted rising block tariff trials alongside other 
seasonal tariff trials. Wessex found that, despite socially progressive appearances, low 
income families continued to face disproportionate burden under a three stage rising block 
tariff. These results echoed some of Loftus’ (2006) conclusions with regard to the FBW water 
policy in South Africa. Moreover, installing water meters does not necessarily mean that 
charges have be structured on a volumetric basis. ‘Sleeping’ or ‘blind’ meters can be used to 
secure the network by identifying household leakages or monitoring water flows rather 
structuring charges. These different systems show that there is no one way to socialise the 
costs of water through water metering. 
 
Compulsory metering programmes in the South East of England have reshaped the way water 
is socialised; collective responsibility, to an extent, has been supplanted by individual 
responsibility for managing water. Here water companies have forwarded a somewhat 
misleading message, that metering results in a fair charging system where households pay 
only for what they use. This way of socialising water is reminiscent of Pattern and Stripple’s 
(2020) work on governmentality in that the introduction of meters encourages water users to 
behave responsibly and think about water in calculative terms. Taken together with other 
moments, this re-socialisation of water and renegotiation of fairness, contributes to a socio-
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technical fix whereby companies attempt to tackle tensions within the sector, in this case the 
perceived unfairness of existing charging mechanisms informed by rateable value, in a way 
that strengthens the neoliberal character of the waterscape.  
 
6.8 Metering, feedback and (temporal) interventions in the everyday    
The reframing of fairness as responsibility is important because it legitimises particular types 
of interventions in everyday life. Here, I am taking a context specific, yet broad, definition of 
‘everyday life’ to examine how people interact with and experience water. SRN and SEW’s 
compulsory metering customer engagement programmes place great emphasis on the need to, 
at least temporarily, intervene in peoples’ water behaviours in order to encourage households 
to act in a responsible manner. The approach adopted by water companies undertaking 
compulsory metering borrows from Thaler and Sunstein who argue that ‘along with getting 
the prices right… we should take other nudge-like steps that can help reduce the problem in 
more politically palatable ways’ (ibid). In particular, Thaler and Sunstein recommend ‘an 
improvement in the process of feedback to customers through better information and 
disclosure’ (ibid). Following the spirit of Thaler and Sunstein’s nudge work, SRN and SEW’s 
interventions took two primary forms, transitional tariffs and providing more information on 
consumption. These interventions in to everyday life are vital for governing others and the 
processes of governing how water users engage with water. Insights from social practice 
theory (see chapter two) suggest that these types of interventions, targeted at individual water 
practices, could only partially address the tension that the water industry is attempting to 
confront. In this sense nudge is best understood as a partial governmentality. Combined with 
other moments, these interventions, contributed to the sociotechnical fix by reinforcing 
notions of individual responsibility, freedom and choice in water management which, in turn, 
are central to the continuation of neoliberal waterscape. 
6.8.1 Making the transition to metered charging   
A shift from an unmeasured to measured water charging system will have significant 
financial implications for some households (see chapter seven for more on the financial 
implications of metering). Both companies have introduced opt in transitional tariffs to 
provide households with an opportunity to make adjustments to their water behaviours and 
limit any bill increases resulting from a metered charging system. The two companies 
approached transitional tariffs differently. SRN’s mechanism, the Changeover Tariff, 
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introduced metered charges in steps over a two year time period. SRN argued that this gives 
households time to ‘budget appropriately and review water use’ (SRN, 2013b: 3). The 
Changeover Tariff is comprised of two elements:  the measured element (what would be 
charged using the metered tariff) and an unmeasured element (the charge that would have 
been levied for the billing period if the meter had not been installed). In the first year of 
metering the bill paid by households who opt in to the Changeover Tariff is calculated by 
combining 33.3 per cent of the measured and 66.7 per cent of the unmeasured elements. In 
the second year, these figures are reversed so the measured element forms the dominant 
element of the charge. By the third year, households pay water bills according to the full 
metered charge (SRN, 2013b: 3). Initially SRN had proposed introducing a ‘soft landing’ 
where water users would receive an indicative metered bill but would continue to be charged 
on an unmeasured basis for two years. However, the CCW and Ofwat criticised this proposal 
because they were unconvinced that households would pay close attention to the bill and 
would therefore receive a sharp and sudden shock when the metered charge was finally 
introduced.  
 
In contrast, SEW’s Phase in Option is spread out over five periods and provides information 
about water use after three months. In explaining its Phase in Option, SEW provides the 
following example (see Table 16) where a bill increase of £20 is introduced gradually.l.
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Table 16 SEW's phase in option 









 Bill £120 £20 100% £20 £100 
2
nd
 Bill £120 £20 75% £15 £105 
3
rd
 Bill £120 £20 50% £10 £110 
4
th
 Bill £120 £20 25% £5 £115 
5
th
 Bill £120 £20 0 0 £120 
 
The transitional tariffs have been welcomed by regulators and, it seems, water users 
themselves, as a means to manage the transition to a metered charging system. However, over 
half of the household interviewees who answered questions about the transitional tariff in 
SEW’s region suggested that although it might provide temporary relief, they were concerned 
about bill increases after the end of the transitional tariff. For example, one interviewee 
argued that she had little scope to reduce her household water consumption and her 
employment as a child-minder made matters worse: 
 
Being a child-minder means that I have to use much more water in the home than if it was 
just my husband and I. Ofsted requires us to us to teach the kids how to flush the loo when 
they’ve been and how to wash their hands properly. And being kids they go umpteen times a 
day, sometimes 6 times each, so that’s an extraordinary amount of water. It doesn’t stop 
there either. We need to make sure we have clean towels for them to use every day and part 
of the remit of the job is, if they’re school age, to send them to school being clean and 
wearing clean clothes. You can’t send a kid to school dirty can you, it’s not right. And if 
they’re dirty, then their clothes are going to be. To make matters worse, some of the parents 
don’t provide me with a spare set of clothes – so often I put those through too. So that’s 
extra, water and electricity. I worry that having a meter will prevent me from doing my job as 
well as I do. For instance, kids should be allowed to get muddy and have fun when their 
playing. But if I can’t really afford to wash their clothes, then I’m going to have to say to 
them to stay away from the mud, it’s sad and I don’t want to have to do it but I might have to. 
I don’t really think the government or the water company understands my circumstances. I 
rang them up because I thought that I should be able to get some kind of discount or help 
with my bill because I have to use more water but they said there was nothing for me. The 
only thing they could do was put me on, what do they call it, a transitional tariff, but that 
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doesn’t solve any problems does it. It just puts them off. I’m still going to have the same 
problems when that tariff comes to an end (Household interview: Janet, 2 person 
household, Nov 30 2011 SEW).  
 
In the time between meter installation and the introduction of the full metered charge, the two 
water companies hope that households will be able to adjust the way they use water to 
mitigate any increases in water charges. In order for households to “take control” of their 
water bill, companies have attempted to nudge water use in less water intensive directions. As 
highlighted in the customer journey section above, companies have provided water savings 
information, free water saving technologies such as water efficient showerheads and tap 
aerators and free water audits. There is a general assumption within the water industry that 
water users’ understanding of water issues is limited and, therefore, effort needs to be made 
to ‘educate’ them (EST, 2012). Organisations such as the Energy Savings Trust have 
advocated approaches which go beyond the usual mass letter drop. Instead, favouring 
personal, face to face contact with households where demonstrations of water (in)efficiency 
can be made and households’ experiences of water and alternative practices discussed. EST 
maintain that this personal, tailored approach where the water user is more directly engaged 
is more likely to have lasting impacts on how water is used in the home. In this sense 
metering represents a temporal intervention in everyday life as water companies seek to give 
households advice and time to alter the way they use water.  
 
Most households interviewed considered themselves to be water conscious and to have taken 
steps to conserve water. Table 17 outlines the type of steps that households reported that they 









Table 17 Examples of water conservation measures cited 
Most frequently 
cited 
   Least frequently 
cited  










Fill up fish pond 
less often 
Shorter showers Installed water 
but 
Using washing 


















Wash car less 
often 






before washing  
Collect cold 
water from a 
slow heating tap 
(I.e. for drinking) 








Insert a toilet 
'hippo' into the 
cistern 
  Reduce 
frequency of 
toilet flushing 
    
Using a bowl in 
the sink for 
washing up 





    
 
Households interviewed in SEW’s service area reacted very differently to the call to alter the 
way they use water. Just over a third of households interviewed struggled to identify 
additional ways to conserve water in their home and argued that they had already made as 
many changes as possible without compromising comfort or cleanliness standards. These 




I get why they’re doing it and saving water is fantastic, obviously we shouldn’t be wasting 
water but I really don’t think that forcing meters on people is necessary to do that. We try to 
do what we can already. We don’t run the water when we brush our teeth, we spend less than 
5 minutes in the shower normally, we try not to run the dishwasher and washing machine 
unless they’re full… We don’t wash the car with a hosepipe or anything like that. We have an 
eco-bag in the loo. There’s not much else that we can do (Household interview: Karen, 2 
person household, 1st Dec 2011). 
 
The information the water company handed out was okay but it didn’t tell me anything I 
didn’t already know. To be honest I can’t see us using the shower timer. It takes as long as it 
takes to feel clean! The hippo thing isn’t the most appropriate bit of kit for us, we have a dual 
flush loo already and that is already using a low volume of water. If they’d given us 
something else then we might have given that a go. At the moment I’m not sure what else to 
do (Household interview: Pam, 4 person household, 2nd December 2011). 
 
Comparatively, around a quarter of households stated that they would ‘wait and see’ whether 
their bill would increase before they thought seriously about any changes at home:  
 
We’re seeing what happens, the next door neighbour has 3 daughters and he went on a meter 
a year ago, he’s saved water so hopefully it will be the same for us too. The information that 
came with the meter was good and if the bill is more expensive then we’ll probably follow 
some of the steps in there (Household interview: Sue, 3 person household, 1st Dec 2011). 
 
Others, stated that they had no plans to change the way they use water or make modifications 
in their home. Many of these households showed complete indifference to the advent of water 
metering arguing that they could do no more or could absorb the anticipated bill increase. A 
small proportion of these argued that that as they pay for what they use, they would use as 
much water as they were willing to pay for. For example, one interviewee claimed that she 
and her husband were ‘the environment’s worst nightmare’ because they ‘run the tap like 
there’s no tomorrow’. Although the interviewee thought about her water use after being ‘told 
off’ by her granddaughter for leaving the tap on while brushing her teeth, she  said that her 
husband is completely resistant to altering the way he uses water. He thinks that ‘because we 
pay for what we use, we should be able to use it how we want’. Rather than greater 
conservation, individualising water use and emphasising the commodity form of water can, 
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for those who can afford the bill, have little effect in reducing the volume of water used at 
home and might actually lead to increases. This issue has also been identified through water 
company research where some participants told the company that because we pay for what 
we use, we should be able to use it how we want’ (water company interview conducted on 
25.10.2011). This irony has not been lost on the CWW, it has argued that 
There was evidence to suggest that metering would put some people in the right frame of 
mind to be efficient with water, through financial savings. But there was also evidence to 
suggest that metering would put others in the wrong frame of mind allowing them to think 
that as they pay for it, it is therefore up to them how they use it (CCW, 2006: vi). 
 
A smaller proportion of interviewees, just under a fifth, said that they had or were planning to 
reduce the volume of water used at home to mitigate any bill increases. Common examples 
included washing the car less and wearing clothes a greater number of times before washing. 
Some households interviewed, particularly those concerned about prospective bill increases, 
responded to compulsory metering by seeking to actively reduce their water use; this was 
referred to by interviewees as ‘retraining’. Examples cited included using measures such as 
‘save a flush bag’, installing a water butt, ‘outsourcing’ water use (for example by showering 
at a sports club rather than at home), capturing water run-off from slow to heat taps as well as 
encouraging family members to use less water, for example by taking shorter showers. Some 
household interviewees went as far as to mislead their family members as to when the 
metered charge would kick in so that they could take steps to reduce their water use prior to 
the receiving a metered bill. This indicates that domestic water use is negotiated between 
household members; it is not purely an individual practice. For instance, Nicola stated that 
she had 
 
Been a bit sneaky, everyone else in the house, including my husband, thinks that we’re 
already on a metered charge. It doesn’t come on until June but I told them it’s on now, so 
hopefully by the time we get a bill then they will have cut down their use a bit and it will be a 
bit easier for them to keep it up. I’ve put the shower timer up, otherwise they’ll be in there 
forever. I tell them to wait it goes round and then they’re out like a shot. I haven’t got round 
to putting the hippos in but I will. I’ll still water the garden now and again, I use the water 
from the water butt so that shouldn’t be too much of a problem, it’s full at the moment.  I 
used to do the washing every day, and I could do 2 or 3 loads in one go, but now I try to do it 
every other day. I’ve tried to persuade the kids to wear things more than once before putting 
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their clothes in the wash. At the moment that’s as much as we are planning to do. But that 
depends a bit on what happens when the bill comes. If it is more, then I will try to cut down 
on the washing even more (Household interview, Nicola 4 person household 1st December 
2011).  
Some interviewees found it difficult to alter everyday engagements with water, particularly 
surrounding bathing, and discovered that the physical infrastructure of their homes made 
water saving difficult due to taps taking a long time to reach the desired temperature and 
toilets not working well with devices designed to reduce the amount of water used for 
flushing. For example, on hearing that her home would receive a metered charge one 
interviewee hoped that she could encourage her family to adopt more frugal water behaviours 
to limit any bill increase. She installed a ‘save a flush bag’ in the toilet cistern but found that 
the toilet subsequently did not flush well so she removed it. She also attempted to regulate the 
amount of time her children spent in the shower and took more of an interest in how long taps 
were left running. However, her children’s shower practices were much more difficult to 
influence than she had anticipated. The interviewee was concerned that she would not be able 
to minimise bill increases by reducing water consumption in her household. Consumer 
organizations have also questioned whether it is possible for all households to save a 
substantial amount of water arguing that ‘there is a lot of talk about nudging customers to use 
less water, but there are some consumers who really just cannot change their behavior 
much… education is all very well up to a point but you have to accept that it is not possible in 
all cases’ (Consumer group interview conducted on 18.09.2011). Attempts to exert greater 
agency over water use as a result of metering can therefore be frustrated by socially 
constructed expectations of comfort and cleanliness, which have their own histories, as well 
as the existing material infrastructure of the home (Hobson 2011; Strengers 2009).  
 
Without better understanding and greater recognition of the historically and culturally 
specific elements that combine to configure particular practices, such as the constitution of 
norms surrounding frequent showering, the extent to which these types of behaviour change 
interventions can ‘really hope to instigate large scale and sustained forms of societal change’ 
is questionable (Jones et al, 2013: 37). Attempts to address tensions in the water sector 
through behavioural change seem to only offer partial solutions. Within this context Shove, 
and other proponents of social practice theory (including but not limited to Strengers 2009; 
Sofoulis, 2005; Chappells and Medd, 2008), have consistently called for practitioners to 
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explore ways in which practices can be reconfigured rather than focusing on individual water 
use behaviours. This would: 
 
Entail redefining the meaning of relevant evidence such that it is about how practices 
develop, and not primarily about individuals’ values, beliefs and choices. It would also 
involve reviewing policy makers’ capacity to actively configure the ‘landscapes’ in which 
practices do and do not take hold (Shove, 2011: 90).  
 
Household interviews revealed that peoples’ water practices were highly diverse both within 
households and between households. Moreover, the way in which households use water 
changes over time depending, in part, on the changing composition of the household (see 
Pullinger et al’s (2013) for a detailed study on diversity of practices). What is clear from the 
household interviews undertaken for this study is that attempts to intervene in everyday life 
and label households as ‘hyper-responsible’ consumers (Sofoulis 2011) or ‘micro-resource 
managers’ Strengers (2009, 2011) have been taken up by some households, ignored by others 
and rallied against by some. Showing that these interventions, in combination with the 
individualistic understandings of fairness and water as commodity, could unintentionally 
produce high intensity water use actions. Here, Goodwin’s observation that nudge inspired 
interventions place ‘too much emphasis on individual preferences and atomistic ways of 
thinking’ is relevant (Goodwin, 2012: 90). These nudge inspired schemes serve as a reminder 
of the messy and incomplete character of policies and support the adoption of what Hobson 
called a ‘realist’, empirically informed, approach to governmentality that accommodates the 
nuanced people assimilate, reject and live with the emergence of new governmental 
rationales.  
 
6.8.2 Nudging through feedback 
SRN has taken nudging strategies a step further than transitional tariffs; it has designed new 
bills for the compulsory metering programme in an attempt to influence household water use. 
The new bill - known as the forecast bill - provides feedback on household water use and 
water efficiency advice. These bills also contain case studies of and comparisons with 
households in the local area who have made water and financial savings. Importantly, in 
addition to the provision of greater information, SRN plan to use the colour of the bills in 
order to nudge household water use. Should water users exceed the amount of water used 
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(beyond a particular threshold) during the previous billing period, the household will be 
issued with a purple bill to alert them to the higher water use. Conversely, if consumption 
drops below the previous billing period then a green bill is issued. SRN also have the option 
of altering the thresholds that trigger different colour bills. For instance it would be possible 
for the company to reduce the threshold during a drought in an attempt to encourage 
households to conserve water. In addition, SRN plan to introduce a key fob reader which can 
be used to provide households with real time information about water use. Here the metering 
programmes seek to foster, or nudge, a greater sense of household responsibility for water use 
and make the flows of water within the home more visible. These mechanisms are vital in the 
company’s efforts to tackle a tension between perceived profligate water use and water stress 
in the South East. In this context, feedback apparatuses play an important role in the 
sociotechnical fix that is at work in and through compulsory water metering.  
 
SEW did not deploy the same feedback measures in its compulsory metering programmes 
because the company was unconvinced that this kind of nudge would influence consumption 
(Water Company interview conducted on 15.09.2011). Consequently, SEW concluded that 
these types of measures would not be cost beneficial. At this time it is not clear whether these 
nudging techniques will successfully influencing household water use in South East England. 
Recent research on SRN’s altered bill format suggested that household reactions to these 
interventions have been mixed. While some households found the additional information 
provided by SRN’s forecast bill useful, others found the premise unclear and were 
disappointed that their reduced water use might not necessarily translate into a smaller water 
bill. CCW argued that 
 
The ‘forecast bill’ provides a useful guide to water consumption for many customers who 
recall it. Information on bills comparing water consumption with households of various sizes 
is referred to but the findings suggest that this can mislead customers into thinking that if 
their household’s use is below average, then their bill should not increase. They are unaware 
that if their unmetered bill was low, it is possible that they will have a higher bill when moved 
onto a meter even if they are using less water than average (CCW, 2013: 3).  
 
It is too soon to ascertain what lasting impact these particular billing nudges will have on 
household water consumption. Nevertheless, these attempts to intervene in everyday 
experiences of water use demonstrate how the water sector has enacted a sociotechnical fix 
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through compulsory water metering. Here companies have attempted to tackle a tension in 
the sector, the perceived wasteful behaviour of households, by increasing information flows 
and providing feedback mechanisms. In this context, transition tariffs and bill related nudges 
have become important nudging tools or technologies of government.  
 
This section examined how transitional tariffs and feedback mechanisms, as technologies of 
government, have been used in an attempt to influence water users’ everyday interactions 
with water. The transitional tariffs offer a period of time for households to adjust to a metered 
charge while SRN’s billing system offered a further means to nudge behaviour. In this 
context, these mechanisms, inspired by nudge, have emphasised individual responsibility as 
well as financialised understandings of water.  Here water companies’ have sought to tackle 
tensions in the water sector in ways that strengthen the neoliberal character of the waterscape. 
Furthermore, interventions in everyday life combined with other moments, through 
compulsory water metering, to contribute to this sociotechnical fix. In this context, the 
section showed that in examining how water users are governed, governmentality approaches 
are useful for teasing out how people react to nudge inspired policy proposals in different 
ways. This highlighted the importance of recognising that any governmentality is often 
incomplete and messy. Drawing on both Harvey’s moments and Foucauldian notions of 
governmentality reveals the complex, dynamic processes through which the waterscape is 
renegotiated in and through compulsory water metering. 
 
6.9 Conclusion 
This chapter has argued that metering has become more than a mechanical engineering 
project. Companywide compulsory metering in South East England is best described as a 
sociotechnical fix where tensions, for example between water stress and perceived profligate 
household water use, have been, at least partially, addressed in a way that secures, and in 
some cases, strengthens the neoliberal character of the waterscape. This chapter builds on 
existing literature on metering by demonstrating how Harvey’s work on moments, along with 
Foucault’s notion of governmentality, can be used to explain how sociotechnical change 
occurs in the water sector. This chapter has shown that compulsory metering programmes are 
constituted of a series of ‘moments’ which combine to reproduce the waterscape and alter the 
way that water and water users are governed. The moments in question differ to those cited 
by Harvey and include relations of production (the RCM), technology (smarter meters), ideas 
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(nudge), the role of the water company and its relationship with domestic water users, 
relations to nature (the true value of water), socialising water (paying for what you use) and 
intervening in everyday interactions with water (through feedback mechanisms). Here the 
different moments are interrelated and evolve dynamically to reproduce the waterscape, 
within each moment different technologies of government are used to influence how water 
and water users are governed. By drawing on Foucault’s concept of governmentality, as well 
as Harvey’s method of moments, this chapter has explored how water users have reacted to 
the different governmental rationales offered by compulsory metering. 
 
In the context of compulsory water metering, Thaler and Sunstein’s ideas surrounding nudge 
have been particularly important for renegotiating the waterscape. Companies have made use 
of ideas from behavioural economics to communicate different understandings of the ‘true 
value’ of water and how water should be socialised. Here companies have made use of 
smarter technologies to intervene in and engage with peoples’ experiences of water. In this 
sense nudge inspired compulsory water metering programmes have expressed an altered form 
of governmentality that depicts water as a financialised product and households as potentially 
profligate water users who ought to be encouraged to better understand the value of water. 
Here, water users are expected to respond to the greater information, financial incentives and 
feedback provided by smart(er) metering to use water in what is perceived to be a more 
responsible fashion.  
 
The way that water and water users are governed, in and through compulsory water metering, 
resonates with how the water meter has been used to negotiated and renegotiate the 
waterscape since the Victorian era (see chapters four and five). The water industry has 
experienced multiple governmentalities where fairness and understandings of water have 
been expressed differently and struggled over. Contemporary programmes differ from 
previous uses of metering in terms of the governmental mechanisms that are used to 
reproduce the waterscape and the preference of nudging tactics over direct disciplinary 
mechanisms. Here the particular form of governmentality at work operates at both a policy 
and household scale; it influences the broader socio-economic processes as well as the micro 
processes of self-governing. 
 
To varying degrees, compulsory metering has been presented as an opportunity to save 
money, energy and water. This, in turn, projects a sense of fairness that is rooted in limited 
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notions of choice, cost recovery ideas and financialised understandings of water. In this 
sense, water users embraced, rejected and struggled with compulsory water metering and the 
associated customer engagement programme. The nudge inspired governmentality that is 
exercised through compulsory metering is neither neat nor linear. The process of 
sociotechnical change is messy and throws up unanticipated outcomes, showing that 
governmentalities are rarely closed systems. Here Harvey’s method of moments helps to 
elucidate the dynamic and dialectical processes through which sociotechnical change takes 
place. Overall this chapter argued that interventions made through compulsory metering 
programmes represent the emergence of a new, or at least altered, way of governing water 
and water users that strengthens the broadly neoliberal characteristics of the waterscape 





7 Compulsory metering and water affordability: water companies 
as reluctant welfare providers? 
 
These schemes they are bringing in, these social water charges, presumably they are 
distinct from the general anti-social water charges?! (Frank Dobson MP, former 




While the previous chapter explored the dynamic processes of sociotechnical change that are 
under way as a result of compulsory water metering in South East England. This chapter 
grapples with a topic that has grown in importance throughout the development of 
compulsory metering in South East England; the relationship between metering and 
affordability. As alluded to in the previous chapter, the introduction of compulsory 
companywide metering represents a new challenge regarding how water charges are 
socialised in South East England. Historically, the rateable value method of charging had 
offered a series of ill-targeted yet ‘deliberate, selective cross-subsidies’ (Bakker, 2001: 156). 
For instance, the rateable charging system enabled total transfers of approximately £600 
million per annum, with around £180 million of this being directed towards low income 
households (Walker, 2009: 119). Compulsory water metering, however, entails a substantial 
demise of the cross-subsidies that are built into the existing charging method. If, as projected, 
metering penetration rates in England and Wales reach 50 per cent by 2015, then the total 
transfers between water bill payers will fall from £600 million to approximately £500 million 
a year. Moreover, as metering becomes more prevalent, the level of transfer will reduce and, 
in instances of universal metering, it ‘will reduce to zero’ (Walker, 2009: 119).  
 
Although the social impacts of metering have come under considerable scrutiny in the global 
South, particularly in South Africa (see chapter two, Loftus 2006; Harvey 2005; Von 
Schnitzel 2008), the relationship between compulsory water metering and affordability in 
South East England received comparatively little attention. Questions regarding the 
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relationship between affordability and compulsory metering were initially deemed secondary 
to supply/demand balance issues and had not been thoroughly investigated. It is widely 
accepted that when plans for compulsory metering were originally drawn up in preparation 
for the 2009 price review, the two companies, SRN and SEW, were not in a position to 
deliver the programmes in a way that would be sensitive to affordability impacts. This is 
despite negative impacts on the poorest in society being frequently cited as a core reason for 
avoiding widespread metering since the Victorian period (see chapter four).  
 
Overall, this chapter interrogates the discursive representations of water affordability, as a 
biopolitical governance problem, in England and Wales and analyses the way that 
compulsory metering has resulted in a renegotiation of the role of the state and the private 
water company. Here, it is not my intention to construct a crass binary between 
environmental and social debates regarding metering or to privilege the under theorised social 
influences of metering above all else. Indeed, as the preceding chapter suggests, such an 
approach would be deeply problematic. Nor does this chapter presuppose that metering 
necessarily produces negative effects; as discussed in chapter two metering technologies are 
best understood as contingent mediators that can produce both negative and positive 
outcomes (Marvin et al, 2011; Furlong 2013). In this context, Feenberg argues that 
technology can ‘enframe and colonise’ yet it can also ‘liberate’ (1999: 222). With respect to 
water metering, some households who previously struggled to pay their bills are likely to 
benefit from metering while others will struggle. Therefore, Coutard and Guy’s advice to 
steer clear of ‘intellectually and politically disabling technological pessimism’ regarding the 
role of new technologies is apt (2007). Instead, drawing primarily on Foucault's work on 
governmentality and the state, this chapter teases out the messy and, to an extent, 
unanticipated effects of compulsory metering. It focuses on the emergence of affordability as 
an important and immediate governance problem that required the private water company, at 
the behest of the government and with support from the economic and customer regulators, to 
take on a new role, albeit often reluctantly, as water welfare providers.  
 
Previous work on affordability in the water sector has analysed how the state had sought to 
mitigate some of the worst effects of a water charging system that privileges economic equity 
over social equity. For example, the former Labour government legislated against 
disconnection and introduced a bill capping scheme for low income households who were 
considered susceptible to high water charges due to a water intensive a medical condition 
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(Bakker, 2001). This work was undertaken at a time when companywide compulsory 
metering was thought to be unachievable. The introduction of compulsory metering raises 
different and immediate challenges with respect to affordability. In order to think through the 
contemporary conceptual questions regarding the implications of private water companies 
taking a more explicit role in providing water welfare, this chapter draws on Foucault’s 
concept of governmentality and historical materialist work on the state to explore the process 
of governing affordability in the water sector. In doing so, the chapter takes forward insights 
from Bulkeley and Schroeder (2012) and Jessop (2007) to explore how, in reacting to the 
problem of affordability, new alliances, alignments and forms of delegated authority have 
emerged and what this means for understandings of the state.   
 
Importantly, the private water company has been recast as an explicit, formal provider of 
water welfare. The chapter seeks to explain and problematize the implications of this largely 
unexpected extension of governing power exercised by private water companies. As chapter 
two demonstrates, despite some of Foucault’s well known objections to ‘official and vulgar 
Marxist’ positions, there are few substantive obstacles to bringing both approaches together 
to address the how and why questions of governing in contemporary neoliberal regimes 
(Jessop, 2007: 40). The chapter argues that these two approaches help explain how water 
affordability (as opposed to water poverty) became a governmental problem. Here the chapter 
examines how the ‘space of government’ has been rearticulated through attempts to tackle 
water affordability problems emanating from compulsory metering. The chapter argues that is 
no simple ‘roll back neoliberalism’ but a stretching of the water company role. This 
reconfiguration of governmental relations is best thought through in relation to the current 
coalition government’s short-lived ‘Big Society’ project. Here one of the main aims of the 
Big Society was to carve out a stronger role for the private sector in delivering services on a 
local basis. Although the concept of the Big Society has largely disappeared from public 
consciousness, at the time this research was conducted the idea of the ‘Big Society’ was 
attracting a large amount of attention in the press and in public forums. Reflecting the high 
volume of attention this ill-defined transient concept initially drew, interviewees from water 
companies explicitly referred to the Big Society to frame their new role in providing variants 
of water welfare. While the Big Society idea is now largely defunct, the ideological 
foundations that constitute it, i.e. localism, economic liberalism, volunteerism and stronger 




The chapter is divided into two main parts. The first part argues that the emergence of water 
affordability as an urgent governance problem is a significant yet unanticipated outcome of 
compulsory water metering. The second part then explores how the role of the private water 
company has been stretched and reshaped. It demonstrates how companies, in the context of 
the government’s ‘Big Society’ rhetoric, have taken on greater responsibility for water 
affordability through new company-led social tariffs. The chapter shows that understandings 
of the state, as a series of social relations that produce governing effects, is continually 
contested and renegotiated over time. The chapter then explores how the renegotiation of the 
state contributes to shaping the type of support offered to households that potentially face 
financial hardship as a result of compulsory metering. Materially, the new affordability 
measures accompanying the compulsory metering programmes have ensured that the 
transition to a metered charging base is more sensitive to potential affordability problems 
than it would have otherwise been. However, the support on offer does little to tackle 
underlying affordability problems in the sector. The chapter concludes that companywide 
compulsory water metering has had important yet unanticipated consequences regarding the 
way that water affordability, as an urgent problem, is understood and managed. In devising 
ways to manage water affordability problems caused by metering, the role of the private 
water company has been reshaped and understandings of the state in respect to water 
governance have been reworked.  
7.2 Making mischief, locating the problem: Water poverty? 
It is a significant yet curious inconsistency that while there is an official definition of 'fuel 
poverty', there is no corresponding government approved definition of ‘water poverty’. In 
fact the phrase is actively avoided within the sector. Instead the issue is framed around the 
less precise and contested notion of ‘affordability’. The preference for the term affordability 
over water poverty is important and should not be taken as value neutral; the discursive 
difference between poverty and affordability is both deliberate and important for evaluating 
how the relationship between metering and affordability are made sense of. Framing in this 
context has important ramifications for how affordability has been understood as a particular 
problem that requires attention and intervention in relation to compulsory water metering. 
Here Foucault’s iterations on discourse and governmentality are useful for evaluating how the 
notion of affordability, as the dominant way of framing the problem, has been made 
intelligible through ‘processes of definition and contestation’ (Raco, 2003). This is important 
because government is a ‘problematizing activity’ where the ‘ideals of government are 
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intrinsically linked to the problems around which it circulates, [and] the ills it seeks to cure’ 
(Rose and Miller, 2010: 279). In order to tackle a social ill, it has to be located and 
recognised as a ‘problem’. Understanding the problem as one of 'affordability' rather than 
‘water poverty’ translates into policy interventions that are very different.  
 
The absence of an official, government approved definition of water poverty in England and 
Wales requires explanation. Interviewees suggested that the unofficial reason for preferring 
the absence of a definition for water poverty is that key actors within the sector are 
uncomfortable with depicting water poverty as a distinct social problem. According to 
interviewees, there is an unspoken consensus among key policy makers that water poverty is 
not a specific social problem distinct from general poverty. Therefore, any measures to 
alleviate the situation of those who struggle to pay their water bill should be addressed 
through the broader tax and benefits system. For example, in 2006, the House of Lords 
Science and Technology Committee stated that ‘people suffering from serious difficulty in 
paying their bills should be helped through the benefits and tax credits system’ (p.36). 
Moreover, recently, the CAB, in its response to the government’s 2011 Consultation 
Affordable Water, argued that there is considerable merit in the government further 
supplementing peoples’ incomes through the tax and benefits system so that they are better 
able to afford their water bill:
  
 
The simplest way to improve affordability of water would be to improve people’s incomes. 
The fact is that many people are unable to afford their water simply because they live on a 
very low income and this is an issue that falls squarely within the purview of the government 
through the benefits and tax credit systems. The fact that benefit income fails to provide many 
people with sufficient income to pay their water and other essential bills leads many people 
inexorably towards debt (CAB, 2011:3). 
 
In this sense, general poverty has been understood as the ill that ought to occupy government 
attention rather than 'water poverty' and, subsequently, government has historically provided 
assistance through the tax and benefits system. For example, until 1988, under the 
Supplementary Benefits scheme, claimants received the actual cost of water charges along 




The approach to water is very different to that of energy. Fuel Poverty received full 
recognition as a distinct social problem in the Warm Homes and Energy Conservation Act in 
2000 and the UK Fuel Poverty Strategy Act in 2001 (JRF, 2011: 2). Households were 
considered to be suffering from fuel poverty if they spent in excess of 10 per cent of their 
income to heat and power their home to a standard that is ‘sufficient to maintain the health 
and well-being of household occupants’ (JRF, 2011: 4). This definition for fuel poverty is 
useful because it provided a platform for government to commit to a series of strategies that 
target fuel poverty on a statutory basis. Such measures included a combination of targeted 
programmes (designed to improve the energy efficiency of homes, and therefore indirectly 
reduce energy bills) as well as non means tested grants for the elderly who are considered 
particularly at risk of energy poverty. For example, the Green Deal offers householders a loan 
from government to cover the upfront costs of installing energy efficiency measures; the 
Energy Companies Obligation (ECO) provides subsidised energy efficiency measures
40
; Cold 
Weather Payments provide those who are in receipt of specified income based benefits with a 
£25 payment for each 7 day period of very cold weather (where the temperature is either 
recorded as, or forecast to be, an average of zero degrees Celsius or below). Furthermore, 
universal (non means tested) Winter Fuel Payments of between £100 - 300 are available for 
people born on or before 5 January 1952 on a tax-free basis (ECC, 2013).  
 
The Fuel Poverty agenda occupies a prominent role in policy circles, for instance the 
government has recently accepted a new, more challenging, relational definition of fuel 
poverty developed by Hills (2012).
41
 Academic studies have also sought to better understand 
how notions of energy justice and vulnerability are ‘materially configured through socio-
technical networks’ and everyday experiences (Hall et al, 2013: 417). In contrast to the water 
                                                 
40
 The Conservative government has very recently announced that rushed plans to water down the Energy 
Company Obligation in a myopic attempt to reduce energy bills in the short term. This could result in an 
average annual bill reduction of £30-35 of bills and is in response to a Labour government pledge to freeze 
household energy bills if they are elected in 2015 (ECC, 2013). The precise provisions and proposals made 
available are rapidly changing as the two political parties posture in advance of the forthcoming election.  
41
 Hills (2012) determined that households are considered fuel poor if they have required fuel costs that are 
above the median level and were they to spend that amount they would be left with a residual income below the 
official poverty line. Hills concluded that the government should count the number of individuals in this 
position as well as the number of households they live in (p.5). This relative measure attempts to track the 
experience of people with low incomes living with high costs compared to those with average incomes. 
According to Hills, this rethinking of fuel poverty measurement has a considerable energy policy impact. Using 
the new measure, the number of people living with fuel poverty will only be a tenth lower than it would have 




sector, energy poverty is understood as a distinct social problem that requires government 
backed intervention. The acceptance of an official definition has then been translated into a 
programme of governance. The chasm between energy and water sectors can be explained, in 
part, by their respective different regulatory practices. Whereas the water sector economic 
regulator, Ofwat, has a pivotal role in negotiating bills by setting price limits, the energy 
regulator does not boast an equivalent power. Water is a much more closely regulated market 
than energy. From this perspective, the government expected the regulator to ensure that the 
water charging system remained affordable through the Price Review process.
42
 Therefore, 
any affordability problems that did emerge were assumed to derive from broader processes of 
poverty and should be dealt with through the tax and benefits system.  
 
Nonetheless, the adequacy of the tax and benefits system to cater for potential water 
affordability problems came under considerable scrutiny in the late 1990s due to 
disconnections for non-payment and well publicised increases in water bills (see chapter 
four). The regulator was perceived as failing to ensure the functioning of an affordable 
charging system and, at the same time, the available support options provided by the tax and 
benefits system were reducing. In particular, the ability of the benefits based system to 
provide for those who struggled to pay their water bills was undermined by changes made to 
income support in 1988 (Lister, 1995). Whereas previously the actual costs of water bills had 
been met directly through the benefits system, after 1988 a water charge cost of £1.65 a week 
was incorporated into the new income support mechanism. This amount was less than the 
average cost for water and, despite subsequent uprating processes, it did not increase in 
proportion to the price of water bills. This, in turn, eroded the purchasing power of the benefit 
payments (Fitch and Price, 2002: 19). The tax and benefits system was problematic in two 
further ways. Firstly it did not reflect the substantial regional variance in water prices and, 
secondly, it was difficult to assess whether the amount of benefit was sufficient because, over 
time, the cost of water bills was not identified separately (Walker, 2009: 120).
43
 At a time 
                                                 
42
 In 1997 when the regulator has been thought to have been too lenient, and allowed the utility to make profits  
that were considered excessive, a  one off 'windfall tax' has been placed on water companies. A similar call for a 
windfall tax on water companies was made by Robert Halfon MP in June 2013 who accused the utilities for 
making unreasonable profits (Hawkes, 2013).   
43
  Interestingly, in its Interim Report, the Walker Review team recommended introducing regionally sensitive 
benefit payments to reflect differences in water prices across England and Wales. The majority of responses 
were supportive of this proposed measure. However, the Department for Work and Pensions rejected the idea 
arguing that an the introduction of a regional benefit to accommodate price differences would create additional 
complexity to the benefits system at time when they were seeking to simplify it through the new Universal 
Credit programme (Walker, 2009: 120). 
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when the government was taking active steps to address energy poverty, Martin Fitch and 
Howard Price, who were active members of PUAF, asserted the government’s failure to 
recognise water poverty as an urgent problem smacked of negligence (2002). Here, Fitch and 
Price considered water poverty to be a distinct social problem that was not adequately 




Fitch and Price made attempts to compose a more methodologically sound measure of what 
they called water poverty that could be used, provocatively, as a platform to pressure 
government action to tackle water poverty (Interview with Price, 27 March 2011). Fitch 
and Price’s water poverty measure was communicated through a report entitled Water 
Poverty in England and Wales (2002) (published jointly by the Centre of Utility Consumer 
Law, University of Leicester and the Chartered Institute of Environmental Health). In this 
paper Fitch and Price took ‘the government’s methodology for defining fuel poverty  and 
applied it to data derived from the Office for National Statistics’ Family Expenditure Survey 
to quantify the number of households in England and Wales deemed, on that definition, to be 
spending an excessive proportion of their income on water charges’ (2002: 3). At that time 
the government considered households to be suffering from fuel poverty if they spent more 
than 10 per cent of their income on energy; data from the 1988 Family Expenditure Survey 
suggested that households in the bottom three income deciles spent 10 per cent of their 
income on energy (Fitch and Price, 2002: 9). Using a sample of households provided by the 
Severn Trent Trust Fund and the Anglian Water Trust Fund, Fitch and Price commissioned 
the Office of National Statistics to find out how much the lowest three income deciles spent 
on water (ibid). Their study concluded that these households spent on average 3 per cent. 
Fitch and Price then argued that this finding enabled them ‘to propose the standard of 3 per 
cent to determine whether, in relation to their income, a household’s water charges are 
affordable, and thus whether or not the household is experiencing water poverty’ (2002: 9-
10). To put this finding in context, the average expenditure on water for all water customers 
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 Although the government has not sanctioned a definition or measure of water poverty, it had previously 
tracked the sustainability of water charges. For example, Defra has previously used an illustrative measure of 
water affordability in the context of its Sustainable Development Indicators which discerned that water bills 
were unaffordable when households spent more than 3 per cent of income (after housing) on water. Defra came 
by this figure by doubling the median spend (1.5 per cent of income) on water (Defra, 2004).
 
However, Defra 
did not attach specific targets or goals to this indicator and this measure was discontinued following its omission 




in the UK was approximately 1 per cent. Fitch and Price concluded that, based in their 
calculations, around four million, or 1 in 6, households were in water poverty.  
 
For Fitch and Price, the most important message was to highlight the reality of water poverty, 
to start a debate about what was reasonable for households to pay for water and to pressure 
government to take action. Here Fitch and Price perceived their 3 per cent figure to be ‘a bit 
of mischief’ in that it was intended as a provocative challenge to the sector; they did not 
intend for it to be used as a standard benchmark (interview conducted on 27.03.2012). Part 
of the problem, according to Fitch and Price, was that the regulatory system lacked a 
definition of water poverty that could be used to compel intervention in order to support those 
who struggled with their water bills (also see Sawkins and Dickie, 2006). 
 
7.3 Managing affordability through regulation: WaterSure and the meter 
as a facilitator of basic needs 
Concern and debate surrounding water affordability was prominent in the late 1990s. The 
Labour Party, which owed some of its 1997 electoral success to a campaign pledge to end 
water disconnections, held a water summit soon after coming into power (see chapter five). 
Moreover, a cross government paper was published on water affordability in 2004. This 
interest in water affordability did not translate into the development of an official definition 
or the implementation of schemes on a similar scale to the energy sector. Nonetheless, the 
government did acknowledge that water affordability was a genuine risk for a relatively small 
number of households.  
 
From the late 1990s, government sought to mitigate the worst social effects of the water 
charging system through the water regulatory framework. Government argued that problems 
with water affordability could and should be dealt with through the water charging system. 
This did not mean completely abandoning a market orientated preference for cost recovery 
mechanisms, yet greater emphasis was placed on ensuring that households, particularly those 
at greatest risk of facing high water bills, were able to access a sufficient amount of water to 
satisfy essential needs. Bakker has referred to water policy charges at this time as a liberal 




Eligibility for the main mechanism used to manage water affordability, WaterSure, was 
conditional upon the household accepting a water meter. Within this context, the meter acted 
as a facilitator of basic needs. WaterSure was introduced in 2000 under the Vulnerable 
Groups Regulations and capped the bill of eligible metered households at the average bill in 
their water company area. In order to qualify for WaterSure, households must have a meter, 
be in receipt of selected income-based benefits
45
 and must demonstrate need by either (i) 
being responsible for three or more children who are in full-time education and live in the 
property or (ii) someone in the property having a medical condition that requires substantial 
additional quantities of water to be used.
46
 WaterSure is a means-tested tariff and is funded 
through a levy placed on water customers’ bills; it effectively costs £0.40 per customer bill. 
Recently, the government briefly entertained committing public funding to an enhanced 
WaterSure tariff but signalled its intention not to do so in its 2011 Water White Paper (Defra, 
2011: 65). 
 
The ability of WaterSure to address water affordability problems is limited. Take up of 
WaterSure is low, at present approximately 50, 000
47
 people claim assistance from the 
WaterSure scheme and, while improving, CCW maintain that public awareness of WaterSure 
remains low (CCW, 2012:1). Moreover, according to CCW’s and CAB’s responses to the 
interim Walker Report, the eligibility criterion for Watersure does not encompass the full 
range of households who face affordability risks (CCW, 2011; CAB, 2011). In the context of 
WaterSure, water affordability problems have been narrowly framed and little attempt was 
made at monitoring the extent and effect of water affordability issues in the sector on the 
scale that exists in the energy sector. Indeed, there is consensus that WaterSure is insufficient 
to address water affordability problems. In this context, through WaterSure, the meter has 
played a role in tackling water affordability problems, albeit in a minimal sense.  
                                                 
45
 Universal Credit, Housing Benefit, Income Support, Income-based Jobseeker’s Allowance, Working Tax 
Credit, Child Tax Credit (excluding those in receipt of the family element only), Pension Credit and Income-
related Employment and Support Allowance.  
46
 Examples include weeping skin diseases (i.e. Psoriasis), Crohn’s disease or ulcerative colitis.  
47
 At an oral evidence session at on Dec 2013 Yve Buckland, Chair of CCW, suggested that this figure has risen 
to 72, 000.  
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7.4 Managing the problem from the water companies’ perspective: 
Governing debt 
Water companies have tended not to perceive water affordability as a problem in itself but 
have identified water debt as a crucial problem that requires careful management. Ofwat have 
calculated that the level of water debt is increasing and already exceeds that of energy debt; 
around five million households have outstanding payments on their water bill (Ofwat, 2010b: 
3). Reportedly, the ‘National Debtline, a telephone helpline, have said that the number of 
calls it received about water debt ‘had risen by 250 per cent since 2007’ (Wild, 2013). The 
cost of recovering water debt is shared across customer bills, it is estimated that ‘non-
payment of bills adds about £14 [per annum] to the bills of other customers, some of who[m] 
may be struggling to pay their own bills’ (Ofwat, 2011b: 3).48 Water companies have sought 
to limit water debt rather tackle affordability problems more directly. For example, some 
water companies have established charitable trusts and introduced measures that are designed 
to provide assistance to households who face a sudden hardship and are thus unable to pay 
their bill or are in arrears. Historically, there has been ‘little enthusiasm’ for water companies 
taking greater responsibility through mechanisms like social tariffs for, according to an Ofwat 
consultation in 2000, popular consensus within the sector was that ‘these are matters that 
should be decided by government’ (Ofwat, 2000). Although affordability and debt are far 
from mutually exclusive, rather than attempting to tackle affordability problems, water 
company schemes tend to be primarily driven by companies’ concerns about the cost of 
recovering outstanding customer debt. For example a CCW interviewee suggested that: 
 
It is probably fair to say that a lot of companies’ approaches to affordability are very closely 
linked to their debt position; they tend to see them as one issue. It is understandable, from 
their perspective, they are not there to deliver social policy. They are there to try to collect 
the money from their customers. Naturally they will have a focus on debt (Consumer Council 
for Water interview conducted on 18.04.2012). 
 
A rather cynical attitude to debt is prominent with the water industry. It is often assumed that, 
rather than being unable to pay, many of those who are in debt are adopting a ‘won’t pay 
attitude’. Some companies have argued that some households simply refuse to pay their bills 
because they are aware that water companies are unable to disconnect households from water 
                                                 
48
 Tony Smith told an All Party Water Group Meeting in October 2013 that this cost has since risen to £16. 
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for non-payment. Companies have used this argument particularly forcefully following a 
recent study which revealed that debt specialists such as the CAB advise their clients to 
privilege debts, such as mortgage or rent payments, where there are serious implications for 
missed instalments such as repossession or homelessness, over water payments. Household 
water debtors are often represented, at best, as poor money managers and, at worst, as anti-
social deviants rather than as vulnerable people who are simply unable to meet the costs of 
their water bill.  
 
Of course not all households fall into debt for the same reasons and it is unlikely that all 
households in water debt are suffering on the same scale. Nonetheless, CCW’s research, 
Living with Poverty, paints a different picture to the one composed by water companies. 
CCW’s research undermined the notion that a ‘won’t pay’ attitude is persistent among water 
users. CCW reported that:  
 
...almost without exception, people who found themselves in arrears were not adopting a 
‘won’t pay’ attitude. Instead, they were desperately trying to meet their various financial 
commitments and what they wanted was a means of helping them keep their heads above 
water until such time that they could clear their outstanding debts (CCW, 2007: 35). 
For water companies, the primary governmental problem that ought to be managed is water 
debt rather than water affordability. Previously, water companies disciplined payment 
through prepayment metering and, subsequently, companies have shown interest in flow 
restrictor valves for the same purpose (see chapter five). Although these technologies 
continue to be available in other countries, for instance South Africa and Australia, in 
England and Wales they are prohibited because they could result in low income users 
reducing their water use below that which is desirable on health grounds.
49
 As a result, 
companies have sought to address debt through other means, predominately through a 
combination of charitable trusts and debt relief schemes.  
 
                                                 
49
 In relation to debt, the introduction of flow restrictor valves is periodically debated. For example as late as 
2011, Ofwat noted that it was ‘pleased to note that the Walker review recommended exploring this option [flow 
restrictors and prepayment metering] further if there is a demand from customers to help them budget 




Auriga (2011) confirmed that seven water companies, including Thames Water and SRN, 
sponsor charitable trusts. As registered charities, these ‘charitable trusts are run 
independently of the water company but according to objectives set by the donor company’ 
(Auriga, 2011: 3). Here the donor company determines its own criteria for assistance. 
Charitable trusts tend to make grants to creditors rather than provide money directly to 
applicants; in 2000-10 approximately £16 million was made available. Where grants are 
made directly to the applicant, this is often done on a ‘provisional basis’ and applicants are 
‘expected or encouraged to keep up with a payment plan during a given period before 
receiving the award’ (ibid). Charitable Trusts play an important role for households who are 
in debt yet the available resources are limited, for example both Auriga (2011) and Walker 
(2009) reported that the volume of applications can and does exceed the amount of money 
that is donated by the companies.  
 
In addition to Charitable Trusts, some companies offer debt relief schemes; SRN administers 
a restart scheme called NewStart, whereas SEW has a programme called the Helping Hand 
Scheme. With the former, SRN targets customers who have debts of at least £750 and writes 
of debt equivalent to the value of customer payments over the course of 12 months. 
Meanwhile, SEW’s Helping Hand programme provides financial help to clear water debt 
through provisional awards in cases where households ‘demonstrate their commitment to 
improving their financial sustainability… [and] the ability and intention to pay current and 
future charges and avoid falling back into debt’ to the company (SEW website). These 
schemes, targeted at households in significant debt to water companies, provide an important 
service in the absence of comprehensive measures to tackle broader affordability problems in 
the water sector. In France, where similar systems exist, such programmes are referred to as 
‘ex-post financial aid’ (Reynaud, 2007: 19). Debt relief schemes tend to be administered on a 
win-win basis, meaning that they are justified to the regulator on the grounds that the cost of 
administering the service, and writing off customer debt, is equal or less than that of 
recovering debt through the court system. It is clear that water companies have taken an 
active role in providing measures to tackle bad debt. However, at least until very recently, 
there has been a reluctance to accept that there is an affordability problem in the water sector. 
Instead, missed payments have been attributed to sudden hardship, poor money management 
and, more cynically, deviant households that refuse to pay for water. Importantly, water 
affordability has not been designated as a specific governance problem and while the 
Vulnerable Groups Regulations seek to catch some of the worst effects of the charging 
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system, from the perspective of water companies, debt rather than water affordability has 
been understood as the primary governance problem.   
 
7.5 Reframing the debate? Affordability: A new “field of intervention” 
Water affordability has recently come to the fore in water policy debates as an urgent and 
imminent government problem that requires careful management. According to Tony Smith 
(2012), the Chief Executive of CCW, affordability is now a ‘red light’ issue for the water 
sector. Water affordability in this sense resembles what Rose (2007) has referred to as a new 
‘field of intervention’. The Walker Review (2009), undertaken in the context of impending 
compulsory metering, forced an important debate on the definition and discursive framing of 
water affordability in England and Wales. According to the CCW, although discussions 
around affordability had  
  
Gained momentum in more recent years and we [CCW] have managed to get the issue up the 
government’s agenda so it is at the stage where it is a recognised issue and it is understood 
that something needs to be done… it was the Walker review that gave the impetus’ 
(Consumer Council for Water interview, 18.04.2012). 
 
Walker concluded that the three per cent figure that had been provocatively presented by 
Fitch and Price in 2002 was too simplistic to capture the drivers of affordability problems in 
England and Wales. It concluded that 
 
The issues surrounding the affordability of water and sewerage services are too complex to 
be captured in a single and somewhat arbitrary measure of a percentage of disposable 
household income used for their purchase (Walker, 2009: 127).  
 
Walker argued that more work needed to be undertaken in order to better understand the 
dynamics of water affordability and advised that Ofwat, who have a duty to protect 
vulnerable households through the regulatory system, should undertake further work on the 
meaning and reporting of affordability issues in England and Wales. Walker implored Ofwat 




Ofwat already has a statutory duty to have special regard to those who are chronically sick 
or disabled, of pensionable age, or with low incomes. Ofwat must take its duties on 
affordability and vulnerable customers seriously, part of which will involve it ensuring that 
companies are doing all they can to minimise affordability problems. The review team 
believes that Ofwat should be given a clear responsibility to monitor what is happening to 
affordability, make adjustments to its own policies where necessary and possible, and provide 
outside advice to UK government and Welsh Assembly government where the action needed 
lies outside its responsibilities or powers. The complexity of the affordability issue and the 
growing impact of the transition to metered tariffs mean that as a matter of some urgency, 
much more needs to be understood about household income and its relationship to problems 
with the affordability of water and sewerage services (Walker, 2009: 128).  
 
In response to the Walker Review, Ofwat embarked on research where it sought to develop a 
‘rigorous approach’ to measuring water affordability (Ofwat, 2011b). Here Ofwat emphasised 
that, as an economic regulator, it was not its ‘role to decide on an indicator or threshold that 
could be used to trigger help for household customers with affordability issues’ (ibid). 
Moreover, Ofwat maintained that the matter of a threshold is a social policy decision for 
government. Here Ofwat argued that government should provide the appropriate legislative 
framework within which water companies should design and deliver company specific 
programmes. Company specific problems, according to Ofwat, would have the benefit of 
being locally accountable (Ofwat, 2011d: 4). Ofwat clearly perceives its own role, as 
regulator, to be limited to informing policy rather than designing or leading on social policy. 
In seeking to establish a workable definition of water affordability to inform government 
decisions, Ofwat favoured a ‘basket’ approach to thinking about indicators of water 
affordability. In a one-off study undertaken in 2011, which Ofwat has no plans to update, it 
developed a set of income based indicators and argued that levels of debt as well as data on 
self-reported affordability problems should be taken into account when identifying 
affordability risks.  
 
With respect to income based indicators, Ofwat, using data from the Family Resources 
Survey, concluded that ‘an appropriate threshold for water affordability risks lies in a 3-5 per 
cent range’ and that ‘this fulfils the requirement for statistical robustness’ (Ofwat, 2011d: 18). 
However, Ofwat also reiterated that ‘the use of these thresholds is not intended to imply 
213 
 
thresholds for policy interventions – only indicators’ (ibid: 13). Moreover, Ofwat also 
stressed that it could not ‘strictly describe a household paying more than 3 per cent as 
“having affordability problems” as this is purely an indicator’ (ibid: 18). Nonetheless, using 
these indicative measures, Ofwat estimated that around 23 per cent (5.41 million) of 
households spent more than 3 per cent, while 11 per cent (2.6 million) spent more than 5 per 
cent, of their income on their water bills (Ofwat, 2011b:4). A more extensive breakdown of 




In addition to income based indicators, self-reported data on affordability suggests that there 
is a problem in the water sector. For example, research commissioned by Ofwat and CCW 
found that 25 per cent of respondents who answered questions on affordability stated that 
their bills were not affordable (Ofwat/CCW, 2008). Furthermore, depending on how the 
question is phrased, research commissioned by Ofwat and CCW tend to find that between 15 
per cent and 25 per cent of households consider their water bills to be unaffordable. 
Importantly, as Table 20 demonstrates, affordability risk differs between house types. The 
Walker Review team found that low-income households, lone parents, working age adults 
living alone and single pensioners are most likely to struggle with their water bills. 
Unsurprisingly, a research study commissioned by CCW found that a higher percentage of 
households in the lowest socio-economic group reported problems with meeting their water 
bills; 25 per cent of respondents in the DE group considered their bills to be unaffordable 
compared to 9 per cent in the AB bracket. 
 
Table 18 Percentage of income spent on water bills (Source: Ofwat, 2011b: 14) 
% Income spent on water > 3 > 4 > 5 > 6 > 5 > 7 > 8 > 9 > 10 
%  Population 23 15 11 8 11 7 6 5 5 
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 A 2013 NAO report has since updated Ofwat’s methodology and found that 12 per cent of households who 






Table 19 Proportion of households spending more than 3 per cent and 5 per cent of income, 
by sewerage company area (Source: Ofwat, 2011b: 14) 
Sewerage company area >3% of income >5% of income 
Anglian 23 11 
Northumbrian 22 9 
Severn Trent 21 9 
South West 33 16 
Southern 22 11 
Thames 20 11 
United Utilities  28 12 
Welsh 30 14 
Wessex 22 11 
Yorkshire 22 9 
Note: This table uses geographic regions indicated by sewerage company areas. These can 
include customers of several different water-only companies too and thus explains the 
difference in the figures for Thames Water and South West Water in the paragraph above the 
table.  
Table 20 Water affordability risk by house type (Source: Ofwat, 2011b: 14) 
Household Type Spending more than 
3% of income 
Spending more than 
5% of income 
Total number of 
households (million) 
Lone parents 42 18 1.4 
Working age adults 
living alone 
36 22 4.5 
Single pensioners 36 14 3.6 
Pensioner couples 16 5 2.6 
Couples with 
children 
14 7 4.4 
Couples without 
children 
13 6 4.7 
Multi-unit and 
other 
10 5 2.1 
Total 23 11 23.3 
 
The 3 and 5 per cent indicators are now used widely within the sector; in fact they are quoted 
in Defra’s 2011 Water White Paper (Defra, 2011c: 4). However, there is no absolute 
consensus within the sector that the 3/5 per cent are adequate indicators. For example, 
Thames Water’s 2010 WRMP suggested that ‘in practice it might be expected that this level 
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would need to be higher than 3 per cent to cause actual hardship’ (2010: 64). Similarly, SRN 
have concluded that it sees: 
 
No obvious reason why the threshold for fuel poverty is set at 10%, yet an equivalent figure 
of 3% is often suggested for water. A figure of 5% for water services and 5% for sewerage 
services would provide equivalence with the fuel poverty definition which properly 
recognises that water and sewerage services remain for most customers, exceptionally good 
value compared with other network utilities (SRN, 2009b:10). 
Moreover, CCW have argued that the ‘3 and 5 per cent numbers have a value in defining the 
relationship between income and water charges’ yet, when planning the criteria for 
interventions designed to alleviate affordability problems, further work should be undertaken 
to determine whether the household is on a low income (Consumer Council for Water 
interview, 18.04.2012). Although recent work on affordability has received a mixed 
reception and does not readily translate into policy interventions, it is important to note that 
the framing of water poverty as a problem of governance has altered. The problem of 
affordability is portrayed as being much more extensive and complicated than it was 
presented in the 1990s - early 2000s. Nonetheless, the discursive framing of water 
affordability as an urgent and imminent concern does not entirely settle debate regarding 
what water affordability is and on what scale and by whom it should be managed. Instead 
there continues to be a struggle over whether affordability problems are particular to, and a 
specific result of, the water charging system or should be understood as being a component 
part of the broader poverty problem.  
 
In practice, this binary positioning is unhelpful, affordability problems experienced in the 
sector are likely to be derived from a combination of water sector specific matters as well as 
broader societal issues. For instance, decisions undertaken within the water sector have a 
direct impact on the affordability of water bills. Water prices have increased by almost 50 per 
cent in real terms since privatisation in 1989 (see Table 21) and, according to the NAO, have 
increased by 21 per cent in real terms between 2002 and 2011 (NAO, 2013: 7). Consumer 
groups have argued that above interest price increases in water bills have contributed to 
households coming under considerable financial strain.
51
 Price increases are an important 
                                                 
51
 The next price review is due in 2014, early indications suggest that ‘most water companies have taken the 
regulatory and political agenda fully on board’ (Utility week, 2013). Industry magazine Utility Week suggests 
that ‘perhaps forewarned by the onslaught of outrage that energy suppliers currently face, they [water 
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factor, however, the impact of prices are also compounded by wider trends and circumstances 
outside of the immediate water sector’s control. In this case, the broader relationship between 
household income and the cost of living is important. According to the Joseph Rowntree 
Foundation’s (JRF) Minimum Income Standards Survey the cost of basic services and goods 
is increasing and, at the same time, household incomes are increasing more slowly than 
inflation (JRF use CPI) meaning that ‘achieving a minimum standard of living’ has become 
more difficult (Hirsch, 2013). According to Hirsch (2013), ‘minimum spending requirements 
have risen by around 4 per cent, but wages and benefits by only 1 per cent or less’. Here the 
popular press and Opposition parliamentarians have referred to a ‘cost of living crisis’. 
Similarly, the NAO found that while water bills increased by 21 percent between 2002 and 
2011, median incomes were at the same level in 2011 as they were in 2002 (NAO, 2013: 7). 
Therefore, a combination of increasing water bills and broader of living trends is likely to 
account for the level of water affordability problems in England and Wales.  
 
There is no recognition that there is an affordability problem in the water sector, yet 
considerable debate remains regarding how affordability should be understood and managed. 
Water companies, in general, continue to position water affordability as part of a broader 
poverty problem and argue that the government should take primary responsibility for 
tackling social problems. Meanwhile, the government argues that water affordability is an 
important problem, a solution for which should be sought primarily through the regulated 
water charging system. In this context, Ofwat has consistently remarked that it is for 
government to decide what an affordable water charging system should look and feel like 
while water companies should have a role in delivering solutions that are locally accountable. 
In this sense, water affordability as a problem continues to be presented in binary terms and, 
like MacFarlane and Rutherford's insights on the representation of infrastructures, is ‘socially 
constructed by various interest groups through an array of tension, tactics and complexities’ 
(MacFarlane and Rutherford, 2008: 370). This, in turn, has important ramifications for how 
the problem of water affordability is understood and governed. The way in which the 
‘problem’ is framed is fundamentally important because it helps shape how water users are 
represented and how different aspects of the water sector act, according to their interests, to 
manage the problem in its different guises.  
                                                                                                                                                        
companies] have been quick to announce price rises in line with or below inflation, while some have gone 
further, offering to forgo price increases that have already been approved by the regulator for 2014’. Not all 
companies will seek bills changes that are equal to or below inflation; Thames Water is the first to announce 
plans for above inflation bill increases.  
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Table 21 Water and sewerage bill change from 1989 - 2014 (Source: Adapted from Bennett 

















Anglian 350 449 418 381 444 431 435 434 




247 316 366 361 426 406 405 406 
Northumbrian 241 328 356 312 341 365 362 359 
Severn Trent 238 315 339 298 340 339 337 335 
South West 
52
 327 527 529 490 561 563 555 499 
Southern  278 342 409 345 419 436 439 449 
Thames 226 283 310 281 343 345 346 354 
Wessex 310 387 409 377 462 467 469 478 
Yorkshire 274 332 362 327 373 366 367 368 
Industry 
Average 
251 337 363 325 370 368 375 375 
 
7.6 Unanticipated consequences of compulsory metering: a new governance 
problem 
The relationship between metering and affordability did not initially rank highly on the 
agenda when the plans for compulsory metering in the South East England were formulated. 
Although affordability was increasingly recognised as an important issue, the regulatory 
framework had not taken account of the potential affordability problems that could emerge as 
a direct consequence of compulsory metering. Here the development of mechanisms to 
manage water affordability problems emerged as an unanticipated outcome of the 
compulsory metering process. Focus on the messy, unanticipated development of 
affordability measures, to an extent, overcomes what MacKinnon has called a ‘tendency to 
over-emphasise the coherence and effectiveness of political projects’ within governmentality 
studies (2000: 309).  
                                                 
52
 Government has pledged to cut bills for all South West Water by £50 as of April 2013 for the remainder of 
the spending review through the vehicle of the 2012 Water Industry (Financial Assistance) Bill. Bills in the 
South West are approximately 43 per cent higher than the national average due to the extensive investment 
required to improve quality of beaches being borne by South West Water’s relatively small customer base. The 
£50 deduction will cost the treasury about £40 million. This measure is described as a fairness issue rather than 
an affordability issue (interview conducted on 18.04.2012). Moreover, Mary Creagh MP (Labour) Shadow 
Environment Secretary Water has described the Industry (Financial Assistance) Bill as ‘an orphan Bill which is 
decoupled from the long-term reforms required to tackle climate change and keep water affordable’ (29 Feb 
2012 col. 357). 
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Compulsory companywide metering represents different problems regarding affordability 
compared to previous metering interventions in England and Wales. Meters are not 
specifically targeted at low income homes with the intention of disciplining payment and 
water use in a draconian fashion (Drakeford, 1998). Compulsory metering applies to 
households on an almost universal basis and, consequently, has an enormous impact on how 
costs are socialised in the South East England. Most importantly, the move to a metered 
charging base unravels the cross-subsidies inherent within the rateable value charging system 
(as indicated further above). These changes do not have altogether negative consequences, 
indeed some households who would have struggled to meet their water costs under the 
previous system, particularly the elderly and households with a small number of occupants in 
high rateable value houses, would see bill reductions. On the other hand, larger households in 
low rateable value homes are more likely to experience large increases in their bills. The 
ability of metering to produce both negative and positive impacts for households reinforces 
the notion that technology, following Feenberg (1999), should be read as ambivalent, having 
the potential to challenge existing patterns of inequality and create different, positive and 
negative, outcomes.   
 
Importantly, Ofwat's 2008-09 PR09 guidance did not explicitly require companies to perform 
a detailed analysis of the impact that compulsory metering would have on affordability for 
different types of households. Instead, the guidance was geared almost entirely around water 
availability (Ofwat interview conducted on 01.10.2013). Companies were required to 
conduct a cost benefit analysis for the programme as a whole, which involved justifying the 
cost of implementing the system and any proposed increases in the companies' price limit. 
Little work was undertaken on how, specifically, a transition from rateable value to 
volumetric charges would be experienced by domestic water users. As a result, the WRMPs 
submitted by SRN and SEW in advance of the 2009 price review were geared almost 
exclusively around the role of metering in tackling the demand/supply imbalance. For 
example, while SEW’s WRMP acknowledged that affordability might present a concern but 
remained elusive as to the precise impact of its plans and what action might be deemed 
appropriate to manage affordability:  
 
The Company plan has adopted universal metering. Metering remains an area of mixed 
customer opinion in part due to the concerns regarding vulnerable groups and affordability. 
219 
 
The Company will ensure it works closely with relevant stakeholders to manage these 
concerns (SEW, 2010: 278).  
 
SRN and SEW's WMRPs essentially omitted any concerted assessment of the relationship 
between metering and affordability (CCW, 2010: 5). Furthermore, Ofwat gave its final 
determination on SRN's water management plan without the company appearing to be in a 
position to deliver the compulsory metering in a way that would be sensitive to any 
affordability problems arising from metering. This is despite the CCW being consulted on 
SRN's water management plan.  
 
It should not have been a surprise that compulsory companywide metering would engender 
bill swings and, as such, would have meaningful impacts, both positive and negative, on 
water users. For example, Walker (2009) noted that 
 
Metering changes the distribution of industry costs between different groups of customers 
and tends to increase the bills of large households and reduce the bills of small households. 
Although there are customers with affordability issues in both customer groups, low-income, 
large households will experience faster increases in their bills than most other customers. 
For this customer group, increased levels of metering will exacerbate any affordability 
problems they currently face (Walker, 2009: 116).  
 
Research jointly commissioned by the Greater London Assembly and the EA also assessed 
the impact of different metering scenarios (50, 60, and 90 per cent metered) in South East 
England (Reid, 2009). It indicated that the speed and rate of meter penetration influenced the 
sector of the population at risk of water affordability problems. Reid’s modelling work found 
that under the 50 and 60 per cent scenarios ‘some households will have lower water bills and 
some higher bills’ and,’ in general, there will be more households with lower bills than higher 
bills’ (2009: v). However, Reid also argued that the average cost increase would far exceed 
the average reduction that those with lower bills following metering would encounter. Reid 
concluded that ‘only under the 90 per cent metering scenario is there evidence that water 
charge affordability will worsen overall’, this is because ‘a significant proportion of the larger 
households in the lower income groups would become metered, whereas under the 50 and 60 
per cent scenarios these households may not be included’ (Reid, 2009: v). Both Walker 
(2009) and Reid (2009) expected that, under near universal metering, affordability problems 
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would be most extensive for low-income single parents, low income households with three or 
more children, those with a low income and a high essential water use for medical reasons, 
low income households in high cost areas and those with a low income more generally 
(Walker, 2009: 188; Reid, 2009). In this context, Walker recommended that measures to 
tackle affordability problems should be developed in advance of compulsory metering 
interventions.  
 
Nonetheless, according to a consumer group interviewee, 'despite a clear message in Walker 
that affordability needs to be addressed before metering goes any further; that does not seem 
to have been taken any notice of' (consumer group interview, 27.03.2011). The initial 
omission on the relationship between affordability and compulsory metering points to a 
significant problem in the regulatory system; that the PR09 process did not require companies 
to thoroughly consider the affordability impact on metering. Focus fell disproportionately on 
water resource issues associated with metering. Affordability issues, as a specific governance 
problem particular to metering that needed to be managed, were initially unanticipated by 
companies as well as regulators and some consumer groups. The potential of compulsory 
metering to exacerbate, and even create, affordability problems came to the fore through the 
public inquiry launched to investigate SEW's WRMP.    
 
SEW’s 2010 - 2035 (as well as Thames Water’s) WRMP was subjected to public inquiry. 
Water companies’ statutory WRMPs are subjected to public inquiry, on the behest of Defra, 
in cases where the companies’ plans are deemed controversial and disagreement between 
companies and Ofwat cannot be reconciled through the regular price review process. The 
terms of reference for SEW's WRMP primarily reflected concerns that the company had not 
adequately considered a full range of options in its forward plan, had used unjustifiably high 
PCC assumptions and that its plans were not sufficiently cost effective or environmentally 
sensitive (Boyland, 2010: 2). Nevertheless, the CCW used the public inquiry as a platform for 
demanding that the ‘largely unexamined and unaccounted for distributional and affordability 
impacts’ of the imminent compulsory metering programmes be taken seriously and 
thoroughly investigated (CCW, 2010a: 5). CCW highlighted that affordability and other 
aspects of metering should not be divorced from one another (see chapter five for more on the 
dialectical processes of socio-technical change). In its submission to the public inquiry, CCW 
argued that ‘an inquiry and report which omitted any assessment of affordability and 
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distributional aspects [of companywide compulsory metering] would be incomplete’ (CCW, 
2010a:5). CCW stressed that 
 
The fact that some WRMPs with significant metering programmes have been approved 
despite the present state of uncertainty about the distributional impacts and potential 
mitigation options is no reason for neglecting the affordability impacts at SEW’s WRMP 
Inquiry. We suggest that affordability is an admissible consideration both because the 
purpose of the inquiry is to investigate all the concerns expressed about the WRMP, and 
because affordability is an important aspect of any change in the way households pay for 
water and sewerage services. We go further and say that excluding affordability issues would 
put the Secretary of State at risk of neglecting his duty to have due regard to the needs of 
households on low incomes. It follows that he should have available analysis and advice on 
such impacts before making decisions, and that an assessment of the affordability impacts of 
recommended metering policies without mitigation measures should be part of the 
Inspector’s report (CCW, 2010a: 4).  
 
The inquiry process brought about a substantial shift in how metering programmes are 
approached and what 'problems' are deemed important in the planning phase. As a Thames 
Water interviewee highlighted, ways of thinking about metering have changed in the water 
sector. Rather than being limited to water resource issues associated with metering, ‘the 
wider debate has focused on the actual effect on people' (water company interview 
conducted on 31.10.2011). Potential affordability problems caused by companywide 
compulsory metering programmes emerged as a serious problem that needed to be managed 
and mitigated in order to secure the successful implementation of metering programmes. 
Subsequently, the key question became: how should water affordability be governed and who 
should take responsibility for designing and delivering such mechanisms? The answer to this 
question has substantial ramifications for understanding the role of the state in governing the 
waterscape.  
 
7.7 How to manage water affordability? The “Big Society” in action 
The government has made clear that it expects private water companies to provide 
mechanisms to support those who struggle to pay their bills. Companies are expected to 
proactively manage affordability problems in the water sector in addition to dealing with bad 
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debt. In this context, the role of the private water company has been stretched to encompass 
explicit responsibilities for providing water welfare services to manage water affordability 
problems caused by metering. In thinking through this reconstitution of relations, Foucault’s 
work on the governmental state, where he explored ‘the continual (re)definition of state 
competences and the division between public and private’, is instructive (Jessop, 2007: 38). 
As Bulkeley and Schroeder (2011) suggest, the boundaries between state and non-state and 
public versus private are not easily drawn and undergo continual processes of contestation 
where new alignments are forged. In South East England, the assemblage of practices, and 
strategies that comprise the state are reorganised in ways that both extend and curb 
neoliberal, market environmentalist, approaches to managing the waterscape. More precisely, 
metering, on the one hand, extends neoliberal commodification and instils cost recovery 
approaches yet, at the same time, companies have sought to protect those most exposed to 
affordability problems through specially designed support tariffs. This reorganisation is best 
understood in the context of the Conservative Party’s short-lived Big Society concept and the 
party’s broader ambition to deepen the role of the private sector in delivering services.  
 
The Conservative Party’s fleeting Big Society project sought to strike a different ‘balance 
between central state and civil society in favour of the latter’ (North, 2012: 820). Within this 
context localism and deregulation became key watchwords (Featherstone et al, 2012). The 
Conservative Party claimed that it was ‘not opposed to the state but deeply concerned about 
the state’s ability to meet social needs’ (North, 2012: 818). Crucially, proponents of the Big 
Society placed considerable emphasis on the role of the private sector (as well as individuals 
and families) in meeting needs that are often thought to be safeguarded by government. In 
this context, the Big Society idea privileges ‘accountability to local communities’, in this case 
households within a water company area, over accountability to a democratic body. The 
government has encouraged water companies to take a proactive role in designing and 
delivering affordability programmes to mitigate the negative impacts of metering. It advised 
that 
 
Any undertaker that chooses to introduce a universal metering programme across all or part 
of its operating area, or where metering reaches very high levels, should seriously consider 
including a company social tariff in its charging scheme. This would address long-term 
affordability issues that may arise from the unwinding of the cross-subsidy inherent in 
charging for water according to the rateable value of a property (Defra, 2012b: 6).  
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This does not mean that government completely disappears, it retains a role in setting the 
broad policy framework and the legislative conditions for the water industry. Nevertheless, 
water companies have undeniably been granted greater responsibility for water welfare 
provision. In this sense, the government has been quite clear regarding how it understands 
this reworked relationship, it stated that 
 
The government has responsibility for setting the policy and legislative framework for 
addressing social issues, including water affordability. The government wants to see water 
and sewerage undertakers take a more proactive role in responding to the needs of their 
customers including by developing and implementing local solutions to local problems 
(Defra, 2012b:2). 
 
The government introduced the 2010 Flood and Management Act, in part, to facilitate the 
water companies’ new, more expansive role. Section 44 of 2010 Act contained a provision 
that enables, yet does not compel, water companies to introduce a social tariff. Prior to this 
legislative move, companies had been prohibited from introducing any tariff that would result 
in cross-subsidies between different categories of customer. Ofwat made an assessment that 
water companies should not be expected to provide measures beyond the Vulnerable Groups 
Regulations (Herrington, 2007). This was in part due to the perverse way that License 
Condition E of Ofwat’s charging principles, which stipulates that ‘companies must make sure 
when fixing their charges that no undue preference is shown to, and that there is no undue 
discrimination against, any class of customers or potential customers’, has been interpreted. 
Measures that involved transfers between customers were interpreted as potentially 
discriminating against some low income customers in favour of others (Ofwat, 2012b). The 
government’s decision to allow, but not compel, companies to introduce social tariffs has 
resulted in the official Opposition describing the situation as ‘the Big Society in action’ 
(Mary Creagh MP, former Shadow Environment Secretary, House of Commons, 2012). This 
claim implies that the role of the state in managing the waterscape in South East England is 
being reconstituted and companies, acting on a voluntary basis, are expected to provide a 
water welfare service.  
 
Companies have responded to their new role, and the government’s position on social tariffs, 
in different ways and with differing degrees of zeal. In a broad sense, Walker (2009) 
remarked that there was a strong feeling across the sector that social policy was a matter for 
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government. Indeed, the issue of who should be responsible for designing, funding and 
administering water welfare through social tariffs continues to be a ‘sticking point’ within the 
water sector (Water company interview conducted on 15.09.2011). Some companies have 
welcomed the responsibility
53
 while others have been much more reticent.  Interviewees 
attributed this variation to different water company cultures, ownership structures and 
conflicting priorities within water companies. An interview with the CCW highlighted the 
different water companies’ approaches regarding affordability and the development of social 
tariffs. CCW noted that  
 
There are some companies that are keen to get started and those who are keeping a watching 
brief before committing to anything. I think it generally falls into three camps. Those who 
don’t intend to do anything, those who are keen to get on with it as soon as the opportunity 
presents itself and those who are keeping a watchful eye (Consumer Council for Water 
interview 18.04.2012). 
 
Although, some companies have supported the notion that companies should proactively 
provide mechanisms for those who are unable to pay their water bills, the companies 
undertaking companywide compulsory metering have demonstrated a degree of reluctance. 
Unsurprisingly, SRN and SEW argued that the government should be the primary actor in 
delivering water welfare. For instance, in its Final Business Plan SRN stated that: 
 
We believe that it is right that water companies should take reasonable steps to address the 
worst affordability issues. Ultimately, however, issues of social equity must be a question for 
elected politicians, not private business or regulators (SRN, 2009b: 15). 
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 Although not administering companywide compulsory metering, Anglian Water and Wessex Water have 
proactively offered forms of social tariffs. Anglian offers a scheme called Aqua Care Plus which is targeted at 
low income households who have a meter and are in receipt of benefits from a specified list. The tariff has a 
higher than standard fixed annual standing charge but charges less for the volume of water used. Wessex Water 
offer a scheme, Water Assist, where a Citizen’s Advice Bureau or debt advice agency must apply for the tariff 
on behalf of the household. Households then pay a lower bill bases on their ability to pay (Wessex Water, 2013). 
Currently around 8, 000 customers receive support through this route. Ofwat have permitted this tariff because 
Wessex Water have demonstrated that it is cost neutral in that it costs as much to administer as it would to 
retrieve outstanding charges through the court system. Thames Water has indicated that it will introduce a social 
tariff in 2014 that is not directly related to metering. SRN also intend to administer a social tariff ‘as soon as 
possible’ after 2015, although the details are not yet available.  
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Furthermore, SEW suggested that encouraging the company to take on additional 
responsibilities for providing social tariffs challenged the accepted role of the private water 
company. One senior SEW employee noted that: 
 
You could take the view that companies have a social responsibility in the “Big Society” 
framework. That we, as a company, should be looking at the local community and seeing 
what their needs are. But you can take the other view that we are a service provider, largely, 
and it seems a bit odd that we might be asked to do that. That is the way it is going to be and 
we are just going to have to get on and deal with that. Our view as a company is that we 
should not be doing that but if you are mandated, you have got to do it. It shouldn’t be our 
role (Water company interview conducted on 15.09.2011). 
 
The repositioning of the private water company as a reluctant welfare provider within the Big 
Society represents a significant reshaping and reorganisation of the ‘the state’ in the South 
East of England. Water companies have the opportunity to, with those undertaking 
compulsory metering being expected to, provide explicit forms of water welfare. In this 
sense, the introduction of compulsory metering has produced an unintended outcome; the 
renegotiation of the way that the waterscape is governed. The unexpected nature of this 
change is reflected in Ofwat’s decision to adjust both SRN and SEW’s price agreements. This 
allowed the companies to fund mechanisms that could analyse and tackle any hardship 
resulting from compulsory metering. The remainder of this chapter is devoted to exploring 
the governmental rationales, techniques and strategies employed by companies who, in 
performing their new roles as reluctant welfare providers, seek to manage water affordability 
problems caused by compulsory metering programmes. 
 
7.8 Affordability as a local problem? 
One of the main reasons for repositioning water companies as welfare providers is that water 
affordability has been portrayed as a local issue with distinct characteristics according to 
particular water company areas. In line with the Big Society mantra, which emphasises local 
accountability over democratic responsibility, individual water companies have been 
considered best placed to manage water affordability problems. Water companies 
undertaking compulsory metering were required by Ofwat’s October 2010 guidance to 
produce a ‘winners and losers analysis’ in order to better understand the changing 
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affordability dynamics brought about by the unwinding of the rateable value system in their 
area (SEW, draft strategy, personal correspondence). In this context, companies have 
undertaken economic modelling which, in turn, has helped them better understand and govern 
water affordability. In this sense, modelling operates as a governmental technology that 
reinforces the notion that affordability is a local problem best managed by companies on an 
individual basis.  
 
Government is certainly convinced that water affordability risks are substantively different 
across, and are particular to, specific water company areas. For instance, the government’s 
guidance regarding social tariffs stated that:  
 
The government is clear that undertakers are best placed to take decisions around the design 
of company social tariffs as part of their charging schemes so that they can take account of 
local circumstances, needs and the views of their customers (Defra, 2012: 1). 
 
Furthermore, regarding mechanisms for managing affordability, the government argued that 
‘national consistency is neither feasible nor necessarily desirable’ (Defra, 2012: 4). While it 
is certainly true that the gross number of households experiencing water affordability 
problems differs in the various water company areas, it is highly questionable as to whether 
the type of household facing affordability risks does.  
 
Although the information is reported in a way that makes comparisons difficult, SEW, SRN 
and Thames Water have all produced similar findings regarding the impact of metering on 
affordability. SEW found that, overall, more water bills would be higher (56 per cent) than 
lower (44 per cent) (see table 22 for distribution).
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 The companies’ analysis reveals that 
while ‘a significant proportion of lower income customers will benefit from being metered… 
within that low income loser group there are some significant bill increases’ that are in excess 
of £200 (Table 23). Here ‘households with 2 or more working age adults with no children and 
families with up to 2 children’ were found to be particularly at risk of affordability problems.  
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Similarly, SRN initially reported that approximately half of the households receiving meters 
as part of its Universal Metering Programme will see an increase in their water bills while the 
remainder will see a saving (Simmons, 2012). In its 2009 Final Business Plan, SRN reported 
results from indicative modelling undertaken by ICS Consulting which showed that around 
60 per cent of households would experience small bill changes (+/- £5), while some, 
particularly low income families, would see rapid increases in their bills. More recently, 
Darren Bentham (SRN’s Director of Metering) reportedly told a local newspaper, the Argus, 
that:  
 
Of those households that have received bills as part of the programme around 59% are 
enjoying a reduction in their bills. Average savings are £11 a month, with some families 
saving nearly £100 a month due to the new, fairer system of charging by meters. Around 41% 
of customers have experienced an increase in bills (Bentham in the Argus, 2012). 
 
While almost 60 per cent of SRN’s metered customers have seen a reduction in their bills, 
CCW’s recent research on The Customer Impact of Universal Metering Programmes 
revealed that other households have experienced much greater bill increases than average. 
For instance, CCW found that a family of four were expecting their bill to rise from £500 to 




Once the first bills were received, while it was mainly family households that saw an 
increase, it seemed not to be confined to these. Moreover, some of the smaller families who 
lived in properties with a lower rateable value were surprised at the increase especially as 
they sometimes felt they had been led to believe that all customers could save by going onto 
metered charging (CCW, 2013: 54).  
 
Meanwhile Thames Water, using a bespoke geo-database, designed specifically to support 
their metering plans, called Customer Analysis and Rollout Design (CustARD), modelled the 
influence its metering programme would have on its customers’ bills. With findings similar to 
those of SEW and SRN, it suggested that the bill impact would be, broadly, normally 
distributed with many households experiencing relatively small bill changes of +/- £10-£20 
while some households would  potentially face significant bill increases of over £100 a year 
as a result of a metered charge.  
 
The findings across the three water companies suggest that the absolute numbers of 
households likely to experience affordability problems as a result of a large increase in their 
water bill following metering varies. Nonetheless, there are similarities regarding the type of 
household likely to be at higher risk of facing affordability problems. Therefore, it seems 
unlikely that the character of affordability is locally specific and substantially different across 
water company areas. Consequently, the value of enabling each water company to design and 
introduce affordability measures on an ad hoc basis is questionable. The CAB have come to a 
similar conclusion, noting that 
 
Although it is argued that water companies have particular insights into the affordability 
needs of their customers, we are not convinced that this means companies need to have 
absolute control over the design of their social tariffs. Our debt statistics indicate a 
consistent pattern in the age and household profile of people who need help with water debt 
across the country. While water debt and water affordability are not perfectly correlated, we 
believe our evidence does suggest that certain groups of people are consistently more likely 




While the government, and elements of the water industry, have distanced themselves from 
national affordability solutions, trends in the energy sector are now pointing towards a more 
coordinated, national, approach.
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 Although mechanisms have been offered to better manage 
the transition to a metered charging system, there is no guarantee that social tariffs will be 
introduced for those who struggle to pay their bills but live in an area where compulsory 
metering is not under way. For example, the CAB and CCW have expressed concern that the 
voluntary nature of social tariffs might lead to different service levels being made available 
across England and Wales. Instead, the CAB have advocated ‘introducing some form of 
standardisation in social tariffs’ with an element of flexibility in design (ibid). Interviewees 
from the CCW raised concerns about the consistency of companies’ affordability 
mechanisms, and highlighted that 
 
A company may decide that they are not willing to go down that route [providing a social 
tariff] or customers might say for whatever reason that they are not willing to pay anything. 
So you will different levels of support in different areas…  And you have the comparisons 
with energy where you had the more localised social tariffs but now they are moving towards 
more nationalised schemes (Consumer group interview conducted on 18 April 2012). 
 
In this context, Julie Hilling MP has called for national action on social tariffs, arguing that 
her region in the North West, served by United Utilities, would not benefit from company 
social tariffs and that, as private monopolies, ‘frankly it is not enough just to expect them 
[water companies] to be philanthropists’ (HC debate, 6 Match 2012: c720). She described the 
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 The Walker Report did actually recommend a range of affordability interventions for the Government to 
consider that are more analogous to the energy sector. It suggested that low income households should be 
assisted through a discounted volumetric tariff where ‘all low-income metered and assessed charge households 
in receipt of certain mean-tested benefits and tax credits should be eligible for a 20 per cent discount on their 
bills’ (Walker, 2009: 123). Or, alternatively, by means of a discounted volumetric tariff targeted at low income 
metered households with children who were in receipt of specified means-tested benefits or tax credits. This 
second tariff would offer a discounted water bill equivalent to, following WHO guidelines on minimal water 
requirements, 50 litres per day per child. Walker estimated that this would cost around £40-80 per child and 
would provide ‘each child with a daily amount of water to ensure essential needs are met and deliver a lower bill 
for the household while still retaining an incentive for water issuing’ (Walker, 2009: 124). In addition to these 
three proposals, Walker recommended the introduction of company specific water efficiency schemes for low 
income households. Such a scheme would include the retrofitting of water efficiency measures as well as 
interventions to address ‘more general affordability issues such as benefit entitlement checks’ which, Walker 




situation (in rather clichéd terms) as a ‘postcode lottery for millions of customers facing 
water poverty’ (HC Debate, 29 Feb 2012: col 360). Moreover, the Shadow Environment 
Secretary, Maria Eagles MP, has remarked that it was difficult to see how allowing water 
companies to implement social tariffs on a voluntary basis would ensure that customers 
receive consistent support. More recently, Eagles announced that the Labour Party ‘will seek 
to use the forthcoming Water Bill legislation to require all water companies to participate in a 
national affordability scheme’ (Eagles, 2013). The waterscape could, therefore, look 
significantly different if the Opposition are successful in pursuing this amendment.  
 
The construction of affordability as a local problem contributes to water companies being 
reconstituted as water welfare providers. Companies have been portrayed as best placed to 
identify problems and solutions regarding their respective constituencies. This devolution of 
responsibility for managing water affordability by extending the role of the private sector into 
new aspects of the water charging system, has profound implications for the design and scale 
of schemes that have been developed to tackle water affordability problems resulting from 
metering.  
 
7.9 (Partially) paying for water affordability 
The decision to allow each water company to design its own water affordability mechanism is 
not politically innocent, in advocating company by company approach the government has 
found a means to address water poverty without negatively effecting its own balance sheet. In 
this context, the CCW have noted difficulty in ‘gaining government acceptance to take bigger 
ownership to address the problem and to fund that through public expenditure’ represents 
(Consumer Group interview conducted on 18.04.2012). This, according to the CCW, is 
‘one of the most important barriers’ to developing appropriate affordability measures (ibid). 
The government’s reluctance to commit public funds is particularly acute following the 2009 
financial crisis. Interviewees suggested that ‘in the current climate they would obviously 
prefer the companies to have the ownership’ over funding affordability mechanisms 
(Consumer Group interview conducted on 18.04.2012). Funding for affordability 
measures, then, is derived through transfers between households (levied through water bills) 
within a water company area rather than through public funds raised through national tax 
receipts. Critics of the government’s approach, have questioned whether sufficient funding 
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can be raised through customer transfers to adequately tackle affordability problems in the 
water sector.  
 
The Defra (2012b) guidance on company social tariffs requires that companies considering 
such a tariff consult CCW and Ofwat, as well as its customers, regarding how much 
households would be willing to contribute to a social tariff from their own bills. In this 
context, the Chief Executive of CCW told the Environment and Rural Affairs Select 
Committee that while affordability apparatuses such as social tariffs would help tackle 
affordability, it is unlikely that these mechanisms would raise sufficient funds to adequately 
tackle the problem (Efra, 2012). Research commissioned by CCW concluded that water 
users’ would prefer a national, government funded, solution but also found that ‘most 
participants were willing to make some contribution via their bills providing the total amount 
was affordable – for most people, this was less than £5’ (CCW, 2010d: 16). The report 
warned that the figure of five pounds should not be taken too literally and cautioned that 
participants tended to favour a level of cross - subsidy lower than £5. On this issue, the 
government has advised that  
 
A charge of up to 1.5 per cent of the average annual household water and sewerage bill 
across England would be a reasonable amount of cross-subsidy to expect non-qualifying 
households to provide under a company social tariff. This figure is offered as a broad 
indicator rather than a cap. The key test is that the proposed level of cross-subsidy should 
have broad customer acceptability (Defra, 2012b: 8).  
 
This indicative threshold would translate to around £5 based on the average 2011/12 bill 
(Defra, 2012b: 8). CCW has questioned whether a social tariff funded through household 
water bills could simultaneously raise enough capital and prove acceptable to households 
whereas CAB (2012) expressed disappointment that the government prescribed a maximum 
but not a minimal level of support for social tariffs. It has not been possible to find out how 
much SEW and SRN’s support tariffs cost, only the overall cost of the metering programme 
(£100m over ten years and £83m over five years respectively). However, Snell and Bradshaw 
(2009) and Walker (2009) both assessed the amount of funds needed for a range of potential 
water affordability measures on a national scale and, according to CCW, found that a 
‘comprehensive affordability solution could be in the region of £400m’ yearly (Efra, 2012). 
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This amount is far in excess of the amount that would be raised through bills; Tony Smith has 
stated that 
 
Customers might be prepared to contribute up to perhaps £2 extra from their annual bills but 
not much more, to help others on low incomes. Customers funding at that level would 
generate around £40 million across the industry. 
 
Whether it is through general taxation or water charges, waters users will foot the bill for 
affordability measures. Many stakeholders in the water sector, and in fact most households, 
favour national funding of social tariffs through taxpayer receipts. Funding social tariffs 
through national taxation would be more progressive for two reasons. Firstly, contributions 
taken through income tax would be more closely aligned to ability to pay. And, secondly, 
national funding would avoid potential funding difficulties in areas where a large amount of 
water users struggle to meet the cost of their bills.
56
 Under arrangements where a social tariff, 
or another affordability mechanism, has been funded through water company bills on a local 
basis, some companies may find difficulty in setting a levy at a level that would satisfy 
funding requirements without causing additional affordability problems for households that 
are currently just above the threshold. Government support for water company led 
affordability measures is linked to localism and Big Society style politics, yet it is also has 
financial benefits for companies bear the cost and, in turn, pass the cost on to their customers. 
Fundamentally, while the production of company affordability mechanisms and tariffs 
ensured that the transition to metering has been more sensitive to affordability issues, the 
funding mechanism that has been preferred may not be sufficient to meet the cost of tackling 
the problem of affordability comprehensively.  
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 Interestingly, the current government have recently announced that it plans change the funding arrangements 
for some of the social and environmental programmes that are currently funded through consumer bills. In 
response to pressure regarding the rising cost of living and increases in energy bills, the government has 
announced that it will, in the short term, fund a rebate on energy bills and the Warm Homes discount through 
revenue recovered from tax avoidance. In the future, these programmes will be funded through general taxation 
(DECC, 2013). No corresponding announcement has been made regarding water bills.  
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7.10 Reconfiguring accountability: Owning the relationship between 
customer and provider 
In addition to taking the cost of providing water welfare off the balance sheet, company led 
approaches to water affordability have helped reconfigure processes of accountability for 
social policy. Each company, in line with Big Society inspired localism and effectively acting 
as a social policy agent, is required to devise criteria for its water affordability mechanism. 
Here the government has been reluctant to act in any way that could be interpreted as 
prescriptive. For example, it has not stipulated a minimum standard, or detailed guidance, 
regarding eligibility criteria (Defra, 2012b: 3). Consequently, accountability for water welfare 
predominately lies with the private utility rather than with government. In this sense, 
company social tariffs have been referred to, affectionately, as ‘DIY affordability solutions’ 
in the sector press (Utility Week, 2011). Here the government have sought to ensure that the 
‘water companies own the relationship with customers’ (Ofwat interview conducted on 
01.10.2013). The relationship between the state and private water utilities has been reworked 
with important ramifications regarding how accountability is articulated; a private 
organisation rather than a democratic body has become responsible for deciding who should 
be eligible for help with their water bills. The ability of private water companies to define 
their own eligibility criteria is important because it provides insights into how power and 
authority are continually redistributed and renegotiated in the practice of governing in the 
water sector. 
 
Encouraging water companies to develop water affordability criteria is not without its 
problems. Water companies do not have extensive experience developing social policy and 
there are questions regarding the legitimacy of a private organisation deciding who should be 
eligible for help with their water bills. In developing affordability mechanisms, some water 
companies had expected to work closely with the Department for Work and Pensions (DWP) 
and had anticipated that benefits entitlements could be used as key eligibility indicators for 
affordability mechanisms. According to the CCW, this would have been advantageous in that 
it ‘increases the perceived legitimacy’ of the schemes because ‘you are linking up to an 
accepted way of determining eligibility rather than making value judgements about peoples’ 
personal circumstances’ (CCW interview conducted on 18.04.2012). Moreover, some water 
companies have expressed unease regarding the difficulty and desirability of their new task. 
For example, SEW reflected on the some of the problems with its new role, stating that 
234 
 
We were saying that effectively that should not be up to us [to design a social tariff], that it is 
definitely a government role. We are a privately owned company that is about making a 
return. Okay, we have a public health responsibility but we are not another element of the 
social services. We were of the view that it should be quite straightforward for DWP to send 
us a list of people on benefits and then we could send them an appropriate bill. However, 
there is a whole data protection problem around that and so it all gets very complicated. If 
you read the Walker Report which was about future charging, there is a lot in there about 
how that could work and it basically concludes that it is quite knotty. Defra are effectively 
going to put the Walker Review into action in the White Paper that is coming later in the 
year, they are going to leave it up to companies, I can guarantee that, that is basically 
because it falls into the too difficult box! (Water company interview conducted on 
15.09.2011). 
 
Benefit entitlements have not been used to shape water affordability mechanisms for two 
reasons. The primary reason is that data protection issues prevented the DWP from sharing 
information regarding benefits recipients with water companies. The second reason is that 
there are questions concerning how well eligibility for benefits and risk factors shaping water 
affordability problems are correlated. Consequently, water companies have developed their 
own ways of assessing need. For instance, SRN commissioned work from Experian to 
identify households that could face bill increases, SRN were interested in reaching 
households on low incomes, especially those not in receipt of benefits but would receive 
much higher bills. Interestingly, SEW claimed that their own research suggested customers 
perceived private companies to be better equipped to assess need than government: 
 
It is quite interesting… we asked them if we should have different tariffs for people on 
benefits, their answer was not unexpected but they think that those in genuine need should get 
something but if you said, we are planning on linking that to the benefits system then no no 
no no no because they think that the wrong people get benefits… So if we were giving to 
people on benefits we would be seen as compounding that problem! So bizarrely enough they 
effectively led us down the route, they trusted us more to do an assessment of need through a 
social tariff than they did the government’s benefits system (water company interview 




Despite the government’s conviction that companies are best placed to understand customers’ 
needs, and the companies’ suggestion that water users perceive companies as more legitimate 
welfare designers than the government, other actors within the sector have expressed concern 
about the lack of uniformity, and the dearth of explicit guidance provided by government, 
regarding the design of affordability mechanisms. For example, the CAB raised concerns 
about the amount of discretion water companies have been afforded. In its response to the 
government’s 2012 guidance on social tariffs it stated that 
 
We are disappointed with the way in which Defra has chosen to implement social tariffs in 
the water industry. We feel that the draft guidance is lacking in detail and is insufficiently 
prescriptive. We are concerned at the range of issues over which water companies have 
complete discretion, including whether or not to introduce a social tariff at all (CAB, 2012: 
2). 
 
Similarly UNISON stated that it  
Would not be acceptable for a different standard of social tariff to operate on a company by 
company basis. Instead Government should, as a matter of public policy, design a model 
social tariff for adoption by each water company (2011: 5). 
 
Rather than leave the entirety of the social tariff design to the water companies, these 
organisations would prefer to see a minimum standard stipulated by government so that 
service levels do not become wildly uneven between water company areas. Without explicit 
guidance from the government regarding who should be eligible for social tariffs, water 
companies have had to play a more proactive role in understanding their customer base in 
order to design an appropriate social tariff. Here companies have been encouraged to ‘own 
the relationship’ between customer and water company. In this sense the accountability for 
water welfare has been reconfigured, with the authority to determine who is eligible for help 
with their bulls becoming the responsibility of the water company. In line with the 
Conservative Party’s Big Society inspired preference for localism and greater involvement of 
the private sector, water companies have been afforded greater accountability for social 
policy through affordability mechanisms in relation to water. This has important 
ramifications for how the state is understood in the waterscape as well as who is able to 




7.11 Producing new subjectivities and identities of the “deserving poor” 
In practice SRN and SEW have designed slightly different company tariffs (both called the 
Support Tariff) to accompany their respective metering programmes. The two tariffs are 
similar in that they target households who have experienced hardship as a direct result of 
metering. Therefore these mechanisms are not designed to tackle broader affordability 
patterns.
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 Should households prove eligible for a social tariff, their bills are capped at their 
previous unmeasured charges. This would certainly help those who have experienced a 
substantial increase in bills, yet it would do little for those who had found their unmeasured 
bill unaffordable. These support tariffs are targeted at a relatively small
58
 number of 
households and qualification for the support tariffs, particularly SRN’s, involve the applicant 
passing through a number of lengthy and, arguably intrusive, steps (see Table 24 for a brief 
outline of the application process of SEW and SRN’s support tariff). Water users must 
demonstrate that they are not able to meet the cost of their new metered bills and have 
adopted reasonable water efficiency measures. Both water companies make the case that the 
conditional nature of water efficiency measures were appropriate as a matter of fairness in 
that, according to their customer research, other bill payers are reluctant to cross-subsidise the 
bills of those who are profligate with water. Here the support tariffs play an important role in 
delineating new regimes of truth and forms of knowledge regarding who is deserving of and 
who should be eligible for support. This, in turn, unintentionally produces new subjectivities 
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 Southern Water are in the process of designing an additional social tariff which it had hoped to pilot in 2013 
following the implementation of the DWP’s much delayed Universal Credit benefit system reorganisation. It 
plans to pilot its new tariff with around 2, 000 households (SRN, 2013: 29). Thames Water have also proposed a 
social tariff that ‘will use a small increase in bills for the majority of customers to reduce charges for those who 
most struggle to pay’. It anticipates that this tariff will ‘assist a relatively small number of customers’ (Thames 
Water, 2013a: 12.).   
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 Although absolute target numbers are not available, it is quite clear that SEW’s tariff is directed at a relatively 
small proportion of their customers whose bills increase as a result of the metering programme and whose 
household income is very low. SRN intend to conduct around 108 000 Green Doctor visits over the course of 
the five year metering programme which will see approximately 500, 000 meters being installed (interview, 




Table 24 Outline of SEW and SRN's support tariff application process 
South East Water Southern Water 
1. The customer must see a bill increase in 
excess of £60 as a result of compulsory 
metering. 
2. Applicants must have a basic income that 
is below £15, 860.
59
 
3. The applicant receive a free water and 
energy audit and accept water efficiency 
devices and advice where appropriate. 
4. Applicants must agree to receive a 
financial ins and outs survey. 
1. Applicants must have faced increased bills due 
to the Universal Metering Programme (SRN have 
contracted Experian to help identify households 
who may be at risk) 
2. Must receive a free water and energy audit and 
accept water efficiency devices and advice where 
appropriate. 
3. Applicants must receive a benefits entitlement 
check and income assessment provided by a 
Community Interest Company called 
IncomeMAX who then advise Southern if 
households should receive the support tariff.  
 
As Table 24 indicates, being on a low income is not enough to qualify a household for the 
support tariff, eligibility hinges on two further criteria. Households must demonstrate that 
they (1) have taken steps to become more water efficient and (2) are “genuinely” unable to 
pay for bill increases caused by compulsory water metering. Here the two companies have 
sought to marry affordability mechanisms to the broader water efficiency and behaviour 
change agenda (see chapter six for more on the influence of behavioural change in the water 
sector).  
 
As part of this process, before the company is willing to commit to providing the applicant 
with financial help its support tariff, SEW and SRN customers must participate in a free of 
charge water and energy efficiency assessment. This, according to SEW is to 'determine 
whether more efficient use of water at the customer’s property could reduce the size of future 
metered bills’ (SEW, 2012: 14). In SRN’s case, eligibility for the social tariff is conditional 
on households ‘accept[ing] any reasonable and practical offer’ that is made to install water 
efficient devices in the applicant’s home (SRN, 2013a: 7). It is not my intention to admonish 
the importance of water efficiency measures and the savings that can be made through the 
installation of the gratis water efficiency measures and advice offered by SRN and SEW. 
However, this process is important because it produces particular images of the type of 
household that is deserving of help under these schemes.  
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 Income must include everything except: Child Tax Credit, Disability Living Allowance, Attendance 
Allowance, Housing Benefit and Council Tax Benefit, Mortgage Interest Relief and Pension Credit. 
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In this respect, the name of SRN's scheme is instructive. SRN have worked closely with a 
local charity called Groundwork to provide the Green Doctor service. Complementing the 
positioning of the meter as a device that gives households greater control over the water bill 
(see chapter six), SRN have emphasised how the main purpose of the Green Doctors 
Intervention is to assist customers in a better understanding of how ‘the meter could work for 
rather than against’ them (Green Doctor visit, 26.01.2012). The title Green Doctors is 
discursively problematic, yet important, in constructing an idea of the deserving poor; it 
implies the existence of an illness or sickness, in this case being potentially water inefficient, 
which needs to be treated. It follows then that households are considered deserving of support 
only if they are, or are actively seeking to become more, water efficient. 
 
In addition to agreeing to water efficiency measures, applicants must also demonstrate that 
they are ‘unable to afford that increase in charges’ (SRN, 2013a:7). SEW assess whether 
households can “genuinely” afford bill increases through an in-house financial ins and outs 
survey whereas SRN have employed the services of an external partner, IncomeMAX. Here 
there are additional hurdles to pass before the customer is able to access SRN’s Support 
Tariff. On behalf of SRN customers, IncomeMAX administers a benefits entitlement check to 
assess whether there are any state benefits that the household is entitled to but not receiving 
that might raise their income. Subsequently, households must undergo an income and 
expenditure assessment to identify the amount of money that the household has ‘available to 
pay towards any increase in… service charges following the switch to metering’ (SRN, 
2013a: 7). IncomeMAX then contacts SRN and, in a far from transparent process, 
recommends whether households should receive assistance with the increase in their water 
charges (unsuccessful applicants can appeal through the CAB) and the household then must 
complete and return an application form for the Support Tariff within 30 days of the income 
and expenditure assessment being completed. This convoluted process of assessment places 
considerable emphasis on applicants demonstrating that they have undertaken water 
efficiency measures and, as often described in the sector, they are genuinely unable to afford 
bill increases. In this sense, the deserving poor are adjudged to be those who are both water 
efficient and demonstrated the extent of their need through investigation of their finances. 
Here, responsibility for providing water welfare has been effectively privatised.  
 
The Support Tariffs have eased the transition to metering for some households. For example, 
SRN has recently claimed that its benefits entitlements service has, in around two years, 
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‘helped customers secure more than £1 million in benefits that they did not know they were 
entitled too’ (SRN, 2012b). This translates to an average of £1, 700 for each household SRN 
has worked with (SRN, 2012b). Nonetheless, the lengthy process that households have to 
undergo in order to access SRN's, and to a lesser extent SEW’s, Support Tariff, which cap 
bills at the previous unmeasured charge, is intrusive and is likely to result in a relatively small 
number of applicants. Experience of the WaterSure tariff suggests that where an application 
process is complex or not widely advertised, take up tends to be low. In addition to making 
support conditional on agreeing to water efficiency measures, adding an excessive additional 
burden of proof onto those applying for help with their water bill suggests that the water 
company is reluctant to provide support unless it absolutely has to and all other sources of 
support have been exhausted. It is clear that both SRN and SEW have taken their new 
responsibilities seriously yet their respective approaches raise questions as to whether 
company social tariffs are the best possible solution to manage affordability problems. The 
way that companies have sought to manage affordability problems caused by compulsory 
metering reflect a reshaping in the way the state is understood and the production of different 
subjectivities surrounding the deserving poor that link eligibility much more closely to 
commitment to water efficiency.  
 
7.12 Conclusion: renegotiating the state, the water company as (reluctant) 
water welfare provider  
This chapter has drawn on Foucauldian tools to explore how the ‘problem’ of water 
affordability has been discursively represented and recognised as a serious concern that 
requires immediate management. The chapter traced how the notion of water affordability 
has been constructed in different ways, and by different actors, to justify (in)action over water 
affordability. Here understandings of what constitutes water poverty, and how that should be 
measured, have been deeply contested. The chapter has demonstrated that way the ‘problem’ 
of affordability is understood has important implications for the manner of support offered 
and how the state is understood in that context. Examining the process whereby particular 
understandings and ways of managing water affordability become dominant provides insight 




The chapter demonstrated that companywide compulsory metering represented an important 
juncture for these programmes presented a new challenge, and a different distribution of 
charges, that would have substantial impacts on patterns of water affordability. Although the 
issue of affordability was not initially interrogated in relation to compulsory metering, 
unintentionally, the introduction of these metering programmes contributed to water 
affordability being viewed as a distinct, biopolitical, problem that required active 
management. Following public inquiry, and under pressure from the CCW, water companies 
had to seriously consider the influence that metering would have on its customers. This 
chapter has shown that the meter can influence in both positive as well as negative ways. 
Importantly the meter should be read as an ambivalent technology that can both entrench and 
cause negative outcomes but, at the same time, can lead to positive outcomes for some 
households. In order to manage water affordability problems related to compulsory metering, 
the role of the water company has been stretched to include responsibility for designing and 
delivering forms of water welfare.  
 
In the context of the Conservative Party's commitment to Big Society politics, water 
companies have been encouraged to take responsibility for managing water affordability 
problems caused directly by the introduction of compulsory metering. Water affordability has 
been articulated as a local problem that is best understood and managed by individual water 
companies. This represents a substantial reshaping of roles and responsibilities in the 
waterscape. In addition to its responsibility for collecting and managing water debt, the role 
of the private water company has been stretched to encompass a more explicit water welfare 
responsibility. This chapter has shown that companies undertaking compulsory metering have 
taken this responsibility seriously, nonetheless some have expressed reluctance regarding 
their new role. Reshaping of the role of water companies has not been an entirely smooth 
process; other actors in the sector have disputed and resisted the role of water companies in 
managing water affordability. Moreover, consumer groups have thrown considerable doubt 
on whether treating affordability as a local problem that requires local solutions, thus 
enabling companies to offer substantially different programmes, is the best way of organising 
water affordability solutions. Here CCW, in particular, have questioned whether these types 
of schemes will be able to raise sufficient capital for substantial programmes of support.   
 
The Support Tariffs produced by SRN and SEW have resulted in the compulsory water 
metering programmes being more sensitive to water affordability problems than would have 
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otherwise been the case. Here the eligibility criteria developed by water companies, 
particularly SRN’s criteria, contributes to producing an understanding of the deserving poor 
that is explicitly linked to water efficiency commitments (see chapter six) and judgement 
from a financial company that households cannot afford to pay the increases in their water 
charges. While providing much needed help to a minority of households to cope with the 
transition to metering, support is conditional on traversing a lengthy and, at times, intrusive 
application process. The reshaping of the role of the water company as a reluctant welfare 
provider thus has broader implications for how the “deserving poor” water user is perceived.  
 
Overall, this chapter builds on broader debates about the role of the state in water governance 
by focusing on the repositioning of private water companies as, at times reluctant, water 
providers. Allocating the private water company with responsibility for designing and 
delivering a water welfare safety net has substantial implications for the role of the state in 
the water sector. Importantly, providers of water affordability schemes are not directly 
accountable to a democratic body. Instead, individual private water companies are 
accountable to Ofwat and, indirectly, their customers. This raises important questions about 
how decisions are made in the waterscape, particularly how changes to the way that water 
welfare provision is delivered can be affected by water users. Companies attempt to gauge 
support for affordability mechanisms by opening customer consultations throughout the 
development of their WRMPs and business plans, furthermore forthcoming price reviews will 
see customer representatives including the  CCW and other organisations such as the CAB sit 
on customer review panels for this purpose. There is, however, no opportunity to vote for 
change as there would be should the government have greater responsibility for the design 
and delivery of these policies. This chapter shows that the decision to encourage water 
companies to manage water affordability problems caused by metering has important 
ramifications for understanding the state, and the private water company, in South East 






8 Conclusion – measuring fairness, reproducing the waterscape 
8.1 Introduction 
This chapter performs three main functions. It (1) outlines the main findings and conclusions 
of the thesis, (2) highlights the policy implications of the findings and proposes 
recommendations, and (3) suggests directions for future research that could build on the 
thesis findings.  
 
This final chapter begins by bringing together the main findings from chapters four, five, six 
and seven in order to respond to the research questions described in chapter one. This section 
briefly summarises how compulsory metering emerged, from the perspective of some water 
companies and stakeholders, as a legitimate way of governing the waterscape, how the water 
meter has been used to influence the way water and water users are governed and how the 
introduction of compulsory water metering has, inadvertently, led to companies taking 
greater responsibility for water welfare. This section also outlines the significance of the 
thesis’ main findings.  
 
The chapter then discusses the policy implications that follow from this thesis. This part of 
the chapter offers a series of recommendations and questions that policy makers may wish to 
consider regarding the role of feedback mechanisms in compulsory water metering 
programmes and the shape and form of affordability mechanisms. Finally, the chapter 
outlines directions for future research that could build on the findings in this thesis.  
8.2 Main findings and contributions 
This section outlines the contribution that this thesis makes to existing work on governing 
water and water users.   
 
Chapters four and five used Foucauldian inspired tools to develop a genealogy of water 
metering (1840-2009) which demonstrated how the meter, as a contingent technology has 
been used to negotiate and renegotiate the waterscape. This genealogy is vital for two 
reasons: it is important for better understanding the emergence of compulsory companywide 
metering programmes in the contemporary moment and for exploring how notions of fairness 
have been articulated in relation to metering. This thesis demonstrates the importance of 
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Foucauldian genealogical tools for better understanding how and why particular policy 
interventions emerge in the contemporary moment.    
 
This genealogy of water metering from 1840-2009 is important in a second sense; it provides 
insight into how any why contemporary compulsory water metering programmes have 
emerged, from the perspective of some companies and stakeholders, as desirable policy 
interventions in the South East of England (see research question one). Here, following 
Foucault, this genealogy offers a history of the present. This genealogy is an important and 
effective way of conveying that the decision to adopt and implement compulsory metering 
was not ahistorical. Here this thesis, by developing an extensive genealogy of metering, 
builds on and takes forward existing work on metering in England and Wales by providing 
insight into how and why compulsory companywide metering was introduced in parts of 
South East England. This genealogical approach demonstrates the value of historicising 
contemporary policy interventions; this is particularly clear in relation to arguments 
surrounding metering and fairness.  
 
The thesis has shown that the meter has been pivotal in reflecting, communicating and 
managing different ideas of fairness in relation to water supply and charging. Water metering 
interventions, in their different guises, have been pivotal in helping to reproduce the 
waterscape. These chapters stressed that the meter, as a contingent technology, can be, and 
has been, utilised to provoke a range of outcomes that can be considered more or less positive 
or more or less “fair”. Here the meter has proved to be an important fulcrum around which 
debates surrounding fairness materialised. Importantly, the thesis did not impose a criteria for 
fairness, instead it analysed the multiple ways that fairness was understood in relation to 
metering.  
 
Persistently, water metering programmes have been central to debates surrounding what 
constitutes fairness in the water sector. Fairness has been understood in multiple, and 
sometimes contradictory, ways. Consistently, metering has been depicted rather crassly.  
Metering programmes have often been perceived to be an unfair intervention that represents a 
disproportionate tax on the poor. In contrast, the meter has also been understood as an 
instrument that enables a fair charging system by encouraging water users to “pay for what 
you use” and aligning more closely with cost recovery mechanisms. Moreover, metering has 
also been positioned as a facilitator of fairness in socio-ecological terms where financial 
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incentives are thought to be instructive in efforts to alleviate water stress. In this sense 
debates around metering have often (but not always) positioned biopolitical concerns and 
economics as antithetical. This binary representation is unhelpful. Water metering has the 
potential to rework the waterscape in multiple ways which can be to be more or less fair to 
the water company, the environment and the water user. The meaning of fairness in this 
context has been struggled over, with claims and counter claims regarding the dimensions of 
fairness and the extent to which metering can be considered fair. 
 
 In this context, the two chapters exposed how the meter has been used to help ensure 
constant supply of water, mediate understandings of domestic and profligate use, discipline 
payment, and secure water supplies in the context of water stressed conditions. The reasoning 
for introducing metering differed across the genealogy and the object of metering (pipes, 
payment, water use practices) changed over time. This genealogy is important because it 
helps explore the multiple ends that metering can serve; understandings of fairness in relation 
to water metering are not static. The different uses of metering represent struggles over what 
the waterscape should look like and, importantly, what constitutes fairness in relation to 
water provision. In illustrating the important of Foucauldian inspired genealogical 
approaches, this thesis makes a valuable contribution to existing literature by demonstrating 
the importance of historicising contemporary policy interventions and highlighting the 
multiple possibilities for the relationship between metering and fairness.   
 
Chapter six focused on how the introduction of compulsory water metering influenced the 
way that water and water users are governed in South East England (research question two). 
The thesis argued that one of the key motivations for embarking on compulsory metering was 
that water companies were seeking to resolve a tension between perceived profligate water 
use and water supplies that are considered to be stressed.  
 
In analysing this sociotechnical fix, the thesis offered Harvey’s work on moments as an 
effective interpretative framework. The chapter identified a series of moments that were 
loosely based on Harvey’s: relations of production (the RCM), technology (smarter meters), 
ideas (nudge), the role of the water company and its relationship with domestic water users, 
relations to nature (the true value of water), socialising water (paying for what you use) and 
intervening in everyday interactions with water (through feedback mechanisms). Here the 
thesis argued that the different moments are interrelated and evolve dynamically to reproduce 
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the waterscape. The framework is vital for examining the messy and non-linear character of 
policy interventions such as metering and for explaining processes of sociotechnical change 
in neoliberal environments.  
 
In this context, the chapter found that contemporary compulsory metering programmes have 
been used as a way to encourage households to value water differently, nudge water users’ 
behaviour and promote an altered interpretation of fairness. These metering schemes differed 
from previous metering programmes in that companies sought to actively guide and intervene 
in peoples’ everyday water use through nudge inspired interventions. In this sense, the thesis 
built on existing work on metering by identifying an emergent, if not fully realised, nudge 
inspired governmentality. By drawing on Foucault’s concept of governmentality and 
Harvey’s method of moments, while being conscious of the limitations of working with the 
two frameworks, this thesis built on existing literature by exploring the implications of 
compulsory water metering for how water and water users are governed.  
 
The final, and perhaps most important, contributions that this makes are explored in chapter 
seven. Here the thesis examined the unanticipated outcomes of compulsory metering with 
respect to the relationship between metering and affordability.  It revealed that the 
development of affordability mechanisms was an unanticipated outcome of the compulsory 
metering process; affordability issues were not considered in depth prior to the introduction 
of compulsory water metering. Subsequently, water companies have designed and developed 
specific mechanisms for managing water affordability problems resulting from the 
introduction of companywide compulsory metering. This, in turn, represents significant shifts 
in the allocation of governing responsibility and forms of democratic accountability in the 
water sector. The unanticipated outcomes of compulsory metering here illustrate Foucauldian 
insights regarding the non-linear contingencies of governance and have important 
implications for thinking about the role of the corporation in relation to public life. 
 
The state has been rearticulated in light of water companies, at times reluctantly, taking on 
responsibility for water welfare problems resulting from compulsory metering. As chapter 
two discussed, the state is best understood as a fluid entity, or a series of social relations, that 
take concrete form at particular times. This reframing of water companies as water welfare 
providers has important ramifications for how the state is understood. Contrary to many 
accounts of neoliberal governance, where the state is thought to be retreating and 
246 
 
neoliberalism ‘rolled out’, this thesis has built upon Foucauldian and historical materialist 
approaches to the state. It has argued that, in the context of political posturing through 
transient notions of the Big Society, the complex web of state relations that make up the state 
have been re-spun so that water companies, if they choose to, become legitimate water 
welfare providers. This, in turn, has had important ramifications for processes of 
accountability in the water sector as well as the shape and form of affordability interventions. 
The unintended consequences of compulsory metering (where water companies have had to 
design and deliver forms of welfare) expose significant shifts in the role of the private water 
company in public life, the implications of which have not been fully realised and warrant 
further consideration.  
 
8.3 Policy Implications and Recommendations 
This section considers the policy implications of this research and offers some 
recommendations that might help inform future work in the water sector. Two main issues 
are covered. First, the section urges greater reflection regarding how water charges should be 
socialised through metering in England and, secondly, the section suggests that it would be 
advantageous if the sector were to revisit the way that water affordability is managed.  
 
Compulsory water metering, as discussed in chapters six and seven, has important 
implications for how water is socialised in the South East of England. In this context, 
decisions have to be taken about what sort of services water companies should provide and 
how these services should be paid for. The thesis highlighted that the meter can be used in a 
variety of different scenarios to produce charging systems that look very different, distribute 
costs in ways that benefit some groups over others and reflect different principles of fairness. 
In particular, the chapter highlighted that, potentially, the meter can be used to structure a 
range of charging systems, all of which are imbued with different values. The thesis 
identified that the two companies undertaking compulsory metering have introduced 
straightforward volumetric tariffs alongside their respective metering programmes. In this 
context, further debate about what sort of role the meter should have in structuring the 
waterscape would be timely.  
 
Installing meters does not necessarily require the introduction of a straightforward volumetric 
charge, and as discussed in chapter six, volumetric charging can promote water uses that are 
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antithetical to more sustainable water management. The decision to structure charges in 
particular ways is a political one and reflects the dominant ways in which fairness are 
understood (see chapters four, five and six). The genealogy of water metering developed in 
this thesis shows that, feasibly, water meters could support a wide range of volume based 
tariffs or could be used to provide information about in-home water use and report leakages 
without necessarily charging for water by volume. Clearly, with the introduction of 
compulsory metering, there is an opportunity for open debate and experimentation with 
different tariff options. Debate regarding how water costs should be socialised through 
compulsory metering are clearly linked to broader questions surrounding what the waterscape 
should look and feel like; water meters constitute just one, albeit very important, element in 
this debate. Here there is clearly greater scope for debate and discussion surrounding the 
shape of the waterscape, the meter’s role in socialising costs and how fairness might be 
understood in that context.  
 
Debate over how water costs are socialised is especially important given that water 
affordability is now recognised as an important and pressing problem in England (and 
Wales). There are, as chapter seven demonstrated, two different yet related strands of water 
affordability to consider: problems caused directly by the introduction of compulsory 
metering and broader ongoing affordability issues. Water companies have developed specific 
mechanisms to support some households who face higher bills as a direct result of 
compulsory metering, while some plan to introduce social tariffs to address broader 
affordability issues. As highlighted in chapter seven, and revisited further above in this 
chapter, the emergence of a Big Society inspired governmentality where private water 
companies are made accountable for forms of water welfare,  has important implications for 
democratic accountability and how governing authority is distributed in the water sector. 
Despite water companies taking their responsibilities seriously, there remain concerns 
regarding the scope and form of affordability interventions led by water companies. 
Moreover, there is little sustained work being undertaken on the scale and characteristics 
relating to affordability problems. 
 
As discussed in chapter seven, Ofwat undertook research in 2011 to establish some of the 
drivers and indicators of water affordability problems in England. Although the 2009 Walker 
Review had suggested that Ofwat should subsequently track and report on affordability issues 
at regular intervals, there are no plans for Ofwat to do so at the time of writing. Water 
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companies are expected to be abreast of the primary pressure points in their respective 
constituencies, yet the absence of explicit standardised means of reporting water affordability 
patterns precludes assessment of affordability issues being undertaken in a coordinated 
fashion or comparisons being made between different water company areas. The absence of 
such information makes evaluation of the problem and appropriate policy interventions 
difficult. It would be prudent, therefore, if an organisation collected, reported and analysed 
data on water affordability on a regular basis in a coordinated fashion in order to better 
understand the scale of the problem and the relative effectiveness of different ways of 
managing it. Such a responsibility might well fall within Ofwat’s purview, yet the allocation 
of these tasks would require government action. Whichever organisation bore this 
responsibility, transparency in reporting data on affordability would be vital.   
8.4 Directions for future research 
This section suggests possible research directions by outlining how some of the work in this 
thesis might be followed up and extended. Subsequently, it sets out research ideas that might 
take this work in new directions. 
 
This thesis has focused on compulsory metering in the South East of England. It is important 
to recognise that as this research was undertaken in the early stages of meter installation, 
some of the interventions associated with compulsory metering are in their infancy and, as a 
result, would constitute important avenues for future or follow up research. In particular, the 
water companies’ use of nudge inspired feedback interventions demand further attention.  As 
discussed in chapter six, at the time of conducting this research, it was not clear how the new 
nudge inspired bill format and greater information provision might influence water users’ 
behaviour. These new tools could prove to be important. By engaging with nudge, 
behavioural economics and metering, this research has provided sound conceptual footing 
and important contextual information for new work on feedback mechanisms to build on.  
 
In addition to follow up research on feedback mechanisms, there are substantial opportunities 
for pursuing detailed quantitative work on water consumption patterns following meter 
installation; such an approach was beyond the scope of this thesis. Should data be made 
available, independent research on how the introduction of water meters influences the way 
water flows through the home would be possible. Such work would be particularly interesting 
if it made a distinction between water saved through better leakage detection and changes in 
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household water use more broadly. In order to better understand how household water use 
might change following the introduction of metering, quantitative data on household water 
consumption would be enhanced if it were accompanied by qualitative work that provided 
insight into why particular changes might occur. In chapter five, this thesis highlighted that it 
is often assumed that meters produce a 10 per cent demand reduction, further research along 
the lines described in this section would provide more nuanced information about what type 
of demand reductions occur, at what times and why.  This, in turn, would help inform policy 
on metering.  
 
While this thesis has focused on compulsory water metering programmes underway in the 
South East of England, the research approach would be applicable to the study of other 
metering interventions in different areas of the UK and in different countries. What would be 
particularly interesting is the study of metering in areas where water is not considered to be 
under stress. In the South East of England, establishing a ‘fairer’ water charging system was 
an important motivating factor for introducing compulsory metering, yet the most immediate 
concern was the need to address the supply/demand balance. In areas where water stress is a 
less pressing issue, understandings of what constitutes fairness in relation to metering may 
differ. Teasing out how understandings of fairness are articulated and measured in different 
areas, especially in the context of Big Society politics, would be a valuable exercise and take 










Abrams, P., 2006. Notes on the difficulty of studying the state. In Shama, A., & Gupta, A., 
(eds). The Anthropology of the State. Oxford: Blackwell. 
 
Affinity Water. 2011. June Return 2011. Veolia Kent Water Southeast Ltd. 
 
Agamben, C., 1998. Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life. Stanford: Stanford: 
University Press. 
 
Agrawal, A., 2005. Environmentality: technologies of government and the making of subjects 
NY: Duke University Press. 
 
Allen, J. and Cochrane, A. 2010. Assemblages of state power: topological shifts in the 
organisation of government and politics. Antipode.  42(5), 1071-1089. 
 
Anais, S., 2012, Genealogy and critical discourse analysis in conversation: texts, discourse, 
critique. Critical Discourse Studies. 10(2), pp. 123 - 135. 
 
Anderson, W. & White, V. 2009. The Smart Way to Display: Exploring customer preferences 
for home energy display functionality. Report to the Energy Savings Trust.  Centre for 
Sustainable Energy: Bristol.  
 




Auriga Services Limited. 2011. Review of Charitable Trusts and other measures to help 





Bakker, K., 2001. Paying for Water: Water Pricing and Equity in England and Wales. 
Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers, 26(2) pp. 143-164.  
 
Bakker, K., 2004. An uncooperative commodity: privatizing water in England and Wales. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press.  
 
Bakker, K., 2005. Neoliberalising Nature? Market Environmentalism in Water Supply in 
England and Wales. Annals of the Association of American Geographers. 95(3), pp 542-565. 
 
Bakker, K., 2010. The limits of ‘neoliberal natures’: Debating green neoliberalism. Progress 
in Human Geography, 34(6), pp. 715-735. 
 
Bakker, K., 2012. Water: political, biopolitical, material Social Studies of Science, 42(4), pp. 
616-623. 
 
Bakker, K. & Bridge, G. 2006. Material Worlds? Resource Geographies and the 'matter of 
nature'. Progress in Human Geography, 30(5), pp. 5-27. 
 
Barnes, J., 2012. Pumping possibility: Agricultural expansion through desert reclamation in 
Egypt. Social Studies of Science. 42(4), pp. 517-538. 
 
Barnett, C., 2005. The consolations of ‘neoliberalism’ Geoforum 36(1), pp. 7-12. 
 
Barraque, B. 2011. Is Individual Metering Socially Sustainable? The Case of Multifamily 
Housing in France. Water Alternatives 4(2), 223-244. 
 
Barry, A., 2001. Political Machines: Governing a technological society. London and New 
York: Althlone Press. 
 
Barry, A. 2006. Technological Zones, European Journal of Social Theory, 9(2), pp. 239-253.  
 
Barry, A., Osborne, T., and Rose, N., (eds). 1996 Foucault and Political reason: Liberalism, 




Bayliss, K., & Fine, B., (eds) 2009. Privatization and Alternative Public Sector Reform in 
Sub-Saharan Africa: Delivering on Electricity and Water. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. 
 
Baxter, J., & Eyles, J., 1997. Evaluating qualitative research in social geography: establishing 
‘rigour’ in interview analysis. Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers, 22(4). Pp. 
505-525.  
 
Baxter, J. 2010. Case Studies in Qualitative Research. In Hay I (eds) “Qualitative” Research 
Methods in Human Geography (3
rd
 Edition). Oxford University Press: Ontario.  
Becker, G.,1962. Irrational Behaviour and economic theory. Journal of Political Economy , 
70(1). Pp. 1-13. 
 
Bellamy-Foster, J., 2000. Marx’s Ecology: Materialism and Nature. NY: Monthly Review 
Press 
 
Bell, V. 1996. The promise of liberalism and the performance of freedom. In Barry, A. 
Osborne, T and Rose N. (eds). 1996. Foucault and Political Reason: liberalism, neo-
liberalism and rationalities of government. UCL Press: London 
 
Bennet, O., Alyesi, C., & Bolton, 2013. Water bills – are they affordable to all? House of 
Commons Library Standard Note SNSC-06596. 
Bentham, D. 2012. Your Interview: Darren Bentham from Southern Water The Argus 
available online http://www.theargus.co.uk/news/10082232.print/ last accessed 11/09/2013.   
 
Benzie, M. Harvey, A. Burningham, K. Hodgson, N. & Siddiqi, A. Feb 2011, Vulnerability to 
heatwaves and drought: Case studies of adaptation to climate change in South-West 
England, Joseph Rowntree Foundation. 
 
Berg, N. & Gigerenzer, G. 2010. As-if behavioural economics: neoclassical economics in 
disguise? History of Economic Ideas 18(1), 133-166.  
 
Bikjer, W., 2007. Dikes and Dams: Thick with Politics Isis 98, pp. 109-123.  




Boyland, A., 2010. Report to the Secretary of State for Environment Food and Rural Affairs: 
Inquiry into the South East Water Management Plan 2010-2035. Available online at: 
http://archive.defra.gov.uk/environment/quality/water/resources/documents/101203-inquiry-
report.pdf last accessed 05.04.2012. 
 
Bradbury, A., McGimpsey, I.,& Santori, D., 2013. Revising rationality: the use of ‘Nudge’ 
approaches in neoliberal education policy Journal of Education Policy 28(2), pp. 247-267. 
 
Brain, D., 1994. Cultural production as “society in the making”: Architecture as an exemplar 
of the social construction of cultural artefacts. In Crane, D., (eds). The Sociology of Culture, 
Oxford: Blackwell.  
 
Braun, B. & Castree, N. (eds) 1998, Remaking Reality: Nature at the millennium, Routledge, 
New York.  
 
Braun, B. & Whatmore S (eds) 2010. Political Matter: Technoscience and public life. 
University of Minnesota Press: Minneapolis & London. 
 
Brighton Palestine Solidarity Campaign BHPC activist wins concession from Southern Water 
over Israeli-made water meter available online:  
http://www.brightonpalestinecampaign.org/local-news-reports/bhpsc-activist-wins-
concession-from-southern-water-over-israeli-made-water-meter last accessed 19.09.2013. 
 
Brockling, U., Krasman, S., & Lemke, T., (eds). 2011. Governmentality: Current Issues and 
Future Challenges. New York & London: Routledge.  
 
Budds, J., 2009. Contested H20: science, policy and politics in water resources management 
in Chile. Geoforum 40(3), pp. 418-430. 
 
Budds, J. & Hinojosa, S., 2012. Restructuring and rescaling water governance in mining 




Bulkeley, H., & Schroeder, H., 2012. Beyond state/non-state divides: Global cities and the 
governing of climate change. European Journal of International Relations 18(4), pp. 743-
766. 
 
Burchell, G., 1996. Liberal government and techniques of the self in Foucault and Political 
Reason: liberalism, neo-liberalism and rationalities of government. (eds). A. Barry, T.  
Osborne & N. Rose. London: UCL Press. pp. 19-37.  
 
Byatt, I., 2004. Managing Water for the Future: The Case of England and Wales. In Trotter 
and Slack (eds) Managing Water Resources Oxford University Press: Oxford. Pp 73-88. 
 
Cabinet Office, Department of Education & the Government Economic and Social Research 




Carse, A., 2012. Nature as infrastructure: Making and managing the Panama Canal 
Watershed Social Studies of Science, 42(4). Pp. 131-563. 
 
Castree, N., 2002. False Antitheses? Marxism, Nature and Actor Networks. Antipode, 34(1),  
pp. 111-146.  
 
Castree, N., 2003. Commodifying what nature? Progress in Human Geography, 27(3), pp. 
273-279.  
 
Castree, N., 2008a. Neoliberalising nature: the logics of deregulation and reregulation. 
Environment and Planning A, 40(1), pp. 131-152.  
 
Castree, N., 2008b. Neoliberalising Nature: Processes, Effects and Evaluations. Environment 
and Planning A, 40(1) pp. 153-174.  
Cave, M., 2009. Independent Review of Competition and Innovation in Water Markets: Final 
Report. Available online from: 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/69462/cave-




Central Advisory Water Committee. 1959. Sub-committtee on the Growing Demand for 
Water. First report. London: HMSO. 
 
Central Advisory Water Committee. 1962. Report of the Sub Committee on the Growing 
Demand of Water. Final Report. London: HMSO. 
 
Chappells, H., & Medd, W., 2008. What is fair? Tensions between sustainable and equitable 
domestic water consumption in England and Wales. Local Environment. 13(8), pp.725-741.  
 
Citizens Advice Bureau. 2011. Affordable water: a consultation on the Government’s 
proposals following the Walker Review of Charging, Citizens Advice to Defra. London. 
 
Citizens Advice Bureau. 2012. Company social tariffs. Consultation on guidance to water 
and sewerage undertakers and the Water Services Regulation Authority under Section 44 of 
the Flood and Water Management Act 2010: Citizens Advice response to Defra. CAB: 
London. 
 
Clark, N., 2012. Renationalise English Water: The obscene commodification of a natural 
resource has gone on long enough, ripping off ordinary people. The Guardian available 
online at: http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentis free/2012/jan/31/renationalise-English-water 
last accessed 08.07.2013. 
 
Climate Change Committee Adaptation Sub-Committee Progress Report. 2012. Climate 
change – is the UK preparing for flooding and water scarcity?  London: Committee on 
Climate Change. 
 
Conservative Party. 2010. Big Society, not big Government available online at: 
http://www.conservatives.com/news/news_stories/2010/03/~/media/files/downloadable%20fi
les/building-a-big-society.ashx last accessed 12.11.20. 
 




Consumer Council for Water. 2006. Using Water Wisely: Quantitative Research to determine 
consumers’ attitudes to water use and water conservation. MVA Consultancy: London. 
 
Consumer Council Water. 2007. Deliberative research into consumer view on fair charging 
for the Consumer Council for Water. London. 
 
Consumer Council for Water. 2009b. Memorandum Submitted by Consumer Council for 
Water. Ofwat Price Review: Environment, Food and Rural Affairs Committee Evidence. Fifth 
Report of Session 2008-2009 Volume II.  
 
Consumer Council for Water. 2009c. Annex to CCWater’s submission on companies’ Final 
Business Plans Southern Water. Available online:  
http://www.ccwater.org.uk/server.php?show=nav.1122 last accessed 11/09/2013. 
 
Consumer Council for Water. 2009d. Annex to CCWater’s submission on companies’ Final 
Business Plans South East Water. Available online: 
http://www.ccwater.org.uk/server.php?show=nav.1122 last accessed 11/09/2013. 
 
Consumer Council for Water. 2010a. Inquiry into South East Water’s Water Resources 
Management Plan: CCWater London and South East Statement of Case. Available online at 
http://archive.defra.gov.uk/environment/quality/water/resources/documents/100315-
consumer-council-for-water.pdf last accessed 10.07.2013. 
 
Consumer Council for Water. 2010b. Cross subsidies and social tariffs: the consumer 
perspective. Commissioned by the Consumer Council for Water. Creative Research Ltd: 
London. 
Consumer Council for Water. 2010c. Annual Tracking Survey 2009. CCW: Birmingham. 
Consumer Council for Water. 2010d. Cross Subisidies and Social Tariffs: The Consumer 
Perspective. CCW: Birmingham. 
 
Consumer Council for Water. 2011. Annual Tracking Survey 2010. CCW: Birmingham. 
 
Consumer Council for Water. 2011a. Response to Ofwat’s consultation on involving 




Consumer Council for Water. 2012. Changes to WaterSure as a result of the introduction of 
Universal Credit: A Defra consultation. CCW: Manchester.  
 
Consumer Council for Water. 2013. The Customer Impact of Universal Metering 
Programmes: Report of Research Findings Creative Research/Accent: London. 
 
Corporate Watch. 2013. Arad: Supplying water meters to Sussex while helping bleed 
Palestine dry Available online http://corporateoccupation.org/arad-supplying-water-meters-
to-sussex-while-helping-bleed-palestine-dry/ last accessed 19.09.2013. 
 
Counterclaim. 1995. Water: You don’t have to pay for it. No.50. 
 
Coutard, O., & Guy, S., 2007. STS and the City: Politics and Practices of Hope. Science, 
Technology & Human Values, 32(6), pp. 713-734.  
 
Cowan, D., Morgan, K., McDermont, M., 2009. Nominations: an actor-network approach, 
Housing Studies. 24. Pp. 281-300.  
 
Crampton, J., & Elden, S., (eds). 2007. Space, Knowledge and Power: Foucault and 
Geography. Aldershot: Ashgate publishing limited. 
 
Crooke, J., 2011. Southern Water’s Universal Metering Programme Water Treatment and 




Cunningham, C.,Griffin, J., Laws, S., 1996. Water Tight: the impact of metering on low 
income families. London: Save the Children.  
 
De Laet, M., & Mol, A., 2000, "The Zimbabwe Bush Bump: Mechanics of a fluid 




Deacon, R., 2003. Fabricating Foucault: Rationalising the Management of Individuals. 
Milwaukee: Marquette University Press. 
 
Dean, M., 2004. Governmentality: Power and Rule in Modern Society. London: Sage ltd.  
 
Deedat, H. & Cottle, E., 2002. Cost Recovery and Prepaid Water Meters and the Cholera 
Outbreak in KwaZulu-Natal. In Cost Recovery and the Crisis of Service Delivery in South 
Africa, eds. D. McDonald & J. Pape., London: Earthscan, pp. 81-97.  
 
Department of Energy and Climate Change. 2013. Government action to help hardworking 
people with energy bills. Press release. Available online at: 
https://www.gov.uk/government/news/govt-action-to-help-hardworking-people-with-energy-
bills last accessed 02.12.2013.  
 
Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs. 1992. Using Water Wisely. HMSO: 
London. 
 
Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs. 2004. Cross-Government Review of 
Water Affordability Report HMSO: London. 
 
Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs. 2007a. Government response to 
consultation on water metering in areas of serious water stress between 31 January to April 
2007. HMSO: London. 
Department for. Environment, Food and Rural Affairs. 2007b. Water metering to become an 
option in long term plans. News Release 262/07 iisued 16 August 2007.  
 
Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs. 2008a. Future Water: The 
Government’s Water Strategy for England. HMSO: London. 
 
Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs. 2008b. A Framework for 
Proenviornmental Behaviours. HMSO: London. 
 
Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs. 2011a. Defra’s approach to regulatory 




Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs. 2011b. Affordable water: a 
consultation on the government’s proposals following the Walker Review of Charging. 
HMSO: London. 
 
Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs. 2011c. Water for Life: Water White 
Paper. HMSO: London.  
 
Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs. 2012a. Defra’s Strategic Policy 
Statement for Ofwat: Draft for Consultation Available online at: 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/82656/consult-
sps-seg-doc-20121112.pdf last accessed 01.12.2013. 
 
Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs. 2012b. Company Social Tariffs: 
Guidance to water and sewerage undertakers and the Water Services Regulation Authority 
under Section 44 of the Flood and Water Management Act 2010. HMSO: London. 
 
Department for Environment, Transport and the Regions. 1998. Water charging in England 
and Wales: Government Decisions following consultation. DETR: London. 
 
Dermitt, D. 1998, Science, social constructivism and nature. in Remaking Reality: Nature at 
the Millennium, eds. B. Braun & N. Castree, Routledge, New York, pp. 173-193.  
 
Dittmer, J., 2009. Textual and Discourse Analysis. In DeLyser, D., Crang, M., McDowell, L., 
Aitken, S., Herbert, S. (Eds.). SAGE Handbook of Qualitative Research in Human 
Geography, pp. 274-286. London: SAGE Publications. 
 
Dobson, F., 1995. Licensed to Leak: How the Tories let the water companies off the hook. 
Labour Party: London. 
 





Dobson, F., 1996b. The Waterfacts of Privatisation: Failure, waste and greed in the privatised 
water industry 1990 – 95. Labour Party: London. 
 
Dobson, F., 1996c. Ending the Waste: Labour’s plans for a world class, water-efficient, 
sustainable water industry. Labour Party: London. 
 
Dobson, F., 1996d. Floods of cash, floods of excuses: Labour’s 1996 annual report on the 
privatised water industry. Labour Party: London. 
 
Doron, N., 2011. Water use in Southern England: What do the public think is fair? Fabian 
Society: London.  
 
Doron, U., The, T., Haklay, M., & Bell, S., 2011. Public Engagement with water 
conservation in London. Water and Environment Journal. 25(4), 555-562. 
 
Doward, J. 2011. 'Water poverty' to rise in the UK as scarcity pushes up bills The Guardian 
available from http://www.theguardian.com/environment/2011/feb/20/water-poverty-uk-
scarcity-bills last accessed 06.12.2012. 
Drakeford, M., 1998. Water Regulation and Pre-Payment Meters, Journal of Law and 
Society, 25(4), pp. 588-602.  
 
Dreyfus, H., L. & Rabinow, P., 1982. Michel Foucault: beyond structuralism and 
hermeneutics. Brighton: Harvester. 
 
Eagle, M., 2013. Cameron still refuses to require water companies to introduce a social tariff 
– Maria Eagle. Labour Press Release Nov 1st 2013 available online at: 
http://press.labour.org.uk/post/65700778122/cameron-still-refuses-to-require-water-
companies-to last accessed 03.12.2013. 
 
Ekers, M., & Loftus, A., 2008. The Power of Water: developing dialogues between Foucault 
and Gramsci. Environment and Planning D: Society and Space, 26(4), pp. 698-718. 
 




Energy Saving Trust. 2013. At home with water. EST: London. 
 
England, K., 1994. Getting Personal: Reflexivity, Positionality, and Feminist Research. 
Professional Geographer. 46(1), pp. 80-89.  
 
Environment Agency. 2007. Areas of Water Stress: Final Classification. HMSO: Bristol. 
 
Environment Agency., 2008a. Water resources in England and Wales – current state and 
future pressures. Bristol: Environment Agency. 
 
Environment Agency. 2008b. Using Science to create a better place:  the costs and benefits 
of moving to full metering. HMSO: Bristol.  
 
Environment Agency. 2009. The impact of household water metering in South East England. 
HMSO: Bristol.  
 
Environment Agency and Natural Resources Wales, 2013. Water stressed areas – final 
classification. Available online: 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/244333/water-
stressed-classification-2013.pdf last accessed: 17.08.2013. 
 
Environment, Food and Rural Affairs Committee (EFRA). 2009. Ofwat Price Review 2009 
Fifth Report of Session 2008-09 Volume I. HC 554-I. 
 
Environment, Food and Rural Affairs Committee (EFRA). 2012. The Water White Paper Vol 
2 20 June 2012. HM Stationary Office: London. 
 
European Environment Agency. 2013. Assessment if cost recovery through pricing of water. 
Technical Report 16/2013.  
 





Fairness on Tap coalition. 2011. Making the Case for Metering. Available online at 
http://assets.wwf.org.uk/downloads/fairness_on_tap.pdf last accessed 29.11.2011.  
 
Featherstone, D., Ince, A., Mackinnon, D., Strauss, K., & Cumbers, A., 2012. Progressive 
localism and the construction of political alternatives Transcations of the Institute of British 
Geographers 37(2), pp. 177-182. 
 
Feenberg, A., 1999. Questioning Technology. London and New York: Routledge.  
 
Feenberg, A., 2002. Transforming technology: A critical theory revisited. Oxford & New 
York: Oxford University Press. 
 
Feenberg, A. 2011. Afterword: The liberation of nature in A Biro (eds) Critical Ecologies: 
The Frankfurt School and Contemporary Environmental Crises Toronto and London: 
University of Toronto Press, 187-206. 
 
Fine, B., 2005. From Actor Network Theory to Political Economy. Capitalism Nature 
Socialism, 16(4). Pp. 91-108. 
 
Fitch, M., & Price, H., 2002, Water Poverty in England and Wales, Chartered Institute of 
Environmental Health & Centre for Utility Customer Law. 
 
Flick, U. 2009. An Introduction to Qualitative Research (ed 4). London: Sage. 
Fontana, A., & Prokos, A., 2007. The Interview: From formal to postmodern. California: Left 
Coast Press, Inc. 
 
Foucault, M., 1988. Technologies of the Self. In Martin, L., Gutman, H., & Hutton, P., A 
seminar with Michel Foucault. Massachusetts: The University of Massachusetts Press Pp. 16-
50. 
 
Foucault, M., 2004 [1975-6]. Society Must Be Defended. Lectures at the College de France. 




Foucault, M., 1976. The Meshes of Power. In Crampton, J., & Elden, S., 2007. Space, 
knowledge and power: Foucault and Geography. England: Ashgate Publishing Ltd. Pp. 153-
163. 
 
Foucault, M., 1977. Nietzsche, genealogy, history. In D Bouchard (Ed) Language, counter-
memory, practice: Selected essays and interviews, NY: Cornell University Press. Pp. 139 -
164. 
 
Foucault, M., 2003. Society Must be Defended: Lectures at the Collège de France, 1975-76. 
Translated by David Macey. London: Penguin. 
 
Foucault, M., 2008 [1978]. The Birth of Biopolitics. Ed. Senellart, M., Translated Burchell, 
G., London: Palgrave Macmillan.  
 
Foucault, M., 1979. History of Sexuality: volume 1. London: Penguin Books. 
 
Foucault, M. 1980. Two Lectures. In C Gordon (eds) Power/ Knowledge: Selected interviews 
and other writings 1972-77 New York: Pantheon, pp 78 -108. 
 
Foucault, M. 1991 [1975]. Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison. Penguin Books: 
London. 
 
Foucault, M. 1994. On the genealogy of ethics: An overview of a work in progress. In H. 
Dreyfus & P Rabinow (eds) Michel Foucault, beyond structuralism and hermeneutics. Pp. 
253 -280. 
 
Foucault, M., 2009. Security, territory, population: lectures at the Collège de France. 
Basingstoke: Palgrave MacMillan. 
 
Foucault, M. 2010. [1982-1983] The Government of the Self and Others. Ed. Frederic Gros. 
Translated by Burchell, G. London: Palgrave Macmillan. 
 
Furlong, K., 2010. Small Technologies, big change: Rethinking infrastructure through STS 




Furlong, K., 2013. The dialectics of equity: consumer citizenship and the extension of water 
supply in Medellin, Colombia Annuals of the Association of American Geographers, 103(5), 
1176-1192.  
 
Gandy, M., 1999. The Paris Sewers and the Renationalisation of Urban Space, 24(1). Pp.23-
44. 
 
Gandy, M. 2003. Concrete and Clay: reworking nature in New York City Massachusetts and 
London: MIT Press. 
 
Gandy, M. 2004a. Water, modernity and the emancipatory city in The emancipatory city? 
Paradoxes and possibilities. (eds). L. Lees. London: Sage. Pp. 178-191. 
 
Gandy, M. 2004b. Rethinking urban metabolism: water, space and the modern city City 8(3), 
363-379. 
 
Ghertner, D., 2010. Calculating without numbers. Economy and Society. 39(2). Pp. 185-217. 
 
George, Kent, ltd., 1938. A volume of reminiscences and pictures in commemoration of the 
firm’s centenary 1938-1939. Luton: George Kent Ltd. 
 
Giddens, A., 1984. The Constitution of Society Cambridge: Polity Press.   
 
Gill, N., & Gill, M., 2012. The limits to libertarian paternalism: two new critiques and seven 
best-practice imperatives Environment and Planning C: Government and Policy 30(5), pp. 
924-940. 
 
Gleick, P., 1998. The human right to water. Water policy, 1(5). Pp. 487-503.  
 
Goodwin, T., 2012. Why we should reject ‘nudge’. Politics, 32(2), pp. 85-92.  
 




Miller, P., (eds)., The Foucault Effect: Studies in Governmentality, London: Harvester  
Wheatsheaf. Pp. 293-72. 
 
Goyal, M., & Hall, M., 1992. Analysis of Domestic Water Metering. WRc: Swindon. 
 
Graham, S., & Marvin, S., 2001, Splintering Urbanism: Networked Infrastructures, 
Technological Mobilites and the Urban Condition, London: Routledge.  
 
Gray, D., 2011. Review of Ofwat and consumer representation in the water sector. London: 
Defra.  
 
Gray, A., 2013. Southern Water to please for price increases Financial Times available online 
at: http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/e3b5f244-aa1b-11e0-958c-
00144feabdc0.html#axzz2mPQjk3Jb last accessed 15 January 2012.  
 
Gregory, D., 2006. Introduction: Troubling Geographies in N Castree and D Gregory (eds) 
David Harvey: a critical reader London: Blackwell Publishing. 
 
Guy, S., & Marvin, S., 1997. Planning for Water: Space, Time and the Social Organisation of 
Natural Resources. School of Architecture, Planning & Landscape Global Urban Research 
Unit, University of Newcastle upon Tyne.  
 
Guy, S. Marvin, M. Medd, W. Moss, T. 2011. Shaping Urban Infrastructures: Intermediaries 
and the Governance of Socio-Technical Networks. London and Washington: Earthscan. 
 
Halliday, S., 2001. The Great Stink of London: Sir Joseph Bazalgette and the Cleansing of 
the Victorian Metropolis. Abingdon: The History Press Ltd. 
 
Hand, M., Shove, E., & Southerton, D., 2005. Explaining Showering:  a discussion of the 
material conventional and temporal dimensions of practice. Sociological Research Online 
10(2). 
 
Haraway, D., 1988. Situated knowledges: the science question in feminism and the privilege 




Haraway, D.,1990. A manifesto for cyborgs: science, technology & socialist feminism in the 
1980s in Feminism/Postmodernism, ed. L. Nicholson. New York & London: Routledge, pp. 
190-233.  
 
Haraway, D. 1991. Simians, Cyborgs and Women: The Reinvention of Nature. London: Free 
Association Books.  
 
Haraway, D. 2003. The Companion Species Manifesto: Dogs, People and Significant 
Otherness. Chicargo: Prickly Paradigm Press (University of Chicago).  
Haraway, D. 2008, When Species Meet. Minneapolis & London: University of Minnesota 
Press. 
 
Hargreaves, T., 2011a. Questioning the virtues of pro-environmental behaviour research: 
Towards a phronetic approach Geoforum 43(2), pp. 315-324. 
 
Hargreaves, T., 2011b. Practice-ing behaviour change: Applying social practice theory to 
pro-environmental change. Journal of Consumer Culture. 11(1), pp 79-99.  
 
Harris, K., 2000. Socially and environmentally responsible pricing in water in Palmer, G. 
(eds) Water Charging and Social Justice: Why politicians must act. New Policy Institute. Pp. 
27-36.  
 
Harrison, D., 2004. It’s official – the South-East has less water per head than Sudan. The 
Telegraph available online at: http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/4192701/Its-official-
the-South-East-has-less-water-per-head-than-Sudan.html last accessed 18.06.2013.  
 
Hart, G. 2002. Disabling Globalisation: places of power in Post-Apartheid South Africa, 
University of Natal Press, Pietermaritizburg.  
 
Hartstock, N., 1998. Moments, margins and agency. Annuals of the Association of American 
Geographers. 80, pp. 707-712. 
 




Harvey, D., 1996. Justice, Nature and the Geography of Difference. Oxford:  Blackwell. 
 
Harvey, D. 1993. The nature of the environment: the dialectics of Social and Environmental  
change Socialist Register 30, 1-31.  
 
Harvey, D. 2001. Spaces of Capital: towards a critical geography Edinburgh: University of 
Edinburgh Press. 
 
Harvey, D., 2007. The Kantian Roots of Foucault’s Dilemmas in J Crampton and S Elden 
(eds) Space, knowledge and power: Foucault and Geography Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing 
Ltd, pp. 41-49. 
 
Harvey, D., 2009. Cosmopolitanism and the Geographies of Freedom New York: Columbia 
University Press.  
 
Harvey, D., 2010. The Enigma of Capital: And the Crises of Capitalism. London: Penguin 
Books. 
 
Harvey, E., 2005. Managing the Poor by Remote Control: Johannesburg's Experiments with 
Prepaid Water Meters in The Age of Commodity: Water Privatisation in Southern Africa., 
eds. McDonald, D., & Ruiters, G., London: Earthscan, pp. 120-129.  
 
Hassan, J., 1998. A History of Water in Modern England and Wales. Manchester: Manchester 
University Press. 
 
Haughton, G., 2002. Market making: Internalisation and global water markets. Environment 
and Planning A, 34(5), pp. 791-807.  
 
Hausman, D., & Welch, B., 2010. Debate: To Nudge or Not to Nudge The journal of political 
philosophy 18(1), 123 - 136. 
 





Herbert, A., & Kempson, E., 1995. Water Debt and Disconnection. London: Policy study 
Institute. 
 
Herrington, P., 1974. The costs of domestic metering. Water Services. 78, pp.306-310.  
 
Herrington P., 1979. Nor any drop to drink: The economics of water. Occasional paper, 
Economics Association: Surrey.  
 
Herrington, P., 1982. Water: A consideration of conservation. Journal of the Royal Society 
Arts. London. 
 
Herrington, P., 1989. Deep water investors beware: Water privatisation an alternative 
prospectus. Water Industry Unions Committee. London: The Jason Press Limited.  
 
Herrington, P., 2007. Waste Not, Want Not? Water Tariffs for Sustainability: Report to 
WWF- UK.  Centre for Sustainable Energy: Bristol.  
 
Heynen, N., 2013. Urban political ecology I: The urban century Progress in Human 
Geography published online before print, August 30th, 2013. 
 
Heynen, N.C., Kaika, M., & Swyngedouw, E., 2006. In the nature of cities: urban political 
ecology and the politics of urban metabolism, New York, NY: Routledge. 
 
Hickman, L. 2011. Water companies should sort out their leaks before telling women how to 
shave The Guardian available online 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/blog/2011/aug/26/water-conservation-women-
shower-shaving last accessed 28.06.2013. 
 
Hills, J., 2012. Getting the Measure of Fuel Poverty: Final Report of the Fuel Poverty Review 
Summary and Recommendations. London: Centre for Analysis of Social Exclusion. 
 
Hills, B., Huby, M., Kenway, P., 1997. Fair and sustainable: Paying for Water, what the 




Himley, M., 2008. Geographies of Environmental Governance: The Nexus of Nature and 
Neoliberalism. Geography Compass, 2(2). Pp. 433-451.  
 
Hinchliffe, S., & Whatmore, S., 2009. Living Cities: Toward a Politics of Conviviality. In 
Technonatures: Environments, Spaces and Places in the Twenty-first century, eds. D. White 
& C. Wilbert. Waterloo, Canada: Wilfred Laurier University Press. Pp. 105-124.  
 
Hirsch, D., 2013. A minimum income standard for the UK in 2013 Joseph Rowntree 
Foundation available online at: http://www.jrf.org.uk/publications/MIS-2013 last accessed 
15th October 2013. 
 
Hitchings, R., Day, D., 2011. How older people relate to the private winter warmth practices 
of their peers and why we should be interested. Environment and Planning A, 43(10), pp. 
4452-2467.  
 
Hitchings, R., 2012. People can talk about their practices. Area, 44(1). Pp. 61-67. 
 
Hobson, K. 2004. Sustainable Consumption in the UK: The Responsible Consumer and the 
Government at Arm’s Length. Journal of Environment and Development. 13(2), 121-139. 
 
Hobson, K., 2006. Bins, Bulbs, and Shower Timers: On the ‘Techno-Ethics’ of Sustainable 
Living, Ethics, Place & Environment, 9(3), pp. 317-336. 
 
Hobson, K., 2011. Environmental politics, green governmentality and the possibility of a 
‘creative grammar’ for domestic sustainable consumption. In Lane, R., & Gorman-Murray, 
A., (eds) Material Geographies of Household Sustainability. Surrey: Ashgate publishing Ltd. 
Pp. 193-211. 
 
Hobson, K., 2013. On the making of the environmental citizen. Environmental Politics, 
22(1), pp. 56-72. 
 
House of Lords and Technology Committee. 2006. Water Management. Volume I: Report, 
8
th




House of Lords Science and Technology Select Committee. 2011. Behaviour Change. 2
nd
 
Report of Session 2010-12. HM Stationary Office: London. 
 
Howarth, D. 2011. Privatisation help or a hindrance in managing water demand? National 
Water Demand Centre: Environment Agency: England. 
 
Hugby, M., 1994. Water Poverty and Social Policy: Review of the Main Issues. Paper 
delivered at PUAF Water Poverty Conference.  
 
Hunt, A., 2004. Getting Marx and Foucault into Bed Together! Journal of Law and Society. 
31(4), pp. 592-609.  
 
Huxley, M., 2007. Geographies of Governmentality in Space, knowledge and power: 
Foucault and Geography, (eds). J. Crampton., & S. Elden. England: Ashgate Publishing. pp. 
185-205.  
 
Huxley, M., 2008. Space and Government: Governmentality and Geography. Geography 
Compass. 2(5), pp. 1635-1658. 
 
Huxley, M., 2011. A history of the ‘Nudge’. In: Pykett, J., Jones, R., & Whitehead, M., (eds) 
Intervention on The Political Geography of ‘Libertarian Paternalism’. Political Geography, 
30(7), pp. 301-310. 
 
Hyatt, S., 2004. Water is Life, Meters Out! Women’s Grassroots Activism and the 
Privatisation of Public Amenities. Occasional Papers on Globalisation, 1(7). pp. 1-18. 
Independent Water Review Panel (IWRP) (2007) Strand One Report: Costs and Funding 
Available online: http://www.iwrp-ni.org.uk/iwrp_strand_1_report.pdf last accessed 
21/08/2013. 
 
Institution of Civil Engineers (ICE)., 2012. State of the Nation: Water 2012. Available online 




Jaglin, S., 2008. Differentiating networked services in Cape Town: Echoes of splintering 
urbanism? Geoforum, 39(6). Pp. 1897-1906.  
 
Jenking, R. 1973. Fylde Metering. BGlackpool: Fylde Water Board. 
 
Jessop, B. 1982. The capitalist state: Marxist theories and methods, Martin Robertson: 
Oxford.  
 
Jessop, B., 2007. From micro-powers to governmentality: Foucault's work on statehood, state 
formation, statecraft and state power. Political Geography, 26(1), pp. 3-40.  
 
Jessop, B., 2011. Constituting another Foucault Effect: Foucault on States and Statecraft in 
Brockling, U., Krasmann., S & Lemke, T., (eds) Governmentality: Current Issues and Future 
Challenges NY & Abingdon: Routledge. 
 
John, P., Cotterill, S., Moseley, A., Richardson, L., Smith, G., Stoker, G,. & Wales, C., 2011. 
Nudge, Nudge, Think, Think: experiments with ways to change civic behaviour. London & 
New York: Bloomsbury. 
 
Jones, R., Pykett, J., Whitehead, M., 2011a. Governing temptation: Changing behaviour in an 
age of libertarian paternalism. Progress in Human Geography, 35(4), pp. 483-501. 
 
Jones, R., Pykett, J., Whitehead, M., 2011b. The Geographies of Soft Paternalism in the UK: 
The Rise of Soft Paternalism and Changing Behaviour after Neoliberalism. Geography 
Compass 5(1): pp. 50-62. 
 
Jones, R., Pykett, J., & Whitehead, M., 2013. Changing Behaviours: the Rise of the 
Psychological State. London: Eiger. 
 
Jordan, A., Richardson, J., & Kimber, R., 1977. The Origins of the Water Act of 1973. Public 
Administration. Pp. 317 -334. 
 




Kaika, M., 2004. Interrogating the Geographies of the Familiar: Domesticating Nature and 
Constructing the Autonomy of the Modern Home. International Journal of Urban and 
Regional Research, 28(2). pp. 265-86. 
 
Kaika, M., 2005. City of flows: modernity, nature and the city. New York & Oxon: Routledge. 
 
Kaika, M. 2006. The political ecology of water scarcity: the 1989-1991 Athenian drought. in 
In the Nature of Cities: Urban political ecology and the politics of urban metabolism, eds. N.  
Heynen, M. Kaika & E. Swyngedouw, New York & London: Routledge, pp. 150-165.  
 
Kearns, R. 2010. Seeing with Clarity: Undertaking Observational Research. In Qualitative 
Research Methods in Human Geography (3
rd
 eds). Canada: OUP. 
 
Kenway, P. 2000. Setting the Principles: Why Politicians Can Make a Difference to Water 
Charging in Palmer, G. (eds) Water Charging and Social Justice: Why politicians must act. 
London: New Policy Institute.   
 
Kent, W., 1892. The Water Meter: Its difficulties, types and application – A manual of 
reference and fact in connection with the supply of water by meter. London: E &F.N. Spon. 
 
Kinnersley, D. 1988. Troubled water: Rivers, politics and pollution. Hillary Shipman: 
London.  
 
Kirsch, S., & Mitchell, D., 2004. The Nature of Things: Dead Labour, Nonhuman Actors, and 
the Persistence of Marxism. Antipode, 36(4), pp. 687-705. 
 
Kisby, B., 2010. The Big Society: Power to the People? Political Quarterly, 81(4), pp. 484-
491. 
 
Knamiller, C., & Sharp, L., 2009. Issues of Trust, Fairness and Efficacy: A Qualitative Study 
of Information Provision for Newly Metered Households in England. Water Sci. Technol.: 




Knights, D., & Vurdubakis, T., 1994. Foucault, Power and all that. In (eds) Jermier, J., 
Knights, D., Nord, W., Resistance & Power in organisations. London: Routledge. pp 17-19. 
 
Kirsch, S. & Mitchell, D. 2004. The Nature of Things: Dead Labour, Nonhuman Actors, and 
the Persistence of Marxism. Antipode, 36(4), pp. 687-705.  
 
Lane, R. & Gorman-Murray A (eds). 2011. Material Geographies of Household 
Sustainability. Surrey: Ashgate publishing Ltd.  
 
Larner, W. 2000. Neoliberalism: Policy, Ideology, Govermentality. Studies in Political 
Economy. 63(1), pp 5-25. 
 
Larner, W. 2007. Neoliberal governmentalities in Heynen N, McCarthy J, Prudham S and 
Robbins P (eds) False Promises and unnatural consequences.  Routledge: New York. 
 
Latour, B., 1993. We have Never Been Modern. Brighton: Harvester Wheatsheaf. 
 
Latour, B., 2005. Reassembling the Social: An Introduction to Actor Network Theory. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press.  
 
Lees, L., 2004. Urban Geography: discourse analysis and urban research. Progress in Human 
Geography. 28(1), pp. 101-107. 
 
Legg, S., 2005. Foucault’s population geographies: classifications, biopolitics and 
governmental spaces. Population, Space and Place. 11(3), pp. 180-201. 
 
Lemke, T., 2001. The Birth of Bio-Politics: Michael Foucault's lecture at the College de 
France on neo-liberal rationality. Economy and Society. 30(2), pp. 190-207.  
 
Lemke, T., 2002. Foucault, Governmentality and Critique. Rethinking Marxism. 14(3), pp 49-
64. 
 
Lemke, T. 2007. An indigestible meal? Foucault, governmentality and state theory. 




Lemke, T. 2011a. Bio-politics: An advanced introduction. New York University Press: New 
York and London. 
 
Lemke, T. 2011b. Beyond Foucault: From Biopolitics to the Government of Life in Brockling 
U, Krasmann S and Lemke T (eds) Governmentality: Current Issues and Future Challenges 
Routledge: New York & Oxon, pp. 165-185. 
 
Linton, J., 2010. What is Water? The history of a modern abstraction. Vancouver: University 
of British Columbia Press. 
 
Littlechild, C., 1986. Economic Regulation of Privatised Water Authorities:  A Report 
Submitted to the Department of the Environment. H.M. Stationary Office. 
 
Lister, R., 1995. Water Poverty. The Journal of the Royal Society for the Promotion of 
Health. 80. Pp. 80-83. 
 
Lobina, E., 2012. Water services governance, technological change and paradigm shifts: a 
conceptual framework. International Journal of Water 6(4/4). pp. 155-175.  
 
Loftus, A., 2006. Reification and the Dictatorship of the Water Meter. Antipode. 38(5), pp. 
1023-1045.  
 
Loftus, A., 2012. Everyday Environmentalism; Creating an Urban Political Ecology.  
Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. 
 
Luke, T., 2009. The property boundaries/boundary properties in Technonature Studies: 
inventing the future. In Technonatures: Environments, Technologies, Spaces, and places in 
the Twenty-first century (eds.) D. White & C. Wilbert, Wilfred Laurier University Press: 
Ontario, Canada, pp. 193-213.  
 
MacFarlane, C. & Rutherford, J. 2008. Political Infrastructures: Governing and Experiencing 




MacKinnon, D., 2000. Managerialism, governmentality and the state: a neo-Foucauldian 
approach to local economic governance. Political Geography. 19(3), pp. 293-314. 
 




Maloney, W., & Richardson, J., 1994. Water policy making in England and Wales: Policy 
communities under pressure? Environmental Politics, 3(4). Pp. 110-138.  
 
Maniates, M., 2001. Individualisation: Plant a Tree, Buy a Bike, Save the World? Global 
Environmental Politics, 1(3). pp. 31-52. 
 
Marion, Young, I., 1998. Harvey’s complaint with race and gender struggles: a critical 
response. Antipode 30(1), 36-42. 
 
Marvin, S., Chappells, H. & Guy, S. 1999. Pathways of smart metering development: shaping 
environmental innovation, Computers, Environment and Urban Systems, vol. 23(2), pp. 109-
126.  
 
Marvin, S., Chappells, H., & Guy, S., 2011. Smart Meters as Obligatory Intermediaries: 
Reconstructing Environmental Action. In Guy, S., Marvin, M., Medd, W., & Moss, T., 2011. 
Shaping Urban Infrastructures: Intermediaries and the Governance of Socio-Technical 
Networks. London & Washington: Earthscan. 
 
Marvin, S., & Graham, S., 2001. Splintering Urbanism: Networked Infrastructures, 
Technological Mobilities and the Urban Condition. London: Routledge. 
 
Mayo, E., 2013. Nudged out: this is mutualisation, but not as we know it The Guardian 
available online http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2013/may/03/nudge-unit-
mutualisation-but-not-as-we-know-it last accessed 27.06.2013. 
 
McCarthy, J., & Prudham, S., 2004. Neoliberal Nature and the Nature of Neoliberalism, 




McCulloch, C., 2009. The Water Resources Board: England and Wales’ Venture into 
National Water Resources Planning, 1964-1973. 2(3). Pp. 461-475. 
 
McDowell, L. 1998. Elites in the city of London: some methodological considerations 
Environment and Planning A, 30(12), 2133–46. 
 
McDowell, L., 2010. Interviewing: Fear and Liking in the Field. In DeLyser, D., Herbert, S., 
Aitken, S., Crang M and McDowell (eds) The SAGE Handbook of Qualitative Geography, 
London Sage, pp. 156-172. 
 
McFarlane, C., & Rutherford, J., 2008. Political Infrastructures: Governing and Experiencing 
the Fabric of the City, International Journal of Urban and Regional Research, 32(2), pp. 
363-377.  
 
Medd, W., & Chappells, H., 2007. Drought. Demand and the scale of resilience: challenges 
for interdisciplinary in practice. 32(2), pp. 233-248. 
 
Michael, M., 2006. Technoscience and Everyday Life. Berkshire: Open University Press.  
 
Miller, P. and Rose, N. 1990. Governing economic life Economy and Society, 19(1), 1-31. 
 
Miller, P. & Rose, N., 2008. Governing the present: Administering Economic, Social and 
Personal Life. London: Polity Press. 
 
Mills, C., 2012. Why Nudges Matter: A reply to Goodwin. Politics. 33(1), pp 28-36. 
Ministry of Housing and Local Government, 16
th
 June 1967 Memorandum.  
 
Morris, W. R Esq., 1868. Royal Commission on Water Supply: minutes of evidence and 
appendices 1867-1868. London Metropolitan Archives. 
 
Moss, T., 2008. 'Cold spots' of Urban Infrastructure: 'Shrinking' Processes in Eastern 
Germany and the Modern Infrastructural Ideal, International Journal of Urban and Regional 




Moss, T. Guy, S. Marvin, S. Wedd, W. 2011. Intermediaries and the Reconfiguration of 
Urban Infrastructures: An Introduction. In Guy, S. Marvin, M. Medd, W. Moss, T. 2011. 
Shaping Urban Infrastructures: Intermediaries and the Governance of Socio-Technical 
Networks. Earthscan: London and Washington. 
 
Muller, M., 2008. Free Basic Water - a sustainable instrument for a sustainable future in 
South Africa. Environment and Urbanisation, 20(1). pp. 67-87.  
 
Nash, F., 2013. Participation & Passive Revolution: The Reproduction of Neoliberal Water 
Governance in South Africa. Antipode, 45(1). Pp. 101-120. 
 
National Audit Office. Infrastructure investment: the impact on consumer bills. London: 
HMSO. 
 
North, P., 2011. Geographies and utopias of Cameron’s Big Society Social & Cultural 
Geography, 12(8), pp. 817-827. 
 
Northumbrian Water. 2013. Your essential guide to our charges scheme 2013/14. Available 
online http://www.nwl.co.uk/_assets/documents/Charges_Scheme_2013-14_-
_Northumbrian_Region.pdf last accessed 15.07.2013. 
 
Nussbaum, M., 2003. Capabilities as Fundamental Entitlements: Sen and Social Justice 
Feminist Economics 9 (2-3), pp. 33-59. 
 
Ockenden, K., 2012. In full flow: Tony Smith interviewed Utility Week Available online 
http://www.utilityweek.co.uk/news/news_story.asp?id=196431&title=In+full+flow%3A+Ton
y+Smith+interviewed last accessed 23 August 2013. 
 
O’Farrell, C., 2005. Michel Foucault London: Sage Publishing Ltd. 
 
O’Malley, P., Weir, L., & Shearing, C., 1997. Governmentality, criticism, politics, Economy 




Ofwat. 1991. Paying for Water. Ofwat: Birmingham.  
 
Ofwat. 1993. Paying for Growth Ofwat: Birmingham.  
 
Ofwat. 2000. Approval of companies’ charges schemes 2001-2002: Ofwat’s conclusions on 
the consultation. Ofwat: Birmingham. 
 
Ofwat. 2003. Tariff structure and charges: 2003 - 04 report. Ofwat: Birmingham. 
 
Ofwat/CCWater. 2008. Research into Household Customers’ Views on Competition on the 
Water and Sewerage Industry. Ofwat: Birmingham. 
 
Ofwat. 2009a. Ofwat’s response to the independent review of charging for household water 
and sewerage services: protecting consumers, promoting value, safeguarding the future. 
Ofwat: Birmingham. 
 
Ofwat, 2009b. To Regulatory Directors of all water and sewerage companies and water only 
companies. PR09/31. Available online at: 
http://www.ofwat.gov.uk/pricereview/pr09phase3/ltr_pr0931_revcorrectmech last accessed 
04.02.2013. 
 
Ofwat, 2010a.The Development of the Water Industry in England and Wales. Birmingham: 
Ofwat.  
 
Ofwat. 2010b. A drain on society – what can be done about water debt? Birmingham: Ofwat. 
 
Ofwat 2010 Service and delivery – performance of the water companies in England and 
Wales 2009-10. Ofwat: Birmingham. 
 
Ofwat. 2010c. Waste not. Want not – making the best use of our water Ofwat: Birmingham. 
 
Ofwat. 2010. Beyond limits: how should prices for monopoly water and sewerage services be 




Ofwat. 2010. Resilient supplies: How do we ensure secure water and sewerage services? 
Ofwat: Birmingham. 
 
Ofwat. 2011a. Push, pull, nudge: How can we help customers save water, energy and 
money? Birmingham: Ofwat. 
 
Ofwat. 2011b. Horizons Water affordability: evidence and issues workshop. Ofwat: 
Birmingham. 
 
Ofwat. 2011c. Information Notice: Simplifying the Revenue Correction Mechanism. 
Available online at: http://www.ofwat.gov.uk/regulating/prs_in1104rcm.pdf ;last accessed 
06.12.2012. 
 
Ofwat. 2011d. Affordability and debt 2009-10 –supporting information. Ofwat: Birmingham. 
 
Ofwat. 2011e. Exploring the costs and benefits of faster, more systematic water metering in 
England and Wales. Ofwat: Birmingham.  
 
Orwell, G., 1937. The Road to Wigan Pier. London: Penguin. 
 
Osborne, T., 1996. Security and vitality: drains, liberalism and power in the nineteenth 
century in Barry, A., Osborne, T., & Rose, N., (eds). 1996 Foucault and Political reason: 
Liberalism, neo-liberalism and rationalities of government. UCL Press: London. 
 
Page, B., 2005. Paying for water and the geography of commodities. Transactions of the 
Institute of British Geographers. 30(3), pp. 293-306. 
 
Paine, A, (eds). 2007. The Complete Letters of Mark Twain. Middlesex: The Echo Library.  
 
Painter, J., 2006. Prosaic geographies of stateness. Political Geography, 25(7), pp. 752-774. 
 
Palmer, G., (eds) Water Charging and Social Justice: Why Politicians Must Act. London: 




Parker, J., & Wilby, R., 2013. Quantifying household water demand: a review of theory and 
practice in the UK Water Resource Management, 27(4). Pp. 981-1011. 
 
Patterson, M., & Stipple, J., 2010. Myspace: Governing individuals’ carbon emissions. 
Environment and Planning C: Society and Space. 28(2), pp. 341-362. 
 
Peck, J., 2010. Zombie Neoliberalism and the ambidextorous state. Theoretical Criminology. 
14(1). Pp. 104-110.  
 
Peck, J., & Ticknell, A., 2002. Neoliberalising Space. Antipode, 34(3). pp. 380-404.  
 
Philo, C., 1992. Foucault’s Geography Environment and Planning D: society and space. 
10(2), 137-67. 
 
Philo, C., 2012. A ‘new Foucault’ with lively implications – or ‘the crawfish advances 
sideways’. Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers. 37(4), pp. 496-514. 
 
Pigeon, M., McDonald, D., Hoedeman, O., & Kishimoto, S., (eds). 2012. 
Remunicipalisation: putting water back into public hands. Amsterdam: Transnational 
Institute.  
 
Pratt, G., 2002. Studying Immigrants in Focus Groups. In Moss, P (eds). Feminist Geography 
in Practice: Research and Methods, Oxford: Blackwell. 
 
Pritchard, S., 2011. Confluence: the Nature of Technology and the Remaking of the Rhone 
Massachusetts: Harvard University Press. 
 
Pritchard, S., 2012. From hydroimperalism to hydrocapitalism: ‘French’ hydraulics in France, 
North Africa and beyond. Social Studies of Science. Pp. 42(4), 591- 615. 
 
Prudham, S., 2004. Poisioning the well: neoliberalism and the contamination of municipal 
water in Walkerton, Ontario. Geoforum, 35(3), pp. 343-359.  
 





PUAF, 1993. Transcription of Lower Grange Campaign for Water Meter Justice Committee 
Meeting with Ian Byatt, Director General of Ofwat, Leeds. PUAF archives 1993. 
 
PUAF, 1994. Letter from anonymous to Helen Jackson MP. PUAF archives 1994.  
 
Pullinger, M., Browne, A., Anderson, B., & Medd, W., 2013. Patterns of water: The water 
related practices of households in southern England, and their influence on water 
consumption and demand management. Lancaster: Lancaster University. 
 
Pykett, J., Jones, R., Whitehead, M., Huxley, M., Strauss, K., Gill, N., McGeevor, K., 
Thompson, L., & Newman, J. 2011. Interventions into the political geography of ‘libertarian 
paternalism’. Political Geography, 30(6), pp 301-310.  
 
Quality of Life Policy Group. 2007. Blueprint for a Green Economy: Submission to the 
Shadow Cabinet. London.  
 
Rabinow, P., 1984. The Foucault Reader: An introduction to Foucault’s thought. London: 
Penguin.  
 
Rabinow, P., & Rose, N., 2006. Biopower Today, Biosocieties, vol. 1, pp. 195-217.  
 
Raco, M., 2003. Governmentality, subject-building, and the discourse and practices of 
devolution in the UK. Transactions of the Institution of British Geographers, 28(1). Pp. 75-
95.  
 
Raco, M. 2009. From expectations to aspirations: State modernization, urban policy, and the 
existential politics of welfare in the UK. Political Geography 28(7) 436-444. 
 
Raco, M., & Imrie, R., 2000. Governmentality, rights and responsibilities in urban policy, 
Environment and Planning A, 32(12), pp. 2817-2204.  
 




Rose, N., & Miller, P., 2010. Political power beyond the State: problematics of government. 
British Journal of Sociology, 61(1). Pp. 271-303.  
 
Reckwitz, A., 2002. Toward a theory of social practices: a development in culturalist 
theorising European Journal of Social Theory, 5(1), pp. 243-263. 
 
Reid, S., 2009. Using Science to create a better place: The impact of household water 
metering in South East England. Bristol: Environment Agency. 
 
Reid, S., & Acutt, M., 2011. What do customers want from their water companies? Utility 
week available online 
http://www.utilityweek.co.uk/news/news_story.asp?id=195172&title=What+do+customers+
want+from+their+water+companies%3F  last accessed 09.07.2013 
 
Reuters. 2013. Fitch affirms Southern Water’s Senior Secured Debt at ‘A-‘/’BBB’ available 
online at http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/09/20/fitch-affirms-southern-waters-senior-sec-
idUSFit67009320130920 last accessed 12 November 2013.  
 
Reynaud, A., 2007. Social policies and private sector participation in water supply – the case 
of France. United Nations Research Institute for Social Development.  
 
Rice, G., 2010. Reflections on interviewing elites, Area 42(1). pp. 70-75. 
 
Robbins, P., 2007. Lawn People: How Grasses, Weeds and Chemicals Make Us Who We Are. 
Philadelphia: Temple University Press. 
 
Roberts, A., 2008. Privatising Social Reproduction: The Primitive Accumulation of Water in 
an Era of Neoliberalism, Antipode, 40(4), pp. 535-560.  
 
Robertson, M. 2010, Performing environmental governance Geoforum 41(1), 7-10. 
 
Robertson, M. 2012. Measurement and alienation: making a world of ecosystem services. 




Rose, G., 1997, Situating Knowledges: Positionality, Reflexivities and Other Tactics. 
Progress in Human Geography, 21(3). Pp. 305-320.  
 
Rose, N., 1991. Governing by numbers: figuring out democracy. Accounting, Organisations 
and Society. 16(7), pp. 673-692. 
 
Rose, N., 2007. The Politics of Life Itself: Biomedicine, Power and Subjectivity in the 
Twenty-First Century. New Jersey: Princeton University Press. 
 
Roth, M., 1981. Foucault’s “History of the Present”. History and Theory 20(1), pp. 32-46. 
 
Routledge, P., 2008. Acting in the Network: ANT and the politics of generating associations. 
Environment and Planning D: Society and Space, 26. Pp. 199-217. 
 
Rudy, A., & Gareau, B., 2005. Actor-Network Theory, Marxist Economics and Marxist 
Political Ecology. Capitalism Nature Socialism. 16(4) 85-90. 
 
Ruiters, G., & Smith, L., 2006.The public/private conundrum of urban politics: a view from 
South Africa. In Heynen, Swynegdouw, E., (ed) In the Nature of Cities, Urban Political 
Ecology. New York: Routledge.  
 
Rumming, K., 2009. Following the Actors: mobilizing an actor-network theory methodology 
in geography. Australian Geographer, 40(4). pp. 451-469. 
 
Rutherford, S., 2007. Green governmentality: insights and opportunities in the study of 
nature’s rule. Progress in Human Geography. 31(3), pp. 291-307. 
 
Rutherford, P., & Rutherford, S., 2013a. The Confusions and Exuberances of Biopolitics 
Geography Compass, 7(6), 412-422. 
 
Rutherford, S., & Rutherford, P., 2013b. Geography and Biopolitics, Geography Compass 




Rutland, T. & Aylett, A., 2008. The work of policy: actor networks, governmentality, and 
local action on climate change in Portland, Oregon. Environment and Planning D: Society 
and Space, 26(4), pp. 627-646.  
 
Rydin, Y., 2005. Geographical knowledge and policy: the positive contribution of discourse 
studies. 37(1), pp. 73-78. 
 
Saal, D., & Parker, D., 2001. Productivity and Price Performance in the Privatised Water and 
Sewerage Companies of England and Wales. Journal of Regulatory Economics. 20(1), pp. 
61-90. 
 
Said, E., 2003 [1978]. Orientalism. London: Penguin.  
 
Sawkins, J., & Dickie, V., 2005. Affordability of Household Water and Sewerage Services in 
Great Britain Fiscal Studies, 26(2). Pp. 225-244. 
 
Sen, A., 1999. Development As Freedom. Oxford, Oxford University Press. 
 
Scholesser, K., 2008. Bio-Political Geographies. Geography Compass. 2(5), 1621-1634.  
 
Shaoul, J., 1997. A critical financial analysis of the performance of privatized water 
industries: the case of England and Wales. Critical Perspectives on Accounting. 8(5), pp.479-
505. 
 
Sharp, L., McDonald, A., Sim, P., Knamiller, C.,Selton, C., & Wong, S., 2011. Positivism, 
post-positivism and domestic water demand: interrelating science across the paradigmatic 
divide Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers. 6(4), 501-515. 
 
Shove, E., 2004. Comfort, Cleanliness and convenience: the social organization of normality. 
London: Berg. 
 
Shove, E., 2010. Beyond the ABC: climate change policy and theories of social change 




Shove, E., 2011. How the social sciences can help climate change policy: An extraordinary 
lecture at the British Library 17
th
 Jan 2011. Available online 
http://www.lancaster.ac.uk/staff/shove/exhibits/transcript.pdf last accessed 18th Nov 2013. 
 
Shove, E., Pantzar, M., Watson, M., 2012. The Dynamics of Social Practice and how it 
Changes. London: Sage. 
 
Shove, E., & Panzar, M., 2005. Consumers, producers and practices: understanding the 
invention and reinvention of Nordic walking. Journal of Consumer Culture. 5(1), pp. 43-64. 
 
Siemens, SG., 1856. On an improved water meter. Excerpt minutes of proceedings of the 
meeting of the Institution of Mechanical Engineers. Birmingham, 30
th
 July 1856. 
 
Silverman, D., 2010. Doing Qualitative Research 3rd Edition. London: Sage. 
 
Smith, T. 2012. The Water White Paper is a positive vision for the future of the industry but 




ns_remain_on_the.pdf last accessed on 04.05.2013. 
 
Social Research. 2011. Customer Research on South East Water’s Metering Programme: 
Draft report to South East Water. SEW: Snodland. 
 
Simmons, D., 2012. Southern Water: Universal Metering Programme Measuring Leakage in 
2015. Presentation delivered at Water UK Leakage 2012. 
 
Sofoulis, Z., 2005. Big Water, Everyday Water: A Sociotechnical Perspective. Continuum: 
Journal of Media & Cultural Studies. 19(4). Pp. 445-463. 
 





South East Water. 2009. South East Water’s Future Plans 2010-2015. SEW: Snodland. 
 
South East Water. 2010. Water Resources Management Plan 2010-2035: Final Plan. 
Snodland: SEW PLC. 
 
South East Water. 2012. Charges Scheme 2012- 2013 
 
South East Water. 2013. Charges Scheme 2013-14.  
 
South West Water. 2013. Charges scheme 2013-14  
 
Southern Water. 2009a. Water Resources Management Plan 2010-2035. 
 
Southern Water. 2009b. Final Business Plan B.8 Tariffs and Revenue Projections. SRN: 
Snodland.  
 
Southern Water. 2009c. Final Business Plan. C4(A) Supply Demand Appraisal (Water 
Services). SRN: Snodland.  
 
Southern Water. 2012a. Water and Sewerage Charges 2013-14: A guide for metering 
programme customers.  
 
Southern Water. 2012b. £1 million benefits boost for customers Press release 06/12/2012 
available online from http://www.southernwater.co.uk/about-
us/news/Default.asp?wdgt16460661=0_0_16464784_2012_12_0_0_76463096 last accessed 
17.09.2013. 
 
Southern Water. 2013a. Water and Sewerage Charges 2013-14 A guide for customers who 
are part of South East Water’s Customer Metering Programme. Worthing: UK. 
 





Smith, N,. 1990. Uneven Development: nature, capital and the production of space, 2nd edn, 
Oxford: Blackwell. 
 
Smith, N. 2007. Another Revolution is Possible: Foucault, Ethics and Politics. Environment 
and Planning D: Society and Space. 25(1), 191-193.  
 
Smith N., 2008. Uneven Development: Nature, Capital and the Production of Space. 3rd edn, 
The Georgia: University of Georgia Press.  
 
Smith, T. 2012. The Water White Paper is a positive vision for the future of the industry but 
questions remain on the issues of competition and affordability. Available online at: 
http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/politicsandpolicy/archives/22473 last accessed 05.07.2013. 
 
Snell, C., & Bradshaw, J., 2008. Water Affordability in England and Wales: A report 
prepared for CCWater. University of York and CCWater.  
 
Strang, V., 2004. The Meaning of Water. Oxford: Berg. 
 
Strengers Y., 2009. Bridging the Divide between resource management and everyday life: 
Smart metering, comfort and cleanliness. PhD thesis. RMIT 
 
Strengers, Y., 2012. Peak electricity demand and social practice theories: reframing the role 
of change agents in the energy sector Energy Policy 44(1),pp.  226-234. 
 
Swynegdouw E., 2004, Social Power and the Urbanisation of Water: Flows of Power. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press.  
 
Swynegdouw E., 2006. Metabolic urbanisation: the making of cyborg cities. in In the Nature 
of Cities: Urban political ecology and the politics of urban metabolism (eds.) N. Heynen, M.  
 




Swynegdouw E., 2007. Technonatural Revolutions: the scalar politics of Franco's hydro-
social dream for Spain, 1939-1975. Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers, 
32(1), pp. 9-28.  
 
Swynegdouw, E., 2009. Circulations and Metabolisms: (Hybrid) Natures and (Cyborg) Cities 
in Technonatures: Environments, Technologies, Spaces and Places in the Twenty- first 
Century, (eds). D. White & C. Wilbert, Wilfred Laurier University Press: Waterloo, Canada, 
pp. 61-84. 
 
Taylor, V. & Trentmann, F., 2011. Liquid Politics and the politics of everyday life in the 
modern city. Past and Present, 211. Pp. 199-241.  
 
Thaler, R., & Sunstein, C., 2009. Nudge: Improving decisions about health, wealth and 
happiness. London: Penguin.  
 
Tibbetts, G., 2007. Millions face compulsory water metering. The Telegraph Available online 
at: http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/1560575/Millions-face-compulsory-water-
metering.html last accessed 03.03.2014.  
 
Tinson, A., & Kenway, P., 2013. The water industry: a case to answer. A report by the New 
Policy Institute. London: UNISON & NPI. 
 
Trentmann, F., & Taylor, V., 2005. From users to consumers: water politics in nineteenth 
century London. In The making of the consumer: knowledge, power and identity in the 
modern world. Oxford: Berg Publishers, pp. 53-79. 
 
Taylor,V,. Chappells, H., Medd, W., & Trentmann, F., 2009. Drought is normal: the socio-
technical evolution of drought and water demand in England and Wales 1893-2006. Journal 
of Historical Geography. 35(1), pp.568-591. 
 
Thames Water. 2010. Our plans for 2010-2015. Available online at: 
http://www.thameswater.co.uk/tw/common/downloads/aboutus/our-plans-for-2010-2015.pdf 




Thames Water. 2013a. Our draft five-year plan 2013-2020 12303 04/2013 Available online: 
http://www.thameswater.co.uk/pr14/business-plan-complete-document.pdf last accessed 
05/06/2013. 
 
Thames Water. 2013b. Our draft Water Resources Management Plan 2015-2040: Overview 
and Consultation 12275 04/13 Available online: 
http://www.thameswater.co.uk/tw/common/downloads/wrmp/WRMP_A4_36_page_WEB.pd
f last accessed on 05.06.2013. 
 
Thames Water. 2013c. Metered charges: water and wastewater charges if you have a water 
meter 2013-14. Available online from 
http://www.thameswater.co.uk/tw/common/downloads/your-home/Metered_Charges_2013-
2014.pdf. Last accessed 15.07.2013. 
 
The Water Engineer’s Pocket Book and Directory. 1929. A Comprehensive guide to the 
water undertakings of Great Britain and Ireland. London: Water and Engineering.  
 
The Water Engineer’s Pocket Book and Directory. 1930. A Comprehensive guide to the 
water undertakings of Great Britain and Ireland. London: Water and Engineering. 
 
The Water Engineer’s Pocket Book and Directory. 1931. A Comprehensive guide to the 
water undertakings of Great Britain and Ireland. London: Water and Engineering. 
 
Thompson, A., 2010. “Daily life” not a “moment” like the rest: notes on Harvey’s 
“organising for the anti-capitalist transition. A journal for and about social movements, 2(1), 
pp. 271-286. 
 
Trentmann, F., & Taylor, V., 2011. Liquid politics: water and the politics of everyday life in 
the modern city. Past and Present 21(1). Pp. 199-241. 
 
Turner, G., 2013. Money down the drain: getting a better deal for consumers from the water 




Unison. 2011. Response to the Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs, 
Affordable Water: a Consultation on the Government’s Proposals following the Walker 
Review of Charging.  
 
Utility Week. 2011. Southern Water pursues universal metering to relieve pressure on 
resources available online from 
http://www.utilityweek.co.uk/news/news_story.asp?id=195061&title=Southern+Water+pursu
es+universal+metering+to+relieve+pressure+on+resources last accessed 17.09.2013 
 
Utility Week. 2012a. Social tariffs cannot be left to companies, says Shuker Utility Week 
available online from 
http://www.utilityweek.co.uk/news/news_story.asp?id=196425&title=Social+tariffs+cannot+
be+left+to+companies%2C+says+Shuker Last accessed 16.09.2013. 
 
Utility Week. 2012b. Metering benefits Southern householders by more than £70 000 in tax 
credits available online at 
http://www.utilityweek.co.uk/news/news_story.asp?id=197320&title=Metering+benefits+So
uthern+householders+by+more+than+%26%23163%3B700%2C000+in+tax+credits Last 
accessed on 23.08.2012. 
 
Utility Week. 2013. Have water companies gone far enough for Ofwat? Available online at: 
http://www.utilityweek.co.uk/news/have-water-companies-gone-far-enough-for-
ofwat/952352#.UpymKMRSh8F last accessed 02.12.2013. 
 
Valentine, G., 1997. Tell me about...Using interviews as a research methodology, in 
Flowerdew, R. and Martin, D. (eds.) Methods in Human Geography: a Guide for Students 
Doing a Research Project. London: Longman. 
 
Vogel, S. 2011. On Nature and Alienation in a Biro (eds) Critical Ecologies: The Frankfurt 
School and Contemporary Environmental Crises University of Toronto Press: Toronto and 
London. Pp 187-206.  
 
Von Schnitzler, A., 2008. Citizen Prepaid: Water, Calculability, and Techno-Politics in South 




Walker, A., 2009. The Independent Review of Charging for Household Water and Sewerage 
Services, London: DEFRA.  
 
Walker, G., 2012. A critical examination of models and projections of demand in water utility 
resource planning in England and Wales, International Journal of Water Resources 
Development, 29(3). Pp. 352-372. 
 
Walker, G., and Burningham, K., 2011. Flood Risk, Vulnerability and Environmental Justice: 
evidence and evaluation of inequality in a UK context Critical Social Policy, 31(2), pp. 216-
240. 
 
Walker, G., and Day, R., 2012. Fuel Poverty as injustice: integrating distribution, recognition 
and procedure in the struggle for affordable warmth Energy Policy 49, pp. 69-75. 
 
Walker, T., 1883. Croydon Water Works report upon the application of the Waste Water 
System for the direction of waste water in Croydon. London: Howard & Jones.  
 
Walters, W. 2012. Governmentality: Critical Encounters. Routledge: London. 
 
Ward, C., 1997. Reflected in water: a crisis of social responsibility. London. Cassell. 
 
Ward, K., 2010. Towards a relational comparative approach to the study of cities, 34(4). Pp. 
471-487. 
 
Water Briefing. 2012. Southern Water at risk of credit rating downgrade Water Briefing 
available online at: http://waterbriefing.org/index.php/home/finance-and-risk/item/5711-
southern-water-at-risk-of-credit-rating-downgrade last accessed 12th May 2012.  
 
Water UK. 2009. Briefing note on “Reduced Flow” (or “Trickle Flow” devices. Available 
online at: http://www.water.org.uk/home/policy/positions/reduced-flow-devices/reduced-
flow-devices.pdf last accessed. 03.03.2012. 
 




Watherston, E., 1876. The Waste Water System (2nd ed). Liverpool: Waste Water Meter 
Company Co Ltd. 
 
Watts, M., 1998, Nature as Artiface and Artifact in Remaking reality: Nature at the 
millennium, eds. B. Braun & N. Castree, London: Routledge, pp. 243-270.  
Wessex Water. 2011. Towards sustainable Water Charging: Interim findings from Wessex 
Water’s trial of alternative charging structures and smart metering.  
 
Wessex Water. 2013. Charges scheme 2013-14. 
 
Wild, J., 2013. Household water bills to rise 3.5% Financial Times available online 
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/82a5c78e-6f74-11e2-b906-00144feab49a.html#axzz2d67i4XVB 
last accessed 26 August 2013.  
 
Wilkins, A., 2013. Libertarian paternalism: policy and everyday translations of the rational 
and the emotional Critical Policy Studies. 7(4), pp. 395-406. 
 
Whatmore, S., 2002. Hybrid Geographies, Natures, Cultures and Spaces. London: Sage.  
 
Whatmore, S., 2009. Mapping knowledge controversies: science, democracy and the 
redistribution of expertise. Progress in Human Geography, 1-12.  
 
White, D., & Wilbert, C., (eds) 2009. Technonatures: Environments, Technologies, Spaces 
and Places in the Twenty- first Century, Ontario: Wilfred Laurier University Press. 
 
Winchester, H., & Rofe. M. 2010, Qualitative research and its place in human geography.In 
Haye, I. (Ed), Qualitative Research Methods in Human Geography. Don Mills: Oxford 
University Press. 
 





World Bank., 2011. PPP in Infrastructure Resources Center: Full divestiture/Privatisation.  
Available online from http://ppp.worldbank.org/public-private-partnership/agreements/full-
divestiture-privatization last accessed 02.02.2011. 
 
Wright, O. 2013. The great Civil Service sell-off: Dozens of services and 75, 000 staff set to 
be transferred to private sector. The Independent. Available online: 
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/the-great-civil-service-selloff-dozens-of-
services-and-75000-staff-set-to-be-transferred-to-private-sector-8598188.html last accessed 
27.06.2013. 
 
Young, D., & Keil, R., 2007. Re-regulating the urban water regime in neoliberal Toronto in 
Heynen N, McCarthy J, Prudham S and Robbins P (eds) False Promises and unnatural 
consequences  NY: Routledge 
 
Yusoff, K., 2011. The Valuation of Nature: The Natural Choice White Paper Radical 
philosophy no. 170, pp. 2-7. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 294 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
